In recent years, the international community has worked to confront the large and growing threat of terrorism, including by introducing new counterterrorism (CT) measures and tightening existing ones. These measures take many forms, including international, regional and domestic sanctions against individuals, groups and other entities. Such efforts pursue the legitimate aims of security and international peace – things that terrorism undermines and goes against – but they have, at the same time, implicated a degree of overlap and confusion between international humanitarian law (IHL), on the one hand, and the law and policy framework underwriting CT measures and sanctions regimes, on the other, particularly as both apply to and affect principled humanitarian action. This article addresses this area of overlap and confusion. First, it examines the applicability of IHL to CT measures and operations. Next, it addresses the co-application of IHL, CT regulations and sanctions regimes, from the mindset of preserving IHL without impeding CT measures and their objectives. The article then examines the legal questions that arise when sanctions regimes and CT measures affect IHL-mandated and IHL-protected activities undertaken by impartial humanitarian organizations. Finally, the article analyzes recent developments and makes proposals aimed at preserving an effective humanitarian space in contexts where IHL, CT legal frameworks and sanctions apply simultaneously.

This article looks at the legal position of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on situations in which a State, a coalition of States or an international or regional organization intervenes in a pre-existing armed conflict, either giving support to one of the parties or exercising control over a non-State armed group party to the armed conflict (hereafter “non-State party”). For the purposes of this article, foreign intervention is considered to be a form of “co-belligerency” of such a degree that it makes the intervening power a party to the armed conflict. Situations in which there is no objective link between the foreign intervention in the territory of a third State and a pre-existing armed conflict in that same territory are therefore excluded from the scope of this article.

The aim of this article is to describe how the ICRC determines the applicability of international humanitarian law to such situations, based on the existing law and an approach that examines each bilateral relationship between belligerents separately.

The article also explains why the ICRC abandons the use of the term “internationalized internal armed conflict”, which is misleading in that it suggests that only the law of international armed conflict applies. The ICRC is therefore using new terminology for the legal classification of such situations; this change is intended to align the terminology used with the realities of the applicable law.

The multifaceted nature of peace operations today and the increasingly violent environments in which their personnel operate increase the likelihood of their being called upon to use force. It thus becomes all the more important to understand when and how international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to their action. This article attempts to clarify the conditions for IHL applicability to multinational forces, the extent to which this body of law applies to peace operations, the determination of the parties to a conflict involving a multinational peace operation and the classification of such conflict. Finally, it tackles the important question of the personal, temporal and geographical scope of IHL in peace operations.

A review of the different occupation situations evidences that these situations are characterized by a poor record of compliance with the law of occupation. The international humanitarian law (IHL) conventional enforcement mechanisms have not been activated and compliance with the law has almost exclusively relied upon judicial processes. However, since enforcement of IHL through adjudication operates mainly under the principles of criminal individual responsibility, this course of action has been of little relevance for occupation law insofar as the latter contains only few provisions the violations of which amount to graves breaches of IHL or other serious violations thereof. Disrespect for occupation law barely gives rise to criminal proceedings and therefore excessive focus on the latter procedures constitutes an impediment to the effective enforcement of this corpus juris. In addition, actual IHL mechanisms designed to induce compliance with occupation law do not allow for the appropriate control of the administrative and legislative acts of the occupant. In light of the contemporay forms of occupation and the tendency to broadly interpret the powers conferred on the occupant by IHL, administrative and legislative acts of the occupant should not be left without legal review. The present Article investigates the role and legal entitlement of different domestic courts in this respect after having previously examined the obstacles to exercise of jurisdiction by domestic courts with regard to the measures undertaken by the occupant within the framework of Article 43 of The Hague Regulations of 1907. The author argues that, despite their usefulness, domestic courts do not actually provide an appropriate course of action for legal review of the administrative and legislative measures promulgated by the occupying power.

International humanitarian law (IHL) does not provide a precise definition of the notion of occupation, nor does it propose clear-cut standards for determining when an occupation starts and when its ends. This article analyses in detail the notion of occupation under IHL and its constitutive elements, and sets out a legal test for identifying when a situation qualifies as an occupation for the purposes of IHL. It concludes by suggesting an adjustment of the legal test to the specific characteristics of occupation by proxy and occupation by multinational forces.

Like other international organizations, the European Union has progressively included an «international humanitarian law» dimension in the policies it intends to pursue in its international relations. Initially focused on human rights, the regional European organization has taken the convergence between the various legal instruments for the protection of the individual into account. Today it no longer regards international humanitarian law as an alternative, hut as a useful complement to be applied within its foreign and common security policy. At first concentrated in its basic policy statement that law now features in all legal instruments at the organization's disposal to act in accordance with its international vocation. This new reference thus highlights the European Union's role not only in disseminating the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and promoting respect for them, but also in ensuring that the rules of international humanitarian law progress and become adapted to new forms of conflict.