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The COVID‐19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer‐term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID‐19‐specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID‐19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania – two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear – a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID‐19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right‐wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID‐19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand‐side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.
The Element identifies the logic of how the European Union (EU) has developed both in terms of the way the organization works and the way it has expanded to include new member states. It combines insights from the economic theories related to clubs and common-pool resources. The argument is that the EU may have started as a club, where members agreed to lose arrangements to generate and govern non-rivalrous goods from which only they could benefit, but it quickly evolved into a system of common-pool resources, where members have to manage rivalrous goods, the access to which cannot easily be refused to outsiders. That evolution was necessary to avoid the depletion of the goods EU member states depend on. The argument is illustrated through the evolution of the single market, the single currency, the single financial space, and security. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The biggest issue confronting Europe today is moving forwards with the EU project. Studies focusing on the EU as well as public discourse concentrate disproportionately on the flaws of this supranational construct, giving the impression of constant crisis. This incentivizes the counterfactual reasoning that post-World War II social and economic progress would have been possible in the absence of the EU. What is worrying about our present situation is not the increased fragmentation of views on what Europe could become but the growing acceptance (and increasing familiarity) of things as they have always been. EU integration is a simultaneous process of creation and destruction that slowly erases the sovereignty of the nation state. This rattled the old European order and is met with resistance from the nation state. And yet twenty-first-century challenges cannot be addressed with nineteenth-century institutions, meaning nation states first and foremost. An increasingly complex global environment presses to stride forwards with the remodeling of the European institutional system.
The new prominence of the EU in political discourse seems to suggest that this is a project in peril of disintegration. The argument is that building a monetary system that makes sense in Finland just as much as it would in Greece is too difficult. It is that rule of law means different things in Hungary and in the Netherlands. And it is that “Russian connections” spell gas pipelines in Germany and existential threats in Estonia. However, the need to give some kind of unifying meaning to rules and concepts was always inevitable. It is fanciful to assume that there would be no resistance from national and local interpretations to unifying European rules. “Building Europe” can only happen at the expense of national sovereignty. Much like the popular movie line from Highlander: in the end, there can be only one. Either the EU or the nation state will predominate. My goal here is to sketch the opportunities for a more solidified EU offered by current challenges.
Embrace coalition building
The May 2019 European Parliament elections gave the EU a more fragmented legislative body. The center-right European People's Party (EPP) and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost their combined majority for the first time even if they remain the two largest parties.
Previous studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we empirically analyse the pay-offs given to support parties under minority governments. We argue that the content of support agreements is conditioned by support party type. Results are based on a two-stage empirical investigation: a text analysis of 10 explicit support arrangements for minority governments in Romania and a within-case comparison of two Romanian minority cabinets with different support arrangements. We employ an original data set of support agreements and elite interviews with former minority cabinet members. We empirically confirm that ethno-regional parties are mostly policy-seeking and target benefits for their specific groups. In contrast, mainstream parties make stronger claims for office distribution. The analysis challenges the widespread understanding that all support parties are mostly policy-seeking.
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