Pan agrees with art historian Yu Jianhua’s remark that the poetic form in which tihuashi are written limits their usefulness in painting criticism, but he sees Yu’s complaint as largely beside the point. Describing tihuashi as a “worthy complement to formal Chinese art criticism and art history,” Pan continues by noting that “traditional Chinese scholarship itself in these two areas is marred by obscurity, ambiguity, and inconsistency of the written discourse” (p. xiv). Furthermore, it becomes clear in what follows that Pan finds such ambiguity to be a fertile source for the literati tradition’s constant vibrancy and potential for redefinition. This conviction of Pan’s does no damage to his critical acuity. In his chapter on Su Shi’s poetics, for example, Pan offers much-needed clarity to the problem of Su’s famously vague, and largely misunderstood, poetry-painting analogy, while at the same time embracing the “fuzzy poetics” (p. 259) of Su Shi as a central mode of Su’s theory. Pan also compares Su’s ideas with Western theories of ekphrasis, and with Gotthold Lessing’s theory of “poetic pictures” (in his Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry [1766], translated by Ellen Frothingham [New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1969]): while both of these latter envisioned painting as a mimetic art, Su’s analogy did not pursue actual pictorialism in poetry and painting, but rather stressed “the two arts’ capability to signify ad infinitum beyond the surface text, the attainment of which has almost become a sine qua non in literati aesthetics” (p. 260). Yet in spite of Su’s implied desideratum, his actual poems, including those about paintings, allow for no such open-endedness, for their discursive elements “tend to impose a closure on the signifying process, thus undermining the signifying subtlety and potentiality of the text” (p. 237).

Interesting observations like this are found throughout Pan’s study. As with all books, there are a few flaws in fact and language. In some chapters, one is inundated with an overabundance of material, raising the question of whether more conciseness would have been possible. Yet had the contents been reduced, we would be deprived of this cornucopia of examples at our fingertips. Far outweighing any flaws is the book’s comprehensive sweep combined with informed commentary. The proximity of Chinese texts to their fine English translations is also very welcome.

ELIZABETH BROTHERTON
SUNY New Paltz
brothere@newpaltz.edu

doi:10.1017/S0021911812001404

Given China’s growing importance in global politics and its rapidly changing society, the book under review presents a timely study addressing a critically important topic: societal influences on the state’s foreign policy making. The
author argues that Chinese society is capable of self-initiated mobilization of public opinion that can mount tremendous pressure on the state regarding specific policy issues; the Chinese state can choose to revise its foreign policy when it is constrained by strong domestic public opinion. Following a brief period of leniency or tolerance, however, the Chinese state is capable of demobilizing strong public opinion. Furthermore, in the aftermath of a major wave of public mobilization, the state can regain dominance, through its still powerful propaganda machinery, in shaping domestic public opinion. The author uses the interactions between public opinion and China's policy toward Japan between the 1980s and 2008 as a case, and makes an attempt to link his findings to two related areas, namely China-U.S. relations and China's domestic politics.

Sidney Tarrow's opportunity structure theory is cited to explain the emergence of public mobilization, and Putnam's “two-level game” is used to understand the state's behaviors in extracting concessions from its foreign counterpart. More importantly, the author sees the study's main contribution in two theoretical offerings. The first is the idea of “a wave of public mobilization” to describe how public opinion plays a role in policy making by an authoritarian regime. Strong mobilizations occur because of a number of interwoven factors related to the state, the society, and external events. In the face of rising public opinion, the state can respond with either repression or tolerance. In either case, public mobilization will have its impacts on policy makers, leading to state actions such as changes in negotiation strategies, official rhetoric, elite discourse, and/or policy decisions. Having responded to such a dramatic rise in public opinion, the state will then attempt to regain control of the opinion environment by repressing mobilization or reshaping the discourse, bringing the wave of public mobilization to an end.

Another theoretic insight put forward by the author is the idea of “responsive authoritarianism,” which describes a state that is capable of understanding and responding to public opinion and hence can weather a surge in public participation and expression in politics. The author presents a strong case for the Chinese state's capacity to gather, understand, respond to, and redirect public opinion regarding its Japan policy. Thus, he supports those who argue that the Chinese regime is resilient and will not likely democratize anytime soon. Yet, somewhat fatefully, the book draws parallels between China and several Middle Eastern states, arguing that authoritarian systems there were equally capable of accommodating rising public participation and expression without forgoing their grip on power. But as events since the Arab Spring in late 2010 have shown, those authoritarian regimes in the Middle East were in fact not as resilient as they appeared to be just a few years ago. So how different the Chinese situation is now needs to be explained.

The author argues that cracks in China's elite represent a critical opening in the opportunity structure available to China's activists who want to mobilize public opinion to press the state for responses. With regard to Japan policy, this was probably very true in the 1980s, when the reformers (Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang) were very keen to engage Japan, while more conservative leaders (e.g., Chen Yun) held a much different view. Yet similar cracks did not exist in
the early 2000s, when another huge wave of public mobilization emerged. The author briefly mentions that Jiang Zemin was more of a hard-liner than the Hu-Wen team that succeeded him, but does not make a solid case. It is probably more useful to examine the changes in other aspects of contentious politics between the 1980s and the early twenty-first century. Social actors now have many more resources and more powerful technologies (e.g., the Internet) at their disposal. Also, the authority fragmentation in the political system—i.e., the lack of coordination between the various sections of the state, such as the Ministries of Railways, Foreign Affairs, and Propaganda—provides better opportunities for public mobilization than any cracks in the top leadership. The evolution of China’s policy toward Japan is well documented in the book, but the strategic thinking behind the decision to mend fences with Japan in the early 1980s differs significantly from that of China’s post-2000 Japan policy. The author is sharp in pointing to economic interests as a key factor in the 1980s, but only touches lightly on the new “grand strategy” that started to shape China’s foreign policies post-2000. A richer discussion of what China’s new global thinking is and how Japan figures in it would have supported the argument that in 2006–07 the state indeed seriously intended to redirect public opinion toward more favorable views of Japan.

ZHENGXU WANG
University of Nottingham
zhengxu.wang@nottingham.ac.uk

Return Migration and Identity: A Global Phenomenon, A Hong Kong Case. By NANCY M. SUSSMAN. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011. xiv, 368 pp. $50.00 (cloth); $30.00 (paper).
doi:10.1017/S0021911812001416

Based on research conducted in Hong Kong between January and July 2004, as part of “The Hong Kong Remigration Project” (HKRP), this book explores the psychological experiences of remigrant populations and tests the Cultural Identity Model (CIM) of Cultural Transitions. This model recognizes four possible identity profiles of returnees, which are summarized below.

The book has two core objectives. First, the author wants to report and analyze data collected by the HKRP; with this objective, the book carries on a dialogue with a broader theory of cultural transitions. It examines where the experiences of Hong Kong people are different from and overlap with those of returnees of other nationalities. The second objective is to narrate stories of the many returnees interviewed by the author (a cross-cultural psychologist). Therefore, the book offers a more revealing account of the lives of the returnees. The author hopes the book will be welcomed by returnees looking to understand their experiences and find ways to address the changes in their lives.

The book is organized into eleven chapters, with four appendixes in which the reader can examine the questionnaires utilized for the project and benefit