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In the 1940s and early 1950s, the Cold War convention of containment, which undergirded American involvement in Vietnam, was broadly shared, internalized, at times even fostered, by the United States European allies. This consensus broke down by the 1960s, as successive US administrations saw themselves locked ever more rigidly into Cold War logic which seemed to require going to war to preserve a noncommunist South Vietnam. By contrast, the United States transatlantic allies and partners increasingly came to question the very rationale of US intervention. By the mid-1960s there was a remarkable consensus among government officials across Western Europe on the futility of the central objective of the American intervention in Vietnam of defending and stabilizing a noncommunist (South) Vietnam. European governments refused to send troops to Vietnam. However, West European governments differed considerably in the public attitude they displayed toward US involvement in Vietnam, ranging from France’s vocal opposition to strong if not limitless public support by the British and West German governments. Across Western Europe, the Vietnam War cut deeply into West European domestic politics, aggravated political and societal tensions and diminished the righteousness of the American cause.
This chapter focuses on the debates about development, human rights, and ‘basic needs’ that defined much of the push to craft a decolonized international law during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In particular, it considers the emergence of the international right to development, and the relation between international human rights and poverty-reduction strategies like the ‘basic needs’ approach in New International Economic Order-related discussions, against the background of the rise of neoliberalism and organized human rights movements during the 1970s and early 1980s. It does so partly through a close reading of the two reports produced by the ‘North-South Commission’ chaired by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Despite its overarching commitment to a renewed form of ‘global Keynesianism’, the Brandt Commission expounded a broadly rights-friendly approach to development that absorbed many of the neoliberal assumptions then on the rise. When US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher dismissed the Brandt Commission’s recommendations at the ‘North-South Summit’, held in Cancún in October 1981, the moment signalled the end of the struggle to cultivate an international law of development that would live up to the ideal of an international law of decolonization.
Chapter 9 introduces the metaphor of a pendulum to characterize the sharp swings in Brandt’s policies toward European integration; the chancellor frequently backed ambitious EC projects that proved premature and unworkable. In 1970, fierce debates arose among the six EC members concerning how to pursue economic and monetary union (EMU). Brandt’s point person on Europe, Katharina Focke, sympathized with the French desire to tighten monetary cooperation among the EC partners right away. Bonn’s economy ministry under Karl Schiller took a more cautious line, insisting that macroeconomic convergence was necessary first. An EC agreement on EMU in early 1971 favored the French line; but soon thereafter a currency crisis prompted Brandt’s cabinet to “float” the mark, putting the EMU project on hold. Bonn’s policies helped the Nixon administration as it sought to stabilize the remnants of the Bretton Woods system – much to the dismay of French president Georges Pompidou. Afterwards Brandt worked to mend fences with France, and at a summit of the newly expanded EC in 1972 they pledged to form a European Union complete with a unified currency by 1980.
Chapter 11 examines the steps needed to rescue Brandt’s Ostpolitik from its near-demise at the hands of a polarized Bundestag. Following a rash of back-channel diplomacy with Egon Bahr at the center, France, Britain, the United States, and the USSR finally reached a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin; it guaranteed access to the city but failed to clarify West Berlin’s relationship to the Federal Republic, leaving room for future disputes. Brandt’s surprise visit to Brezhnev in Crimea deepened the relationship between these two leaders, but created suspicion in the Western camp that did not ease even with Brandt’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize. Rainer Barzel, leader of the CDU/CSU, insisted that the Warsaw and Moscow treaties must be renegotiated; he maneuvered in the Bundestag to overthrow the Brandt government. Outside observers feared that the entire course of détente was in jeopardy. Barzel’s bid for power failed, but he continued to seek concessions from the Soviets; the GDR did briefly take a softer line. The treaties passed without CDU/CSU support, and Brandt went on to win a decisive victory in the 1972 elections, affirming public backing for Ostpolitik.
The book’s introduction explains why the years 1963 to 1975 were a period of tremendous experimentation in German foreign relations. A succession of relatively weak chancellors gave scope for cabinet members to push in various directions, whether this involved voracious weapons procurement, a single-minded battle against inflation, more generous development aid, or a tighter commitment to European integration. Even in periods of political instability, developments in West Germany had great import for Europe and the world beyond. Historiographically, the introduction stresses the broader historical relevance of German foreign relations: its study reveals the contested values of postwar Germans and how those priorities came to shape the international environment. Methodologically, the chapter presents a brief discussion of constructivism as outlined by political scientists Alexander Wendt and Susan Strange. International relations theory informs the book’s core question – how West Germans shaped and were shaped by the international system.
With the forming of a Grand Coalition, headed by Kurt Kiesinger (CDU/CSU) as chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as foreign minister, West Germany sought equidistance between France and the United States and pursued a new Ostpolitik in parallel with de Gaulle. As Chapter 5 explains, the project proved highly unstable; de Gaulle could do little to aid Bonn vis-à-vis Poland, and Brandt wound up preferring direct contacts with the Soviets. Disputes over Britain’s accession to the EEC further soured Franco-German relations, and Paris was hardly pleased at Bonn’s renewal of its offset promises toward London and Washington. But the U.S.–German relationship also came under strain as the United States and USSR negotiated a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) that would force West Germany to accept a permanently inferior status. Kiesinger and Brandt used their leverage with Washington to force significant changes to the NPT in the areas of nuclear research and commerce; but they also consulted with other nuclear have-nots, such as India and Iran, and contemplated Germany’s future as a middle-sized power. Increasingly, West Germans identified technology exports as a significant source of prestige.
In Chapter 8, focus turns to the handiwork of Brandt’s Ostpolitik – the negotiation of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in 1970. Egon Bahr’s bargaining strategy in Moscow was hasty and dilettantish; he did not worry overly about the contents of the treaty with the USSR, since he saw the agreement as only one component of an interlocking series of treaties. When the substance of the “Bahr Paper” was leaked, his secretive approach and his failure to address the Berlin problem further polarized German politics. The CDU/CSU vehemently rejected Brandt’s policies and members of the coalition parties began to defect. The external resonance of German Ostpolitik was nonetheless enormous. Brandt’s meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow alerted the world to the ebbing of Soviet hostility, resulting in greater maneuvering room for Bonn. When the chancellor kneeled in Warsaw, it appeared to signal German acceptance of the moral weight of Nazi crimes. A closer view shows, however, that the Federal Republic was extremely hard-nosed toward Poland; it demanded emigration rights for ethnic Germans while refusing to offer restitution payments. Brandt’s Germany looked forward, not backward.
Chapter 7 depicts a severe cleft in German politics as the Grand Coalition headed toward Bundestag elections in September 1969. Chancellor Kiesinger tried to coax the USSR into softening its enmity toward West Germany, but his hard-line stances on Berlin and the NPT stalled progress. Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt’s controversial aide, urged the SPD to cast aside old ballast: Bonn should sign the NPT, stop isolating the GDR, and renounce territorial claims in Poland. Economy minister Karl Schiller, the SPD’s central figure in the 1969 campaign, insisted that the German mark should be revalued. Kiesinger’s CDU/CSU rejected all of these proposals, and the coalition cabinet proved incapable of decisive action for most of the year – causing economic havoc across Western Europe. The SPD–FDP coalition won the election only narrowly, but as Chancellor Willy Brandt acted decisively to revalue the mark and pledge German support for “deepening” and “widening” Europe at an EC summit in The Hague. On Ostpolitik, Brandt signed the NPT and authorized soundings with the USSR and Poland; but Bahr grew impatient and angled to open a back channel to the Kremlin.
Turning to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Chapter 10 explores the challenges Bonn faced amidst the turmoil of the early 1970s. Tightened budgets, occasioned by worries about inflation, hampered efforts by aid minister Erhard Eppler to follow through on Brandt’s promises of expanding development aid to the Global South. Karl Schiller insisted that trade, not aid, was the better path forward. Bonn’s liberal, free-trade approach drew criticism from African leaders, as West Germany invested heavily in apartheid South Africa; Brandt’s government did, however, enact tighter restrictions on weapons exports outside NATO. German officials frowned upon Global South demands for a more balanced world trading order, but they played a mediating role at UNCTAD III, a global trade and development conference in Santiago, Chile. Confronted with a rash of kidnappings in Latin America and Palestinian terrorism on German soil, Brandt’s government opted repeatedly to appease the hostage-takers rather than prosecute them. This passive response contributed to the disaster at the Munich Olympics in 1972, when Israeli athletes were captured and murdered.
Chapter 13 documents a shift in leadership as hard-nosed pragmatist Helmut Schmidt moved to the fore. The 1973 “oil shock” provoked disarray among the EC-9 as European countries adopted egoistic strategies to secure oil supplies. Bonn responded by putting the EC Regional Development Fund on hold, touching off a crisis in British–EC relations. Schmidt aligned German positions more closely with the United States, ending capital controls and embracing Henry Kissinger’s plan for Western energy cooperation. When Brandt resigned over a spy scandal, Schmidt assumed control of a confident West Germany that was managing the oil price spike smoothly – and used its influence (and a Bundesbank loan) to urge austerity measures on Italy. Schmidt forged a tight partnership with French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who endorsed many German economic views. Relations with the USSR soured due to disputes over Berlin, and also because of Bonn’s key role in thwarting communist gains in Portugal and Italy. As seen in German diplomacy toward Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, Schmidt’s Germany was defining a role as a stabilizing force on the European continent in cooperation with the United States.
Chapter 12 shows how the Federal Republic’s booming economy created new challenges and expectations. Currency crises wracked the West, leading to the final breakdown of the Bretton Woods order. Together with other leaders of the newly expanded EC of Nine, Brandt and finance minister Helmut Schmidt instituted a “joint float” of European currencies (excluding Britain, Ireland, and Italy). The Nixon administration tried to slow the EC’s momentum by proposing a “Year of Europe” that would cement U.S. leadership; Bonn was again caught between the United States and France, with both countries fearing that West Germany had become “Finlandized” as a result of its Ostpolitik. Brezhnev’s visit to Bonn, along demands raised by Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, showed that West German prosperity had raised expectations of financial generosity. Brandt’s Germany began to play a more visible role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, and in September East and West Germany were finally able to join the United Nations. The EC-9 undertook steps toward greater coordination of foreign policy, particularly at the UN, and Brandt insisted that West Germany was there to act as a European power.
This chapter deals with the response of Willy Brandt, West Germany’s former chancellor and towering moral figure, to the 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland. As Chancellor, Brandt had played a central role in putting human rights-related questions into the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and thus on the agenda of East-West relations. In December 1981, however, he demanded Western restraint toward events in Poland and even expressed some understanding for the Polish government. To explain this stance, this chapter deciphers the ideas and wider imaginaries that informed his actions, an approach that also provides insights into the intellectual changes that powered the human rights revolution of the 1970s and the 1980s. Brandt, this chapter shows, understood human rights work in a way indebted to 1950s and 1960s discourses revolving around a vision of competing political and social systems, of antagonistic ways of organizing society, of fundamentally different views of how long-term historical processes shaped the fate of nations. Enmeshed in this culture, Brandt believed that a successful human rights policy had to take structural constraints and broad time horizons into account. The demands of the dissidents—calling upon the international community to intervene for the human rights of everyone, everywhere—seemed to Brandt not morally objectionable so much as implausible and unreasonable.
This chapter discusses how the book's main themes relate to the historiography of human rights. It makes four points: First, it argues that the history of the Solidarity movement shows how precarious and contested human rights remained in international politics well into the 1980s, a finding that challenges the view of the 1970s as the final breakthrough of human rights. Second, this chapter argues that the history of Polish dissent and of its supporters in France and the USA reveals discourses in which human rights were not seen as an alternative to politics so much as a means of creating a new kind of politics. Even the overtly antipolitical imagery of groups like Amnesty International merely concealed a profound symbolic politics of human rights. Third, the findings of the book do not suggest that the origins of human rights really lie in the 1980s but that the entire quest for a point of origin is misguided. The history of human rights, rather, is one of their continuous competitions with other universalisms, their repeated reinvention, and adaptation to new causes. Fourth, this chapter argues that the book's findings show that human rights had a crucial impact on the end of the Cold War.
In the historiography of human rights, the 1980s feature as little more than an afterthought to the human rights breakthrough of the previous decade. Through an examination of one of the major actors of recent human rights history – Poland's Solidarity movement – Robert Brier challenges this view. Suppressed in 1981, Poland's Solidarity movement was supported by a surprisingly diverse array of international groups: US Cold Warriors, French left-wing intellectuals, trade unionists, Amnesty International, even Chilean opponents of the Pinochet regime. By unpacking the politics and transnational discourses of these groups, Brier demonstrates how precarious the position of human rights in international politics remained well into the 1980s. More importantly, he shows that human rights were a profoundly political and highly contested language, which actors in East and West adopted to redefine their social and political identities in times of momentous cultural and intellectual change.
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