

to have been used), is an accomplished writer (his book on John F. Kennedy's foreign policy is very good), and is cognizant of the crucial questions.

Henry A. Wallace served as secretary of agriculture and vice-president under Franklin D. Roosevelt, and, next to the president himself, Wallace was considered the voice of the New Deal. He became secretary of commerce under Truman and was fired from the cabinet in September 1946 for criticizing the "get tough" diplomacy of the accidental president. One of the very few leading politicians in American history to leave high office in protest and then to take his case to the electorate, Wallace became an editor at the *New Republic* and then ran as a Progressive in 1948, losing badly. Wallace questioned a unilateral foreign policy, repeatedly called for negotiations between Washington and Moscow, denounced the anti-Communist mania at home, recommended disarmament measures, cautioned against too much emphasis on military aid, and urged close analysis of foreign conflicts to determine whether they were civil or international in character. Because he criticized American foreign policy, his critics assumed wrongly that he was condoning the ugly Soviet record. As Walton well demonstrates, Wallace scrutinized and condemned the machinations of the Soviets, holding them also responsible for postwar tension.

Walton dismisses the popularized and politically exploited myth that Wallace's Progressive Party was the creation and tool of the Communist Party. Communists attached themselves to the third party movement, but Wallace was his own man. Propaganda from the politically vulnerable Truman camp deliberately tried and succeeded in distorting reality. Wallace refused to reject the support of the Communists, because he would not engage in the Red-baiting so unbecoming to the liberals who would themselves fall victim to McCarthyism. Wallace sought to explain how his position differed from that of the Communists, but the hyperbole of the 1948 campaign subverted his case. In 1950 Wallace said: "The Communists have their party. We have ours. We agree with the Communists that peace with Russia is possible—but that doesn't make us Communists. We agree with the Democrats and Republicans that capitalism can be made to work—but that doesn't make us Democrats or Republicans." Nevertheless, Schlesinger, the ADA, and the Alsops depicted Wallace as a Kremlin stooge. Towns would not rent halls to him for political speeches; newspapers printed the names of people who signed Wallace petitions in the hope that they would be intimidated; and the ADA published the dishonest but influential pamphlet, *The First Three Months of the Wallace Campaign*.

Wallace had his faults and Walton catalogs them. The Progressive standard-bearer disliked the details of the political game and made serious tactical errors; he failed to coddle the press; he made unguarded statements; he did not sufficiently emphasize his criticisms of the Soviet Union; and he often spoke in shrill tones. Walton concludes that Wallace was a Christian missionary, a naïve capitalist, and an idealist who was right.

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ZAGADKA SMERTI STALINA (ZAGOVOR BERIIA). By *A. Avtorkhanov*.
Frankfurt/Main: Possev-Verlag, 1976. ii, 316 pp. DM 22.40, paper.

Avtorkhanov, in his book *Zagadka smerti Stalina*, recounts five or six different versions of the circumstances of Stalin's death. It is to his credit that he does not try to determine which of these tales is the "true" one. Avtorkhanov seems to be telling us that there is a fundamental truth to all of them—that is, prior to Stalin's death his associates conspired to have him removed.

Because the period studied in the book, 1947–53, is, in the words of the renowned student of Stalinism, Professor Adam Ulam, perhaps the most obscure in the entire

Soviet history, Avtorkhanov has to use scanty and not fully reliable evidence (such as Khrushchev's memoirs). He must search for hidden meaning in official pronouncements and publications and sift through rumors that were leaked to the West by various "well-informed" sources. Given all this he fares remarkably well. Though compellingly interesting and personal, his work is not one of gossip but one of serious political and historical analysis. We learn from his book why and how Khrushchev, Beria, Malenkov, and Bulganin conspired to have Stalin removed.

Avtorkhanov is a former Communist who lost his illusions and became a student of Stalinism. As such he belongs to a group of distinguished authors. He is rather atypical among them, however, in that he is a Russian citizen by birth and one who was formed and educated in the Soviet Union. By joining the Institute of Red Professors (*Institut Krasnoi Profesury* [IKP]), he automatically became one of the "leadership group" (*rukovodiashchii aktiv*) included in the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee. The Institute, its professors and students, formed what was called the "theoretical headquarters" of the Central Committee, and indeed all who in later years were responsible for ideology and propaganda at the CC level studied in the twenties and thirties at the IKP. Not surprisingly, they were taught by prominent Marxists such as Varga, Bukharin, or Pokrovskii; non-Marxist professors such as Marr, Struve, or Tarle; and distinguished intellectuals-politicians like Togliatti, Bela Kun, or Wilhelm Pieck. Kalinin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders used to come to the IKP to deliver an occasional lecture. Because of Avtorkhanov's close view of Stalin's ascent to power in the twenties and his consolidation of power in the early thirties, and knowing of Avtorkhanov's intimacy with the prominent figures of the Soviet regime, one may feel more at ease with his involved, subjective, and at times very personal style of narrative.

In an earlier book, *The Technology of Power* (Munich, 1959), Avtorkhanov has shown masterfully that no episode in the history of the Soviet Union which had some impact on the control and allocation of political power could be attributed merely to coincidence, unforeseen circumstances, or some similar fiat. Everything, and especially everything that concerned Stalin, had its assigned place in the general order established to generate and control power in Soviet society. Obviously Stalin's death was no trivial matter for the Soviet system and, if Avtorkhanov's analysis is fundamentally correct, it could not be left to the unpredictable forces of nature. *Zagadka smerti Stalina* proves the point and thus, in a way, completes Avtorkhanov's analysis undertaken in *The Technology of Power*. In the spectacle of the ultimate triumph of the system he has begotten, we see, as we have to, Stalin's death. Only then is it demonstrated that *no one* is immune to downfall. Only then does the system prove to be stronger than its leader; it shows that it can survive him because it can be taught to others.

And yet in some curious way it is he, Stalin, who accomplishes this last crowning endeavor of Stalinism—Stalin's death. By attempting to repeat the Great Purge on his associates, who were his accomplices in the thirties, he leaves them no choice but to "liquidate" him. Avtorkhanov's book tells us this story admirably.

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WARNING TO THE WEST. By *Alexander Solzhenitsyn*. Introduction by *George Meany*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976. viii, 146 pp. \$7.95, cloth. \$2.95, paper.

Solzhenitsyn's *Warning* contains references to many events little known in the West—a March 1918 meeting of Petrograd workers denouncing the Communists' deceit;