Even in the relatively hospitable contexts of feminist and queer studies, there is something awkward, almost shaming, about the lesbian. Notwithstanding “shame’s new cachet” in queer circles, this particular declension of lesbian shame persists in an old-school way.¹ Seemingly always already anachronistic to the scenes in which she appears, the lesbian has been persistently represented in terms of belatedness, derivation, imitation, and secondariness.² Even drawing attention to the ways that lesbianism has been occluded from major critical frameworks, marginalized in the fields in which it figures, and deemed irrelevant to key disciplinary questions can seem – how to put this? – a very lesbian complaint. Understood in most accounts as structurally marginal to the representational fields that feminism and queer respectively delineate, “lesbian” might be usefully thought a disciplinary casualty of the ongoing counterdefinings of the field imaginaries of feminist studies and queer studies.³ As such, the figure of the lesbian is a useful key to understanding developments in feminist and queer thought and the historically shifting relations between them. This chapter traces the conceptual work enabled – as well as the conceptual trouble caused – by the figure of the lesbian in a number of influential critical analyses of sex, gender, and sexuality since the last quarter of the twentieth century.⁴

The post-1968 emergence of organized countercultural protest in western urbanized contexts supported the consolidation of various liberatory movements. As the women’s and gay liberation movements grew publicly visible across the late 1960s and 1970s, a significant number of lesbians, having experienced resistance or indifference to their presence at official organizational levels, began to analyze their specific political situation. Informed by different feminist perspectives – most notably, Black and women of color, liberal, radical, and socialist feminisms – there was lively and cross-referencing critical debate across the early 1980s about what constitutes lesbianism and how it should most efficaciously be defined. These debates were part of a wider contestation of the identity-politics frameworks that had prominently

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1. See, for example, Judith Butler’s work on performativity and gender norms.
2. Gayle Rubin’s “The Traffic in Women” is a seminal text in this regard.
3. This is particularly true of the work of Dominick LaCapra, who argues for a “hermeneutics of the double,” wherein the construction of the Other is always already the construction of the self.
4. The references here are to a range of authors and works, too numerous to list in full.
structured post-1960s political movements and their academic instantiations but became increasingly subject to critique for their monocultural focus on a single axis of identity, such as gender, sexuality, class, race, or nationality, and the inevitable, although unintended, exclusions that followed.⁵

Motivated in part by activist attempts to make lesbianism both visible and legitimate within the feminist liberation movement, Adrienne Rich’s now famous 1980 essay, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” boldly claimed that lesbianism was not a marginal interest but necessarily central to feminist theorizing: “Feminist research and theory that contributes to lesbian invisibility or marginality is actually working against the liberation and empowerment of woman as a group.”⁶ Asserting that heterosexuality “needs to be recognized and studied as a political institution,” Rich coined the phrase “compulsory heterosexuality” to capture her sense in which female heterosexuality is less a preference or an orientation than an ideological regime maintained by a complex web of cultural, economic, and psychological forces intended to maintain male supremacy.⁷

Largely eschewing the term “lesbianism” on account of its perceived clinical or patriarchal resonances, Rich suggested instead thinking in terms of a “lesbian continuum,” by which she meant “to include a range – through each woman’s life and throughout history – of woman-identified experience; not simply the fact that a woman has had or consciously desired genital sexual experience with another woman.”⁸ The lesbian continuum allows Rich to reframe lesbianism as quintessentially feminist: not simply – or perhaps even primarily – an erotic relation but an intensely affective attachment, a cooperative sociality and a political resistance to male domination.

Many scholars found Rich’s definition of lesbianism across such a broad set of coordinates problematic insofar as it was “ahistorical and amaterialist – too imprecise to be useful epistemologically, though enormously evocative politically.”⁹ Suspicious that a definition of lesbianism that is detached from sexual practice plays into “recent, glossy ‘women-loving women’ definitions, which too often hide the genital homophobia of an otherwise purified and cleansed reconstruction of the term,” others insisted on “genital sexuality” as definitionally central to lesbianism, emphasizing that “carnality” is what distinguishes lesbianism from “affectionate friendships in which women enjoy each other, support each other, and commingle a sense of identity and well-being.”¹⁰ In particular, the way in which Rich’s desexualized lesbian continuum defined itself against certain lesbian and gay subcultural traditions of sexual practice was critiqued from a pro-sex feminist perspective. For, as part of its project of defining lesbianism without recourse to erotic orientation, Rich’s essay carefully demarcates a properly lesbian continuum from butch/femme erotics, intergenerational sex, cruising, and public sex.
Acknowledging that lesbian existence has its negative aspects, for instance, Rich lists “role playing” alongside “self-hatred, breakdown, alcoholism, suicide, and intrawoman violence.”\textsuperscript{11} Equally, in arguing that lesbian experience is not coterminous with gay male experience, she emphasizes what she sees as “qualitative differences in female and male relationships,” taking an ideological distance from “the prevalence of anonymous sex and the justification of pederasty among male homosexuals, the pronounced ageism in male homosexual standards of sexual attractiveness, etc.”\textsuperscript{12}

With its citational recourse to key feminist works such as Kathleen Barry’s \textit{Female Sexual Slavery}, Andrea Dworkin’s \textit{Woman Hating}, and Catharine MacKinnon’s \textit{Sexual Harassment of Working Women}, Rich’s essay framed female sexuality prominently in terms of male violence against women.\textsuperscript{13} It discounted lesbian sadomasochism as an internalization of “dominant cultures’ teachings about the relation of sex and violence” and evidence of the willingness of some lesbians to follow “male homosexual mores,” for instance, and it characterized pornography as a degrading masculinist commodity that “strips women of their autonomy, dignity, and sexual potential, including the potential of loving and being loved by women in mutuality and integrity.”\textsuperscript{14} As such, Rich’s essay was an important flashpoint in what became known as the feminist sex wars, a series of high-wattage discursive conflicts about sex within feminism across the 1980s between two groups gradually characterized as anti-pornography feminists and pro-sex feminists or sometimes radical feminists and sex radical feminists.\textsuperscript{15} The category of the lesbian was key to these debates, often held up by the anti-pornography side as the utopic figure for a reciprocal sexuality of equality least distorted by the reach of male sexual violence and by the pro-sex side as an outlaw figure of sexual dissidence animated by principles of autonomy and pleasure.

If Rich situated lesbianism definitionally at the heart of gender – “I perceive the lesbian experience as being, like motherhood, a profoundly \textit{female} experience” – Gayle Rubin countered in 1984 with an essay that influentially called for the taxonomic separation of gender and sexuality.\textsuperscript{16} Contextualized in relation to histories of twentieth-century sex panics and more specifically written out of the feminist sex wars and the early years of the AIDS crisis in North America, Rubin’s “Thinking Sex” argued that contemporary debates about the socio-ethical valence of various minority erotic practices took place in “the absence of a coherent and intelligent body of radical thought about sex.” Moreover, given that “much of what is available from the feminist movement has simply added to the mystification that shrouds the subject,” Rubin insisted on the urgency for progressive political
projects to develop radical theoretical models capable of describing and analyzing sex without reproducing majoritarian bias.\textsuperscript{17}

Covering a great deal of conceptual ground and incorporating a number of methodological approaches, Rubin’s lengthy essay resists easy summary. What is of most interest here, however, is Rubin’s contention that feminism itself, with its reliance on gender as its foundational category, is not wholly adequate to the task of theorizing sexuality. Acknowledging that “the feminist movement will always be a source of interesting thought about sex,” Rubin nonetheless contests “the assumption that feminism is or should be the privileged site of a theory of sexuality. Feminism is the theory of gender oppression. To assume automatically that this makes it the theory of sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic desire, on the other.”\textsuperscript{18}

Despite its assertion that sexuality cannot be fully apprehended through the rubric of gender, “Thinking Sex” is itself a feminist intervention. As Rubin reflects a decade later, her essay “assumed a largely feminist readership. It was delivered at a feminist conference, aimed at a feminist audience, and written within the context of feminist discussion.”\textsuperscript{19} Proposing that a sharp differentiation between gender and sex is necessary for the radical theory of sexuality she advocates, Rubin draws productive attention to the various ways in which feminism’s gender-based analyses, while valuable, cannot fully account for the maintenance and reproduction of oppressive hierarchies of erotic behavior.

Rubin’s insistence that sexuality not be conceptualized as a second-order derivation of gender formations means that lesbianism is not understood in her analysis primarily in relation to the category “women.” Noting that the anti-pornography feminist analytic tends to privilege lesbianism such that “monogamous lesbianism that occurs within long-term, intimate relationships and which does not involve playing with polarized roles, has replaced married, procreative heterosexuality at the top of the value hierarchy,” Rubin tends instead to include lesbianism within the more general category “homosexuality” or, where it is specified, to cluster it with other sexual minorities on the basis of shared social marginalization.\textsuperscript{20} “Although it pains many lesbians to think about it,” writes Rubin, “the fact is that lesbians have shared many of the sociological features and suffered from many of the same social penalties as have gay men, sadomasochists, transvestites, and prostitutes.”\textsuperscript{21} No longer an exemplar of feminism, in Rubin’s account, lesbianism is a significant modern demographic itself stratified into different erotic subcultures with correspondingly different relations to social acceptability.
The interventionist force of “Thinking Sex” for the emergence and consolidation of sexuality studies is widely acknowledged. It significantly informed the ground-breaking conceptualization of modern homosexual and heterosexual definition in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 1990 *Epistemology of the Closet*, often cited as one of the inaugural works of queer studies. In her preface to the 2008 edition, Sedgwick wonders about this retrospective identification of her work as queer: “Widely considered a founding text in queer theory, *Epistemology* doesn’t use the word ‘queer.’ So what is queer about it?” She determines that the most queerly productive contribution of *Epistemology* is its “resistance to treating homo/heterosexual categorization – still so very volatile an act – as a done deal, a transparently empirical fact about any person.”

*Epistemology*’s sustained demonstration that the apparently authoritative parceling up of the sexual field under the twin modern rubrics of homosexuality and heterosexuality is riven by irresolvable contradiction draws significantly and explicitly on Rubin’s analytic separation of gender and sexuality. In her agenda-setting introduction, Sedgwick writes: “This book will hypothesize, with Rubin, that the question of gender and the question of sexuality, inextricable from one another though they are in that each can be expressed only in terms of the other, are nonetheless not the same question.” This enables Sedgwick to decompress two impacted contradictions that structure modern understandings of sexual definition. The first is the contradiction between considering homosexuality the property of a distinct and delimitable population, which Sedgwick describes as a minoritizing view, and considering it a broadly human latency or potentiality, which Sedgwick describes as a universalizing view. The second is the contradiction between regarding homosexuals as indeterminately located between or across genders, which Sedgwick describes as the inversion or transitivity model, and regarding them as the epitome of each gender, which Sedgwick describes as the gender-separatist model.

One of the examples that Sedgwick uses to clarify the workings of these two contradictory schematizations of modern sexual definition is none other than Rich’s lesbian continuum, which Sedgwick frames as a prominent articulation of both the universalizing model with its claim that all women are potentially lesbian and the gender-separatist model with its “stunningly efficacious re-visioning, in female terms, of same-sex desire as being at the very definitional center of each gender.” This is not the only way, however, that lesbianism figures in Sedgwick’s detailed mapping of the complexities of modern sexual definition. Consistent with her argument that modern sexual knowledges are organized around structuring contradictions, lesbianism can equally be understood in terms of the minoritizing model as it is,
Debating Definitions

for instance, in the rights-based lesbian and gay liberation movement or indeed in Rubin’s inclusion of it within the general category of homosociality. Similarly, it might be understood in terms of the transitivity model as it is, for instance, when considered a form of gender outlawry.

Although Sedgwick is at pains to point out that neither side of either contradiction is necessarily more historically correct or more politically useful, she does contest certain implications of the gender-separatist model of lesbianism to establish the possible, although far from inevitable, relevance or appeal of gay male-centered analyses for lesbian contexts. Noting that “the powerful impetus of a gender-polarized feminist ethical scheme made it possible for a profoundly antihomophobic reading of lesbian desire (as a quintessence of the female) to fuel a correspondingly homophobic reading of gay male desire (as a quintessence of the male),” Sedgwick identifies the feminist sex wars as an important source of a lesbian transitivity counternarrative that is sustained by recognizing and even cherishing some continuities and overlaps between lesbian and gay male identities and desires.

Published in the same year as Epistemology of the Closet and also frequently “cited as one of the founding texts of queer theory,” Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble approaches differently the question of the analytic relation between gender and sexuality and therefore the issue of lesbian identity. Where Sedgwick argues that, insofar as “the ultimate definitional appeal in any gender-based analysis must necessarily be to the diacritical frontier between different genders,” heterosexuality is inevitably privileged in critical approaches that presume gender as the most meaningful determinant for sexuality, Butler puts pressure on the category of gender itself, arguing that “the ‘unity’ of gender is the effect of a regulatory practice that seeks to render gender identity uniform through a compulsory heterosexuality.” Although Butler uses Rich’s well-known phrasing to make her point, her intervention is more far-reaching. While Rich testifies to the straight-forward existence of “women” as a category that continues beneath the distortions of compulsory heterosexuality and that she sees as feminism’s greatest resource, Butler insists that “women” is a regulatory fiction, the deployment of which necessarily replicates the normative relations presumed between sex, gender, and sexuality that naturalize heterosexuality. Butler therefore argues that, given the ways in which gender is presumed to follow from sex and sexual desire from gender, any commitment to normatively gendered identity works against both the explicit aims of feminism and the sociopolitical recognition of lesbian and gay subjects.

Butler famously defines gender not as an authentic basis for either social stratification or political solidarity but as a “repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over
time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.”

This intervention has at least two major implications for understanding the formation of lesbianism within feminist and queer critical traditions. On the one hand, Butler argues that gender – and, by extrapolation, any category of identity – when understood as the unified basis for political practice, inadvertently generates processes of misrepresentation and exclusion. Gender, therefore, should not be understood as a fixed and necessary ground for political mobilization but as “a complexity whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at any given juncture in time.”

On the other hand, she argues that, through their parodic repetition of gender norms, the gendered styles associated with erotic minority groups – she focuses particularly on drag and butch/femme – both make visible and offer a model for subverting normative constructions of gender and the regimes of social intelligibility they enable: “Inasmuch as ‘identity’ is assured through the stabilizing concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality, the very notion of ‘the person’ is called into question by the cultural emergence of those ‘incoherent’ or ‘discontinuous’ gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to confirm to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined.”

Worked out in emphatically feminist contexts, Butler’s two analytic trajectories correspond to two impulses by which queer theory has come to be strongly characterized: anti-identitarianism and anti-normativity. This is an important realization, given the tendency to think of feminist and queer critical traditions as distinct from – or even sometimes as opposed to – each other. With its articulation of “a feminist genealogy of the category of woman,” Gender Trouble affords one valuable opportunity for acknowledging that recognizably queer impulses animated feminist projects before queer’s own critical profile had stabilized. Interestingly, both the anti-identitarian and the anti-normative tendency have been critiqued from lesbian-feminist perspectives on the grounds that they devalue or oversimplify specifically lesbian perspectives on politically important issues.

One of the strongest critiques of the former tendency comes from Terry Castle, who argues that Butler’s anti-identitarian epistemological excavation of the category “lesbian” is complicit with broader heterosexist or homophobic cultural forces that seek the disappearance – or thorough-going trivialization – of lesbianism. Identifying Butler as one of the “would-be deconstructors” of lesbianism, Castle associates the denaturalization of identity categories with queer rather than feminist values: “Especially among younger lesbian and gay scholars trained in Continental philosophy (including a number of the so-called queer theorists) it has recently become popular to contest, along deconstructionist lines, the very meaningfulness of terms
Debating Definitions

such as lesbian.” Against this tendency, Castle wants to establish “lesbian” as a stable, readily meaningful category to advance a critical case for the importance of lesbian cultural production for the modern arts. Yet although Castle represents herself as taking a commonsense approach in insisting on the semantic transparency of lesbianism “in the ‘ordinary’ or ‘dictionary’ or ‘vernacular’ sense,” Butler’s work powerfully suggests that one reason we might not want to take the self-evidence of identity categories at face value is the way in which the very cultural intelligibility of gendered identity practices indicates the normative operation of causal relations between sex, gender, and sexuality that has historically worked more against than for the recognition of minoritarian groups.

Biddy Martin makes a more sustained critique of what she perceives as the unintended consequences of the anti-normative framework: “Queer theory and politics necessarily celebrate transgression in the form of visible difference from norms that are then exposed to be norms, not natures or inevitabilities. Gender and sexual identities are arranged, in much of this work, around demonstrably defiant deviations and configurations.” For Martin, this queer celebration of bodies and practices that visibly differ from the norm often frames female-embodied femininity – the lesbian femme, for example – as quietist, even reactionary. She connects this tendency to the analytic separation of sex and gender, which she considers a valuable shift in critical perspective but which she argues has become reduced to a caricature in which “lesbians, or women in general, become interesting by making a cross-gender identification or an identification with sexuality, now implicitly (though, I think, not intentionally) associated with men, over against gender, and by extension feminism and women.” Through a series of close engagements with the work of Sedgwick, Martin argues that a closer attention to butch/femme traditions usefully complicates any tidy cleavage of gender from sexuality: “Sedgwick gives sexuality the capacity to collapse conventional gender definitions and distinctions; I would multiply the permutations of gender with sexual aims, objects, and practices instead, so that identifications and desires that cross traditional boundaries do not efface the complexities of gender identities and expressions.” Influentially arguing that the queer anti-normative advocacy of gender performativity and cross-gendered identification often scapegoats feminism, requiring it to stand as the defender of stable and foundational – and therefore politically quietist – understandings of gender, Martin uses the figure of the lesbian – and particularly the gendered dynamics of the butch/femme couple – to demonstrate the urgent need for a more complicated understanding of the psychic and cultural eroticizations of gender.
Judith Halberstam’s *Female Masculinity* takes up rather differently the issue of gender’s complexities. Making good on Butler’s provocation that gender is “an open assemblage that permits of multiple convergences and divergences without obedience to a normative telos of definitional closure,” Halberstam raises to critical attention a diverse proliferation of female masculinities, both contemporary and historical. Arguing for a recognition of masculinity as not necessarily a property of men but something that can be apprehended in myriad female declensions, Halberstam’s return to gender is significantly motivated by a desire to make visible various erotic subcultures and their vernacular knowledges that she suggests have not prominently structured scholarly or popular apprehensions of gender. This is an interesting critical move in the context of the broader analytic separation of gender and sexuality influentially advocated by Rubin as it suggests with fresh force that genders themselves might have erotic dimensions from which they cannot be neatly differentiated and that, within many lifeways, categories and practices of gender and sexuality might inform each other continuously.

Many of Halberstam’s sustained case studies concern drag kings, tomboys, female-to-male transsexuals, women who pass as men, and stone butches. As that list suggests, part of her project is to widen the meaning of female masculinity beyond the lesbianism it is often and reductively taken to index. Although *Female Masculinity* is therefore not about lesbianism in any narrow sense, several of its key arguments implicate the figure of the lesbian in reworkings of the relations between sex, gender, and sexuality. Halberstam’s approach to lesbianism via the analytic of female masculinity is obviously a significant remove from Rich’s staking a claim to lesbianism as “a profoundly female experience.” Perhaps less obviously, it also implies a challenge to Rubin’s assessment of gender as inadequate to the task of theorizing sexuality via its drawing critical attention to what Robyn Wiegman aptly calls “the sexual life of gender identity,” the myriad ways in which gendered stylings and embodiments foundationally constitute erotic identity and practice. In taking female masculinity as her point of conceptual organization, Halberstam focuses not on the figure of the lesbian per se but on those subcultural lesbian traditions strongly organized by masculinity and contextualizes them in relation to other traditions of alternate masculinities.

One of Halberstam’s goals is “to account for one very specific strand of gender variance without assuming that it neatly corresponds to contemporary formulations of the coincidence of sexual and gender variance.” *Female Masculinity* thereby offers a corrective to projects of historical recovery that claim as lesbian or proto-lesbian pre-twentieth-century instances of female cross-gendered identification or practice. Balancing her insistence on the importance of recognizing historical differences with her
interest in capturing gendered identity fields in the process of their contemporary formation, Halberstam uses the category of female masculinity to draw together three demographic groups often in discursive contestation – female-to-male transsexuals, lesbian butches, and transgender people – to specify “the surprising continuities and unpredictable discontinuities between gender variance that retains the birth body (for example, butchness) and gender variance that necessitates sex reassignment.”

Analyzing but not reproducing the territorial demarcations that differentiate between varieties of female masculinity, Halberstam’s consideration of lesbian butchness does not take lesbianism as its organizing rubric, preferring to focus on “the ways in which the lines between the transsexual and the gender-deviant lesbian inevitably criss-cross each other and intersect, even producing a new category: transgender.” In doing so, she suggests the provisionality of lesbian as a term and calls for a method that is at once “feminist, antiracist, and queer.” Where Susan Stryker suggests that “[n]either feminism nor queer studies, at whose intersection transgender studies first emerged in the academy, were quite up to the task of making sense of the lived complexity of contemporary gender at the close of the last century,” Halberstam imagines instead that “as gender-queer practices and forms continue to emerge, presumably the definitions of ‘gay,’ ‘lesbian,’ and ‘transsexual’ will not remain static, and we will produce new terms to delineate what they cannot.”

The definitional career of lesbian across feminist and queer critical analyses of sex, gender, and sexuality emphatically suggests the ongoing interdependence and coeval nature of feminist and queer inquiries. Despite the ordering of the terms of this chapter’s subtitle – the lesbian in feminist studies and queer studies – it is important not to quarantine feminist and queer impulses and initiatives from each other in a chronological narrative that produces them as the incremental stages of a developmental narrative in which queer ultimately succeeds feminism. As I have elsewhere argued, too often “queer theory’s tangled, productive and ongoing relations with feminist theory” go unacknowledged. When feminism and queer are thought in succession, a generational logic pertains whereby the earlier movement is characterized as anachronistic and indexed to the past, while the later political or theoretical turn is represented as current, a proper claimant to the present or, alternately, whereby the earlier movement is seen as mature, its longevity and experience licensing its authoritative hold on the shape of future transformations, while the newer political formation is understood as motivated by wrongheaded but mercifully transitional energies commonly denigrated as adolescent. If this seems a familiar story, it is because it is also a familial
story, its intergenerational struggles, debts, guilt, and gratitude the scaffolding for culture’s ur-text for thinking about the passage of time, progress, forwards movement, the reproduction or the transmission of bodies, emotion, and ideas from one scholarly and activist generation to the next.

Given their reliance on the self-licensing tropes of succession and sequence, quasi-historical accounts might offer the least useful tools for specifying what ought to be the proper relation, which is almost always understood as the proper temporal relation, between feminist and queer. When lesbianism risks domestication as an acceptable face of sexual conservatism (think, for instance, of the place of the lesbian couple in global discussions of same-sex marriage, which proceed largely uninformed by feminist or queer critique), it is worth rethinking the relations between feminism and queer, refusing the disciplinary force of sequence that would temporally quarantine one from another. This is not an idle or theoretical issue for those of us for whom the taxonomies of lesbian and queer have a persistent and mutually informing value for how we think about – which is to say, how we experience – a range of things including our life history and academic specialization and our relations to popular culture, politics, and history. In part as a consequence of being the author of *Queer Theory*, in part as a consequence of being a certain age, I am often referred to as queer, a queer scholar, or a queer theorist. As an identity category, however, there is little about queer that interpellates me, that animates a circuit of recognition between the space that word enables and how I think of myself in the world. My almost squeamishness around the term queer does not extend, however, to all categories of sexual identity. While I recognize its necessary opacities and partialities, I go on recognizing some version of myself in the term lesbian and do not want to let go of that descriptor and its powerful and strategic interventionary effects.

NOTES

4 In taking such an approach, this chapter necessarily naturalizes a western – and, more specifically, an Anglocentric – perspective as its analytical framework. This is not to discount the fact that there are many non-western national and linguistic cultures in which the concepts “feminist,” “lesbian,” and queer” have not
been central to contemporary formations and transformations of sex, gender, and sexuality. For a broad survey of the issues at stake here in the Asia Pacific context, for instance, see *AsiaPacifiQueer: Rethinking Genders and Sexualities*, ed. Fran Martin et al. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008).


7 Ibid., 637, emphasis in original.

8 Ibid., 648.


12 Ibid., 649–650.


15 For a detailed account, see Lisa Duggan and Nan D. Hunter, *Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1995).


21 Ibid., 170.

25 Ibid., 86–90.
26 Ibid., 36.
27 Ibid., 37.
30 Despite these differences, Butler herself acknowledges the formative influence of Rich’s work on her own, noting in a 2007 interview: “It is probably important to remember that I was steeped in Adrienne Rich before I heard Gayle Rubin in 1979 and was introduced to the work of Michel Foucault.” Jordana Rosenberg, “‘Serious Innovation’: A Conversation with Judith Butler,” in *A Companion to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Studies*, eds. George E. Haggerty and Molly McGarry (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 380.
32 Ibid., 16.
33 Ibid., 17.
34 Ibid., 5.
38 Ibid., 77.
39 Ibid., 78.
40 Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 16.
41 Wiegman, *Object Lessons*, 312.
43 Ibid., 143.
45 Halberstam, *Female Masculinity*, 173.