

RUSSIA AND THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY: A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE. By *Sven Allard*. University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970. 248 pp. \$7.95.

This volume, as Kurt L. London writes in the foreword, is a "sophisticated case study of Soviet political behavior" (p. 7). Written by the Swedish ambassador to Austria during the critical months of negotiation preceding the signing of the state treaty, it is also an "inside story." As ambassador to Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria between 1949 and 1951 and to Hungary and Czechoslovakia from 1951 until 1954, Allard, before coming to Vienna, had numerous opportunities to observe Soviet aims and tactics in actual practice.

The author provides the reader with interesting insights into the difficulties confronting foreign diplomats in Czechoslovakia, the reasons for Mátyás Rákosi's replacement by Imre Nagy as prime minister of Hungary, the personal qualities and attributes of key Austrian officials and of the members of the Allied Control Council, Soviet policies and practices in Austria, and various fruitless efforts of the Soviet Union between 1947 and 1950 to seize control of Austria through coups d'état supported by the Soviet army. Yet the main emphasis is always on the foreign policy of the USSR and the seemingly sudden Soviet *volte-face* early in 1955, when, to the surprise of *cognoscenti* throughout the Western world, the Soviet Union not only agreed to sign a state treaty with Austria but actually took the initiative in pushing the treaty to conclusion.

In Allard's opinion, the sudden change in the attitude of the USSR toward Austria was only a reflection of the decisive change in Russian tactics, though by no means in long-range goals, that crystallized, after a bitter struggle in the Kremlin, with Khrushchev's rise to power. Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe after World War II had frightened the Western democracies into establishing NATO and hastening plans to rearm the German Federal Republic; hence it was thought advantageous to relax tensions in the hope of inducing the Western Powers to conclude a European security pact, persuading the United States to abandon Europe, and, above all, forestalling any further attempts to rearm Germany. After failing in its efforts to use Austria as a pawn to prevent the rearmament of Germany, the Kremlin suddenly decided to give up its efforts to link the Austrian negotiations with those involving Germany and to advocate the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria alone in the hope of convincing the Western Powers, as well as the newly emerging countries of Africa and Asia, that the basic aims of Soviet foreign policy had changed. By championing the independence of a "neutral" Austria, the Soviet government hoped eventually to undermine NATO and similar organizations and to influence the new states of Africa and Asia, as well as European nations who wished to avoid political or military entanglements, to form "a peace camp" which the Communists hoped eventually to use for their own purposes.

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