This article examines the future of the world economy from the standpoint of middle powers, with particular attention to Canada in the wake of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s renewed emphasis on middle-power coordination. It argues that the central economic transformation is not simply digitization, but a deeper pivot from the production of goods and knowledge toward the valuation of data generated through those production processes. Agriculture, manufacturing, health, education, logistics, and public administration are increasingly organized around data capture, platform intermediation, and AI-enabled recombination. This shift intensifies economies of scale, network effects, and economies of scope, thereby concentrating economic power in a small group of multinational technology firms. For middle powers, the resulting challenge is not to reject global platforms, but to avoid operational dependency on them. The article advances digital sovereignty as a framework based on control, interoperability, public-interest data governance, sovereign compute, and contestable digital markets. It concludes that middle powers must develop the state as a platform: a provider of trusted digital foundations that can sustain innovation, democratic accountability, and strategic autonomy in an increasingly platformized world economy.

The proliferation of platform-mediated work necessitates a nuanced examination of how workers negotiate their agency and contest power dynamics within these novel labour arrangements. This research seeks to examine the diverse resistance practices among platform workers and the worker-driven determinants that either facilitate or hinder such practices among workers. The research design uses a Global North-Global South dichotomous perspective to understand how workers engaged in analogous labour processes within disparate political-economic frameworks are responding to the challenges. In this, 122 semi-structured interviews were conducted among online food delivery workers in India [Mumbai and Guwahati] and Italy [Milan and Bologna]. The findings contribute to our appreciation of how individual determinants among workers impede resistance practices, ultimately diminishing the potential for unified collective action within the platform workforce.

European cities struggle to regulate platform-mediated short-term rental services in response to local concerns over uncontrolled tourism and affordable housing. In their efforts to tame online platforms and local hosts, cities have consistently pointed to EU law as an obstacle to effective regulation and enforcement and called for solutions at EU level. To date, research has paid limited attention to the precise role of EU law in the regulatory responses to the growth of short-term renting. This article therefore offers an explanation of how EU internal market law structures the multi-level dynamics behind short-rental regulation. Methodologically, the article relies on a contextual analysis of the EU’s legal framework for (electronic) services and an in-depth, longitudinal case study of the City of Amsterdam’s efforts to regulate its Airbnb-driven short-term rental market (2013–2023). Comprehensive empirical evidence indicates that European e-commerce law can deter governments from enforcing platform cooperation in the upstream market and, instead, prompt them to shift the burden of regulation and compliance to the ‘actual’ service providers (the hosts) in the downstream market. These upstream/downstream dynamics also help to explain the successful adoption and normative content of the recent Short-Term Rental Regulation. With its focus on the power struggle between cities and platform actors in the EU internal market, the article also offers a unique, empirically grounded account of how EU law structures urban conflicts over housing and tourism in the context of platformisation and how platformisation might affect the dynamics of European market integration more generally.

Some economic interactions are based on trust, others on monetary incentives or monitoring. In the tax compliance context, the monitoring approach creates compliance based on audits and fines (enforced compliance), in contrast to the trust-based (voluntary compliance) approach, which is based on taxpayers’ willingness to comply. Here, we examine how changes in taxation regarding platform economy revenues affect intended labor supply on such platforms. New EU legislation, effective from 2023, will mandate data sharing between platforms and tax authorities across Europe, thus resulting in increased monitoring. We investigate how this upcoming shift in monitoring power affects the intended use of platforms and how it may interact with users’ trust. We use a survey among platform workers (N = 626) in the Netherlands to examine views of the proposed regulation change, corrected for the proportion of platform income and several measures of trust. We experimentally manipulate information by either informing participants about the upcoming monitoring change or not. Results show that informing respondents about the change negatively affects expected supply of labor, and this effect is independent of respondents’ trust. We discuss the policy implications of these results.

This paper presents an analytical mapping of institutional design possibilities for alternative ways for digital platforms to institutionalise property and corporate form. It builds on the institutional imagination catalysed by three vignettes of experimental sharing economy initiatives presented towards the start of the paper, each of which highlights the imbrication and interdependence between economic and social dimensions of the sharing economy. The paper then interrogates the vignettes through three analytical entry points to the institutional design of commons-based sharing economies: platform, care and place. By remapping the vignettes’ practices around these three entry points, the paper shows how they help constitute the incipient formalisation of commons-based approaches to the sharing economy. The prospects for carrying out a redesign of property and corporate forms more generally thereby become more visible, providing a sound foundation for more in-depth empirical and historical work on alternative trajectories of the sharing economy in the future.

The emergence of digital platforms has been viewed in scholarly narratives as a “technological fix” of global capital, to use Beverly Silver's classic term. That is, capital continues to devise innovative strategies to restructure the labour process and avoid employer legal liabilities. This study reveals an important but somewhat overlooked “financial fix” aspect of the platform economy. Through a case study of a Chinese food delivery platform, the author shows that global speculative capital and its cash-burning games have generated a form of market-value fetishism in this sector. In response, platform companies have devised innovative labour acquisition strategies to expand their market share that have profoundly shaped the work and employment dynamics within the sector. In particular, the platform companies engaged in a subsidy rivalry with their competitors in order to attract crowdsourcing/gig workers for their regular services and at the same time established a highly structured subcontracting system to secure a more reliable and committed workforce to target the relatively high-end consumer market. The author argues that the interaction between global financialization and local capital's strategic choices accounts for the peculiar structure and employment dynamics in the Chinese platform economy.

This article considers, summarises, and analyses the merits of various arguments regarding options for regulating (or not regulating) ‘gig work’, concluding with observations about currently proposed legislation. There is a strong argument for regulating gig work. Many workers are vulnerable, and many of the arguments against any form or regulation – in terms of innovation, productivity, employment, or the inevitability of this trend – lack merit. Current definitions of employment, indeed current labour law, are not adequate and many, but not all, gig workers are like employees in terms of the control exercised over them. However, treating gig workers as employees would encounter several problems. The outcomes would be uncertain. Not all would be covered. Many gig workers would be opposed (despite wanting protection). The gig firms could render such legislation ineffective, or alternatively succeed in mobilising opposition, almost ensuring such legislation would be revoked at the next change of government. Regulating gig work as a form of contracting is a viable alternative. It has the potential to attract support from gig workers themselves, undermining opposition by the gig firms, and attract support from some parts of capital. The New South Wales experience shows us that regulation of gig work as contracting is feasible and politically sustainable. Despite limitations, the ‘Closing the Loopholes’ Bill provides a sustainable model for regulating and protecting many ‘gig economy’ workers. It is time to envisage labour law as something that extends not just to employees but to many contractors as well.

Crowdwork conducted via digital platforms is a young form of work, but a growing part of the gig economy. Typical for crowdwork is low pay, volatile income streams and no social security benefits. Also, crowdworkers have few possibilities for social comparison or negotiation because they work outside of company organisations. This article examines the question of whether these conditions mean that crowdworkers’ expectations about justice in crowdwork arrangements differ in comparison to their expectations regarding justice in conventional employment relationships. This question is addressed empirically on the basis of 36 qualitative interviews and a survey of 230 crowdworkers. The justice expectations of crowdworkers involved in different types of crowdworking platforms in German-speaking countries were examined. In our sample, crowd work typically serves to supplement – not replace – conventional employment. This explorative research shows that crowdworkers use similar standards of justice regarding work performance in their evaluations of work mediated via crowdwork platforms and conventional employment. It shows that crowdworkers perceive injustices in four specific areas: planning insecurity, lack of transparency in performance evaluation, lack of clarity in task briefings and low remuneration. These areas correspond to the theoretical dimensions of distributive and procedural justice on Colquitt’s (2001) organisational justice scale. These findings have implications for future efforts to regulate crowdwork.

This paper is a first attempt to analyse the relationship between social protection systems and countries’ responses towards the regulation of platform work. It is argued that the degree of accessibility to social protection for self-employed workers is a predictor for how countries will deal with platform work. Countries that provide wide access to social protection for the self-employed tend to develop a more integrative response towards these work arrangements from a social protection perspective because the social protection of platform workers is a smaller policy challenge. On the other hand, in countries with a low degree of accessibility to social protection schemes, the response towards platform work is more confrontational. These responses are characterised by a larger number of court cases and legislative proposals because social protection for platform workers is a more pressing policy challenge and platform work arrangements are understood to be more antagonistic towards the respective social protection systems.

Noting the growing importance of online platforms, this paper discusses the rise and development of the platform economy in Korea, defining platforms as a business model and arguing that the platform economy requires financing, an environment for Internet use and users, services, and content. Many believe that the platform economy's development is a natural outcome of technical innovation. However, the platform economy was created by the interplay of government and corporate strategies under certain historical conditions. In Korea, the platform economy developed after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Presenting the IT industry and venture businesses as a solution to the crisis, the government helped finance venture companies through intensive investment and enhanced the strategy of building information and communication infrastructure. Platform companies suffered from the lack of content and services to provide; however, they quickly built web portal platforms with Korean specificities by copying and benchmarking personal computer communication services.