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Peace Operations and Global Order. Edited by Alex J. Bellamy
and Paul Williams. New York: Routledge, 2005. 242p. $115.00.
The literature on peace operations has been dominated by case studies
and by efforts to glean policy-relevant lessons in order to improve
ongoing or future peacekeeping operations. More explicitly theoretical
studies that seek to embed such interventions within the broader debates
in international relations or comparative politics are more recent and
less developed. Peace Operations and Global Order contributes to
these debates by bringing insights from critical theory that raise new
questions about how peace operations and the post–Cold War
international system shape one another.
Diaspora groups link processes of globalization to conflicts over identity and territory. Globalization has increased cross-border migration and decreased communication and travel costs, thereby making it easier for migrants to form diaspora networks that build links between the original homeland and current place of residence. Those forced across borders by war commonly have a specific set of traumatic memories and hence create specific types of “conflict-generated diasporas” that sustain and sometimes amplify their strong sense of symbolic attachment to the homeland. “Homeland” is often understood in specific territorial terms where a space from which a group has been forcefully detached assumes a high symbolic value. Globalization has increased rather than decreased this particular type of territorial attachment and thereby shaped the dynamics of certain homeland conflicts.
Conflict-generated diasporas – with their origins in conflict and their identity linked to symbolically important territory – often play critical roles with regard to homeland conflicts. As other scholars have noted, diaspora remittances are key resources to a conflict and often sustain parties engaged in civil war. In addition, and the focus of this research, such diasporas frequently have a particularly important role in framing conflict issues. Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by memories of the trauma tend to be less willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protractedness of conflicts.
The Ethiopian transition, that began with the overthrow of military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in May 1991, formally ended with the swearing in of the newly elected Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia in August 1995. The intervening four years were a contentious time of clashes among rival political forces to determine the rules under which the transition would be conducted and hence which forces would be favoured. The first act of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) after deposing Mengistu was to convene a National Conference and establish a Council of Representatives that initially included a wide array of political groups. The EPRDF led throughout this transitional period and capitalised on its commanding position to consolidate its power. The party dominated the political landscape by virtue of its military power, effective organisation and leadership, and control of the agenda and rules of competition. It structured the transition around new ethnically defined regions, a constitution that emphasised self-determination, and a series of largely uncontested elections.
Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency in November 1963 with a crowded agenda of difficult and challenging issues both at home and abroad. Africa occupied a peripheral position on Johnson's list of priorities, and the president sought to avoid the diversion of attention or resources to the continent. The euphoria and optimism of the early 1960s as dozens of new states achieved independence, ready to play an important role in John Kennedy's New Frontier, had faded. From Johnson's perspective, Africa was best kept on the back burner, handled by the State Department bureaucracy or ignored as much as possible. Africa was the farthest corner of the world to Johnson, the place to threaten to send indiscreet officials who drew his ire. The Great Society at home, the obsession with fighting the war in Vietnam, and other more important areas of the world all deserved and received greater attention. As one official put it, Africa was “the last issue considered, the first aid budget cut.” Only occasionally – such as when the Congo threatened to erupt into a major crisis in 1964, when African issues required a decision at the United Nations, or when domestic interest groups generated enough attention to make an issue salient – did Johnson have to face decisions regarding the continent. Otherwise, the administration successfully kept Africa off the agenda.