Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-jr42d Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-18T15:27:30.342Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Toleration or Latitude? Two Models for Liberal Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2016

Richard Vernon
Richard Vernon*
Affiliation:
Western University
*
Department of Political Science, Western University, 1151 Richmond St., London ON, N6A5C2, Email: ravernon@uwo.ca
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Theories of toleration maintain that people sometimes have good reasons not to act on their convictions, however strong. Theories of latitude maintain that one should doubt the strength of one's convictions. While toleration has often been taken to be foundational for the liberal tradition, another view (made fully explicit by Brian Barry's Justice as Impartiality) is that we should look, rather, to the idea of latitude, as exemplified in late seventeenth-century Anglican writings. Taking these writings as its initial point of reference, the article maintains that toleration, rather than latitude, should be seen as foundational for the liberal tradition, which is better understood in terms of what one person owes to another than in terms of the relative validity of their beliefs.

Résumé

D'après certaines conceptions de la tolérance, l'on pourrait bien, pour de bonnes raisons, être amené à agir à l'encontre de ses propres convictions, pour fortes qu'elles soient. D'autre part, il existe des théories de la latitude selon lesquelles tout individu doit douter de la force de ses convictions. Bien que la tolérance ait souvent été considérée comme l'une des bases de la tradition libérale, une toute autre idée, formellement explicitée par Brian Barry dans Justice as Impartiality [Justice et Impartialité] affirme que nous devrions considérer plutôt l'idée de latitude à partir des ouvrages anglicans de la fin du XVIIe siècle. C'est sur la base de ces ouvrages que l'auteur avance l'idée que c'est en fait la tolérance et non pas la latitude que l'on devrait tenir pour notion fondatrice de la tradition libérale, cette dernière étant mieux comprise comme ce dont un individu est redevable à un autre, plutôt qu'ayant rapport à la validité relative de ses croyances.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 663 - 678
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ashcraft, Richard. 1992. “Latitudinarianism and Toleration: Historical Myth versus Political History.” In Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England, 1640–1700, ed. Kroll, Richard, Ashcraft, Richard and Zagorin, Perez. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Barry, Brian. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bou-Habib, Paul. 2003. “Locke, Sincerity and the Rationality of Persecution.” Political Studies 51: 611–26.Google Scholar
Brown, Wendy. 2006. Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Champion, Justin I. 1992. The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Chillingworth, William. 1838. Works. 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chillingworth, William. [1687] 1845. Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants: A Safe Way to Salvation ed. Patrick, John. London: Tegg.Google Scholar
Fowler, Edward. 1684. A Defence of the Resolution of this Case, viz. Whether the Church of England's Symbolizing as far as it doth with the Church of Rome, makes it Unlawfull to hold Communion with the Church of England. London: R. Aylmer.Google Scholar
Fowler, Edward. 1699. The Design of Christianity. 3rd ed. London: printed for Luke Meredith.Google Scholar
Glanvill, Joseph. 1675. Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion. London: printed for John Baker and Henry Mortlock.Google Scholar
Glanvill, Joseph. [1661]1885. Scepsis Scientifica, or Confest Ignorance the Way to Science, Owen, John, ed. London: Kegan Paul Trench.Google Scholar
Glanvill, Joseph. 1970. The Vanity of Dogmatizing: The Three “Versions,” ed. Medcalf, Stephen. Hove: Harvester.Google Scholar
Grove, Robert. 1676. A Vindication of the Conforming Clergy from the Unjust Aspersions of Heresy Etc. London: Walter Kettilby.Google Scholar
Grove, Robert. 1681. A Short Defence of the Church and Clergy of England. London: printed by J. Macock for Walter Ketilby.Google Scholar
Hale, Matthew. 1684. The Judgment of the Lord Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale of the Nature of True Religion. London: B. Simmons.Google Scholar
Heyd, David, ed. 1996. Toleration: An Elusive Virtue. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Horton, John. 2010. “Reasonable Disagreement.” In Multiculturalism and Moral Conflict, ed. Dimova-Cookson, Maria and M.R, Peter. Stirk. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
La Selva, Samuel V. 2015. “Toleration Without Hate Speech: The Keegstra Decision, American Free Speech Exceptionalism, and Locke's Letter .” Canadian Journal of Political Science 48: 699–718.Google Scholar
Lecce, Steven. 2008. Against Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality. Toronto: Toronto University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leland, R.J. and van Wietmarshen, Han. 2012. “Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and Reciprocity in Political Justification.” Ethics 122 (4): 721–47.Google Scholar
Locke, John. 2010. Locke on Toleration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Macedo, Stephen. 1990. Liberal Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Marshall, John. 1992. “John Locke and Latitudinarianism.” In Philosophy, Science and Religion in England 1640–1700, ed. Kroll, Richard, Ashcraft, Richard and Zagorin, Perez. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McKinnon, Catriona. 2006. Toleration: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Moore, John. 1708. Of Religious Melancholy: A Sermon Preach'd before the Queen at White-Hall March 6 1691/2. London: H. Hills.Google Scholar
Moore, John. n.d. Of Patience and Submission to Authority, Sermon preach'd before the Lord Mayor and the Court of Aldermen at Guild-hall chapel, 27 Jan 1683/4.Google Scholar
Newey, Glen. 2013. Toleration in Political Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Patrick, Symon. 1662. A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men, 1662.Google Scholar
Patrick, Symon. 1707. A Sermon Preach'd before the Queen at Windsor on Sunday August 31, 1707. London: printed for R. Chiswell.Google Scholar
Payne, Joseph Frank. [1521], 1881. Galeni Pergamensis De Temperamento et de Inaequali Intemperie, facsimile edition. Cambridge: Macmillan and Bowes.Google Scholar
Quong, Jonathan. 2007. “Political Liberalism without Scepticism.” Ratio 20 (3): 320–40.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reedy, Gerard. 1985. The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in late 17th-Century England. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.Google Scholar
Scalet, Steve. 2000. “Liberalism, Skepticism, and Neutrality: Making Do Without Doubt.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2), 207–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheffler, Samuel. 2010. Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schiff, Stacy. 2015. The Witches: Salem 1692. New York: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Shapiro, Barbara J. 1983. Probability and Certainty in 17th-Century England: A Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sleat, Matt. 2013. Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of Liberal Politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press.Google Scholar
Spelman, W.M. 1993. The Latitudinarians and the Church of England. Athens GA: University of Georgia Press.Google Scholar
Stanton, Timothy. 2006. “The Name and Nature of Locke's ‘Defence of Nonconformity.’” Locke Studies 6: 143–72.Google Scholar
Tate, John William. 2016. Liberty, Toleration and Equality. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Verkamp, B. 1977. The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation. Athens OH: Ohio University Press.Google Scholar
Vernon, Richard. 1995. The Career of Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast, and After. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.Google Scholar
Vernon, Richard. 2013. “Lockean Toleration: Dialogical not Theological.” Political Studies 61 (1): 215–30.Google Scholar
Waldron, Jeremy. 1991. “Locke, Toleration, and the Rationality of Persecution.” In John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus, ed. Horton, John and Mendus, Susan. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Weinstock, Daniel. 2006. “A Neutral Conception of Reasonableness?” Episteme 3: 234–47.Google Scholar
Whichcote, Benjamin. 1751. The Works of the Learned Benjamin Whichcote. vol. 2. Aberdeen: Alexander Thomson.Google Scholar
Wolfson, Adam. 2010. Persecution or Toleration? An Explication of the Locke-Proast Quarrel, 1689–1704. Langham: Lexington Books.Google Scholar