The Introduction sets out the main analytical framework to probe a transregional formation of Arabic learning. Building on a rich historiography of the Indian Ocean world and its various regions it formulates an approach to studying mobile manuscripts with a view to exploring the shared social and cultural histories of learned communities. It discusses ‘mobilities’ as the potential of manuscripts to move around and ‘histories of circulation’ as actualised or ‘enacted’ movement among scribes, readers, and owners of manuscripts. In particular, it engages with the concepts of ‘enactment’ to study social and cultural mobilities of manuscripts and ‘entanglement’ to plot these mobilities on a transoceanic field of Arabic learning. Arabic philology takes centre stage in this study and represents a diverse and many-sided field of Arabic learning. Manuscript collections which form the empirical basis of the research are delineated and discussed.

The concluding chapter synthesises the findings from the previous chapters to argue for a cultural integration of the western Indian Ocean through transoceanic mobilities of Arabic learning. It explores the many historical, social, and cultural aspects of Arabic learning based on those findings. Building on recent scholarship it reflects on how transoceanic histories of Arabic learning relate to histories of maritime trade in this period. It considers the importance of locating Arabic as a ‘cosmopolitan idiom of learning’ in early modern multilingual South Asia that shared many social, cultural, and political contexts with other languages.

With reference to the ethos of the ‘neoliberal turn’ in education, the chapter critically analyses and interprets English Medium Instruction (EMI) in South Asia as it is promoted exogenously and realised at the grassroots level endogenously. The chapter identifies in what ways EMI creates unequal opportunities for people from different socioeconomic, educational, demographic, and indigenous backgrounds and consequently results in discrimination and social injustice in South Asian contexts. The chapter also shows that EMI policies and practices indicate a strong presence of monolingual biases, ideologies, and negative attitudes towards mother tongues and indigenous languages. In addition, colonialism rearticulated in neoliberal higher education promotes the English language. In the end, the chapter suggests that a more context-driven, rational, synchronised, and holistic approach to EMI is needed to decolonise and liberate EMI policies and establish linguistic equality, language rights, and social justice in South Asia.

This chapter introduces the phenomenon of party violence, discusses the scope conditions and central arguments of the book, and offers a methodological justification for the distinct cross-regional comparison of Kenya and India. It also details the multiple data sources used to develop the book’s main claims as well as the subnational research sites investigated in both countries. Substantively, the chapter holds that party instability is an underappreciated factor in the broader instrumentalist literature on elites’ decision-making about conflict. It argues that instability matters because it can make the deployment of violence less costly and risky for politicians and thereby incentivize the production of recurring and severe conflict.

This chapter traces political party development in Kenya and India from a comparative and historical perspective. It shows that despite many shared experiences as British colonies, nationalist parties with transoceanic connections to one another, and dominant party structures that endured for several years after independence, party development in the two countries took very different routes in the medium and long terms. In Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) emerged as a narrow, divisive, and ethnically oriented party. By contrast, the Indian National Congress (INC) developed deep societal roots, penetrated rural areas, and sought to unite Indians across caste and ethnic divides. These divergent trajectories influenced the development of new party entrants and generated differing incentive structures for instrumentalizing party violence in the two countries.

This chapter illustrates the relationship between politicians, parties, and communal conflict in India from the 1950s through the late 1980s. Combining national-level violence and volatility data with in-depth qualitative interviews, it shows that the weakening and decline of the Indian National Congress (INC) in the late 1970s spurred an escalation of riot violence across many parts of the country through the 1980s. Since then, however, severe riots have dramatically declined in India, as party stabilization has rendered the risks of provoking such violence prohibitive for many political parties. However, other forms of conflict – including rural clashes and targeted low-level attacks against Muslims – have escalated in recent years under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The chapter suggests that these newer modalities of conflict are part of the same recalibrated elite strategies that have contributed to declines in communal riots across India.

This chapter offers a subnational accounting of patterns of riot violence in Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and Meerut in Uttar Pradesh. It shows that much like at the national level, these cities fell prey to repeated and severe riots when soaring party instability incentivized conflict on the part of both Congress elites as well as politicians from its emerging electoral rivals. However, following the restoration of relative party stability in the late 1980s, both Hyderabad and Meerut have witnessed communal quiescence. The chapter further shows that this quiescence is due to the fact that elites are keen to avoid sanctioning from voters for engaging in conflict.

Many of the unofficial advocates for states-in-waiting were individuals affiliated or identified with the international peace movement. These transnational advocates often found themselves championing independence struggles in states-in-waiting that were situated within newly decolonized postcolonial nation-states. While some within these postcolonial state governments may themselves have relied on these advocates during their own independence struggles, they opposed such advocacy after they won their independence, since it had the potential to undermine their own state sovereignty. The 1963 Friendship March – launched by the World Peace Brigade, a transnational civil society organization set up to find peaceful solutions to global decolonization, exemplified this contradiction. The Friendship March started in New Delhi, India, and intended to cross the Chinese border in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Canberra’s foreign policy orientation has shifted inexorably towards the Asia-Pacific region over the last quarter century. Into the 1970s, Australia viewed itself as in, but not of, Asia. The demise of ’White Australia’ notwithstanding, Canberra remained the capital of a far-flung European outpost. Today, that geopolitical identity seems quaintly archaic. Australia is unambiguously an Asia-Pacific country. Its chief trading partner is Japan; its main ally is the United States; and its strategic analysts’ main focuses are Indonesia and China. Within this broader regional context, Canberra considers North-East Asia, South-East Asia, and the South Pacific as sub-regions of particular concern for Australian foreign and defence policy. But what about South Asia, an area conventionally defined as encompassing India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives, and Bhutan? What role do these countries play in Australia’s international relations? Do Australian policy-makers perceive them as important? Have Canberra’s links with the subcontinent traditionally been characterised by amity or enmity? What is the nature of these relationships today?

In the early 1990s, scholars talked about Australia’s neglect of South Asia, in particular Australia’s failure to understand the rising importance of India. We spoke of indifference, blind spots, missed opportunities, general indifference and even ideological differences between the two countries that began with Jawaharlal Nehru and Sir Robert Menzies. During the last ten years, Australia’s engagement with South Asia has changed dramatically – Australia has been involved in a counterinsurgency war against the Taliban in Afghanistan intermittently since 2002, and India has emerged as Australia’s fourth largest export market. The paradox that this chapter addresses is the way in which Australia’s strategic engagement with South Asia was dominated by Afghanistan while Australian commercial national interests lay with India. These two relationships have overwhelmingly defined Australia’s connection with South Asia. The focus is on Kevin Rudd’s period as prime minister of Australia (2007–10) and his subsequent role as foreign minister (from 2010), because the Rudd years capture the essence of Australia’s new relationship with this part of the world where some two billion people live.