The fighting stopped in 1975 with Hanois victory. But the battle for the hearts and minds of the American people continued and was propelled by politicians manipulating the mythical cause of POWs/MIAs. Postwar movies filled out the scenario of a war lost because of poor leadership in Washington combined with the baleful influence of the anti-war movement. Presidents wrestled with the legacy of Vietnam, including the controversy over the national Vietnam Memorial. Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter both attempted to move the nation beyond the grasp of the Vietnam Specter. Both failed. Ronald Reagan used it to help him win the presidency in 1980, after the debacle that followed the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran, which only seemed to emphasize the nations lost claims to world leadership after Vietnam. George H. W. Bush claimed that it had been buried in the sands of Iraq after the rapid victory in Gulf War I. Bill Clinton succeeded in establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Vietnam. But it re-emerged with renewed force during the Second Gulf War and the never-ending war in Afghanistan. Even today it shapes much thinking about military interventionism.

Iraq’s brutal leader Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf regions for two decades. Soon after coming to power he went to war against Iran in 1980. The eight-year war drained both countries of lives and funds. In search of additional oil wealth, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 to replenish its treasury. President Bush ultimately decided to go to war to repel the Iraqi troops. He forged a multi-national, United Nations–backed coalition and won US congressional approval to expel Hussein’s Republican Guards. The Persian Gulf War featured advanced technological weaponry that utterly vanquished the Iraqi forces as in a Nintendo videogame. The short war contributed to the notion of a Revolution in Military Affairs that promised America easy victories. RMA proved to be no silver bullet against insurgents. The war deepened the Pentagon’s involvement in the Middle East. To protect the rebellious Kurds within Iraq, it established no-fly zones with airpower, which rained down missiles on Iraqi air defenses. This de facto war in the time of peace represented a new version of armed diplomacy. Critically, it set a precedent for future use of aerial drones (pilot-less aircraft) to strike at Islamist militants within countries not at war with the United States.

This chapter chronicles military incursions on behalf of humanity into Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans twice to feed the starving, restore democracy, and rescue populations from annihilation. These altruistic missions, known as “military operations other than war,” or MOOTW (pronounced as “moot-wah”) were viewed skeptically by the traditionally minded Pentagon brass. They regarded MOOTW as a diversion from real soldiering. But troops died in them. George H. W. Bush committed US forces, under United Nations auspices, to Somalia so as to distribute food to the starving Somalis in their volatile and violent land. This humanitarian mission led to a bloody skirmish in Mogadishu during William J. Clinton’s presidency that politically humiliated America. Also in 1993, a military junta in Haiti ousted the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide. When desperate Haitians landed on American beaches, Clinton tried sanctions to restore Aristide. Then he militarily invaded the Caribbean nation to put defrocked Catholic priest back in power. Sobered by the “Mog” firefight, Clinton refused to help halt the bloodbath in Rwanda. He could not avoid the raging war in the Balkans to rescue Bosnian Muslims from Serbia in the worst conflict since World War II. In 1995, Washington corralled Britain, France, and other NATO members into bombing the Serbs and then occupying Bosnia to preserve the peace. Next, the tiny Muslim-dominated province of Kosovo erupted against its Serb overlords. A three-month sustained bombing campaign compelled Serbia to surrender.

With the Iran–Iraq conflict and the Cold War coming to an end, the US–Iran relationship appeared to warm as each country no longer faced the existential threats that had once consumed them. With the death of Khomeini, Iran also found itself at a crucial juncture as more pragmatic figures came to the fore. The ascent of new leadership marked a more pragmatic turn for Iran. Meanwhile, in the US, George H.W. Bush attempted to usher the US into the post–Cold War world, and seemed more eager than his predecessor to engage with Iran. Time would not be on his side, however, and other priorities – especially the revolutions in Eastern Europe and Operation Desert Storm – distracted Bush from making any significant steps toward rapprochement. His successor, Bill Clinton, did nothing to better the relationship in his first term, but with the surprise election of the reformist Mohammad Khatami the two rival nations began warming to the prospect of serious engagement. Despite some initial gestures and successful Track II diplomatic exchanges, however, time and expectations again would become factors and the decade would close without concrete agreements.