

choice and sparseness of supporting economic data, are dwarfed by its many contributions. This exciting and important work is highly commended not only to scholars but to all interested in the origins of the Soviet system, in modern socialism, and in Bukharin's place in world history.

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HERBERT HOOVER AND FAMINE RELIEF TO SOVIET RUSSIA: 1921-1923. By *Benjamin M. Weissman*. Hoover Institution Publications, 134. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. xv, 247 pp. \$7.95.

Like the businessmen's détente of today, the Hoover relief during the Russian famine of 1921-23 was an initiative following a period of hostility in Soviet-American relations from which great consequences were anticipated. Thus Benjamin Weissman's well-researched case study of a neglected subject is particularly timely and interesting. The focus of the study is the American Relief Administration as an organization; its dealings with Bolshevik leaders; its role in American as well as Soviet politics; its motives, which were Hoover's; and its impact on the Soviet Union. The purpose of the study is to explain how it was that a limited, albeit significant, venture in cooperation did not (and perhaps can not) end Soviet-American hostility.

The author's thesis is that "initial agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the desirability of a goal has never meant the end of political contention but only its transfer to another level." The cause of this is mutually conflicting expectations grounded in ideology. Weissman argues that Lenin may have believed that Hoover, because he was a capitalist kingpin with the dual role of secretary of commerce and head of the ARA, was ultimately seeking markets and profit in Russia. Thus, allowing the ARA to alleviate famine in Russia would pave the way for recognition and trade. Hoover apparently believed that, because Bolshevism was utterly irrational as an economic system and therefore incapable of long-term stability, the presence of the ARA would hasten Bolshevism's demise by demonstrating capitalist efficiency and good will to the Russian people. Both perceptions were wrong. George Kennan's comment that "both sides got basically what they most wanted" does, as the author says, "leave much to be explored," but the explorations tend ultimately to support Kennan's summation. As Hoover wished, millions of Russians were fed efficiently by the ARA. As the Bolsheviks wished, averting even more drastic famine helped stabilize Bolshevik rule. But while limited cooperation proved workable, the hostility endured.

One paradoxical result of the relief mission, more suggested than discussed by the author, was the effect of the demonstration of capitalist efficiency on the Bolsheviks themselves. The ARA was the very model of democratic centralism, more unified and better organized than the Bolshevik leadership. The ARA demanded and successfully negotiated autonomy within prescribed nonpolitical limits. ARA men in Russia were both effective and loyal to "the Chief" in Washington, whose directives were binding on the organization. The impact of the ARA may help to explain the penultimate sentence of Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* (1924): "the combination of Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism in party and state work."

In this study, drawn largely from documents in the Hoover archives, Hoover emerges as an institutional autocrat sincerely desirous of feeding the hungry, although influenced by other motives such as promoting American agriculture, promoting himself, and perhaps hastening the fall of Bolshevism. Lenin, set as the other protagonist, is not treated in detail, although Lenin's reserved support for the ARA mission is discussed. The author's distinction between pro-ARA Bolsheviks, including Kamenev and Dzerzhinskii, and anti-ARA hard-liners, including Stalin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev, warrants further treatment of how roles affect the behavior of Soviet leaders. After all, Kamenev was given the task of coping with the famine, while Zinoviev was spokesman for the Third International.

Professor Weissman has made a needed contribution to the literature on the early years of Soviet rule. He also provides an excellent building block for any long-term perspective on Soviet-American relations. Generalizations concerning political theory in the introduction and conclusion span many ideas and provoke thought. The book is well and clearly written, holds attention, and deserves to be widely read.

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THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS, 1933–1945. By *Lucy S. Dawidowicz*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975. xviii, 460 pp. Maps. \$15.00.

I remember all too vividly the endless and painful debates that were almost inevitable whenever a small group of Jewish survivors of the Nazi holocaust would get together in the aftermath of World War II among the smouldering ruins of what were once Jewish towns and villages and crowded Yiddish-speaking neighborhoods of large urban cities. Sooner or later, after some harrowing tales from ghettos and concentration camps, from those who had hidden under assumed identities and those who had fought in the guerilla movement (which, it should be remembered, was often itself loath to admit Jews into its ranks) and those whose stories were *least* painful—those lucky enough to have fought in a regular army—a consensus of sorts would emerge. Individual physical survival, all would agree, was largely accidental. Others, with very similar histories and personal attributes, were murdered nevertheless. It was to larger questions that no answers could be found. Why *did* the Nazis murder six million Jews, slowly and systematically? Why was the mass slaughter continued *up to the very end*, when the outcome of the war was already determined, when German cities were themselves in flames, indeed, when Soviet and American tanks were already rumbling through Germany? And concurrently another question was posed: Why did the Jews fail to foresee that, unlike all earlier anti-Semitic rulers, Hitler was not merely intent on destroying Jewish statehood, robbing Jewish property, or forcibly converting Jews to another faith, but on their total physical extermination?

A provocative but closely reasoned answer to these questions is contained in the main thesis of Lucy S. Dawidowicz's magnificent and shattering book, easily the most important and moving work on the subject to appear in any language in the thirty years since the collapse of the Nazi Reich. Drawing on a huge amount of documentary evidence in many languages, Professor Dawidowicz establishes a convincing pattern of evidence that leads her to the conclusion that Nazi anti-