Animals under human care are exposed to a potentially large range of both familiar and unfamiliar humans. Human-animal interactions vary across settings, and individuals, with the nature of the interaction being affected by a suite of different intrinsic and extrinsic factors. These interactions can be described as positive, negative or neutral. Across some industries, there has been a move towards the development of technologies to support or replace human interactions with animals. Whilst this has many benefits, there can also be challenges associated with increased technology use. A day-long Animal Welfare Research Network workshop was hosted at Harper Adams University, UK, with the aim of bringing together stakeholders and researchers (n = 38) from the companion, farm and zoo animal fields, to discuss benefits, challenges and limitations of human-animal interactions and machine-animal interactions for animals under human care and create a list of future research priorities. The workshop consisted of four talks from experts within these areas, followed by break-out room discussions. This work is the outcome of that workshop. The key recommendations are that approaches to advancing the scientific discipline of machine-animal interactions in animals under human care should focus on: (1) interdisciplinary collaboration; (2) development of validated methods; (3) incorporation of an animal-centred perspective; (4) a focus on promotion of positive animal welfare states (not just avoidance of negative states); and (5) an exploration of ways that machines can support a reduction in the exposure of animals to negative human-animal interactions to reduce negative, and increase positive, experiences for animals.

While mentors can learn general strategies for effective mentoring, existing mentorship curricula do not comprehensively address how to support marginalized mentees, including LGBTQIA+ mentees. After identifying best mentoring practices and existing evidence-based curricula, we adapted these to create the Harvard Sexual and Gender Minority Health Mentoring Program. The primary goal was to address the needs of underrepresented health professionals in two overlapping groups: (1) LGBTQIA+ mentees and (2) any mentees focused on LGBTQIA+ health. An inaugural cohort (N = 12) of early-, mid-, and late-career faculty piloted this curriculum in spring 2022 during six 90-minute sessions. We evaluated the program using confidential surveys after each session and at the program’s conclusion as well as with focus groups. Faculty were highly satisfied with the program and reported skill gains and behavioral changes. Our findings suggest this novel curriculum can effectively prepare mentors to support mentees with identities different from their own; the whole curriculum, or parts, could be integrated into other trainings to enhance inclusive mentoring. Our adaptations are also a model for how mentorship curricula can be tailored to a particular focus (i.e., LGBTQIA+ health). Ideally, such mentor trainings can help create more inclusive environments throughout academic medicine.

Defining death as irreversible cardio-circulatory arrest connects death with ability to resuscitate, raises ethical issues about heart-transplants, and tells us rather when death occurs than what it is. I consider whether death is ceasing to exist, whether immortality is natural for human beings, and whether spatio-temporal continuity is necessary for being the same person. That immortality is natural is alien to Jewish thinking in the Bible, where the idea of existence after death developed only with that of God's transcendent existence. Plato's definition of death as the separate existence of soul and body is grounded on his analysis of intelligence. Christian philosophers now accept that intelligence evolved out of sentience and sentience out of inanimate matter; so they may prefer the Jewish view that existence after death is a gift from God dependent on faith; Aquinas perhaps thought faith stands to natural intelligence much as natural intelligence stands to sentience.

I say briefly what the Catholic Church now teaches about Purgatory. I offer an account of time which allows the purgatorial process to be genuinely temporal, but not precisely quantifiable or temporally relatable to processes and events in our space-time. I examine ancient, Enlightenment and modern notions of punishment, connect them with a theory of the relation of right and wrong to law and with the conception of a faculty of will, and argue that purgatorial process need not be considered punitive. I suggest it might consist in coming to share God's divine knowledge, and consider how prayers for the dead might help them.

Why do some philosophers (Nagel, McGinn, Chomsky), despite all we know about evolution and embryology, think that consciousness makes the mind-body relation a problem still unsolved and perhaps insoluble by those with human brains? They ask how consciousness arises in matter, not in living organisms, whereas non-philosophers ask how far down the ladder of life it extends and when it arises in individuals of sentient and intelligent species. They desire the privacy of Locke's closet, furnished with phenomenological properties; and besides replacing Aristotle's ‘folk’ conception of causation by Hume's, they mathematicise physical explanation in line with Newton's First Law of Motion. Non-philosophers operate with ‘vague’ concepts of life, sentience and intelligence which allow them to treat these things as truly and naturally emergent. Machines that perform intelligent tasks are no more conscious of the reasons for their movements than actors performing them on the stage.

Recent studies have highlighted that illegal activities occurring within protected areas, including the poaching of fauna and flora, cannot be addressed with increased law enforcement alone. Moreover, research on the increasingly militarized nature of front-line conservation efforts has pointed to potentially detrimental aspects of such approaches. This has led to a shift in focus to identifying ways to further engage local communities in the prevention and reduction of wildlife crimes. However, few studies have examined the potential for changing the responsibilities of front-line conservation personnel or their views on such changes. Such insight is vital in forecasting the successful adoption of, or possible resistance towards, a more community-oriented policy. We examined rangers’ perceptions in Uganda to assess their attitudes towards traditional enforcement strategies and alternative, non-enforcement approaches for reducing illegal activities in protected areas. Our findings suggest that although respondents believed that traditional enforcement strategies (e.g. foot patrols) are important and effective in reducing wildlife crime, these strategies on their own were insufficient to address illegal activities. Study participants emphasized the importance of expanding the role of front-line rangers, in line with approaches suggested in the policing literature. We discuss the implications of our findings for transdisciplinary conservation science research and front-line conservation policy and practice.

After (1) a brief introduction I (2) compare accounts of what it is to say something I find in Plato, Frege and Grice, and I distinguish linguistic from practical meaning and words that signify things from ‘syncategorematic’ or ‘grammatical’ words. I then (3) argue that the relation between a signifying word and what it signifies must be understood in terms of two complementary acts, already recognised in antiquity, quantifying and predicating. Discussing quantification (4), I show how problems about universals can be avoided by accepting Aristotle's distinction between possible and actual existence. Discussing predication (5), I defend Aristotle's view that there are more forms of predication than one, and consider this issue in connection with non-mathematical discourse.

I distinguish temptation to do what we think we shouldn't, temptation not to do what we think we should, and the difficulties we experience in customary religious practices like prayer. I ask whether temptation requires a tempter, also whether the phenomena we call ‘weakness of will’ can be explained without postulating a non‐cognitive faculty of will. I look at Plato's claim that training the emotions is the main function of education. Finally I consider how obstacles to prayer can be understood consistently with seeing a continuous development from the natural to the supernatural.

Our paradigm for religion is Christianity, which appeared as a sub-society, the culture of which differed both from Jewish culture and from that of the Greeks and Romans. Human beings are essentially social, depending upon society for all rational thought and activity. As social beings we live with regard to customs we think good on the whole. Customs are rationalised by theoretical and moral beliefs. They contrast with nature and also with convention and habit. Religions, like families, are societies intermediate between individuals and states. So-called secular values concern the same things as religious and have comparable practical consequences.

The Catholic Church claims that its ethical teaching, especially on sex, is based upon natural law. I first show that natural law theories prior to the Middle Ages provide no authority for the Church's teaching on sex. I then examine Aquinas's teaching on natural functions and natural law in the two Summae. I suggest that he partly anticipates Enlightenment thinking about law and morals. I compare his theory of natural law with that of Germain Grisez and John Finnis. Finally, I examine the notion of a principle of practical reasoning and indicate how such principles could be formulated to correspond to elements in human nature.

By ‘atomism’ I mean the idea, applicable in various fields, that explanation proceeds from small to large and part to whole. A theological atomist would see the salvation of mankind as the sum of the salvations of individuals and try to understand the Incarnation, the Last Supper, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection and the Ascension as successive episodes each making its own separate contribution. I argue that we are essentially social beings, and infer that God can communicate with us, and we can be united with him, only as forming a society. More controversially, I suggest that the Son of God became incarnate primarily in a society, and saved it by turning it into a single supernatural organism, living with divine life.

I (1) outline two accounts the Catholic Church gives of the human soul, calling them the Lateran and the Vienne doctrines, and (2) argue they are inconsistent. (3) I run over several difficulties in the more popular Lateran doctrine. (4) I look at three uses to which Catholics might want to put a theory of the soul, and question whether either of the theories on offer can meet their needs. (5) I distinguish the Biblical idea of resurrection from the Greek idea of immortality. Finally (6) I commend the Vienne doctrine as philosophy but advise supplementing it with a view of creation, salvation and sanctification as forming a continuum rather than a discontinuous series of episodes.

What sort of right is the right to life? Does it make sense to speak of a right to die, or to be allowed to die, or to be helped to die, or to die with dignity? Are life and death straightforward alternatives? Are they possible objects of desire or aversion? Can they be given as gifts? If life is a gift, have recipients of it a duty to be grateful? Answers to these questions are obtained by philosophical analysis, chiefly of the concepts of life and death.

The paper presents goodness and truth as analogous formal concepts. I first argue that saying something is true of something and saying it is false of it are basic ways of speaking truly or falsely. I then consider thinking a property a good one for something to acquire and thinking it a bad, equate this with having something as a positive or negative objective, an object of desire or aversion, and argue that these are basic ways of thinking rightly or wrongly. Finally I discuss the notions of a way of speaking or thinking, making special reference to Frege’s ‘Negation’ and ‘The Thought.’