Holy Scriptures. He describes the various ideological positions existing in Protestant Hungary, from the appearance of the "grammar" of the famous humanist, János Sylveszter, to the epic publication of Miklós Bogáti Fazekas. And, finally, he discovers information about the existence of generally unknown, or lost, works. Thus, as a result of his research, Dán revives the polemic of Debrecen reformer, Péter Melius against Rabbi Joseph, he analyzes statements of the "Hungarian Erasmus," András Dudith, about the Hebrew Bible, and he translates and appraises the works of the Unitarian priest, Miklós Bogáti Fazekas.

This unique book required a great amount of work and patience to gather, analyze, and develop the multitude of scattered and forgotten material on the theme. Happily, Dán, with his excellent methodological preparation and his consistent steady work, was equal to the task. Not only has he developed his material well, but he has tried to transmit the conclusions systematically, objectively, and clearly.

The book has one omission that should be noted. The author, who cites so many works in his notes, did not include a special thematic bibliography for his work, and future researchers are thus deprived of a broad scholarly synthesis of all the factual material. But this fault does not detract from the overall worth of the volume, which is an important contribution to the cultural-ideological history of sixteenth-century Hungary.

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When news of the French revolution, in February 1848, reached the United States, Americans quickly and enthusiastically hailed the dawning of a new era in the history of civilization. The agency of the United States in this movement was unmistakable. The moral force of America's democratic example had finally penetrated the darkness of European reaction (the fact that the Paris uprising occurred on George Washington's birthday was regarded as no coincidence). When revolutionary fervor spread from France into the monarchical fastnesses of central and eastern Europe, American newspaper editors joyfully pronounced the final demise of monarchy and all the oppression that was identified with it. Europe was rising from the slumber of ages, ready to throw off the tyrant's yoke and, as the United States had done seventy-two years before, to prove that man was indeed capable of self-government. Revolutionary leaders, like the French poet-patriot Alphonse de Lamartine and the Hungarian reformer Louis Kossuth, became heroes to the American people. The wildly optimistic predictions, however, were premature. The revolutions faltered or, as in the case of Hungary, were brutally crushed. Some Americans began to question whether Europe was yet ready for democracy's blessings. When Kossuth decided to visit the United States in late 1851 to make a personal appeal on behalf of Hungarian independence, American sympathy for Europe's revolutionaries had lost much of its ardor.

Kossuth's visit, treated here in clear, straightforward fashion by an author who is himself Hungarian-born, marked both a temporary revival of the excite-
ment and the final disillusionment with the prospects for democratic change in central Europe. Kossuth encountered large and enthusiastic crowds in some localities, but he also received sharp criticism from scholars who were concerned about his attitude toward the nationalities in his proposed Hungarian state. Abolitionists attacked his reluctance to speak out against slavery, while Southerners viewed his appeals with growing suspicion. The government was wary and politicians were generally cool; it was, after all, an election year. The visit, as Komlos shows so well, was marked by misunderstandings between Kossuth and the Fillmore administration, resentment against the Hungarian's efforts to alter the direction of American foreign policy by a grass-roots appeal, and shock at his attempt to lecture the American public on the meaning of Washington's Farewell Address. Kossuth failed, and Komlos attributes the failure largely to Kossuth's own shortcomings—his ineffective leadership, poor judgment, indiscreet statements, and his misconceptions about the nature of American politics and diplomacy.

The author has examined a wide array of sources, both Hungarian and American, but relies most heavily on the valuable documentary collection, A Kossuth-Emigráció Angliában és Amerikában, 1851-1852 (Budapest, 1940-48). Even so, his study (originally a master's thesis) lacks the depth that a full and proper assessment of Kossuth's mission demands, especially in its treatment of America's very complicated mid-century politics. C. A. Macartney points out in his foreword that Komlos has filled "a real gap" by providing the only serious study of Kossuth's visit in English; until a more definitive account appears, utilizing both European and American perspectives, this brief survey will retain its value and usefulness.

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Count István Bethlen was the man to whom Hungary turned for leadership, in the early 1920s, in the struggle to rebuild a polity disrupted by defeat, revolution, and counterrevolution. Hungary, at that time, had been reduced to one-third its former territory by the secession of its one-time national minorities (taking with them substantial Magyar populations, who now became minorities in their turn in the new successor states). Bethlen, as minister-president, shepherded the disparate political groupings which had emerged from the chaos of 1918-19 into a new United Party, dominated by the same agrarian-industrial-officeholder oligarchy which had ruled Hungary before 1914. A Transylvanian aristocrat, Bethlen set Hungarian foreign policy firmly on its interwar course with demands for a revision of the frontiers set down by the Treaty of Trianon—the treaty which had dismembered the historic Kingdom of Hungary. Revisionist policy brought Bethlen into conflict with the Western powers, but, nevertheless, adroit diplomatic footwork, and his successful restoration of order and some semblance of civility at home, enabled the minister-president to attract loans for reconstruction from the West (at the same time tying Hungary more closely to Anglo-