According to the “miracle of aggregation” principle, in the absence of systematic biases, errors in individual judgments within a population should cancel each other out and lead to a correct decision at the aggregate level. This article explores potential individual- and group-level correlates of the accuracy of citizens’ electoral expectations and investigates how potential markers of political sophistication—namely, educational attainment and political interest—could be used to improve upon the raw aggregation of citizens’ forecasts using massive survey datasets collected during six Canadian national and provincial election campaigns between 2011 and 2022 (n = 279,003). We find that while educational attainment and interest increase the probability of a correct forecast at the individual level, delegating the forecasting task based on these variables does not necessarily lead to improvements in the accuracy of aggregate-level predictions. At the group level, we fail to uncover any evidence that sociological or informational diversity increases forecasting accuracy.

Every four years, numerous election-forecasting models attempt to predict the results of the US presidential election. Regardless of the stability of any election system, such as the bipartisan system in the United States, conditions can arise (e.g., candidate resignations) that negatively impact forecasters’ ability to predict electoral outcomes. Citizen forecasting—that is, directly asking respondents who they think will win an election—has a long track record of successfully predicting presidential elections. This study proposes adapting a citizen forecasting measure originally intended for use in multiparty systems to predict the US presidential election in 2024. Using this measure, we created a forecast of the national-level popular vote and vote-share forecasts for seven swing states.

Secularism—i.e., the separation between the state and religious institutions—is a fundamental characteristic of liberal democracies, yet support for secular arrangements varies significantly across Western countries. In Canada, such attitudinal divergences are observable at the regional level, with citizens from Quebec displaying higher levels of support for secularism than other Canadians. In this paper, we test three hypotheses to account for this regional discrepancy: religiosity, liberal values, and out-group prejudice. Using data from an online panel survey (n = 2,000), our findings suggest that support for secularism in Quebec is mostly explained by the province's lower baseline levels of religiosity, anticlerical feelings, and by its distinctive understanding of liberalism. These factors are likely to result from Quebec's unique religious and sociohistorical history. Results also suggest that while negative feelings toward religious minorities are positively correlated with support for secularism across the entire country, negative feelings toward ethnic minorities are associated with lower support for secularism in Quebec. These findings disprove the commonly held assumption according to which support for secularism is driven by ethnic prejudice in Quebec.

This article investigates the relationship between partisan foreign policy positions on Israel and the voting behavior of religious minorities in Canada. It discusses Stephen Harper's strong pro-Israeli stance in foreign policy when the Conservatives were in power and focuses on two main explanations accounting for such politicization of Israel, namely moral obligations and political clientelism. These hypotheses are tested using the 1968–2015 Canadian Election Study (CES) surveys and the 2011–2015 Vox Pop Labs election data. The results suggest that the Israeli issue had an impact on the support for the Conservatives among voters from religious minorities. Considering the effect of this foreign policy positions, Jewish Canadians are shown to be more supportive of the Conservatives, while the opposite pattern is observed among Muslim Canadians. The implications of these findings are then discussed.

Depuis un an, le Parti conservateur du Québec (PCQ) a fait des gains considérables dans les sondages d'intention de vote. Le parti peut-il encore faire des gains ou a-t-il atteint son plein potentiel? Dans cette note de recherche, nous tentons de répondre à cette question en utilisant un nouvel indicateur, l'index relatif de confiance (IRC), qui permet de mesurer le potentiel de croissance et la solidité du vote des partis.

Cette note de recherche a deux objectifs. Premièrement, nous présentons l'index relatif de confiance (IRC), une nouvelle mesure du potentiel de croissance et de la solidité du vote basée sur la probabilité exprimée par les électeurs de voter pour l'ensemble des partis dans leur circonscription. Nous nous penchons en détail sur les avantages de l'IRC et montrons qu'il permet d’évaluer le potentiel de croissance et la solidité du vote des partis politiques au niveau des circonscriptions et au niveau provincial. Deuxièmement, nous appliquons cet index au cas du Parti québécois à l'aide d’échantillons de grandes tailles récoltés pendant les campagnes électorales québécoises de 2012, 2014, et 2018. Cela nous permet d'illustrer et de tirer des constats sur le potentiel de croissance du Parti québécois.

The current COVID-19 crisis is unprecedented in recent history. On April 1, 2020, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, warned that the world was facing the most challenging crisis since World War II (Associated Press, 2020). With the pandemic taking on an unprecedented magnitude in the twenty-first century, it quickly monopolized media attention. As of early April, Radar+'s large dataset showed that about 65 per cent of headlines on major Canadian media websites were related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the last decade, text-analytic methods have become a fundamental element of a political researcher’s toolkit. Today, text analysis is taught in most major universities; many have entire courses dedicated to the topic. This article offers a systematic review of 45 syllabi of text-analysis courses around the world. From these syllabi, we extracted data that allowed us to rank canonical sources and discuss the variety of software used in teaching. Furthermore, we argue that our empirical method for building a text-analysis syllabus could easily be extended to syllabi for other courses. For instance, scholars can use our technique to introduce their graduate students to the field of systematic reviews while improving the quality of their syllabi.

Words matter in politics. The rhetoric that political elites employ structures civic discourse. The emergence of social media platforms as a medium of politics has enabled ordinary citizens to express their ideological inclinations by adopting the lexicon of political elites. This avails to researchers a rich new source of data in the study of political ideology. However, existing ideological text-scaling methods fail to produce meaningful inferences when applied to the short, informal style of textual content that is characteristic of social media platforms such as Twitter. This paper introduces the first viable approach to the estimation of individual-level ideological positions derived from social media content. This method allows us to position social media users—be they political elites, parties, or citizens—along a shared ideological dimension. We validate the proposed method by demonstrating correlation with existing measures of ideology across various political contexts and multiple languages. We further demonstrate the ability of ideological estimates to capture derivative signal by predicting out-of-sample, individual-level voting intentions. We posit that social media data can, when properly modeled, better capture derivative signal than discrete scales used in more traditional survey instruments.

There is an inherent conflict between the political marketing model of humans and pioneering theories in electoral behavior research. While political marketing logic implies an issue-based and highly volatile voting behavior, voting theories conventionally assume that positional issues have little effect on how individuals vote, and so parties have little incentive to develop issue-based electoral strategies. However, few people would challenge the role that marketing now plays in the modern campaign process. How can we reconcile these theories? This paper revisits the role and impact of positional issues on voting behavior by testing whether specific issues affect different subgroups of voters as contended by the ‘issue-public’ theory. The results show that previous models underestimate issue voting. Once measurement accuracy is improved and the salience-based heterogeneity of issue effects is taken into consideration, positional issues have non-negligible effects on individual vote choice. Furthermore, salience-based heterogeneity is shown to explain better the variation in issue voting than heterogeneity based on political sophistication.

The use of negative political communication is a predominant characteristic of modern politics. However, literature doesn't provide an answer to the following question: what explains fluctuations in the use of negative messages within political organisations during a given political campaign? The present paper examines this question in the context of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Data consists of all tweets distributed by the official Twitter account of both campaign organisations (@YesScotland and @UK_Together) between June 16, 2014 and September 17, 2014. Results are obtained by a non-parametric local regression and by time-series regression analyses. Our model demonstrates that having an advance in the polls had a statistically significant influence on the tweet sentiment of at least one organisation during the referendum campaign: Better Together's messages were more negative when it was ahead in the polls. Meanwhile, Yes Scotland's messages were more negative after each of the leaders' debates.

This article endeavours to explain why English Canadians and Quebeckers differ in their opinions about private healthcare options. Data indicates that respondents in the nine predominantly English-speaking provinces are more likely to oppose private hospitals than Quebeckers. No one province or region in “English Canada” drives these results: aversion to private hospitals is consistent across the nine provinces. Research on welfare states slots Canada into the “liberal” category, which is indicative of a preference for market solutions to welfare problems, which makes this finding perplexing. The argument presented here is that universal healthcare has become bound up with the national identity of English Canada, resulting in a general aversion to private healthcare initiatives outside of Quebec.