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Edited by
Gabriel Kessler, Universidad Nacional de San Martin-Escuela Interdisciplinaria de Estudios Sociales (EIDAES), Argentina,Maria Victoria Murillo, Columbia University, New York
This chapter challenges the conventional wisdom that Latin America’s youth are less committed to democracy. Using AmericasBarometer data (2004–23) from fifteen Third-Wave democracies and age–period–cohort models, I examine democratic attitudes across three generations: pre-transition, transition, and post-transition cohorts. Contrary to expectations, the post-transition generation (those who came of age after democratic consolidation) shows significantly higher support for democracy, lower tolerance for military coups, greater satisfaction with democracy, and higher trust in elections compared to older generations. They also participate more in voting and protests, though less in traditional civic organizations. These generational effects are not explained by demographic changes in education, wealth, or religion, suggesting political socialization is key. The findings indicate that observed age differences reflect life cycle effects rather than generational decline. As generational replacement proceeds, public support for democracy in Latin America is likely to strengthen, not weaken, contradicting fears about democratic erosion among youth.
How does childhood exposure to large-scale criminal violence and militarized law enforcement shape political attitudes and behavior? We examine the case of Mexico’s drug war, where a generation has been raised amidst the country’s most violent conflict in over a century. Surveying nearly 3,000 urban youth to measure their political and interpersonal trust, we matched respondents to historical data on criminal violence and military confrontations and operations in their childhood municipalities. Disentangling the effects of criminal violence and military interventions, we find that exposure to homicidal violence during childhood erodes interpersonal trust and trust in law enforcement, while military interventions – especially those involving violent confrontations – broadly undermine trust in federal security institutions and generate political backlash against the parties that governed Mexico during the exposure period. These findings have important implications for young democracies affected by high crime and violence and advance our understanding of how criminal wars influence political socialization.
Departing from mainstream research on political interest in democratic contexts, this study investigates its evolution in an authoritarian setting. To disentangle temporal dynamics, it applies the age–period–cohort interaction model to repeated cross-sectional data from five waves of nationally representative surveys conducted in China. The results demonstrate distinct effects across age, period, and cohort dimensions. Age effects indicate that younger individuals consistently exhibit lower levels of political interest than older adults. Period effects reveal a downward trend in political interest among the Chinese public between 2002 and 2019. Importantly, cohort effects suggest that, contrary to the linear evolutionary predictions of modernization theory, individuals who underwent political socialization during critical historical periods—such as the Great Famine and its aftermath (1959–1963) and the late Cultural Revolution (1974–1978)—as well as those born in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, exhibit heightened political interest. These findings contribute to theoretical reflections on the evolution of political interest.
This article is a review of the recent literature on generational differences in electoral behaviour. We first discuss several conceptual issues, after which we provide a description of the main findings in three fields: the role of generations in (1) turnout, (2) party choice and (3) the determinants of party choice. In the concluding section we discuss a number of overall patterns that emerge from this very rich literature. We also sketch some pitfalls and avenues for further research.
The growth in economic inequality in the United States over the past forty years has stimulated interest among scholars in the effects of exposure to inequality on the American people. A prominent vein of scholarship explores whether exposure to inequality diminishes belief in a key pillar of the ‘American dream’ – the meritocratic ideal that hard work will translate to economic success. We offer this literature a novel test that explores the relationship between quotidian exposure to economic inequality in one’s adolescent residential context and belief in the American dream among roughly 1.3 million late-adolescent Americans entering college. We find that adolescent residence in high-inequality areas is associated with decreased belief in the American dream upon entering adulthood. Further analysis revealed that this relationship is most pronounced among young Americans raised in higher income households.
While left and right are the main terms to distinguish political views in Western Europe, the family socialization of citizens has mainly been studied in terms of partisan preferences rather than identification with these ideological blocks. Therefore, this study investigates the intergenerational transmission of left-right ideological positions in two European multiparty systems. To investigate expectations regarding gendered patterns in political socialization, ideological transmission between mothers, fathers, daughters and sons are analyzed, making use of German and Swiss household data. The results underline the relevance of the family in the transmission of political ideology in multiparty systems, showing high contemporary parent–child concordance in ideological positioning in line with classic work in political socialization. Moreover, the study demonstrates how the gender-generation gap in political ideology is consequential for this process. Young women consistently place themselves on the left of men across all combinations of parental ideology, which indicates that the gender-generation gap trumps other gendered patterns in intergenerational transmission. Consequently, daughters are less likely than sons to take over their parents’ rightist positions, while parent–son transmission is equally large on the left and the right. This also means that left-leaning parents have a general advantage over right-leaning parents in having their ideological identification reproduced by their daughters. The study highlights the importance of differentiating between the transmission of left- and right-wing ideology in political socialization processes. Moreover, it demonstrates that the distinction by offspring gender is imperative when studying the intergenerational transmission of traits that display gender differences within and between parental and offspring generations. The findings point at the active role of especially female offspring in the political socialization process, as they seem to be more strongly impacted by influences outside the family that sustain generational processes of further gender realignment.
This paper analyses changes in attitudes towards politics among the students of a Bachelor of Communication degree program in Spain after applying an educational innovation project including a formal civic education, an open classroom climate and collaborative learning strategies in politics. The effects of the project on the knowledge and interest towards politics of the participants were measured through a mixed methodology. First, a survey was administered both before and after the project was implemented. Second, focus groups were also conducted in both referred moments. The results show an increase in both understanding and having an interest in politics among students. In the context of low levels of formal instruction on politics during secondary school, such as in the Spanish case, these findings show that political disaffection among youth relates to a serious lack of knowledge about politics.
Can political activism foster electoral participation? We investigate this question by examining the role of the British suffragists in fostering women’s electoral participation. While scholars have shown that women politicians increase women’s participation in politics, less attention has been paid to the role of activists. We fill this gap by studying the 1913 Pilgrimage, a large-scale nationwide march in support of women’s parliamentary suffrage. Using a novel database of geocoded electoral registers, we employ a differences-in-differences strategy to show that proximity to the Pilgrimage increased women’s registration in local elections. To explain this effect, we show that exposure to women activists spurred other women’s political mobilization, and that our results are not driven by an endogenous selection of the march path and cannot be attributed to mobilization by other movements or politicians. Our findings highlight that women’s activism can drive political participation even in the virtual absence of women politicians.
A large literature has studied the effects of socialization under authoritarianism on political attitudes. In this research note, we extend this literature by demonstrating striking gender disparities in the post-transition persistence of these effects. We study the case of authoritarian indoctrination in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) using a regression kink design for causal identification. First, we draw on a unique survey fielded right before reunification to show that education under authoritarianism substantially reduced support for democratic capitalism and reunification with the West. In the second step, we triangulate multiple contemporary data sources to trace the persistence of these effects over time. More than two decades after the fall of the GDR, the attitudinal effects of authoritarian socialization persist only among men, but not women. Our results highlight considerable heterogeneity in the persistence of authoritarian legacies, raising critical questions about post-authoritarian ‘re-socialization’ and gendered adaptability.
Political participation has long been viewed as a social act. But the influence of social relationships on participation is often impossible to disentangle from the factors that select people into these relationships. To overcome this challenge, we study randomly assigned college roommates, thus reducing these selection biases and other confounds. We examine short-run social influence of roommates on voter participation in 2016 and longer-term effects in the 2018 and 2020 elections. We collected consent from over 2,000 first-year students, allowing us to obtain a matched voter file indicating which students voted and the public voting histories of students’ parents, an indicator of students’ pre-college political environment socialization. Our evidence suggests that roommates’ influence on turnout decisions rivals the association between students’ turnout and that of their parents. Yet this parity masks gender differences. For women, the effect of roommates is larger. For men, the student-parent association exceeds the roommate effect.
In The Autocratic Voter, Natalie Wenzell Letsa explores the motivations behind why citizens in electoral autocracies choose to participate in politics and support political parties. With electoral autocracies becoming the most common type of regime in the modern world, Letsa challenges the dominant materialist framework for understanding political behavior and presents an alternative view of partisanship as a social identity. Her book argues that despite the irrationality and obstacles to participating in autocratic politics, people are socialized into becoming partisans by their partisan friends and family. This socialization process has a cascading effect that can either facilitate support for regime change and democracy or sustain the status quo. By delving into the social identity of partisanship, The Autocratic Voter offers a new perspective on political behavior in electoral autocracies that has the potential to shape the future of these regimes.
Chapter 7 tests the four mechanisms of socialization derived from the qualitative data formally with original survey data from Cameroon. The analysis shows that, first, people raised in partisan households are much more likely to adopt partisan identities later in life than people raised in apolitical households. Second, party militants are more politically influential in their social networks than regular partisans or nonpartisans. Third, the partisan homogeneity of contemporary social networks is highly predictive of individual partisanship. Finally, because of the nature of politics in electoral autocracies, opposition partisans face higher levels of cross-partisan influence than ruling party partisans.
Chapter 8 focuses in on showing how the political geography of electoral autocracies shapes the partisan homogeneity of social networks. The chapter begins by outlining a process for measuring political geography. It then uses the measure to show that political geography is an excellent predictor of the partisan homogeneity of partisan networks, even controlling for other key factors. Third, it provides evidence that the relationship between geography and networks is not simply an average treatment effect. Finally, it uses the survey data to illustrate what happens to people who move between stronghold types: The social networks of people who move to new strongholds appear to change partisan identities to match their new location.
Chapter 10 concludes by summarizing the argument of the book, outlining the contributions and implications of the argument, discussing its limitations, and, finally, reflecting on the ability of the argument to extend beyond the narrow scope condition of electoral autocracies.
Chapter 6 continues to explore the qualitative data presented in Chapter 5 by presenting the full social networks of the twelve research subjects, and therefore contemporary process of socialization. The social networks produce three key observations. First, party brokers or activists play an outsized role on the socialization process within social networks. Second, for partisans of all stripes, their larger social networks tended to be much more politically heterogenous than their smaller “inner circles.” Finally, the twelve networks suggest that ruling party partisans are more politically insulated than are opposition partisans.
Chapter 5 seeks to get a better sense of the nature and texture of political socialization in Cameroon by exploring the life histories of twelve Cameroonian citizens. It centers the moment at which the subjects adopted a partisan identity, focusing primarily on early socialization within the childhood home. It also explores the ways in which political geography can produce partisan identities through the mediation of socialization, and the way in which material inducements to join parties can work through social networks as well.
Chapter 2 lays out the theory of the book, providing a broad overview of political science’s extant understanding of partisanship across diverse fields of study. It lays out the theory in three parts. First, it creates a framework for understanding how opposition partisanship and ruling party partisanship are unique social identities in electoral autocracies. Citizens who identify as partisans hold specific political beliefs that are common across all electoral autocracies (but not democracies). Second, it argues that these identities are produced at a grassroots level through a process of political socialization that occurs between friends and within families. Finally, the third part of theory argues that partisan social networks are fundamentally rooted within the unique political geography of electoral autocracies and elucidates a framework for understanding this geography, as well as its broader effects on beliefs about democracy and political legitimacy in such regimes.
Why do some citizens of electoral autocracies choose to support the ruling party while others support the opposition? Chapter 1 explains the puzzle of partisanship under dictatorship, presents existing theories to understand public opinion in such regimes, and briefly summarizes the argument of the book and the data and methods used to test it. It concludes by discussing what we gain by understanding partisanship as a social identity as opposed to a materialist response to regime strategies.
This article examines the challenges of subject formation within state-building efforts by analyzing Keyhān-e Bachcheh-hā (Children’s Universe), a widely circulated Iranian children’s magazine during the post-revolutionary period. Through analyzing the magazine’s content from 1979 to 1989, when the Islamic Republic was consolidating its power and building institutions, this study reveals how the publication served as a key informal education platform, attempting to create politically conscious yet ideologically compliant young citizens. While the magazine aimed to cultivate revolutionary consciousness through anti-imperialist rhetoric and Islamic values, it simultaneously imposed rigid behavioral and ideological boundaries to produce what I term “docile revolutionary children.” The research demonstrates how political themes permeated every aspect of the magazine—from stories and poems to puzzles and contests—transforming it from an entertainment platform into a vehicle for political socialization. Through examination of revolutionary and wartime discourses, gender representation, and the promotion of social humility, this study argues that Keyhān-e Bachcheh-hā embodied a fundamental tension in the state’s vision of ideal citizenship: the simultaneous demand for revolutionary agency and absolute submission to clerical authority. This research contributes to our understanding of how post-revolutionary states employ cultural institutions to shape young citizens and the inherent contradictions in such efforts at political socialization.
Persistent gender inequalities in internal political efficacy have traditionally been attributed to gender differences in resources. This article complements the resource model by focusing on how gendered political socialization occurs during citizenship education and how citizenship education might mitigate, reproduce, or intensify inequalities. Based on multilevel models on a 2016 survey dataset (3898 students across 150 schools) of Belgian senior high school students, we show that citizenship education increases internal political efficacy for both male and female students. However, we also find that citizenship education intensifies inequalities since male students gain more from it than female students, especially in schools with a conservative gender role culture. Our results indicate that the influence of citizenship education depends on the gendered school context in which it is offered. In this respect, citizenship education risks intensifying rather than mitigating gender inequalities.