

tion to a subject usually totally neglected. This chapter will stand for a long time as the best short study of the topic.

Zsuzsa Nagy, the well-known Hungarian historian, and Alfred D. Low deal with subjects that have made them respected and known on two continents: foreign policy and the relations of the Kun regime with the peacemakers in Paris. Although they inevitably go over ground they have covered before, both are able to add new details and insights in well-rounded and argued essays that are a pleasure to read. Approaching practically the same problems from two different angles, they come to similar conclusions, proving that good scholarship follows universal standards.

Iván Völgyes's contribution is short and disappointing. The topic of his chapter, "Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary," is fascinating and would certainly fit perfectly into this volume. Unfortunately Völgyes leaves the topic with the title, and tries to prove instead that Kun was not Lenin's stooge in Hungary. Admittedly this charge has been made, but Kun's actions and behavior made it obvious that it was untrue. The two countries, and even more the two men, were very different; only a tenuous connection existed between Lenin's well-thought-out, long-range views and plans and Kun's short-range improvisations in Hungary. Especially regrettable is the fact that Völgyes is an expert on Soviet-Hungarian relations and could have given his readers a really interesting chapter.

The last essay, "Béla Kun: The Man and the Revolutionary," was contributed by Tökés. It is a model of its kind and a little masterpiece. The author begins by presenting his plan of work and discussing his sources and the lacunae in them. He then proceeds to do what he has promised, writing clearly with great knowledge and a rich supporting apparatus, ending with conclusions based squarely on the story he has presented. The reviewer's only regret is that the author skipped the 133 days during which Kun was Hungary's master. The inclusion of that period would have resulted in the best and most complete short history of Kun, the man and revolutionary, written so far.

The numerous languages used, the copious footnotes, and the danger of repetition must have made this volume an editor's nightmare. It is a pleasure to report that as an editor Völgyes succeeded admirably. The end result certainly justifies his efforts, and his slender volume will be read for many years to come.

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HITLER, HORTHY, AND HUNGARY: GERMAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS, 1941-1944. By *Mario D. Fenyó*. Yale Russian and East European Studies, 11. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972. xii, 279 pp. \$10.00.

The subtitle of this book indicates its subject better than the somewhat theatrical and misleading main title, with the qualification that the consecutive narrative opens only with the immediate preliminaries to Hungary's entry into war against the USSR at the end of June 1941. There was undoubtedly room for a new work on the theme, for the only comprehensive treatment of it to date (the present reviewer's *October Fifteenth*) was written nearly twenty years ago, and since then a considerable amount of documentary material has become available—though not so much, indeed, as Mr. Fenyó, who inexplicably accuses his predecessor of having "neglected to consult documents, apart from those in his personal possession" (p. 251), would

have his readers believe. Most of the studies which have appeared since are in Hungarian and thus inaccessible to most non-Hungarians. Western scholars would therefore have every reason to welcome a compendious account of the subject which took into account all evidence now available.

Insofar as Professor Fenyo's book answers to this description it is to be welcomed, and it is a pleasure to record that it does answer it up to a point. The writer's list of sources consulted is impressive, especially the unpublished German ones (the Hungarian material less so, and he appears to have missed both the *Itél a Történet* and the *Hungarista Napló* series). He has clearly been at pains to present the results fairly: this is a history, not a polemic.

It is not the author's fault if the yield of his dredging has been meager, bringing up few, if any, new facts of major importance, and imposing no big reinterpretations. However, his treatment of the material displays several weaknesses. His system of "omitting the introduction" and beginning "in medias res" and mixing in the "background information with several of the chapters" (p. xi) is unfortunate. Such "background" would often have been necessary for a complete appreciation of many of the events discussed. When given, it is often parenthetical or in a form which disguises its importance from the uninitiated reader. Thus Hungary's fatal decision to allow German troops transit across her territory into Rumania is given only in connection with events occurring much later, and then only in the indirect form of a quotation from a letter from Hitler to Mussolini. It is not explained in any way. Some themes are omitted altogether, such as the Volksdeutsch problem. Professor Fenyo justifies this omission on the extraordinary ground that an excellent monograph exists on the subject. So there does; but the question was an important and integral factor in German-Hungarian relations, and omission of it leaves the story unbalanced. On the same argument, the writer might have omitted treatment of the Jewish question, or of several others on which he has nothing new to add to the work of predecessors. His use of sources is sometimes uncritical. Thus the dictated statements of the renegades Paulus and Ujszászy at Nuremberg are used as though they were evidence of fact. Other sources are sometimes wrongly paraphrased, or even misquoted, and there are many factual errors, ranging from such trivialities as wrong Christian names to such astonishing misstatements as that Ribbentrop and Ciano delivered the First Vienna Award "in the name of the Four Powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy)" (p. 6) or that the Rumanians in the summer of 1940 expected to have to return only a "territory of 14 square kilometers" (p. 8n.). It will be said that such mistakes are mere slips, but they reflect a degree of carelessness of thought or expression, or both, which inevitably reduces the respect which the many merits of Professor Fenyo's work would otherwise command.

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HUNGARY AND THE SUPERPOWERS: THE 1956 REVOLUTION AND REALPOLITIK. By *János Radványi*. Foreword by *Zbigniew Brzezinski*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. xvii, 197 pp. \$5.95.

This well-written volume consists of seventeen chapters which discuss mainly problems of Hungarian diplomacy after 1956, Hungarian-American relations in the same period, and specifically the Kádár government's endeavors for recognition of the Hungarian delegation by the General Assembly's Credentials Committee. Al-