In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining under the UNCLOS Regime,” Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Andrew P. Owsiak examine the extent to which legalization and judicialization of the law of the sea has changed how states manage conflicts. They argue that legalization and judicialization have diminished maritime conflict because disputing parties are able to predict how a court would rule and, therefore, they will be more likely to bargain out-of-court to achieve more favorable outcomes. Their analysis suggests that how adjudicators perform as dispute resolution bodies is basically irrelevant. Drawing on the literature on the performance of international courts, this essay identifies numerous ways that the contribution of international courts to the resolution of disputes is contingent on key performance criteria, including legal clarification and compliance. When international courts perform at their best, judicialization enhances the impact of legalization. If performance is a contingent feature of international adjudication, then the generalizability of Mitchell and Owsiak's argument might be limited by the extent to which adjudicators achieve certain key performance criteria.
