While the UN secretary-general maintains in the 2023 New Agenda for Peace that the impartiality of the United Nations is its strongest asset, the UN is increasingly becoming partial on the ground. The trend that started with the inclusion of the Force Intervention Brigade in the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2013 is accelerating and taking on new forms. The UN has been supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia and providing logistical support to the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force in Mali. In December 2023, the UN Security Council agreed on a resolution that should enable the predictability and sustainability of assessed contributions to African-led counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, on certain conditions. The normative consequences of increased support to African-led interventions are significant and little explored. The UN system, including humanitarian and human rights components, will no longer be able to claim impartiality in countries where the UN is financing African-led interventions that are propping up fledgling regimes against opposition and terrorist groups. This essay will unpack and examine these developments and their consequences for UN peacekeeping and the larger UN system.

This paper examines South–South security cooperation and regional organisations (ROs) in Africa. Much of the literature on peace and conflict in Africa has focused on ROs and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Guided by the mantra ‘African solutions to African problems’, these organisations have facilitated several instances of African-led security cooperation. Yet ROs have limited agency and capacity, are institutionally rigid, and are often donor-dependent. As a result, ad hoc security initiatives such as the G5 Sahel and Accra Initiative – our case studies – are on the rise. While such initiatives are better adapted to local context and feature higher levels of autonomy (relative to APSA), we critique this view by showing how donors pressure and trap African governments facing transnational security threats into ad hoc initiatives. These initiatives transform into ‘zombified’ security institutions that rarely live up to the elevated expectations of African and Western stakeholders. This creates a paradox for debates around African agency in security affairs: ad hoc initiatives lock African states into security frameworks that do not respond to their needs but also facilitate the pursuit of donor funding, reassert the national scale of sovereignty, and incentivise new forms of bilateral security cooperation.

In the field of business and politics, research on the role of business actors in individual fossil fuel industries that contribute to climate change has been sparse. At the same time theorising the role of ad hoc coalitions has been limited even though they appear to be an important vehicle for business actors seeking to shape contemporary policy contests. This paper attempts to address these understudied areas by drawing on a rich empirical dataset to examine the role of three ad hoc coalitions in the U.S. energy sector. In doing so, it builds on the existing literature to establish a theoretical basis for identifying the defining elements of ad hoc coalitions and the conditions under which business actors decide to establish them. Further, it sheds light on how business actors use ad hoc coalitions in three key fossil fuel industries—gas, oil, and coal—to shape policy outcomes, and in turn shape the path to a clean energy transition.