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The formalization of modal notions as predicates is discussed and defended. While it is widely accepted that truth is a predicate, necessity, apriority, knowledge, and so on are standardly formalized as sentential modal operators of standard modal logic.
Possible-worlds semantics for modal predicates is explained. Ill-foundedness rather than circularity is shown to be the source of most paradoxes. The central status of Löb’s theorem is established.
The logical notation is fixed; and some standard topics are reviewed that less experienced readers might not have seen, such as function symbols or many-sorted logic.
This chapter contains some paradoxes that arise without any syntax theory. It sheds some light on how Russell’s paradox and the liar paradox are connected.
Some simple applications of the diagonal lemma are given. Many of the well-known paradoxes (liar, Montague’s, Yablo’s, Curry’s paradoxes, Tarski’s theorem) are presented.
A more expressive axiomatic theory of syntax is presented. It is shown that this theory generalises the theory of chapter 5 and allows the derivation of many natural properties of syntax.
It is investigated what it means for formulae of the syntax to express informal concepts. The Gödel incompleteness theorems and related results are proved for the syntax theory.
Truth, provability, necessity, and other concepts are fundamental to many branches of philosophy, mathematics, computer science, and linguistics. Their study has led to some of the most celebrated achievements in logic, such as Gödel's incompleteness theorems, Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth, and numerous accounts of the paradoxes associated with these concepts. This book provides a clear and direct introduction to the theory of paradoxes and the Gödel incompleteness theorems. It offers new analyses of the ideas of self-reference, circularity, and the semantic paradoxes, and helps readers to see both how paradoxes arise and what their common features are. It will be valuable for students and researchers with a minimal background in logic and will equip them to understand and discuss a wide variety of topics in philosophical logic.
We introduce and analyze a new axiomatic theory $\mathsf {CD}$ of truth. The primitive truth predicate can be applied to sentences containing the truth predicate. The theory is thoroughly classical in the sense that $\mathsf {CD}$ is not only formulated in classical logic, but that the axiomatized notion of truth itself is classical: The truth predicate commutes with all quantifiers and connectives, and thus the theory proves that there are no truth value gaps or gluts. To avoid inconsistency, the instances of the T-schema are restricted to determinate sentences. Determinateness is introduced as a further primitive predicate and axiomatized. The semantics and proof theory of $\mathsf {CD}$ are analyzed.