Dumping is defined, basically, as the sale of goods to an export market at a price below that charged for comparable goods in the exporter's home market. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not forbid such action, not even when injurious to the competing domestic industry. However, it has taken the view that dumping constitutes an unfair trade practice. Under GATT, Article VI Contracting Parties (or Members, as they are now termed in the GATT 1994 Agreements) are authorized, as an exception to other GATT obligations, to unilaterally impose antidumping (hereinafter: AD) duties to counteract the effects of dumping. The duties should create a level playing field in which producers all over the world will be able to compete fairly with each other. The principles sound simple and straightforward, yet their application is one of the most contentious topics in international trade law.

The economic coherence of AD rules is controversial. In international trade, price discrimination between national markets is typically made possible when the exporter has a powerful position in the home market and re-exportation to that market is not feasible. In the domestic arena price discrimination is countered by the laws of competition and antitrust. International trade law offers states a very different remedy, that first and foremost protects the competing local industry, regardless of the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of dumping on the market as a whole.

Since the second half of the last century, public international law has been developing rules regulating the restitution of cultural objects removed from occupied territories during armed conflict. Today it is generally recognized that customary international law forbids pillage. The Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict further mandates that artifacts removed from an occupied territory must be returned to the competent authorities of that territory at the close of hostilities. The Arab-Israeli case highlights the problematic side of this solution. Following the Six Day War in 1967, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza strip and the territory known as the “West Bank” came under Israeli control. Israeli archaeologists carried out numerous excavations, and discovered artifacts of special importance to Jewish cultural heritage. It is regrettable that, as a result of the peace treaty with Egypt, these artifacts can no longer be exhibited and appreciated at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, but had to be delivered to Egypt, where they now face an uncertain future. A similar fate may befall the artifacts excavated in the Golan Heights. The Palestinian claim for restitution cannot be based on the Protocol. The Problem is nevertheless the same in all cases; if the artifacts are to be preserved, properly appreciated and made available for purposes of study and research, it may be more appropriate to distribute them among the states by way of compromise and agreement, that will seek to enhance their cultural significance, rather than use the arbitrary sole criterion of the place of discovery.

The author discusses the conflict in Israel between the public interest in archaeological research and the religious convictions that human remains, once buried, should not be touched. The conflict is exacerbated by urban development, which, in this ancient land, necessitates rescue excavations of tombs, thus bringing the problem to a head. The article examines, first, the rules of Jewish law, which, the author contends, have made it possible to accommodate the interests of the living, and, secondly, the scientific value of the archaeological excavation of tombs, using recent examples as illustrations. The author concludes that Jewish law could be interpreted and applied more flexibly and could then be reconciled with Israeli law. However, even if such a development were not to take place, then, in keeping with democratic values, government officials and the courts would be required to follow the policies established by the legislator, a balance between the conflicting interests having already been embodied in the law.

Professor Mestmäcker opened his seminal work on Verwaltung, Konzerngewalt und Recht der Aktionäre with the following citation: “The directors of such [i.e., public] companies … being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own … Without an exclusive privilege they have commonly mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive privilege they have both mismanaged and confined it”.

The Protocol on Economic Relations (hereinafter: Economic Protocol or Protocol), signed between Israel and the PLO, reflects the schizophrenia that afflicts the agreement as a whole. Is it an agreement to separate Israel from the Palestinians, politically and economically, or is it an agreement of cooperation that will bring about an integration of their economies? These questions can hardly be answered before the parties have reached a shared view of the final status. In the meanwhile, the economic interim solution may dictate the political result. The Protocol provisions are not conducive to economic cooperation. Furthermore, its implementation so far raises serious doubts regarding its viability.