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Artificial Intelligence (AI) has enriched the lives of people around the globe. However, the emergence of AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) has become a significant concern for the international community. LAWS are computer-based weapon systems capable of completing their missions, including identifying and engaging targets without direct human intervention. The use of such weapons poses significant challenges to compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. Scholars have extensively examined LAWS in the context of humanitarian law; however, their implications for human rights warrant further discussion. Against this backdrop, this paper analyzes the human rights challenges posed by LAWS under international law. It argues that using LAWS in warfare and domestic law enforcement operations could violate human rights, such as the rights to life, human dignity, and remedy, among others. Thus, it calls for a prohibition of the use of killer robots against humans.
The prohibitions of torture and other ill-treatment in armed conflict under international humanitarian law largely reflect the prohibitions under human rights law, but there are also a number of important distinctions. Most obviously, the requirement for the involvement in some manner of a public official does not apply in the case of a non-State armed group that is party to a non-international armed conflict. But international criminal tribunals have also, on certain occasion, interpreted the prohibitions in a manner that does not accurately reflect international law. This chapter summarizes the classification of armed conflict under IHL. It then looks at how the two different classification of armed conflict (international and non-international) prohibit different forms of ill-treatment. The third main section of the chapter discusses the perpetration of these different forms of ill-treatment in selected conflicts going back to the start of the millennium, covering the conduct of Russia (in Ukraine), Syria (especially since 2012), Thailand (in the armed conflict in the south), and the United States (in particular at Guantánamo Bay since 2002).
While sexual violence is receiving increasing attention in terms of international humanitarian and criminal law, and on the world political scene, this does not apply to all aspects of such crimes. Sexual acts on dead bodies are a common practice in times of armed conflict, constituting an affront to universal moral values that exacerbates the violence, domination and humiliation which motivates such abuses. However, such crimes have rarely been prosecuted under international criminal law, and where they have, perpetrators have been charged with umbrella offences or in connection with the protection of human dignity rather than with sexual offences. To explain this tendency, the present article takes stock of the legal treatment of sexual violence on dead bodies, examining the legal, philosophical and moral concepts that apply, with a view to obtaining recognition of such acts as sexual offences.
The recent rise of ‘qualified neutrality’ has proven highly controversial. Some have suggested that the separation between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello under international law may prevent the reform of ‘traditional neutrality’ into qualified neutrality. This article will seek to resolve academic debate on this topic, arguing that the principle of separation is of limited relevance to perpetuation and reform within the law of neutrality. Although the principle of separation is prima facie incompatible with qualified neutrality, it does not have the required characteristics as a legal rule to inhibit reform of the law of neutrality and the recognition of qualified neutrality as a positive rule under international law.
The tradition of sepulchre, the recognition that a human body has intrinsic emotional and moral worth to those left behind after death and thus should be handled with dignity and respect, is timeless and knows few cultural boundaries. Its basic tenets are codified in international humanitarian law (IHL) – but codification and interpretation are entirely different things. What does it mean to state that parties to a conflict should ensure that bodies are handled with “adequate care”? What constitutes adequate? What precisely does it mean that bodies should not be “despoiled”? US courts have wrestled with the rights of surviving family members – and the corresponding duties of society – for over 200 years and have slowly crafted a cohesive and comprehensive consensus body of law as it relates to sepulchre. This article presents some of the logic and rationale used by American jurists in the evolution of US common and statutory law controlling the management of the dead in the hope that it may provide some insight into the interpretation of IHL.
This article explores the implications of attaching military chaplains and similar religious personnel to State and non-State fighting forces, and what this means for international humanitarian law (IHL). IHL assigns religious personnel a non-combatant humanitarian function equivalent to medical personnel, stipulating that they should perform exclusively religious duties. This underestimates the scope of “religious” activity, however, particularly the moral dimension of their ministry and the force-multiplying and restraining effects that this has on combatant behaviour. As representatives of non-State institutions embedded within military structures, many religious personnel also enjoy a unique degree of access to – and separation from – the chain of command, and can leverage this autonomy to influence the conduct of hostilities. The more that religious personnel are invested in the achievement of a fighting force's military objectives and are involved in its military operations, the likelier it is that they will test the parameters of their humanitarian function, and the protections they enjoy, under IHL. Moreover, some clerics associated with fighting forces do not aspire to non-combatant or exclusively humanitarian status, and should not be considered religious personnel. It is in the midst of armed conflict that religious personnel are most needed, however, and the tensions and ambiguities between their religious and military support functions are integral to their cross-cutting role. The contribution that religious personnel can make to humanizing war, and socializing IHL or corresponding religious principles, depends on them being present to support combatants and not confining themselves to a separate, but less effectual, humanitarian space. Criteria for their humanitarian exclusivity, attachment to fighting forces and protections under IHL therefore require some clarification.
The rules of war, formally known as international humanitarian law, have been developing for centuries, reflecting society’s moral compass, the evolution of its values, and technological progress. While humanitarian law has been successful in prohibiting the use of certain methods and means of warfare, it is nevertheless destined to remain in a constant catch-up cycle with the atrocities of war. Nowadays, the widespread development and adoption of digital technologies in warfare, including AI, are leading to some of the biggest changes in human history. Is international humanitarian law up to the task of addressing the threats those technologies can present in the context of armed conflicts? This chapter provides a basic understanding of the system, principles, and internal logic of this legal domain, which is necessary to evaluate the actual or potential role of AI systems in (non-)international armed conflicts. The chapter aims to contribute to the discussion of the ex-ante regulation of AI systems used for military purposes beyond the scope of lethal autonomous weapons, as well as to recognize the potential that AI carries for improving the applicability of the basic principles of international humanitarian law, if used in an accountable and responsible way.
This article examines the role of international humanitarian law (IHL) in safeguarding artisanal fishing communities residing along the banks of the Magdalena River in Colombia after the recognition of the river as a rights-bearing entity1 and a victim of the armed conflict. The article also explores the potential of targeted peacebuilding interventions for achieving sustainable well-being, ecological restoration and enduring peace. Against the backdrop of historical conflict, the Magdalena River and its adjoining communities have suffered significant harm, requiring widespread reparations that go beyond immediate crisis management. The study proposes a comprehensive approach for achieving sustainable well-being, ecological restoration and enduring peace, acknowledging the complex connections between legal frameworks, environmental considerations and the cultural heritage of the riverine community.
Decision-makers rely on intelligence to make targeting decisions that comply with international humanitarian law (IHL), yet the relationship between intelligence and the law is not frequently discussed. This article explores crucial elements of intelligence and intelligence analysis that decision-makers should understand to increase their compliance with IHL, focusing on three crucial decision points: (1) the determination of whether a potential target is a military objective, (2) proportionality in attack analysis, and (3) the taking of effective precautions.
In the quest for “identity dominance” over the enemy, armed forces are increasingly leveraging biometrics for a variety of purposes. This paper focuses on the combat employment of one of them – facial recognition, which, unlike other biometrics, does not appear to have been widely utilized for targeting purposes yet. With the purchasing patterns of advanced militaries suggesting that such a development is around the corner, this paper assesses the compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of the use of facial recognition technologies for targeting purposes. It peruses the applicable legal framework to demonstrate that IHL is neutral towards the use of new technologies and that the right to privacy under international human rights law does not preclude the use of biometrics in hostilities. The analysis zooms in on two specific use cases in which facial recognition is likely to be employed on the battlefield, namely (1) targeted killings against combatants and (2) targeted killings against civilians directly participating in hostilities. The paper closes with an acknowledgment that while facial recognition does have obvious operational benefits, it also has the potential to exacerbate targeting practices that stretch the limits of IHL.
It is sometimes said that cruel yet short wars are better for humanity than restrained yet lengthy ones. The idea finds sympathy among Francis Lieber and his Prussian contemporaries, as well as some modern writers who back selective non-compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) on act-utilitarian grounds. This article refutes three underlying claims and reaffirms that IHL progressively narrows room for crude interest-balancing by its duty-bearers. First, it is claimed that toughening wars quickens them, whereas moderating wars prolongs them. This empirical claim overlooks how actions of the party resorting to brutality – the “brutalizer”, for short – interact with the intention of its adversary. Although the brutalizer clearly controls the amount of violence that it chooses to inflict on its opponent, it does not control the opponent's will to resist and, consequently, the length of the war it fights. History abounds with instances where adding cruelty has stiffened the enemy's resolve rather than accelerating surrender. Second, it is claimed that ruthless but swift wars lessen net inhumanity. On this act-utilitarian view, it is normatively superior to hasten wars through barbarity than to lengthen them through moderation; it is therefore the brutalizer's responsibility to toughen fighting and the brutalized party's responsibility to refrain from resisting the brutalizer. Problematically, the brutalizer usurps authority by imposing its own utilitarian considerations upon the brutalized party. Moreover, the brutalizer blames its disobliging adversary for the extra bloodshed to which it resorts in the name of maximum utility. Third, it is claimed that IHL does or should permit non-conformity when non-conformity stands a reasonable chance of increasing net humanity. This position is inconsistent with IHL's functions, however. IHL does aim to reduce net wartime harm, but it would be a mistake to assume that utilitarian ends necessarily justify, let alone require, utilitarian means. When IHL enacts unqualified rules, it predetermines their conformity or non-conformity through processes that are distinctly not act-utilitarian. Nowhere in these processes do lesser-evil justifications naturally belong.
This article provides the personal perspectives of US military operational attorneys and analyzes three significant challenges in applying international humanitarian law (IHL) to modern military space operations: the lack of clear standards for assessing when IHL rules govern particular military activities in outer space; the challenges of effectively distinguishing between civilian objects and military objectives when targeting space systems; and the difficulties of applying IHL rules of proportionality when attacking space systems. To address these challenges, the article argues that States should take steps to develop non-binding norms for military space operations that contribute to broader understanding of States’ views on how IHL applies in space.
International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict, seeks to limit the humanitarian impact of war by regulating the conduct of hostilities and protecting those not or no longer participating in combat. IHL does not prevent war, nor is that its role. IHL is only one part of the fabric of international law, other parts of which (jus ad bellum) govern the legality of war itself. However, IHL plays an essential role in mitigating suffering and fostering conditions that may facilitate a return to peace. This article examines the long-standing debate over whether IHL inadvertently legitimizes war or whether it can actually contribute, indirectly, to peace by imposing humanitarian constraints on conflict. It explores how adherence to IHL can preserve human dignity and support post-conflict reconciliation. Ultimately, while IHL does not prevent war, its strict application helps to reduce war's brutality and create pathways for sustainable peace.
Olivier Ray has been Director of Mobilization, Movement and Partnerships at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since July 2022. Before joining the ICRC, he was the Senior Adviser for Global Affairs to President Emmanuel Macron, leading on multilateral issues (UN, G7 and G20), global health and environment, humanitarian issues, development and human rights. He has worked for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (policy planning and foresight division) and Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Diplomatic Adviser to the Minister). He held various positions at the French Development Agency, including Head of the Crisis Prevention and Post-Conflict Recovery Unit, Director for Lebanon and Syria, and Regional Director for the Middle East. He holds an MA in international relations from Columbia University, an MA in public affairs from Sciences-Po, and a BSc in international relations from LSE. He is the co-author of Africa's Moment (2011, initially published in French in 2010) and Le Grand Basculement: La question sociale à l’échelle mondiale (2011), as well as many articles on international development.
Eva Svoboda is Director of International Law, Policy and Archives at the ICRC. She worked with the ICRC from 1999 to 2011 in Kashmir, Sudan, Myanmar, Iraq, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Algeria as Protection Coordinator, Head of Office and Head of Sub-Delegation as well as Head of Delegation. Prior to joining the ICRC, Eva worked for the Swiss Development Agency and various non-governmental organizations. From 2012 to 2018 she was a Senior Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute in London. Between 2016 and 2017 she worked as the Senior Expert for Detainees and the Missing at the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Syria.
Eva Svoboda worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from 1999 to 2011 in Kashmir, Sudan, Myanmar, Iraq, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Algeria as Protection Coordinator, Head of Office and Head of Sub-Delegation, as well as Head of Delegation. Prior to joining the ICRC, she worked for the Swiss Development Agency and various non-governmental organizations. From 2012 to 2018 she was a Senior Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute in London. Between 2016 and 2017 she worked as the Senior Expert for Detainees and the Missing at the United Nations (UN) Office of the Special Envoy for Syria.
This chapter offers a synthetic overview of the range of international law issues that arose during the course of the Vietnam War, especially as Americans took over from the French after Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and moved towards massive escalation between 1964 and 1973. The chapter begins with the debate about what law applied to the conflict, which turned on the legal status of South Vietnam. The chapter then asks what claims were possible and plausible when it came to the legality of American intervention in the war. Next, the chapter addresses the different kinds of warfare in which the United States engaged, from its bombing campaigns over North Vietnamese territory and waters to the changing forms of its counterinsurgency in the South and, later, across the Cambodian border. Finally, the chapter concludes by examining the legal legacy of Vietnam: not only how it led to the most significant substantive development of the laws of war since the Geneva Conventions, the First and Second Additional Protocols, but also, and equally importantly, how it ensured that international law would play (for good or ill) a central role in debate over and analysis of all future conflicts.
Neutrality, a foundational principle in humanitarian efforts and peace mediation, encounters significant practical challenges in the modern landscape of armed conflicts, particularly in the intermediary role of humanitarian organizations. This study examines the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a neutral intermediary in Yemen, focusing on the release and repatriation of detainees during the 2016–20 peace efforts. Drawing on the ICRC's experience, the analysis highlights the evolving understanding of neutrality from a rigid concept to a more flexible, context-sensitive approach. The findings emphasize the importance of neutrality in fostering trust and facilitating dialogue while acknowledging the operational complexities and strategic considerations involved. This study provides insights into enhancing the contributions of neutral intermediaries to sustainable peace processes.
Newly emerging US cyberspace warfighting concepts highlight the need to update US legal doctrine. Concepts adapted to future high-intensity, high-paced armed conflict, including command post dispersal and integration of cyberspace into other targeting domains, present opportunities to refine US understandings of the law of war attack threshold and overlooked rules applicable to destruction and seizure. The advantages of staking out clear and current opinio juris on these and other matters extend beyond providing responsible and consistent operational law advice. Updated and authoritative military cyber legal doctrine will serve the strategic and diplomatic legal interests of the United States and the international legal system as a whole.
This article examines how European Union (EU) arms control measures are tailored to its constitutional foundations. EU Member States subject shipments of arms and components to controls so as to screen them for risks and potentially block them. In this context different Member States may make different geopolitical and humanitarian risk assessments. Existing EU measures have achieved only limited security screening harmonisation, and have left room for Member States to shirk their obligations under international humanitarian law. But in case of joint arms production, which the EU subsidises to become more autonomous, one Member State’s arms controls may block another State’s exports and thereby jeopardise cooperation. This article posits that any reform of EU arms controls should start by re-evaluating their present legal basis. A constitutional competence analysis shows that controls on arms shipments to non-EU states should be regulated in part through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and not just through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This would be consistent with other EU regulatory regimes for trade security. While a joint CFSP-CCP approach cannot fully prevent conflict, since this would require further foreign policy harmonisation, it could help foster security convergence and strengthen humanitarian due diligence mechanisms.
Ben & Jerry's – the famous ice cream brand known for its quirky flavours and social justice ethos – announced in 2021 that it would withdraw its products from Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). This announcement sparked controversy, with an impact on the company and its parent, Unilever. While the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) (UNGP) have established themselves as the leading international governance framework for the social responsibilities of businesses, their application to conflict-affected areas lacks clarity. Questions remain, including when is a company legally complicit in violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), and when is a corporate exit from an area under military occupation the appropriate and responsible thing to do. This article uses Ben & Jerry's withdrawal from the OPT as the basis for investigating these questions. It finds that while it is unlikely that Ben & Jerry's would be exposed to any legal liability for violating IHL through its product sales in Israeli settlements in the OPT, its withdrawal aligns with its responsibilities under the UNGP as a reasonable and prudent corporate action in response to its activities being linked to enduring and severe IHL violations.