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## BOOKS IN REVIEW

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### A QUESTION OF METHODOLOGY: REVIEW ESSAY ON RECENT LITERATURE ON CUBA

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- Verena Martínez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba. A Study of Racial Attitudes and Sexual Values in a Slave Society* (Cambridge Latin American Studies No. 17; London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 202 pp.
- Rafael Fermoselle, *Política y color en Cuba: La Guerrita de 1912* (Montevideo: Ediciones Geminis, 1974), 256 pp.
- Lydia Cabrera, *Anaforuana: ritual y símbolos de la iniciación en la sociedad secreta Abakuá* (Madrid: Ediciones R Madrid, 1975), 498 pp.
- Duvon Clough Corbitt, *The Chinese in Cuba, 1847–1947* (Wilmore, Kentucky: Asbury College, 1971), 142 pp.
- Irwin F. Gellman, *Roosevelt and Batista, Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933–1945* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), 303 pp.
- Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson Valdes (eds.), *Revolutionary Struggle, 1947–1958. Volume 1 of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972), 471 pp.
- Ramón L. Bonachea and Marta San Martín, *The Cuban Insurrection, 1952–1959* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1974), 451 pp.
- James Nelson Goodsell (ed.), *Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution in Cuba: 1959–1973* (A Borzoi Book on Latin America; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 349 pp.
- Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro. An Essay in Contemporary History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 392 pp.
- Bertram Silverman (ed.), *Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 382 pp.

Roberto M. Bernardo, *The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba*. Introduction by Irving Louis Horowitz (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1971), 159 pp.

Archibald R. M. Ritter, *The Economic Development of Revolutionary Cuba: Strategy and Performance* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 372 pp.

Marvin Leiner (with Robert Ubell), *Children Are the Revolution: Day Care in Cuba* (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 213 pp.

Edward Gonzalez, *Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 241 pp.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), 179 pp.

Howard Hunt, *Give Us This Day. The Inside Story of the CIA and the Bay of Pigs Invasion . . . by One of Its Key Organizers* (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1973), 235 pp.

Prior to the Cuban Revolution in 1959, few scholars in the U.S. considered Cuba a subject important enough for scholarship. There were, of course, those who studied and published or translated works on José Martí and on the American occupation of the early twentieth century. There was Leland Hamilton Jenks' *Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928), a book of enduring interest and value.<sup>1</sup> Prior to 1959, there were but a few important works in English on the politics of the crucial three decades of the twentieth century. Significant studies were Russell H. Fitzgibbon's *Cuba and the United States, 1900–1935* (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta, 1935) and Charles E. Chapman's *A History of the Cuban Republic: A Study in Hispanic American Diplomacy* (New York: Macmillan, 1927). Less important were H. F. Guggenheim's *The United States and Cuba* (New York: Macmillan, 1934) and an official study by Sumner Wells, *Relations Between the United States and Cuba* (U.S. Dept. of State, Latin American Series, No. 7; Washington, 1934). The one comprehensive study relevant to the events leading to the 1933 revolution was the Foreign Policy Association's *Problems of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1935). The single sociological study of any import in English done before 1959 was Lowry Nelson's *Rural Cuba* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950).

In economics there was the study by Henry C. Wallich, *Monetary Problems of an Export Economy: The Cuban Experience, 1914–1917* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950). Nothing in English in anthropology or literature. While Fernando Ortiz' *Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar* (New York: Knopf, 1947) was translated in 1949, the classical work of Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez had to await the success of the Revolution before being translated.<sup>2</sup> Not even the size and significance of the U.S. economic presence in Cuba led to the translation of the single most important study of the Cuban economy prior to 1959, Julian Alienes y Urosa's *Características fundamentales de la economía cubana* (La Habana: Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1950).<sup>3</sup> While there were some excellent studies before 1959, one cannot help comparing, for instance, the number of works on Fidel Castro or Ché Guevara with the fact that there does not yet exist

a single serious biography (in Spanish or English) of such men as Gerardo Machado, Grau San Martín, or Fulgencio Batista.

However one accounts for this absence of scholarly interest in the U.S. prior to 1959, the fact remains that interest in Cuba since that date has been profound and after seventeen years shows few signs of abating. Indeed, the post-1959 literature is so massive that a certain informal classification seems possible.<sup>4</sup> One can identify at least four main clusters. The first is composed of those works written between 1959 and 1962 with the central concern being "why the Revolution" and "why it is or why it isn't going Communist." This cluster has been labelled, appropriately, the "new experts."<sup>5</sup> A second cluster is composed of the work of the disillusioned, disappointed, and/or defeated.<sup>6</sup> By 1970, there appeared a third cluster: foreigners basically sympathetic to the revolutionary process but critical of what they interpreted to be the overly personalized rule of Fidel Castro and the "militarization" of the system.<sup>7</sup> A fourth and final cluster is not identified by time or specific theme but rather by the fact that the authors are Cuban exiles clearly bent on producing serious scholarship on it. The two most outstanding examples are Andrés Suárez and Carmelo Mesa-Lago.<sup>8</sup>

A review of this post-1959 literature indicates two distinct facts: first, if one discounts the translations of speeches by Fidel Castro and the works of Ché Guevara, there is not a single work published *in* post-1959 Cuba that has become part of the widely used literature in the U.S.; second, few of the works written by non-Cubans adhere to a formal Marxian conception of history in their interpretation of events in Cuba. It should be obvious that to be a supporter of the Revolution and generally a "radical" does not make a student *ipso facto* "Marxist." In short, sixteen years after the Cuban Revolution was declared Marxist-Leninist there is yet to be available in English any significant body of literature on that Revolution that is Marxist in methodology.

The books reviewed here are selections from the scholarly production of Cuba between 1970 and 1975. The intention of the reviewer is not to be exhaustive in his treatment of the production of those years; that bibliographic task is being performed competently elsewhere.<sup>9</sup> The purpose, rather, is to open a methodological dialogue with the authors, to probe the logic and consistency of their arguments and handling of data. Hopefully, this critique will have the additional value of pointing to new areas for research or old areas in need of revision.

One of the areas that immediately appears in need of further investigation and historical reevaluation is the field of race and ethnic relations. This is an area that has always been of concern to Cuban intellectuals. In fact it can be said that this area was of primordial concern to nineteenth-century Cuban society and that concern was reflected in the writings of their intelligentsia. The name of a José Antonio Saco engenders both the excellence of scholarship on the topic of slavery as well as the pervasive fear of "Africanization" of Cuba. It was not until 1947, however, that the study by Raúl Cepero Bonilla, *Azúcar y Abolición*, opened up this vital area for systematic research. In no uncertain terms, Cepero Bonilla (who died in 1962) documented the fundamental racism of the Cuban landown-

ing ruling class. They were aristocrats and racists "hasta la medula de los huesos" (p. 138). The basis of Cuban nationality, Cepero Bonilla maintained, was not laid until the technological transformations of the sugar industry brought about social structural changes, the most fundamental of which was the creation of a multiracial agricultural proletariat (p. 126).

As compelling as Cepero Bonilla's thesis was, however, it was not until 1964 that a full-scale and systematic study of the technological transformations he dealt with was published, Manuel Moreno Fraginals' *El Ingenio* (UNESCO, 1974). It was then and remains today the most complete study of the transformations in the Cuban plantation wrought by technological changes.<sup>10</sup> To date, of these studies utilizing sophisticated Marxian frameworks, only Moreno Fraginals has been translated into English (*Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba*, trans. Cedric Belfrage [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976]). American scholars have shown interest in the plantation but that concern has been very much with the development of slavery and its abolition rather than with structural transformations. Arthur F. Corwin studied Spanish attitudes and policy towards abolition; Herbert S. Klein compared slavery in Virginia and Cuba and stressed the central role of religion and culture in the differential treatment of slaves (the so-called Tannenbaum thesis); Franklin W. Knight joined the debate siding with the economic interpretation first made popular in this hemisphere by C. L. R. James and Eric Williams. Regardless of position, however, none of these U.S. authors takes up the Cepero Bonilla/Moreno Fraginals type of analysis in any significant way. Thus, even though one may claim that the debates on the plantation and slavery have had a hearing, one has to lament the absence of a study of technological transformations beyond the 1760 cut-off point of Moreno Fraginals' work. No such hearing or even debate has been published<sup>11</sup> in English or Spanish on the critical issue of race and ethnic relations in Cuba after abolition (1886).

The studies by Verena Martínez-Alier and Rafael Fermoselle attempt to remedy that deficiency. *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*, Martínez-Alier's study, opens with a strident critique of the "Tannenbaum" thesis. She challenges the interpretations of G. Freyre and H. Hoetink, both of which lay heavy stress on cultural factors, and assumes the vulgar Marxist posture that race is purely symbolic, or at best "superstructural." The nearly polemical assertion of a materialistic stance in the Introduction, however, is not sustained in a consistent way throughout the empirical narrative. Rather, cultural and attitudinal factors consistently take on causal weight without any linkages to the economic base indicated. Martínez-Alier's stress on "individual and family honour" is certainly much closer to Max Weber's emphasis on "status honor" as an aspect of societies stratified on the basis of status groups than it is to the classical Marxian conception of stratification based on class. Note, for instance, the following statements:

This [Cuban] preoccupation with heredity was lent additional force by an acute anxiety over racial purity that had characterized Spanish culture over the previous centuries and that in Cuba gained new vigour on account of slavery. It was this emphasis on family

origin coupled with the continued efforts made to preserve family status through social class endogamy that was designed ideally to grant the system the necessary permanence. The high evaluation of female honour positively sanctioned by Catholic morality, effectively provided a suitable mechanism to control marriage (p. 119).

The continual linking of “whitening” with mobility, of racial purity with social status and family honor, and of these with the permanence of the social structure throughout the century are not the kind of secular social relationships associated with class stratification. These are all dimensions of what Max Weber—who certainly did not underestimate the material dimension—called status group relations, relations in which “status honor” plays a fundamental role. Martínez-Alier’s conclusion that in nineteenth-century Cuba “ultimately race relations are class relations” (p. 124) is not supported by her analysis at any point. Her analysis certainly does not follow the basic themes set down by Cepero Bonilla and Moreno Fragnals as to the transformations of Cuban society through technological changes. Rather than changes in the structure of race relations, Martínez-Alier stresses the permanence, even the intensification or crystallization of certain of its most traditional (not to say retrograde) manifestations. This permanence was further sustained by the development of parallel forms of behavior and adjustment such as elopement. Far from being reflections of a changing class structure, they were the safety valves of a traditional structure that had enormous sustaining power. It might very well be that race relations in nineteenth-century Cuba were fundamentally class relations; but this is not demonstrated by this work. The links between the critical changes in technology (and thus in the social relationships of production) and their impact on social relationships in general and race relationships in particular have yet to be demonstrated.

Rafael Fermoselle’s *Política y color en Cuba, la Guerrita de 1912* falls short of his stated goal of clarifying the role of race in Cuban history. This is due in part to the overly ambitious design of the study. Even though his subtitle indicates a study of the 1912 race war, he attempts much, much more: the role of blacks in the Wars of Independence, black discontent after 1898, the formation of the Partido Independiente de Color (PIC) in 1908, the War of 1912, and Cuban attitudes towards race in general. And for good measure, Fermoselle expects his study to throw light on the role of the Platt Amendment and U.S. influence on Cuba. The upshot is a study that does serve to draw attention to a largely ignored historical period<sup>12</sup> but is too general to contribute new materials or interpretations to any of these issues or areas of analysis. Certainly one has to question the author’s contention that race prejudice and antagonism had been overcome in Cuba after the Ten-Year War and only reappeared with the U.S. occupation and intervention in 1898. Not only does the book not document this assertion in any way but much of the analysis indicates the opposite: the existence before the American arrival of a long-standing clash between the Spanish—old residents and new immigrants (including the unionized labor)—and black and colored Cubans. Fermoselle repeatedly makes the point that race and racial fears were central to the propaganda efforts of both the Spaniards and the criollo

*independentistas* during the nineteenth century. "El gobierno español consideró," Fermoselle notes, "que el 'miedo' de los blancos cubanos al negro era la mejor arena con que contaba España."<sup>13</sup> There can be no doubt that the American occupation forces brought with them all the prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory practices then prevalent on the mainland. But it is not at all clear that Cuban blacks saw the Americans as any more bigoted than the white Cuban elite they had to deal with. Fermoselle reprints verbatim the letters sent in 1908 and 1912 by black leaders to American authorities requesting their intervention on behalf of their black brothers. Clearly, white Cuban prejudice against them was nothing new, as a letter of a black leader of the 1912 race war testifies: "In defending ourselves with arms in our hands we do so not out of hatred for the whites but rather because we feel the disgrace which has accumulated against us for the past three hundred years" (p. 186).

Fermoselle calculates the number of black and colored men who joined the black leader Evaristo Estenoz and the PIC in combat at two thousand (p. 197), the same number of votes the party received in the 1908 elections; he calculates the number of black and colored people killed during the war at "over" three thousand (p. 199), "the majority of them civilian" (p. 199). The pent up racial antagonisms had exploded in Cuba and the blacks paid a disproportionately large share of the costs. That war can appropriately be called a "race" war and might even have had Pan-Caribbean, black nationalist ideological overtones. Unfortunately, Fermoselle merely speculates at this (p. 199), and the one study (still unpublished) on the subject of Pan-Caribbean black nationalism brings the analysis only up to 1895.<sup>14</sup> But just as the Cuban elite attempted to stifle black mobilization in 1910 through the Ley Morua, which prohibited the organization of political parties on racial grounds, so has Cuban historiography maintained a systematic silence on the more negative aspects of race relations in Cuba.<sup>15</sup>

One is struck by the irony that Cuba, where race relations have supposedly played such a fundamental role, does not figure in any of the social science literature on race relations in the hemisphere. In neither of the two more readily available works on this topic, (Magnus Mörner [ed.], *Race and Class in Latin America* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1970] and Richard Frucht [ed.], *Black Society in the New World* [New York: Random House, 1971]) are there discrete chapters on Cuba. One has to turn to other areas to be informed about the black presence in Cuba, if not about race relations directly. Fortunately some of the classical works have been reprinted.

Fernando Ortiz was one of the first to study African survivals sociologically and while at first his intent was to "uncover" the illegal and "criminal" aspects of it, he later became aware of their authentic contributions to an "Afro-Cuban" culture. His classical study, *Los negros bruños*, originally published in 1906, has been reprinted in Spanish (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1973); no English translation is available. Also reprinted are the works of Lydia Cabrera who has done much to illuminate this subterranean dimension of Cuban society.<sup>16</sup> The most recently published, *Anaforuana: ritual y símbolos de la iniciación en la sociedad secreta Abakuá*, goes beyond ethnography. In her brief Introduction,

Lydia Cabrera points to a crucial dimension of Cuban and Caribbean race relations: the dichotomy between private and public attitudes.<sup>17</sup> Cabrera reports that the origin of the popular Cuban saying “la amistad a un lado y el ñañigo por separado” dates back to 1863 when Andre Petit, Jsue (head priest) of the Potencia Bakoko (a branch of the ñañigo cult) admitted twenty-five white males. The other branches, composed totally of black males, refused to accept these whites and fought them “navaja en mano.” Finally, in order to avoid further confrontations with the law, they reached an agreement: the “blanquitos” (whites) would not attend black ceremonies nor the blacks that of the whites, but in public they would treat each other with respect. The ñañigo would be but one type of African survival in Cuba, and while they were the most persecuted of all (and consequently, the most secret) they managed to spread; Cabrera reports more than thirty potencias (branches) of the secret society Abakuá in Matanzas in 1958. Again, little is known of the postrevolutionary state of these cults.

Another sector of Cuban society that has remained largely unstudied is the Chinese. Duvon Clough Corbitt, while providing some interesting descriptions of that group in his *The Chinese in Cuba, 1847–1947*, rarely goes beyond description. The author tells us that he actually completed the study during World War II. He calculated that between 1847 and 1874, 125,000 Chinese were brought to Cuba (largely forcibly) as contract laborers; by the end of the century that number was reduced to 14,000 (p. 117). Again, during the twentieth century, some 150,000 were brought in, but by the end of World War II this was reduced to “scarcely fifteen or twenty thousand at most.” How, did these Chinese get along in Cuban society? Corbitt is hardly enlightening when he informs us that: “As a general proposition it might be said that the Cubans held only two things against their Chinese neighbors. First, during the Depression of the Thirties they, along with other foreigners, were regarded as competitors of Cuban laborers; and second, they are Chinese” (p. 114).

The facts, as reported by Corbitt himself, would indicate that the Chinese immigrants were largely illegal, brought in by labor-starved plantation owners in cahoots with corrupt government officials. Cuban legislation on immigration was based on U.S. immigration laws implemented in Cuba by the U.S. military government in 1898 and ratified by the Cuban Congress in 1902. Like their U.S. model, Cuban official policy had systematically discriminated against them. Some indication of Cuban attitudes towards the Chinese is given by the following editorial entitled “The Yellow Peril,” which Corbitt cites (from the newspaper *El Mundo*, 10 May 1924): “There are already nearly one hundred and fifty thousand Chinamen residing in Cuba. The Chinese colony in our nation will soon be as important as that of the Spaniards. The alarm produced by comparing this increase of elements so little desirable for the ethnic composition of our population with previous census reports is understandable” (p. 101).

For all practical purposes, the Chinese lived in isolation: they resided in ghettos (China towns), tended to concentrate in certain occupations, maintained their own Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and their own “family societies” (associations), and generally steered clear of Cuban politics and police. As Corbitt notes (without seeing the implications for the general society) on the Chinese

restaurants: "Cubans seldom penetrated these truly fascinating spots of the Orient transplanted into the West" (p. 108). And how did they get along with other "minorities"? Corbitt gives us only a clue: "Racial troubles involving the Chinese in Cuba invariably started with Whites or Negroes. The Chinese were often annoyed by the Negroes, but as much as they disliked members of that race, they managed to restrict their revenge to an attitude of supreme contempt" (p. 113). In short, rather than a sociological study, what the author gives us are some tantalizing insights into one facet of the plural mosaic called Cuba.

There remains much to be done in the area of social structural analysis and especially in the area of race and ethnic relations. The picture that emerges from these studies of the blacks and the Chinese in Cuba is in some ways akin to what Furnivall called a "plural society." This picture might well be clearer if there existed studies of the various Spanish ethnic groups, the Jamaicans, the Haitians, and the Americans. Be that as it may, the fact remains that there are rich dividends to be reaped by the application to Cuban studies of some of the reformulations of "plural society" theory presently used in Caribbean and African studies.<sup>18</sup> The continued isolation of studies of Cuban ethnic and race relations from the major currents in the field is to be lamented.

The relative abandonment of the area of race and ethnic relations is not replicated in another important area: U.S.-Cuban diplomatic history. Cuban historians, like Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring and Herminio Portell Vilá, had written volumes before the Revolution and it had been a preferred subject for pamphleteers and polemicists on both sides. Irwin F. Gellman's *Roosevelt and Batista, Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933-1945* breaks no new ground in this area. Despite its title, the work says little about either Roosevelt or Batista of a biographical nature; rather they are lost in the flow of descriptive diplomatic history. Additionally, Gellman appears to have used only American materials (largely from the U.S. archives), thus leaving Cuban views unstated. Its weaknesses as biography and balanced diplomatic history might have been mitigated had the author placed his analysis within an explicit framework of international relations theory. This is not the case, and as such the study really does not contribute much beyond Bryce Wood's extraordinary chapters on Cuba in his *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

What little excitement Gellman generates stems from his early assertion that the events of 1933 that he studies have a direct causal relationship to those of 1959. The Revolution of 1933, Gellman maintains, was neither frustrated nor forgotten: "Its fires grew and spread during Batista's first era, and from its live coals burst the flame of the Revolution of 1959" (p. 3; see also, pp. 7, 236). That this is a widely held view is undoubted. Note, for instance, Luis E. Aguilar's categorical language in his *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972): "The similarities between the earlier episode [1933] and the later revolution are so obvious" (p. 230). Or, again: "Yes, the links are obvious . . . 1959 [was] forged by the forces that emerged and grew out of the revolutionary episodes of 1933" (p. 231). A caveat is in order lest this assertion and reassertion of what just might be a classical genetic fallacy becomes an

encrusted interpretation of twentieth-century Cuban political history; causal links between 1933 and 1959 have yet to be documented, much less proven. Certainly, Gellman does not even come close to attempting a proof; he is satisfied with repeating it as a given. The same holds for Aguilar. Neither shows any concern with the theoretical literature on social or revolutionary movements, or with systematic comparison in general. The danger of the fallacy of parallelism is especially strong in the case of revolutions; the two events can show strong resemblances without being causally related.<sup>19</sup>

One of the more interesting attempts to link the 1933 political events with the 1959 Revolution is Jaime Suchlicki's analysis of continuities in student behavior (*University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920–1968* [Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969]). Even this attempt, however, is weakened by the author's inability to explain continuity and change in the behavior of major actors. Surely one would want to know whether the events of 1933 were *necessary*, *sufficient* and/or *contributory* causes or (when taken together) one of a series of *contingent* and *alternative* conditions of 1959.

Related to this problem of causation is the question of periodization in Cuban historiography. Today, the official Cuban historical interpretation is that 1959 represented the final culmination of a "hundred year" revolutionary process, and that what existed up to 1959 was a "neo-colonial" or "pseudo-republic." This interpretation is considerably more nationalist than Marxist and, again, has yet to be documented systematically. On the other hand, those who argue that the "genesis" of 1959 lies in the revolutionary watershed of 1933 are more prone to the "revolution betrayed" argument. It is clear, thus, that periodization is one of the most important generalizations utilized by historians; it makes much explicit, it leaves even more implicit.

The problem of periodization is very evident in the works of Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson Valdes (eds.) *Revolutionary Struggle, 1947–1958. Volume 1 of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro*, and Ramón L. Bonachea and Marta San Martín, *The Cuban Insurrection, 1952–1959*. It would seem that Bonachea and Valdes have selected 1947 as their starting point because that is the date of the first printed statements of Fidel Castro, statements made either as a member of a group or individually. In 1947, Castro was a twenty-year old University of Havana activist, one of many and, indeed, only one of many. But, selection of the date appears to respond to more than the chronological beginning of Fidel Castro's statements (who knows what other pre-1947 statements might eventually appear!). It suits the particular thesis of Cuban revolutionary dynamics of the authors: the crystallization by 1945–50 of a revolutionary political culture. This thesis raises the methodological issues of the role of ideas and culture in revolutionary change, and of the role of men as agents of revolutionary change. In their lengthy introduction (119 pages as compared to 318 pages of selected speeches), the authors argue that in Cuba "there always existed" (p. xiii) a revolutionary tradition, a tradition that sought guidance from José Martí. It was nationalist and antiimperialist, devoid of systematic ideology, and "above all, action oriented." Fidel Castro was in this tradition: "The 1933 revolutionary movement, as we shall show, degenerated into gangsterlike action groups by the 1940s. It was in

one of these groups that Fidel Castro initiated his career and received practical political training. It can be said that he did not depart from Cuba's revolutionary tradition. He relied on Martí's interpretation. He was antiimperialist and nationalist, and above all, he was a man of action" (p. xiii).

This is one aspect of the thesis: that there developed a political culture in which the main ideas were of a nationalist, combative type—a "tradition" of revolutionary action. Such a theoretical stance would have to be submitted to all the methodological queries made of "national character," of "political culture" approaches to revolutionary behavior. But Bonachea and Valdes are never explicit as to their theoretical frame of reference, so the critique has to deal with what is implicit in their approach. Again, the second dimension of their theory of revolution remains implicit, though they are quite emphatic at the descriptive level. This dimension deals with the role of the hero in history, in this case, the role of Fidel Castro: "One can begin to understand the impact of the most fundamental revolution in modern Latin American history by objectively analyzing the words of the man who guided it. . . . Through these selections every facet of Castro's central role as the leader of a revolutionary process can be ascertained to form a clear picture of one of the most dynamic revolutions of all times" (p. xiii).

These two assumptions about the Cuban Revolution, the existence of a long revolutionary tradition and the central role of leaders, seems to accompany another major assumption of the authors: that Cuban history is best understood in terms of generational rather than class conflict. Although this certainly is not a novel suggestion in Cuban studies, the problems with this approach are many. One has, for instance, the difficulty of deciding in which generation to place an individual. Related to this is the danger of the post hoc fallacy: attributing representativeness to those who survive and are successful in achieving power (or at least die with publicly acknowledged heroism).

It is precisely these theoretical presuppositions by Bonachea and Valdes that make the book by Bonachea and San Martín such interesting parallel reading. One notes immediately that the latter adopt 1952 as their starting point. From the very beginning the authors attempt to balance personal with methodological reasons for this choice of 1952:

For several years now, the authors have felt that no meaningful understanding of the Cuban Revolution can be obtained without exhaustive research into the political-military factors that led to the victory of the insurrection. Our interest in the 1952–59 period sprang from intellectual rebelliousness; we wanted to challenge what we felt had become a maze of ill-founded premises about the social, military-political genesis of the Cuban revolutionary process. We believed that a *legitimate beginning* to any study of this period would require us to unearth the names of men and women whose ideas and actions, oddly fallen into an aura of anonymity, had been central to the nature and direction the struggle. Thus, this book has been written from the point of view of the Cuban insurrectionists (p. xi).

The authors accept Ché Guevara's contention that the "insurreccional" phase of armed struggle should be separated from the "revolutionary" phase of social structural transformations. Their interpretation is that the insurreccional phase was led by "a new generation of Cubans . . . the political generation of 1950," whose ideological tenets "seemed to have departed little from the ideals of the frustrated revolution of 1933" (p. 2). Like Bonachea and Valdes, the authors stress the role of individuals as agents of social revolutionary change, but unlike Bonachea and Valdes they insist that there were three leaders, not one: Fidel Castro, Frank País, and José A. Echeverría. Their views on one of these three is revisionist to say the least: "Each of them was young, deeply committed and possessed his own charismatic style. Each exhibited distinct personality traits that reflected his social and political upbringing. The authors' argument is that of the three, Fidel Castro felt most at ease with the conservative views of the Old World. A generous share of egocentrism and male authoritarianism permeated Fidel's actions" (pp. 6–7).

Since no one has yet collected the speeches and statements of either Frank País or José Antonio Echeverría with anywhere near the thoroughness dedicated to Fidel Castro's (and Ché Guevara's for that matter), how is a judgment on the "representativeness" of any to be made; how can one, indeed, claim them to be of the same "generation"? These are but some of the questions generated by this angry, often even abrasive, study by Bonachea and San Martín. They are most assuredly not the only questions engendered by the book for it is clear that they intend to rewrite much of the history of that period. They claim, for instance, that the Communists were clearly involved in the betrayal by Batista's police of Joe Westbrook and three other leaders of the Directorio Revolucionario (pp. 128–30), and "they were probably involved in other betrayals" (p. 130); that during the frustrated strike of April 1958, "many of the so-called leaders of the M–26–7 showed extreme cowardice" (p. 213), and the authors mention their names. Again, regarding Castro's role: "A considerable mythology, on one hand, and a stony silence, on the other, have surrounded the events of April 9, 1958. It can be stated unequivocally that Fidel Castro was responsible for the conception of the strike and for its failure" (p. 214).

Though not directly stated, there is the implication that Castro feared the growing strength of the Havana-based urban wing of the M–26–7 "as a future contender for power" and was not unhappy, therefore, with its defeat (p. 215). There is a passionate tone throughout the book, and more than once one finds what can only be termed vindictive asides. Note, for instance, the description of Communist informers in the early years of the Revolution: "At the Federation of Bank Employees, one of the authors petitioned its executive council to immediately investigate the role of such Communist informers, but was told that revolutionary unity demanded a postponement of complaints against these persons. This position was defended by Odón Alvarez de la Campa, now exiled in Orlando, Florida" (p. 391).

Despite the very real methodological problems cited, problems that make it difficult to generalize from these studies or to use these studies in building any

theory of revolutionary movements, these two works are substantial contributions to the literature of Cuban Revolution. Both are replete with suggestive and controversial comments and interpretations that are not necessarily new but that appear documented in a systematic fashion and made integral parts of a complex narrative on the origins of the Cuban Revolution. To cite only a few interpretations:

“Contrary to popular belief, Fulgencio Batista did not engineer the [1952] coup.” It was engineered by junior officers; Batista only subsequently agreed to lead it as a civilian (Bonachea and Valdes, p. 31).

“From a Marxist perspective, Batista in 1933 was the exemplary revolutionary leader according to his class origins” (Bonachea and San Martín, p. 8).

“Batista had “strongly advocated racial equality and nondiscrimination” thereby winning the support of Cuban blacks; he was an “idol” to the peasantry, immigrant groups, and his soldiers (Bonachea and Valdes, p. 9).

“It is not surprising that urban militants felt strongly anti-Communist. It was not so much a matter of ideological differences—the Communists being far more to the right than Batista . . . the Communists were Batistianos” (Bonachea and San Martín, p. 221).

On the pre-1959 role of Osvaldo Dorticos, Commander of the Cienfuegos Yacht Club and member of the Communist Party: “As a loyal Batistiano he remained neutral during the events” (Bonachea and San Martín, p. 150).

Aside from these controversial interpretations, both books present a plethora of interesting facts that deserve further research. There is, for instance, Bonachea and Valdes’ findings that “so many Cuban revolutionaries are first generation Cubans” (p. 4n), and the fact cited by Bonachea and San Martín, that “at various stages during the struggle, the M-26-7 urban leadership was in the hands of Protestant-affiliated militants” (p. 388n). One speculates, thus, on the role of “marginal” men in the Cuban revolutionary process. Clearly, neither of these books is an introductory text; it requires substantial prior knowledge of Cuban history to make a path through the veritable avalanche of names, places, and events described in detail by the authors. It is, in fact, this richness of documented detail that makes these two works combined, despite the methodological shortcomings cited above, the only competition to Hugh Thomas’ *Cuba* and its extensive treatment of the same periods and events. Both the Bonachea and Valdes and the Bonachea and San Martín books are necessary reading for the serious student.

Those requiring an introductory text to various facets of the Revolution (post 1959) might be tempted to turn to James Nelson Goodsell’s *Fidel Castro’s Personal Revolution in Cuba: 1959–1973*. Like Bonachea and Valdes, Goodsell feels that “the Cuban revolution is in considerable measure a personal revolution, so much so that it is difficult to disassociate Castro and the Revolution” (p. 5). It is hard to find substantiation for that view from the selections that make up the book, however, since they were not chosen to substantiate or even illustrate a theme. In the author’s own words, they were selected to “show the variety of

research and comment on Fidel Castro's revolution from 1959 to the present" (p. 13). Thus, the title is somewhat misleading. The selections are organized into five main headings: the "Political Thrust," the "Economic Thrust," the "Cultural Thrust," the "International Thrust," and "Unanswered Questions." The Introduction is altogether too brief (13 pages) and tends to be largely paraphrasing from the texts included. Note, for instance, the following juxtaposed paragraphs from Goodsell's Introduction (p. 7) and the selection from Hugh Thomas' *Cuba* (p. 293):

Goodsell: "On the positive side, the Castro revolution has provided more educational opportunities, free health services, milk for children, a sense of community, and the encouragement of the arts and literature."

Thomas: "On the one side more education, free health, milk for children, a sense of community, and much more encouragement for the arts."

Goodsell: "On the negative side of the ledger, there would necessarily be the absence of personal liberty, a continuing atmosphere of crisis and tension, the tragedies of lives and families that are deeply divided by politics and a strident propaganda machine."

Thomas: "On the other the absence of liberty, intolerance towards the not inconsiderable group of middle-aged, middle-class people, the persistent atmosphere of crisis and tension, the tragedies in hundreds of families divided by politics, and the strident propaganda."

Goodsell: "An accounting of this, however, does not get at the heart of the Castro revolution."

Thomas: "But such an account would not really get very far for several reasons."

Without a central theme and without an introduction of substance, the selections stand on their own and as such might be more confusing than not to the student attempting to fit together the pieces of this puzzle called the Cuban Revolution. It reflects the dilemma of books attempting to explain complex contemporary social processes: single eyewitness accounts, no matter how cohesive the treatment and sharp the focus, tend to be insufficient; too many and various perspectives tend to lose cohesiveness and focus.

If Goodsell's reader suffers from the latter weakness, Maurice Halperin's *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro* is afflicted with the former. Halperin tells us that aside from noting that he lived in the U.S.S.R. from 1959 to 1962, and from 1962 to 1968 in Cuba, "the book needs no further explanation. . . . It should 'explain' itself, and if it fails to do so, no extended commentary on my part concerning aims, methods, biases and so on will be of much value." This is so, says Halperin, because "in the writing of history, as in the exploits of gastronomy, 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating'" (p. 1x).

By utilizing the title, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro*, and by telling us that the volume is concerned with the first five years (1959–64), Halperin finds himself in the strange position of asserting the decline of a leader who is still in

power thirteen years beyond the period covered. Halperin promises another book to cover the period 1964–69 and one cannot easily speculate as to the title of that one. Unfortunately, what is a proven fact for gastronomy turns out to be mere wishful thinking for history, for even though the author does not state it explicitly, the book does have a method of sorts. The theme of “rise” is related to what one might call the “charismatic” phase of the Revolution, the romantic, nationalistic, idealistic, and utopian period of Fidel Castro’s leadership. The theme of “decline” is related to the institutionalization of that rule and fundamentally to the adoption of the Soviet model. In the author’s own words: “Essentially, the Cuban Revolution is over. What remains after more than fifteen years is a stable, austere, Soviet oriented and supported regime, still dominated by the now middle-aged and portly figure of Fidel Castro. . . . Cuba today is about as exciting a model of Utopia as Bulgaria. The way is open for a normalization of relations with the United States” (p. vi).

With that for openers, Halperin then gives us a chronological narrative of events in Cuba. Because it is very much a personal narrative, Halperin largely dispenses with the traditional references and citation of sources, a fact that helps make the book more readable. The narrative flows well and Halperin’s obvious personal acquaintance with much of what he relates gives the book a touch of intimacy more often than not lacking in studies of this type. His irreverence is refreshing, albeit not always convincing. His personal insights into Fidel Castro’s “style” are frequently given and, on occasion, compelling. For instance:

Such are the idiosyncracies of Fidel Castro. For all his informality, there is much of the *grand seigneur* in Fidel’s personal habits, including both the abuse of prerogative and the generosity of *noblesse oblige* (pp. 292–93). . . . That Fidel’s views on international affairs have frequently been inconsistent does not fundamentally distinguish him from most political leaders. His inconsistencies have been more colorful and conspicuous . . . [but] as in the case of most heads of government, his overriding objectives are the national interest, as he sees it. All of this, of course, helps explain why, despite his self-proclaimed and constantly reiterated inflexible dedication to the purest international revolutionary idealism, he is still ‘in business’ (p. 271).

One needs not belabor the point that no study of a process as enduring and intricate as the Cuban Revolution can be sustained by such personal insights alone. This fact becomes painfully clear once one analyzes further Halperin’s attempt to demonstrate Fidel Castro’s decline. One searches in vain for evidence in the book of that decline (which, one can only assume, is something different from the decline of the Cuban economy, or the decline of Cuban influence in Latin America, etc.). It is a consistent theme of Halperin’s that all nations are out to secure their national interest (being “in business” he calls it), and on this score and up to 1964, Fidel Castro seems far from being in decline; he is, in fact, very much “in business.” To cite but two examples pertinent to Halperin’s thesis of decline: As regards the 1963 sugar deal with the USSR—“Fidel did pay a political price for what he received from Krushchev, though not a big price in

terms of what he received, and not as big a price as it first appeared to be" (p. 236); as regards general exchanges with the USSR—"In the economic exchange between the two countries, the balance of benefit to a considerable degree was in favor of Cuba. On this score, there was little to complain about" (p. 309). On more than one occasion, then, Halperin indicates how Castro forced the Soviets to swallow some bitter pills. Even the legitimization of Cuban socialism, he notes, "was to be sure a reluctant concession by the Kremlin" (pp. 220–21). To the extent that there is a "decline," therefore, it appears to fit more Max Weber's concept of the routinization of charisma, the institutionalization and stabilization of personal rule—perhaps an inevitable trend in revolutionary leadership—but hardly to be confused with a "decline."

There is in Halperin a certain tone seen in the works of many foreigners (and perhaps most vividly in the second work of René Dumont, *Cuba est-elle socialiste?*) when they question the authenticity of Cuban socialism. Regarding publicity for New Year 1964 celebrations, for instance, Halperin interprets the use of pictures of the young female artists as "once more" proving "that Cuban socialism was unique: it was socialism with cheesecake" (p. 362). Or, again, he quotes the Cuban paper *El Mundo* which has Mikoyan telling Ché Guevara that the Cuban Revolution "is a phenomenon that Marx had not foreseen" (p. 201). But certainly both Halperin and Mikoyan should know that there isn't a single socialist revolution in existence that Marx foresaw. Nor did the successful revolutions of present-day socialist countries come about in the manner foreseen by Marx and Engels. Orthodoxy, in so far as it exists today, is a post-Marxian creation and Cuba, like all the other socialist countries of today's world, is an innovator, an experimenter, a blend of different measures of ideology and expediency, all attempting to stay "in business."

There is of course in the social sciences a role for the study of the "deviant case"; if nothing else, such studies tend to reveal the pressures to conform and thus provide the institutional parameters for social change in a given context—in this case the "socialist world." To be productive, such an approach requires an explicit and self-conscious methodology not ideological self-righteousness or condescension.

Few areas and topics of the Cuban revolutionary process have generated more debate than the attempt to create a "new man" by shifting the economy away from material rewards and towards moral incentives. To what degree was ideology and to what degree was expediency involved? To Halperin it was expediency. As he sees it, by 1964, Ché (who, he maintains, "was already contemplating disengagement from Cuba's domestic affairs" [p. 232]) had given the main ideological impulse. It was only Fidel Castro, however, who could implement the plan, and he did so because he was "thoroughly frustrated by political and economic miscalculations" (p. 311). A year after Ché left for Bolivia, Fidel Castro, according to Halperin, "discovered" moral incentives (p. 233), and by 1968 had moved Cuba much further towards an economy based on non-economic incentives than even Ché had advocated. The goal obviously was not merely to bring about economic development but to create a "new man," a new social consciousness. And even if Fidel Castro's remarkable speech of 26 July

1970 would indicate that the experiment had not produced the best economic results, who is bold enough to assert that the experiment did not succeed at the political and sociopsychological levels?

Bertram Silverman, in his *Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate*, has brought together the most important statements in the debate that took place between 1962 and 1965 between the advocates of "revolutionary ethics" and the supporters of economic rationality. To Silverman the shift to moral incentives was brought about fundamentally by economic exigencies, and he is not at all sanguine about their success economically. He is hesitant, however, to discard ideological motivation completely.

To Silverman, the Cuban development strategy was not one-dimensional. Within the context of this strategy, the "ethics of revolution," as expressed in the turn to moral incentives, was rational and had a long tradition: "The 'ethics of conscience' reflected in Guevara's position have deep roots in the Cuban Revolution" (p. 5). The decision, then, was based on expediency and something else. Perhaps it is this approach that leads Silverman to conclude that the long-term social gains might well offset the short-term economic costs:

The reliance on social conscience has already had a dramatic impact on the quality of Cuban economic development. . . . The most striking aspect of Cuba is the extent to which all strata of society are involved in the problems of economic development. The differences between town and country, between student, intellectual, and worker, are being eliminated. In the long run, this transformation of the social structure, in combination with the involvement of a large proportion of the population in economic development, may be the most significant impact of the Cuban Revolution (p. 25).

Unfortunately, Silverman does not attempt to document this assertion. His Introduction is too brief and descriptive to contribute much beyond prefacing the excellent pieces he has selected for his volume. One seeks, therefore, a more extensive analysis to accompany Silverman's selection. This analysis is provided by Robert M. Bernardo in *The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba*. This is a dispassionate economic analysis that contains an interesting comparative commentary on the Chinese case. Written like Silverman's in 1970, Bernardo's assessment leads to even more dramatic conclusions: "A claim I shall be making is that Cuba has become the first country in the world to have achieved Communism under conditions of relative peace . . . it is the first to institutionalize the Communist or egalitarian rule of production and distribution" (p. ix).

To Bernardo there was a fundamental and noneconomic factor in the whole equation: the deep commitment of the revolutionary leadership to egalitarianism as the means of eradicating alienation. On the basis of his interpretation of such a commitment he then analyzes moral incentives as they affect the structure of the Cuban firm and the organization of labor; he ends with a balance-sheet type analysis of the efficiency and viability of moral incentives. His conclusion? Moral incentives have not been successful in promoting growth, the reverse has been the case. But, says Bernardo, there is another way of viewing

growth; from the point of view of "productive potential": "Here, the Cuban record since 1965 is impressive" (p. 117).

Like Silverman, Bernardo estimates that social overhead capital, particularly education in badly needed technical skills, has accumulated rapidly and will have an eventual payoff. Additionally, Bernardo argues, a "broader perspective" would also have to reckon with the drastic reduction of income inequality, something he regards as an important "efficiency criterion." And despite the pressures since 1970 to revert to a market system, Bernardo anticipates that the Cubans would retain major aspects of moral stimulation for some time yet. He cites several reasons. For one, the high level of investments could not be retained under an effective system of material incentives, something Cuba will not be able to afford for a while yet. This, then, is an economic reason; but the fundamental reason, as he sees it, is ideological, to wit: "the main leaders' awesome commitment to promoting the Communist distributive principle" (p. 138). Despite its sophisticated level of analysis, the Bernardo book stands as testimony to the difficulty of predicting the course of decision-making in revolutionary situations, a fact attested to by the conclusions of Archibald R. M. Ritter's *The Economic Development of Revolutionary Cuba: Strategy and Performance*.

In what has to be regarded as one of the more comprehensive and balanced economic histories of the Cuban Revolution from 1959 to 1974, Ritter notes that what is occurring today in Cuba is "nothing less than the termination of Cuba's unique formula for the construction of Communism" (p. 326). Reliance upon the "new man" morality for achieving economic growth has been abandoned as impractical and idealistic: "Indeed, Premier Castro's conception of human nature underwent a significant change. Prior to July 1970 the Premier continuously spoke of the perfectability of man and of the advisability of restructuring society on the assumption that man *was* motivated by altruism and patriotism" (p. 326). Absenteeism, falling productivity, growth of black markets, the proliferation of *amiguismo* (special privileges to the elite), and increasing recourse to regimentation and coercion (militarization) all led to a fundamental change: "After July 1970, however, Premier Castro adopted what was in effect the Stalinist formula for the distribution of income—to each according to his work—though he articulated this position more tactfully and elegantly: 'Society must do most for those who do most for society'" (p. 327). Ritter makes it clear that the failure of the phase of mobilization on moral grounds was by no means a total loss:

In summary, it is possible to be mildly optimistic concerning Cuba's economic prospects in the decade of the 1970s. Even with no further changes in the growth, institutional, and mobilization strategies it is likely that Cuba's massive investment in social and physical infrastructure—public health, elementary, technical, and higher education, and general levels of nutrition—should begin to bear fruit in the 1970s (p. 349).

This point, like so many others regarding this extraordinary social phenomenon called the Cuban Revolution, will no doubt be long debated. But Ritter's book deserves to be analyzed from another perspective: what it says

about doing research on revolutionary societies in general and perhaps this one in particular. The dialectical interplay between the need for scholarly detachment and the constant and pervasive "pull" of commitment takes its toll of studies of such societies. It is clear that neither the "enemies" nor the "friends" have had thus far a distinct advantage in the number of accurate interpretations or observations made. Perhaps Ritter's book has a methodological lesson: there is a basic sympathy for the Cuban process, especially for the human element involved, but there is also a very evident independence of mind and judgment. Ritter's obvious freedom to travel several times to Cuba, yet the complete absence of any indications of "debt" or "gratitude" towards the Cubans, is to be envied. It might well say something about the difference of doing research on Cuba in Canada and doing it from the U.S. sociology of knowledge theory has much to contribute to this matter.

We do well, however, to return to one of Ritter's central points: that 1970 represented a major watershed in the Cuban process. That the changes wrought after 1971 in the general philosophy of the regime were not limited to economic planning is evident in the work of Marvin Leiner, *Children Are the Revolution: Day Care in Cuba*. During his stay in Cuba in 1968–69, Leiner came to admire the goals set by the *círculos infantiles* or day-care centers: (1) the liberation of Cuban women from exploitation and chauvinism (and, not inconsequently, freeing them to work), and (2) the creation of the "new man." It was felt that by fulfilling these two goals the *círculos* would repay handsome social and economic benefits to society both in the short and long term.

Leiner notes that the basic system used in the *círculos* was directed learning—as distinct from a freer "spontaneous" approach. In 1965—coinciding with the initiatives on moral incentives, therefore—a new type of day-care center was created; the *jardines infantiles* that existed then side-by-side with the *círculos*: "While the *jardines* and the *círculos* used the same rhetoric concerning their long-range goals, they operated quite differently. The *círculo* system concentrated its attention on cleanliness, directed learning, and planned schedules, while the *jardines* relied on free play, exploration, and a relaxed, unplanned atmosphere" (p. 106). Leiner notes that the *jardín* leadership "believes its long-range approach is closer to Cuba's revolutionary aims than is that of the *círculos*" (p. 112). And there is no doubt as to what Leiner's own preference was: "The *jardines* in Cuba had a vision which one hopes will find its way ultimately into day care philosophy" (p. 117). This was in 1969.

In 1971, Leiner revisited Cuba and its day-care centers. Gone were the *jardines* and gone from any positions of leadership were those who in 1965 had given birth to them. While Leiner clearly laments this loss (cf. pp. 174–75) at no time does he attempt to relate the changes in the preschool education system with the wider changes occurring in the political and economic system. And here lies one of the fundamental weaknesses of his work: the study of this day-care system takes place in a vacuum. Not only does the author fail to see the links with the broader system but, additionally, and perhaps because of this, he fails to address himself to what he claims is in part his "theme": "Whether the Cuban educational medicine is an appropriate cure for its historical pathology,

whether the Cubans can come up with a cure to arrest the diseases spread by the previous system" (p. 4). This failure stems in part from another characteristic of the book: the questions addressed are dynamic in nature (viz. socialization processes); the analysis provided is invariably static and descriptive. Indeed, there is a serious question as to whether the broad-gauged issues posed by Leiner can be answered at all from an analysis of preschool day-care centers especially when, as the author observes, most of those working directly with the children are so "minimally trained" that they frequently not only ignore the orders that come from the general staff, but "do not even understand the nature of the battle" (p. 104).

Unless the author believes in some form of "original sin" as regards these "social diseases" he describes, the better place to have addressed a study with such a theme would have been a group already socialized, such as university students or other prospective recruits for middle-leadership positions. But perhaps the fundamental flaw of the study is that Leiner, like so many others who are radical in sympathies and intent, fails categorically even to consider, much less adopt, a Marxian understanding of social change.

Had Leiner followed the "great debate" on moral vs material incentives he would have noticed that so much of that debate related to the role of education. He would have had to deal with the voluntarism of Ché and with the materialistic position taken (to cite but one) by the French economist, Charles Bettelheim:

In theory, the behavior of men—both as they relate to each other and as they function in their respective roles—should not be analyzed according to appearances. This would imply that altering such appearances, especially through education, would alter behavior itself; this is an idealistic outlook. Rather, behavior should be viewed as a consequence of the actual introduction of men into the technical and social division of labor and into a given process of production and reproduction.<sup>20</sup>

Again, it isn't that the adoption of Marxian methodology is a *sine qua non* for the study of a socialist society, but is it possible to ignore totally such an approach (and the debates within it) with impunity? Certainly not in the area of socialization and resocialization and the creation of a "new man." Would anyone venture a study of education in officially Islamic Pakistan or Libya without an understanding of the Koran? Leiner's book is valuable for the readiness of the information it provides on the operation of the day-care centers; it falls short, however, in doing much of what it obviously set out to do.

This review could not close without addressing the question often asked by those teaching survey courses on Latin America: since the field has become so specialized, what—aside from Hugh Thomas's monumentally good but also monumentally expensive book—is there on the Cuban Revolution that can be used in such a course? There are two recent works that can be recommended for just that purpose as well as having value for the specialist: Edward Gonzalez's *Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma* and Carmelo Mesa-Lago's *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization*; both are available in paperback. They

are well written, well documented and balanced interpretations. Both perceive an institutionalization of authority, the end of an epoch, the start of another. Both analyze the interaction between internal politics and foreign policy. Neither makes any pretense at contributing to anything beyond the Cuban case, although Gonzalez is considerably more ambitious in his attempts to explain "the *fidelistas* phenomenon." Because such an explanation is attempted from the perspective of charismatic authority and its limitations, one can only lament the absence of a serious treatment of the theory and how that authority reached its limits in Cuba. Gonzalez's whole discussion of charismatic authority takes place in four footnotes, all drawn from the same brief passage by Max Weber. His analysis is, nevertheless, plausible, similar in fact to those of René Dumont, K. S. Karol, and Hugh Thomas. This would place Gonzalez in cluster number three discussed above, a distinguished group of scholars indeed.

The books by Gonzalez and Mesa-Lago, as was noted, are exceptionally well suited for use in "survey" courses and this fact contains a methodological lesson. Mesa-Lago and Gonzalez are experienced students of Cuban affairs; this is reflected in the sober and pondered manner in which they analyze and the caution of their predictions. They are testimony to the value of area studies (i.e., long-term dedication to a particular geographical area), a sense of history, and the interdisciplinary approach. Complex and fast moving social events such as the Cuban Revolution can hardly be understood and explained through any other method. One need not go beyond that major student of nineteenth-century events, Friedrich Engels, to justify the call for more historical research in the study of social change in general and revolutionary change in particular. And in the study of revolutions one would do well to keep in mind what Robert Merton called the "latent" and the "manifest" functions of social action. Engels was well aware of this:

If events and series of events are judged by current history, it will never be possible to go back to the ultimate economic causes . . . the most important of which, into the bargain, generally operate a long time in secret before they suddenly make themselves violently felt on the surface. A clear survey of the economic history of a given period can never be obtained contemporaneously, but only subsequently, after a collecting and sifting of the material has taken place.<sup>21</sup>

The need for interdisciplinary work is clear. In this regard one should understand that there is a use of Marxian methodology which transcends ideology and which is fundamentally historical and interdisciplinary, as Hobsbawm notes: "It is an essential characteristic of Marx's historical thought that it is neither 'sociological' nor 'economic' but both simultaneously. The social relations of production and reproduction (i.e. social organization in its broadest sense) and the material forces of production, cannot be divorced."<sup>22</sup> The literature on Cuba has come a long way since the pre-1959 days described at the opening of this essay. Today the student faces a bewildering number of studies and interpretations on Cuba and its history. The need for a greater methodological self-consciousness is more urgent than ever and contemporary social sci-

ence—together with some major nineteenth-century thinkers—can provide the tools.

Writing in 1935, a journalist who knew the island well confessed: "I make no claim to understanding the Cuban people. . . . My personal opinion is that no Anglo-Saxon can ever fathom the mind of a Cuban."<sup>23</sup> Be that as it may, not only have many "Anglo-Saxon" Americans believed they understood the Cuban, but they may have acted on the basis of such presumed understanding. In fact, much of the rationalization of those who would engage in imperialism or interventions of all kinds, tends to make special claims to a unique understanding. Often it is the very person disclaiming any understanding of "the Cuban" or "the Dominican" who then proceeds to make assertions such as "Cuba cannot live without the United States as her best friend and customer,"<sup>24</sup> or "The problems of Cuba are the problems of the United States."<sup>25</sup>

Such patronizing mental processes are, alas, not something of the past, they are in fact very much present. Take, for instance, the book by Howard Hunt, *Give Us This Day*. Hunt says that he writes with a mood of "nostalgic bitterness" (p. 15). A member of the CIA team that participated in the 1954 Guatemala operation, he also spent nineteen months on the "Cuba Project" that ended in the swamps of the Bay of Pigs. Whether all that was training enough for the Watergate operation is in doubt; Hunt was one of those convicted and jailed. But this book deals with Cuba and the Bay of Pigs. Hunt relates his surreptitious trip to Havana in 1959 and his subsequent recommendation to his superiors, the first on the list being: "Assassinate Castro *before* or coincident with the invasion (a task for Cuban patriots)" (p. 38, emphasis in original). With Vice President Richard Nixon as "the project's action officer within the White House" (p. 40), one understands something of the level of U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs.

All the American imperial disdain for the Cubans, whether in Cuba or in exile, is here. Reminiscent of the American behavior towards the Liberation Army of 1898 is Hunt's revelation: "Cuban plans, in any case, were not the ones that would be used on I-Day, but plans that were being developed by CIA and the Pentagon through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cuban [exile] military planning, therefore, was a harmless exercise. . . . To paraphrase a homily: this was too important to be left to Cuban generals" (pp. 61–62). How dramatically and tragically does history tend to repeat itself. The Hunt book might well be the first of a new "cluster": works by ex-CIA and other intelligence operatives embittered by the whole Watergate aftermath. Fascinating revelations might yet be in store for the students of Cuban affairs. We might even learn something about Cuba; we will certainly discover much about ourselves.

## NOTES

1. Evidence of this value can be seen, for instance, in the extensive use made of it in Oscar Pino-Santos' *El asalto a Cuba por la oligarquía financiera Yanki* (La Habana: Casa de las Américas, 1973). This book—which won the 1973 Premio Casa de las Américas—also contains important inputs from a group of North American researchers.

2. *Sugar and Society in the Caribbean: An Economic History of Cuban Agriculture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Noteworthy in this English edition is the extensive foreword by Sidney W. Mintz.
3. Two official reports of limited circulation were published in the early 1950s: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba, *Report on Cuba, Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission Organized by the IBRD in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950* (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1951); and International Cooperation Administration, Office of Labor Affairs, *Summary of the Labor Situation in Cuba* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Labor, December 1956).
4. A good idea of this productivity can be gotten from Nelson P. Valdes and Edwin Lieuwen, *The Cuban Revolution: A Research Study Guide (1959–1969)* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), and Earl J. Pariseau (ed.), *Cuban Acquisitions and Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1970).
5. Harry Hoetink, "Cuba and the New Experts," *Caribbean Studies* 1, no. 2 (April 1961): 16–21.
6. Representative of this group are the works by Fulgencio Batista, as for instance, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962); Manuel Urrutia Leo, *Fidel Castro and Co., Inc.: Community Tyranny in Cuba* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Teresa Casuso, *Cuba and Castro*, translated by Elmer Grossberg (New York: Random House, 1961); Earl E.T. Smith, *The Fourth Floor, An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution* (New York: Arlington House, 1969); Mario Lazo, *Dagger in the Heart* (New York: Funk and Wagnall, 1968); Rufo López-Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months with Castro* (Cleveland, Ohio: World, 1966).
7. René Dumont, *Is Cuba Socialist?* (New York: Viking, 1974), which first appeared in French as *Cuba est-elle socialiste?* (Paris: Seuil, 1970); K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970); Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
8. Suárez's most important work is *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967). The most interesting of Mesa-Lago's essays are reprinted in his edited reader, *Revolutionary Change in Cuba* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).
9. See *The Cuban Studies Newsletter* 1, no. 1 (December 1970), published by the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh. Since January 1975 (5, no. 1) appearing as *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos* in journal format.
10. A much less significant study is Roland T. Ely's *Cuando reinaba su majestad el azúcar* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1963).
11. There are two significant dissertations worth noting: Thomas T. Orum's "The Politics of Color: The Racial Dimension of Cuban Politics during the Early Republican Years, 1900–1912" (New York University, 1975), which makes a significant contribution to our understanding of what he considers Cuban "schizophrenic society"—"one face for foreign contact [white], another for its own activities [flexible]," (p. x); and Donna Marie Wolf, "The Caribbean People of Color and the Cuban Independence Movement" (University of Pittsburgh, 1973), deals with the pan-Caribbean influences and contacts of black and colored Cubans. A significant as well as fascinating theme.
12. One of the few items on this subject available to me in the Biblioteca José Martí in 1974 was Serafin Portuondo Linares, *Los independientes de color*, 2nd. ed. (La Habana: Editorial Librería Selecta, 1950). This is a sympathetic attempt at explaining the motives behind the PIC's rebellion.
13. This fear was given monumental proportions by stories—not all veridical by any means—of black atrocities during the Haitian Revolution. The fear of black vengeance became an integral part of the Caribbean intellectual milieu. For the use of this fear by English, Spanish, and French see C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1963).
14. Wolf, "The Caribbean People."
15. Hugh Thomas notes that Fidel Castro never mentioned race prejudice in any of his

speeches or programs before the Revolution. According to Thomas, Castro first addressed himself to the question in reply to a North American journalist on 23 January 1959, a fact that he says indicates that "racial prejudice in old Cuba was not overwhelming" (*Cuba*, pp. 1120–21). This assessment notwithstanding, Thomas' subsection on "Black Cuba" (pp. 1117–26) stands as clear testimony to the importance of race in prerevolutionary Cuba. The role of race in revolutionary Cuba has yet to be given scholarly attention.

16. Most important is her *El Monte*, originally published in 1954 and reprinted by Ediciones Universal, Miami, Florida, 1975. See also her *Cuentos negros de Cuba* (Madrid: Ramos, 1972) with the original 1940 prologue by Fernando Ortiz.
17. The best statement on this is contained in Harry Hoetink, *Caribbean Race Relations: A Study of Two Variants* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
18. See Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, *Pluralism in Africa* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971).
19. See Robert R. Palmer, "Generalizations about Revolutions: A Case Study," in Louis Gottschalk (ed.), *Generalization in the Writings of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 66–76.
20. Quoted in Silverman, *Man and Socialism*, p. 4.
21. Friedrich Engels, "The Tactics of Social Democracy," in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 407.
22. E. J. Hobsbawm, "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography," in Robin Blackburn (ed.), *Ideology in Social Science* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972), p. 279.
23. R. Hart Phillips, *Cuban Sideshow* (Havana: Cuban Press, 1935), p. 1. Mrs. Phillips was *New York Times* correspondent in Havana until 1959.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 318.