

STUDIES OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION: ORIGINS IN MEXICO, BOLIVIA, AND CUBA*

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WAR AND REVOLUTION ARE THE CATAclysmic EVENTS OF OUR AGE WHICH affect man and society more profoundly than any other human phenomenon. In Russia and China war brought revolution. Today, in an age of competitive ideologies and competitive nuclear armament, men fear that revolution will lead to war.

The global conflicts that have wracked Eurasia in this century have not touched Latin America directly. The only international conflict of roughly comparable intensity was the Chaco War (1932–1936) in which hostilities were confined to two small powers, Bolivia and Paraguay. Bolivia's defeat was part of a train of events that lead directly to the Revolution of 1952.

Despite Castro's ties with extra-continental powers, Latin America's prospects for avoiding entanglement in wars outside the hemisphere are relatively good partly because of geographic isolation. As the history of inter-American conciliation and mediation shows, political and military pressure which can be brought to bear on potential belligerents often serves as an effective constraint. Barring nuclear conflict, revolution is more likely to disturb Latin America's tranquility than war.

Social revolution as defined here is not simply a coup d'état or one of the other forms of violence which have often determined succession in political office in Latin America. Social revolution is a sudden and comprehensive change in social structure and values initiated by violence.

Many countries in Latin America, such as Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, appear to have teetered on the brink of social revolution. Social revolution began in Guatemala, but did not run its full course. Latin America has had only three social revolutions which correspond to the great revolutions of Eurasia (the French, the Russian, and the Chinese): the Mexican (1911), the Bolivian (1952), and the Cuban (1959). In these countries revolutions have fundamentally changed property relationships and the distribution

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of national income; the locus and modes of exercising political power; and social structure, policies, and values.

Social revolution in Latin America, as elsewhere, may be studied in three chronological phases: 1) the socio-political breakdown of the old regime, 2) the seizure of government, including the strategies and tactics of ruling and revolutionary elites, and 3) the subsequent transformation of social structure and social values. The first two phases of the Mexican, Bolivian, and Cuban revolutions will be dealt with here. A review of the literature of the transformation of the three societies is so complex as to require separate treatment.

The purpose here is to survey and interpret the conclusions of authoritative writers on certain politically significant issues related to the first two phases of these three revolutions. New interpretations will not be advanced, but secondary sources will serve as a basis for tentative comparisons and generalizations. Works having partisan bias and serving a polemical purpose have perforce been used, but reliance has been placed whenever possible on authorities possessing a sense of scholarly detachment.

The Mexican Revolution has a vast historical literature in Spanish, English, and in other languages, but there has been little effort to re-evaluate the origins and nature of the early period with the insights of contemporary social science. Alexander's *The Bolivian National Revolution* (1958) is still the most convenient descriptive account in one volume of the Bolivian upheaval, although there are a few recent scholarly studies of specific topics. Initially some of the richest sources on the Cuban Revolution were provided by French scholars. Draper's work on Cuba deals cogently with selected issues. Good recent studies emphasizing the interaction of domestic and foreign policies include Goldenberg's *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America* (1965) and Suárez' *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966* scheduled for publication in mid-1967. Comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the revolution on Cuban society remains to be made.

In spite of its impact on history, we know relatively little about the revolutionary process. Historians have faithfully given chronological accounts of events and there have been pioneering studies of the natural history of revolutions, such as Crane Brinton's *The Anatomy of Revolution*. Blanksten (1958) and Lanning (1966) are among those who have applied Brinton's and other approaches to Latin America. Much attention, too, has been devoted to identifying different kinds of "revolutions" with essays on their philosophical and social implications. *Revolutions* edited by Carl J. Friedrich (1966) is among the most recent such efforts.

In the last few years two scholars, Chalmers Johnson and Harry Eckstein, have been attempting to break new ground in the study of revolution by going beyond the description of symptoms to the search for causes. In his provocative

study, *Revolution and the Social System*, Johnson provides a typology of revolution with a broad historical sweep. He identifies six types of revolution, beginning with the jacquerie (such as the peasant revolts of the late Middle Ages), and ending with the militarized mass insurrection (illustrated by China, Viet Nam, and Algeria). In this study, Johnson maintains that revolutions are caused in part by disequilibrium in the social system. The condition that causes disequilibrium is "dysfunction" which, when widespread and serious, is "multiple dysfunction." If an intransigent ruling elite is unwilling or unable to relieve such dysfunction, opposing groups turn to violence. In the resulting revolutionary situation, violence is touched off by an "accelerator," such as the rise of a charismatic leader, revolutionary parties, or defeat in a foreign war. In its most simple form Johnson's thesis held that multiple dysfunction, plus elite intransigence, plus an accelerator equals social revolution.

Harry Eckstein (1965) criticized Johnson's model on the grounds that social structure does not always determine attitudes and behavior and that revolutionary developments should not be linked mechanically to the social setting. Instead, Eckstein proposes his own paradigm for analyzing the causes of revolutions which contains four positive variables and four negative ones. Examples of positive variables are disorienting social processes and elite inefficiency and of negative variables, adjustive mechanisms and repression.

Subsequently, Johnson (1966: xi) dropped references to "multiple dysfunction" while reconfirming his contention that "revolution is inseparable from the social context in which it occurs." In *Revolutionary Change* he introduces value changing and environment changing forces as a means of analyzing the cause of disequilibrium. According to Johnson, when the value structure and the pattern of environmental adaptation are not synchronized, disequilibrium occurs. One major characteristic of disequilibrium is power deflation, a condition requiring the ruling elite to rely increasingly on force to maintain social integration. If this elite is subsequently unable to move towards re-synchronization, a loss of authority ensues. Thus, power deflation plus loss of authority, plus an accelerator, produce revolutionary insurrection.

The work of Johnson, Eckstein, and others is beginning to provide more precise analytical tools for explaining revolutions. But, as Lawrence Stone (1966) makes clear, much remains to be done.

I

The distinction between preconditions and precipitants suggested by Eckstein (1965) is useful in analyzing the breakdown of the old regimes. Preconditions are fundamental, underlying causes of social unrest, while precipitants are the more superficial events which lead to the outbreak of violence.

Among the preconditions which are most widely discussed in the literature are: inequitable and inefficient systems of land tenure; stagnating and unproductive economies; fiscal crises; and social discontent arising from low living standards, political repression and brutality; and foreign "domination."

Agrarian issues are central to understanding all three revolutions because of agriculture's importance in each country. On the eve of the revolution the rural population predominated in Mexico (c. 69%) and Bolivia (c. 73%). In Cuba, where the rural population had fallen below the half-way mark (c. 43%) by 1959, sugar, an agriculture product, dominated the economy.

In Mexico under Díaz land became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands by the process of acquisition from small holders, Indian communities, and the state. Silva Herzog (1960: 22) maintains that the large concentrations of land in haciendas were not designed to obtain the greatest return and were responsible for the failure of the nation's agriculture to produce efficiently. In his opinion (1960: 7), the fundamental cause of the Mexican Revolution was

the existence of enormous haciendas in the hands of a few people with a mentality similar to that of the feudal masters of Europe of the 14th and 15th centuries . . . many of the evils from which the country suffered had their origin in the unjust and unequal distribution of land since the beginning of the Spanish domination.

McBride (1923: 158) called the agrarian issues a cause of the revolution, referring to General Díaz's belated statement that the land problem was the cause that lay back of the entire revolution and that he, Díaz, was ready to spend all the accumulated funds of the treasury to find a remedy. Tannenbaum (1950: 136) maintains that "the chief cause of the Revolution of 1910 was the uneven distribution of land." E. Simpson (1937: 43) holds that the social disequilibrium preceding the revolution was at bottom due to inequalities in the distribution of land and to the evil effects of the hacienda system.

Concentration of land in large haciendas, frequently at the expense of Indian communities, took place in the years preceding the 1952 Revolution in Bolivia as it had in Mexico. On the eve of the revolution many Bolivian peons were still required to render services without cash payment. One result of this system, as Alexander (1958: 58) points out, was that almost 3 million of the 3.5 million Bolivians could not properly have been considered part of the national market economy. In his opinion, the system of land holding, together with a number of other factors, held back agricultural development (1958: 10).

Unlike pre-revolutionary agriculture in Mexico and Bolivia which still followed the Spanish colonial pattern, much of Cuban agriculture was organized on a commercial basis. Large sugar plantations employed wage labor, and the sugar mills controlled surrounding lands through actual ownership, rental, or crop purchase. As Goldenberg (1965: 129) points out, Cuban latifundia

were not feudal in character and had nothing in common with the big, almost self-sufficient haciendas in other Latin American countries. Yet, in its dependence on sugar, Cuban agriculture suffered from the lack of diversification, and much land was inefficiently cultivated. Dumont (1965: 32) calls attention to the insufficient utilization of land, labor and capital and stresses the great waste of productive forces resulting from layoffs and insufficiently intensive cultivation that occurred before 1959. Similar criticisms are widely voiced elsewhere in the literature.

Wide disagreement exists about the state of Cuban agriculture as a cause of the revolution. In his authoritative *Rural Cuba*, Nelson (1950: 255) emphasizes public demand for land reform and the serious consequences which may follow further delay. Similarly, Baran (1961) and Huberman and Sweezy (1960: 57) stress peasant unrest in the pre-revolutionary period.

Draper (1965: 75), on the other hand, claims that there is nothing comparable in Cuba to the "classic peasant revolutionary movement" led by Zapata in Mexico in 1910. The Soviet scholar Kalinin (Mikhailov, 1964: 23) denies that Cuban events were "a classical example of a peasant revolution" in view of the existence of a large agricultural proletariat. Goldenberg (1965: 125) rejects the thesis even more decisively: "There was, after 1937, no longer any violent unrest in the countryside . . . the demand for ownership of land among rural people was low."

In all three countries before the revolution, agriculture suffered from insufficiently intensive exploitation, inefficiency, and most of the social evils associated with underdevelopment. Many contemporary authorities blamed this situation in part on antiquated systems of land tenure in Mexico and Bolivia. In Cuba, the tendency is to place greater emphasis on the failure of management to modernize and diversify.

The degree to which the system of land tenure, or agricultural conditions generally were a "cause" of the revolution is another matter. The conditions of agriculture alone would not seem to be decisive. Otherwise, revolutions would have broken out in many other Latin American countries. In the case of Cuba, it may be questioned whether the many anti-Batista sentiments which existed in the 1950's in the countryside were distinctively rural. In Bolivia, whatever may have been the effects of the land tenure system and the state of agriculture generally, the peasants in the country as a whole had not yet been politically aroused at the time the revolution broke out.

The case for agrarian causes is strongest in the Mexican Revolution. Yet, Tannenbaum, who conceived of the Mexican Revolution as agrarian, has always given great attention to its other economic and political origins. In his study of the Mexican ejidos, Simpson (1937: 43) maintains that "it would be a mistake to assume . . . that the agrarian complex was the only cause of the Revolution,

or even a cause at all, if by this term is meant a precipitating force." The participation of elements of the rural population in the revolutions, discussed later, will throw additional light on this point.

In explaining the great revolutions of Europe and North America, Brinton (1965: 28) holds that "revolutions often come during economic depressions which follow on periods of generally rising standards of living." According to Brinton, revolutions are not born in societies that are economically retrograde, but in those which are economically progressive. Under Díaz the economy had achieved rapid rates of capital growth unprecedented in Mexican history. But this growth had been achieved at the expense of the poorer elements of society and, as Tannenbaum (1929: 149) points out, rising prices coupled with relatively stationary wages had lowered the real income of Mexican wage earners. Cuba had had a booming economy in the early part of the 20th century, but Seers (1964: 12) maintains that the economy had been suffering from chronic stagnation since the 1920's. In Bolivia, too, there had been a boom in tin during the early part of the 20th century, but tin mining was threatened by declining yields of ore. Thus, the experiences of all three countries could be described as, in part, bearing out Brinton's thesis, loosely interpreted. Little has been done in any serious way, however, to link these economic trends to social revolutions, and there would appear to be so many reservations and qualifications, different in each case, as to complicate the application of Brinton's thesis to these countries.

Brinton (1965: 29) maintains that on the eve of the revolution governments are often in severe financial straits. One could document to a greater or lesser extent such difficulties in all three countries. In Bolivia, for example, the Keenleyside report (UN: 1951) describes in detail the government's fiscal plight and existing inflationary pressures. Mexico and Cuba appear to have had fiscal problems, too, but of relatively less magnitude. There appear to be no authoritative studies on the relationship between fiscal issues and the revolutions in these three Latin American countries.

Economic conditions were a source of popular discontent on the eve of these revolutions and can be cited as a cause of popular alienation from the ruling elites. And fiscal problems weakened the old regimes to varying degrees. The extent of the importance of economic and fiscal problems as underlying causes of the revolutions is a somewhat different question, which can be fairly evaluated only in a larger context.

Most authorities are in agreement that broad social and political issues were equally or more important than economic and fiscal ones. Discontent with wages, working conditions, and living conditions provide a bedrock of dissatisfaction with governments or regimes in all these countries, but similar economic conditions have plagued most countries in Latin America which have

never experienced social revolution. In the words of Silva Herzog (1960: 169), it is an error to assume that the causes of malaise are exclusively economic, or exclusively international, or exclusively a matter of race. In his opinion, all of the various complex causes are manifested in a "political fever" and social crises focus on "the political question."

In explaining the causes of the Mexican Revolution, González (1960: 203) refers to six causes cited by Luis Cabrera: *caciquismo*, *peonismo*, *fabricuismo*, *hacendadismo*, *cientifisismo*, and *extranjerismo*. In describing them, the latter makes their socio-political content clear: revolt against local political bosses and their despotic methods, against feudal relations on the countryside, against conditions in the factory resembling servitude, against social and political control by a small group of financial and business magnates, and against the privileged positions of foreigners in Mexican society. The natural target of a growing opposition composed of alienated intellectuals and political activists was the commanding figure of the caudillo, General Porfirio Díaz, who had ruled Mexico since 1876.

Although few had dared to oppose General Díaz, and even on the eve of the revolution he appeared invincible, the unscrupulous methods he had used to control elections and insure his continuance in office, his use of censorship and brutality against those who sought to voice opposition, and his cynical manipulation of the levers of power from the capital were well known. Popular perception of the nature of the Díaz system was one thing, organizing opposition to it another. As Octavio Paz (1961: 137) points out, one antecedent of the revolt against Díaz was the development of a middle class due to the growth of commerce and industry: "A new generation had arisen, a restless generation that desired a change. The quarrel of the generations became a part of the general discord." According to Luis Cabrera in Ross (1966: 58), the Mexican Revolution was "nothing more than the insurrection of the Mexican people against a very repressive and wealthy regime . . . against a social, political, and economic system." Or Cosío Villegas (1964: 13): "The Mexican Revolution was in fact the revolt of the impoverished many against the wealthy few . . . the reason which made the reform irresistible came from the purest Christian source: a feeling of obvious social injustice."

The wellsprings of social discontent in Bolivia were similar to those in Mexico: peonage, exploitation of wage labor in the mines, political suppression, concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small elite, and absentee ownership. According to Urquidí (1966: 326), the profound roots of this revolution were the "exploitation from which the people were suffering at the hands of the mining and feudal oligarchy for half a century . . . increasingly accentuated oppression of imperialism . . . and in the anti-democratic conduct of the government."

Unlike the revolution in Mexico, which followed one of the longest and stablest periods in history, the revolution in Bolivia climaxed a 20-year period of unprecedented social and political ferment which began at least as early as the 1929 depression. Alexander (1958: 22) correctly expresses the virtually unanimous opinion that the Chaco War (1932–1936) “disorganized the economy, discredited the army, spread new ideas among the urban workers and miners, and sewed discontent among the intelligentsia, [thereby accelerating] a process of social ferment which reached its high point on April 9, 1952.” Interpretations of the impact of the Chaco War vary. In his study of the Bolivian economy, Zondag (1966: 25) maintains that “apart from disorganizing a national economy, [the Chaco War] was the beginning of a social upheaval, of moral disintegration and of costly political experiments which ultimately led to the revolution of 1952.” Klein (1963: iii) explicitly de-emphasizes the socio-economic consequences of the war and emphasizes “political dislocations”:

The war unquestionably caused the breakdown of both the traditional political party system and traditional patterns of leadership and class orientation. This breakdown was engendered by the Bolivian middle class to rebel against the pre-war upper class leadership because of their conduct of the Chaco War. As a result, the middle classes turned to new radical political solutions to resolve the dilemma of Bolivia’s disastrous defeat. In so doing, the Bolivian middle classes broke a system of political organization which had endured for over half a century, and by breaking this pattern, they set the stage for the great social revolution of 1952.

Cuba differed from Mexico and Bolivia in that she had recently (1944–1952) enjoyed government by moderate, relatively progressive, and popularly elected presidents sponsored by the Auténtico party. True, Bolivia had reform-minded dictatorships in the governments of Toro, Busch, and Villaroel, but these lacked the stability and constitutional legitimacy of the Grau San Martín and Prío governments in Cuba. The failure of the latter two presidents to come fully to grips with the nation’s problems and establish a firm hold on the nation’s loyalties, is fundamental to understanding the Cuban Revolution. On the one hand, Juan Bosch (1955: 141) holds that Grau’s government provided for greater well being for the mass of society and had an “energetic social policy, with measures favoring many classes,” a large public works program, a “dignified and strong international position,” and unrestricted civil liberties. But Bosch calls attention to the Grau government’s lamentable failing: “An absence of administrative honesty . . . ministers left their responsibilities carrying away millions, and an infinity of lower ranked functionaries enriched themselves in their posts.” Gil (1962: 378–9) points out a number of social and political gains, but notes failure to achieve agrarian reform. He, too, tells how the Au-

ténticos immersed themselves in “graft and corruption on a scale unsurpassed only in recent years by Batista’s second regime.” During this period crime, gangsterism, and other forms of violence were rife in Cuba. The symbol of the Auténtico’s incapacity to retain and mobilize effective political support and strengthen government and the economy was Batista’s bloodless coup of March 10, 1952. Although opposition to Batista’s return might have been mobilized, President Prío lost his “will to power and faith in himself.” Bosch (1955: 144).

In a sense, the Achilles heel of the Batista government (1952–1959) was the illegal manner in which he came to power. Most authorities believe his coup in 1952 symbolized his inability to win the forthcoming election. Unable to legitimize his power, Batista relied heavily on coercion. As the revolutionary movement gathered momentum, he resorted increasing to censorship, police brutality, reprisals and terror. According to Draper (1965: 116), “Batista, not Castro, was the indispensable revolutionary ingredient.” Although few authors ignore the inequalities of wealth and living conditions, and particularly seasonal and structural unemployment, there is surprisingly wide agreement about the predominance of political factors in explaining Batista’s fall.

Burks (1964: 8) maintains that “Cuba did not fall to Castro because of its excessive poverty or because of revolutionary class conscious unrest . . . economic and social conditions of the Cuba of the 1950’s were in fact a mixture of achievement and persistent problems . . . corruption which characterized [Batista’s] regime, the methods of terror and torture which it employed to stay in power, led to a profound and increasing revulsion among wider and wider elements of the population.” Suárez (1967: Ch. 1) holds that “the overthrow of Batista was not due to any demand of the masses for the radical transformation of the socio-economic structure.” Gil (1962: 385) maintains that the success of the 26th of July Movement can only be explained by “a national feeling of revulsion towards existing political habits.” Zeitlin and Scheer (1963: 12) quote José Miró Cardona that “the fight against Batista was a fight against political dictatorship, not against economic conditions.” Lanning (1966: 369) also stresses “popular revulsion against widespread corruption and the employment of terror, both essentially non-economic sentiments.”

No discussion of the preconditions of revolution in these three countries would be complete without some reference to foreign economic and political influence. In all three countries “imperialism,” especially United States “imperialism,” had long been a politically sensitive subject. On the eve of these revolutions the United States was an especially important market for a variety of Mexican products, for Cuban sugar, and Bolivian tin. In addition, U. S. investments in Mexican and Cuban land, extractive industries, public utilities, and manufacturing caused friction. Discrimination in favor of North American residents and tourists in Mexico and Cuba, and against the native born, exacer-

bated relations. In both countries anti-Americanism was firmly rooted from the time of the Mexican War and the Platt Amendment. In Bolivia, many informed observers were extremely critical of absentee ownership of the largest tin mines and the Northamerican and other foreign managers, heavy foreign remittances, and the mine owner's manipulation of domestic politics from abroad.

Tannenbaum (1933: 137) indicates that contact with American labor and with other ideas and practices in the United States clashed with the structure of "feudal Mexico," which intensified discontent. Northamerican influence was perhaps relatively greater in Cuba than in either Mexico or Bolivia. According to Williams in Ross (1966: 193),

American control operated to polarize Cuban politics and ideology. The system per se had to be changed before even reforms of a significant nature could be introduced . . . politics became increasingly revolutionary, not only in terms of domestic affairs but also in terms of Cuba's relationship to the United States. American policy thus functioned to create an indigenous radical movement.

Seers (1964: 18) called the contrast between relatively high living standards in the United States, especially in Florida, with those in Cuba "intolerable." Robert Smith (1960: 176) holds that anti-U.S. feelings, and the factors that caused them helped produce Castro's victory.

The Díaz and Batista governments, and the Bolivian *rosca* to a lesser degree, were closely associated with, and in part dependent on, U.S. interests and policies. And this association with foreign interests was one further source of popular dissatisfaction with these pre-revolutionary governments.

Most authors explaining the cause of these revolutions mention "imperialism," but few have attempted in any precise way to evaluate its relative importance as a precondition. How many revolutionaries would take up arms and risk their lives because of foreign ownership of specific properties or because of the leverage of the U.S. sugar quota? On the other hand, the subordination of their country to what they considered to be intolerable foreign domination was one of many reasons behind the demand for change. In Mexico and Cuba the "anti-imperialist" character of the revolutionaries' programs was less evident before the seizure of government than afterwards. The contrast is less marked in Bolivia.

Identifying the precipitants of social revolutions is perhaps less difficult than determining the preconditions conceived as fundamental causes. Difficult estimates are involved about how far back in time precipitants may occur and about their relative importance.

Singling out the most important precipitant in each case from treatment in secondary sources may seem arbitrary, but the exercise forces one to look more deeply into the revolutionary process. In Mexico, the most important precipi-

tant was the arrest and imprisonment of Francisco I. Madero by the Díaz regime as the presidential campaign, in which the former was a leading contender, was approaching its climax. Ever since the Creelman interview of 1908, the Mexican people had been led to expect that General Díaz might step down. When his principal opponent in the election was arrested, the opposition's only remaining recourse was violence. As Silva Herzog (1960: 127) maintains, "only one route was left: armed struggle with all its consequences." Ross (1955: 06) calls Madero's arrest "a political blunder, inopportune and stupid. [Madero] became the object of sympathy and enjoyed even greater popularity."

A comparable moment in Bolivia was in mid-1951 when the incumbent government refused to permit the congress to select from the leading candidates in the presidential elections in which the candidate of the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR), Paz Estenssoro, had received a plurality. Barcelli (1956: 249) said that the military junta's take-over "forced the MNR and the people to follow the route of conspiracy." Or, at any rate, the take-over tended to justify such a conspiracy since the MNR had already unsuccessfully tried insurrection in 1949. Peñaloza (1963: 256) points out that the military's nullification of the 1951 election resulted in the great increase in support for the MNR.

Although preceding by nearly seven years the victory of the revolution, the most important precipitating event in Cuba appears to be General Batista's coup d'état of March 10, 1952. He seized power on the eve of elections in which many observers felt he had no chance of victory. Coming as it did after three terms of popularly elected administrations, Batista's unconstitutional act led to a series of subsequent assassination attempts, general strikes, and revolts allegedly designed to restore the constitutional order. The earliest and now best known of these was the foolhardy attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba in 1953, which event served as the genesis of Castro's 26th of July Movement. As Draper (1965: 116) states, a catalytic agent was needed to bring accumulated social tensions into eruption and that agent was Batista's coup in March, 1952. He adds that subsequent revolutionary conspiracies were primarily against Batista rather than with Castro. A number of other events contributed to the mounting pace of revolutionary activity, such as the U. S. embargo on arms to Cuba, the Herbert Matthews interview, and the failure of moderates to arrange free elections.

In view of the historical traditions and political character of the pre-revolutionary regimes, undue emphasis on the maintenance of legality or constitutionality as popular norms seems out of place. Yet, the arrest of presidential candidate Madero on the eve of the elections, the Bolivian military's refusal to permit the congress to carry out the electoral mandate of 1951, and Batista's usurpation of power on the eve of the 1952 elections all have one attribute in

common. In each case, a dictatorial figure or group openly and cynically denied the electorate the opportunity to select its own leadership. Such open defiance of the nation was more than simply a breach of constitutional norms; it showed contempt for the citizenry. In each case, the arbitrary and violent measure discredited the group involved, revealed its reliance on force rather than consent, and provided moral and political justification for revolution.

II

In the potentially explosive political climate created by the preconditions and precipitants described above, social revolution breaks out only in the presence of revolutionary leadership. Simpson (1937: 44) maintains that once the "oppressed classes are aware that some other way of life is possible and their ambitions are stirred, from then on revolt . . . becomes largely a matter of the appearance of leaders." The leader of a revolutionary group must somehow make himself visible on the national scene. Whereas Díaz had squelched other rivals, Madero was permitted to campaign against him in the 1910 elections because the mild, unprepossessing, little man seemed such an unlikely threat. Castro claimed public attention by a variety of public escapades such as his court case to force Batista's resignation, the bloody attack on Moncada Barracks, and his 1956 landing in Oriente province. Victor Paz Estenssoro had a dozen years of governmental and political experience behind him, plus a victory in the 1951 presidential elections.

The leadership of all three of these revolutions is usually described as lacking a carefully articulated doctrine as compared, for example, to the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions. This is particularly true in the case of the Mexican and Cuban Revolutions. Tannenbaum (1950: 49) called the Mexican Revolution ". . . unadorned by any philosophy of politics, meager in its social program, and opportunistic in its immediate objectives." Simpson (1937: 46) described the Mexican Revolution as "innocent of either doctrine or theory . . . in the beginning it was largely a blind, blundering, haphazard, spontaneous outbreak." Cosío Villegas (1964: 3) maintains that the precursors of the revolution had greater "moral than ideological value" and that the Mexican Revolution "never had a definite program, nor has it attempted to formulate one now." Octavio Paz (1950: 136) points out that the "lack of ideological precursors and the scarcity of links with universal ideology are characteristic aspects of the revolution."

In Cuba the rich and varied ideological influences which played upon the revolutionary forces and subsequent efforts to interpret Cuban events in theoretical terms should not obscure the doctrinal confusion of Castro's prerevolutionary statements, particularly when compared with orthodox Marxism-

Leninism. In describing Castro's efforts to come to terms with Marxism, Burks (1964: 28) concludes that "the Castroites failed in their search for an adequate ideology of their own." Suárez (1967: Ch. I) describes Castro as having "only the most superficial smattering of ideology even in 1962." Perhaps, no one has devoted more critical attention to this subject than Theodore Draper (1965: 58) who concludes that "Castroism seemed to be a blueprint without a theory . . . Castroism has rather had only a 'retrospective' theory, in the sense that only after taking power did it begin to ask itself what it had done and how it had been done."

Unlike the Mexican and Cuban revolutionary movements, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) of Bolivia was an organized and functioning political party for some dozen years, had participated in government, and had been developing its own political programs. The fact that the MNR had been influenced by both Fascist and Marxist thought was the source of no little political and ideological confusion. Under the circumstances, it should be no cause for surprise that its early programs foreshadowed only in part the course of the new revolutionary government. In the compilation sponsored by the U. S. Army, the *Area Handbook On Bolivia* (1963: 2), the Bolivian Revolution was characterized as "neither a coup d'état, nor a revamping of society according to the dictates of a particular doctrine . . . it is more aptly characterized as that primitive stage in which modernization receives official endorsement."

These revolutions were not generated in a day. The revolutionary leadership passed through a period of underground or openly rebellious actions that tested their strategy and courage. In Mexico there were numerous small uprisings prior to 1900 (particularly in the north) as well as in the first decade of the twentieth century, and Madero's insurrection lasted from the issuance of his Plan de San Luis Potosí of October 1910 until the fall of Díaz in May 1911. In Bolivia, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario was involved in conspiracies off and on from its formation in 1940 until the seizure of government in 1952, perhaps the most dramatic instance of which was the failure of the insurrection of 1949. The actual seizure of government in Bolivia lasted only about three days, with intense fighting confined largely to La Paz and a few other urban centers. If Castro's abortive attack on Moncada Barracks and other incidents are excluded, the Castroite insurrection lasted slightly more than two years, from the landing of the Granma in late 1956 until Batista's flight on January 1, 1959.

The revolutionary movements owe their success in no small measure to weaknesses of the armies of the old regimes, whose impressive facades concealed poor morale and leadership. Parkes (1938: 320) calls the Díaz dictatorship, despite its invincible appearance, as rotten with age and explains how the "army had been steadily weakened; nominally 30,000, it actually contained only

18,000 men, and these were unwilling conscripts badly equipped by grafting war department officials." Never having recovered from its disastrous defeat in the Chaco War, the Bolivian army continued to suffer from the wide rift between officers and enlisted men, poor morale, and weak organization. The revolt of the Minister of Government, General Antonio Seleme and the police, who turned over weapons to the rebels, was a fatal breach in the old regime's unity. With regard to Batista's army, Julien (1961: 91) attributes Batista's coup in 1952 to his subversion of unscrupulous officers. But the effectiveness of this technique also explains why these military "adventurers," concerned first about saving their own skin and enjoying the fruits of their corruption, could not be counted on in his hour of need. Draper (1965: 105) also points out that Batista's army was made up of raw peasant recruits who had little stake in the existing regime and "abandoned it at the first sign of weakening." The rank and file of the regular armies in Mexico and Bolivia had no better reason to risk their lives in the defense of tottering governments.

As the pressure of the revolutionary forces in each country increased, the professional, political, and moral bankruptcy of the armed forces of the old regimes led them to increasingly desperate and counter-productive measures. In the concluding months of his rule, Porfirio Díaz mixed brutal suppression with ill-timed concessions, only stimulating the revolutionary forces to new exertions. In Bolivia after the repudiation of the 1951 elections, the military junta, according to Ostria Gutiérrez (1952:81), took harsh and not always strictly legitimate measures of self defense which generated sympathy for the "trouble makers" and paved the way for their victory. The military's repressive activities were perhaps most counter-productive in Cuba. Phillips (1959:342) described in detail the brutalities, torture, and murderous reprisals for which the Batista armed forces were responsible and which had the effect of uniting the population in opposition to the Batista regime. Gil (1962:383) describes how "the brutal revenge taken by the regime, in the form of murder and torture applied indiscriminantly to all opponents of Batista, terrorized the population" and led to widespread revolutionary activity all over the island.

The Bolivian revolutionaries used a lightning urban insurrection to achieve a classical coup d'état. The fact that the revolutionaries included important elements of the civilian population distinguished it from the typical palace or barracks revolts. In Mexico and Cuba the revolutionaries used a wide spectrum of violent techniques: demonstrations, strikes, local revolts, and armed rebellion. Castro's methods, unlike those used in the Mexican and Bolivian Revolutions (methods well known in Latin America) combined paramilitary activities with the techniques of psychological warfare. His meticulous attention to publicity, indicated in part by his "History Will Absolve Me" speech and the Matthews interview, the strict rules about proper guerrilla conduct

toward the local populace, the dramatic kidnapping of racing driver Juan Manuel Fangio and of American and Canadian executives, were all part of his political strategy. In assuming the military risks of announcing his 1956 landing in Cuba in advance, Castro explicitly indicated the priority he gave "psychological warfare." (Huberman and Sweezy, 1960:52).

Although the techniques of revolutionary violence varied, none of the three revolutionary movements could escape direct confrontation with the military forces of the old regimes. In each case, when the revolutionaries had successfully bested regular forces in a conventional military situation, the old regimes collapsed like a house of cards.

In Mexico the confrontation took place at Ciudad Juárez on the U.S. border, after revolts and demonstrations scattered through Mexico had shaken Díaz's authority. Cut off from distant sources of supply in the south, regular forces proved no match for Madero's irregulars. According to Silva Herzog (1960:160), "the fall of Ciudad Juárez was the *coup de grâce* of General Díaz's government. With a single battle won, by the taking of an unimportant town square, such as that of Ciudad Juárez, the revolution begun in November, 1910 had triumphed. It was not the army but public opinion which had won." While recognizing the vast repercussions of the Madero revolt, Cline (1953:121) calls it "scarcely the mass uprising of a downtrodden people . . . not the instrument of rapacious foreign capitalism . . . the Madero revolution was essentially a colossal bluff that succeeded . . . even by Mexican standards it was a small affair."

In Bolivia the confrontation with the army took place in La Paz itself. With the support of the police, the revolutionary forces hung on in La Paz and defeated the most courageous defenders of the old regime, the cadets from the military school. According to Peñaloza (1963:279), when the commanding general, Torres Ortíz, learned of the rebel victory in Oruro, was informed of his troops' reluctance to fight, and faced a dwindling supply of munitions, he capitulated to the MNR's demands. As Patch (1961:127) indicates, "The revolution did not follow the rules. . . there was little loss of life, there was little fighting outside of La Paz."

In Cuba the decisive military confrontation of the revolution took place in Santa Clara in Las Villas province. Detachments of Castro's 26th of July Movement marched west from their sanctuary in the Sierra Maestra mountains, harassing Batista's army, subduing small garrisons, but avoiding a direct confrontation in force. At Santa Clara, troops from the 26th of July Movement and other resistance organizations under the leadership of Ché Guevara met and attacked a heavily armed military detachment in force and won. Subject to a variety of other pressures such as a U.S. embargo, the unwillingness of troops

to fight, and the demands of his own general staff, Batista fled the island within a matter of hours.

Until the revolutionary forces were ready to face and defeat the regular armies in direct combat, they could not dislodge the old regimes. When these armies were defeated in single encounters at Ciudad Juárez, La Paz, and Santa Clara, the old regimes collapsed from within. Agreement about the military insignificance of the coup in La Paz is virtually unanimous. Authorities also tend to play down the military significance of Madero's victory, even though the local revolts of Orozco, Zapata, Villa, and others should not be ignored. The significance of Castro's paramilitary activities, however, is one of the most controversial issues of the Cuban Revolution.

Controversy about the military significance of Castro's victory relates primarily to two questions. First, how important were Castro's resistance activities as compared to those of other Cuban revolutionary groups? According to MacGaffey and Barnett (1965: 277), "for most of the two year period that Castro spent in guerrilla warfare, the rebels were on the defensive in the mountains . . . a much larger urban resistance movement harrassed the army and police in the cities." Taber (1961: 277) explains the decision to send Guevara and Cienfuegos to the west as the means of ensuring Fidelista predominance over other revolutionary groups which far outnumbered the Fidelistas. And there can be no doubt that strikes, sabotage, demonstrations, attempted assassinations, local revolts sponsored by groups independent of Castro played an enormous role in bringing Batista down. Evidence from secondary sources, however, is insufficient for quantitative measurement of the importance of Castro's efforts compared with those of others, if in fact quantification is possible. What may be more significant is the fact that Castro's strategies succeeded where others had failed, he became the best known leader of the Cuban resistance, and imposed his will on the nation after the seizure of the government.

A second controversial issue involves the military as opposed to the political or psychological significance of Castro's revolutionary activities. Phillips (1959), the *New York Times* correspondent in Havana, gives the impression of considerable paramilitary activities throughout the country. Also the accounts of the guerrilla campaigns by Taber (1961), Pardo Llada (1960) and Guevara (1963) describe seemingly complex and far reaching guerrilla operations. Yet, it appears that Castro's armed forces on the eve of his victory barely exceeded 1,500 men. According to Pardo Llada (1960: 42) who joined Castro in the Sierra in October, 1958, Castro had succeeded in arming from 1,500 to 1,700 men. Goldenberg (1965: 162) reports that he was personally informed that there were only about 803 officially recognized members in Castro's forces in December 1958. Draper (1965: 71) quotes Castro as maintain-

ing that the “decisive battles” of the war were fought with fewer than 500 men. Evidence available from secondary sources is thus not conclusive on this point, but a reasonable working hypothesis is that Castro’s armed forces represented a tiny fraction of the number of men available to Batista.

Many of the authoritative accounts de-emphasize the military aspects of Castro’s victory. Julien (1961: 97) concludes “the victory of Fidel Castro was not strictly speaking a military victory. Above all, it was a moral and popular victory.” MacGaffey and Barnett (1965: 295) describe Castro’s forces as being unprepared for Batista’s flight since “their only substantial military victories had occurred in December, culminating in the seizure of Santa Clara.” Draper (1965: 25) also describes Castro’s surprise at Batista’s capitulation, a capitulation to a “hostile people,” rather than “a defeat by a superior force.” Draper maintains that Batista’s regime would not have fallen without Castro’s military pressure, but military pressure itself was far from enough to bring about Batista’s fall. While there may continue to be grounds for disagreement about the extent and impact of Castro’s paramilitary activities, the weight of authority gives precedence to the political rather than the military significance of his victory.

In the light of what happened later, especially in Mexico and Cuba, the initial political objectives of all three insurrectionary movements were surprisingly moderate. In Mexico Madero directed his criticism at President Díaz’ unwillingness to step down after so many years in power, calling for free elections, and the restriction on suffrage. According to Quirk (1963: 3), Madero “abhorred revolution” and turned reluctantly to armed revolt. He concentrated on the implementation of democratic and constitutional norms rather than far-reaching socio-economic reform. Initially, he had been prepared for all manner of compromise with Díaz; it was only the latter’s intransigence which forced him to take up arms. In Bolivia, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario did have specific ideas about political and economic innovation, but the leadership assumed that mantle of constitutional legitimacy in claiming Paz Estenssoro’s right to the presidency as a result of his plurality in the 1951 elections. During the insurrection in Cuba, Castro’s political platform was firmly based on a return to the Constitution of 1940; the Cuban Revolution was radicalized *after* he was in power.

On the eve of and during the insurrections the revolutionary movements in all three countries directed their fire at fairly narrow political targets. Madero fought Díaz and his inner circle. The MNR sought to wrench power from the military who represented the “rosca,” the combination of mining and landed interests that had traditionally ruled the country. Unlike pre-revolutionary Mexico and Bolivia, Cuba by the 1950’s no longer had a society so clearly marked by the traditional pattern of 19th century class stratification. Castro’s

revolt was against Batista and his military clique, not against a traditional upper class.

Although it is not too difficult to identify what group these three revolutions were against, it is somewhat harder to determine who they were for. An analysis of the groups which made the revolutions provides a partial answer.

In Mexico, almost all classes were sources of revolutionary leadership. Madero came from a rich family of hacendados, Carranza and Obregón were ranchers, Calles a school teacher. Zapata was a peasant who clung to the land and Pancho Villa escaped peonage as a cattle rustler. During the insurrection and Madero's presidency the class character of the new regime had not yet been determined; these issues were to be resolved during the civil war and thereafter.

Almost all authorities agree that the Bolivian Revolution was made by members of the middle class and industrial workers, particularly miners. Canelas (1966: 160) holds that the leadership in the 1952 Revolution was "fundamentally petty bourgeois" and the rank and file were predominantly "urban workers and miners." In the official *Bolivia: Diez años de revolución*, Dirección Nacional de Informaciones (1962) the MNR government makes explicit reference to the middle class' participation in the 1952 coup. Few if any authorities indicate any significant participation by the peasants and Urquidí (1966: 327) explicitly denies peasant participation. Most of the leading members of the MNR were middle class intellectuals and professional men, although there were a few important leaders, such as Juan Lechín, who came up through mining or other sectors of organized labor.

The social origins of the participants in the Cuban revolutionary movement are far more controversial. Agreement does exist about the important contribution of the middle class to Castro's victory. In the first place, Castro's core group, those who survived the 1956 landing, were middle class, as Taber (1961: 12) points out, and included: the son of a sugar cane planter, a grocer's son, an accountant, a judge's son, a school teacher, and a minor league baseball player. Draper (1965: 68) quotes Ché Guevara that "none of us . . . of the first group who came in the *Granma* . . . had a worker's or peasant's background." According to Draper (1965: 111), the great majority of leadership and a large part of the rank and file came from the middle class until 1957 or even perhaps 1958. Even the Soviet analyst, Kalinin (in Mikhailov, 1964: 28), leaves no doubt about middle class participation. Gil (1962: 384) and MacGaffey and Barnett (1965: 289) describe Castro's financial and other support from rich Cubans who opposed Batista.

For ideological and other reasons many commentators sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution list the participation of organized labor in the resistance movement. Much evidence is available, however, to discount the signifi-

cance of labor's role. Draper (1965: 76) denies that the Cuban Revolution was a "proletarian revolution," as far as the conquest of power was concerned, and MacGaffey and Barnett (1965: 179) said the Castro government came to power without the support of organized labor. Castro's advisor, Dumont (1965: 40), said that the urban working class was too Americanized and remained on the sidelines during the resistance. Goldenberg (1965: 144) described the workers as taking "less part in the struggle than any other class."

The extent of peasant participation in the Cuban resistance movement is difficult to determine in part because of the contradictory testimony. Aguirre (1964: 301) and Huberman and Sweezy (1961: 78) emphasize the role of peasants in the guerrilla movement. The latter claims elsewhere (p. 57) that 3/4 to 4/5 of the soldiers in the final campaigns of 1958 were peasants, and that the "most important class" which joined the rebels was the peasantry. Draper (1965: 72) takes a contrary position, maintaining that "Castro's active peasant backing was so limited in terms of the peasantry or agricultural population as a whole that it can hardly serve to support the theory of 'agrarian revolution.'" He quotes Guevara to show that the members of the rural populace in the Sierra Maestra who joined the 26th of July Movement were atypical in that they wanted land of their own and were not wage laborers on large sugar plantations. Draper (1965: 67) points out that Guevara does not derive guerrilla warfare from the agrarian revolution, but the reverse. That is, Guevara stresses fighting in the countryside because this is easier and more effective than in the cities. In comparing the role of the middle class and the peasants, Lanning (1966: 367) concludes that the revolution probably could have succeeded without the peasants, but it could not have succeeded without the middle class.

Another issue which needs to be squarely faced is the extent of Communist participation during the seizure of government in these three countries. Alexander (1958: 272) expresses what is probably the most accepted view, namely: "The Mexican and Bolivian Revolution have both been fundamentally American. Neither has been led by people owing their allegiance to any foreign government or any foreign ideology." The Mexican Revolution, of course, took place well before the Bolshevik Revolution and the Mexican Communist Party was not formed until 1919. The Bolivian Communist Party was formed in 1950 and Communist sources often claim an active role in the 1952 insurrection. But at this early date the Communist Party was extremely small and it was not until 1959 that it held its first national congress.

The nature and extent of Communist participation in the resistance movement has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Cuban Revolution. Virtually all sources agree that some Communists supported Castro and participated in the guerrilla and other activities of the resistance movement sev-

eral months prior to Batista's fall. Burks (1964: 30) expresses one authoritative view:

Sometime in the summer of 1959 the PSP [Partido Socialista Popular] (Communist) old guard decided they should support Castro, since it seemed certain that he was going to win, and that Batista was on the way out. The Communists were not, however, united; some Party members continued to serve in the Batista government and others failed to oppose Batista openly. In the early summer of 1958 a Communist leader, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, had visited Castro in the Sierra Maestra. There is no known evidence one way or another of a deal, but it would seem that Castro reassured the Party leaders that if he came to power he would not be and it would not be anti-Communist.

The major issues, then, were not whether the Communists supported Castro, but how soon, to what extent, and the significance of their participation. In general, those who tend to stress the importance of the Communists in the early phases of the Cuban Revolution come from one of two extremes. On the one hand, Cuban and other Communists who seek credit for the Party's participation in the revolution tend to emphasize Communist participation and gloss over Castro's differences with the Party. On the other, some of Castro's harshest critics stress the Communist tie in connection with their efforts to support positions on public policies hostile towards Castro in other countries.

Communist criticism of Castro's abortive attack on Moncada Barracks in 1953 and their unwillingness to support Castro's call for a general strike in April 1958 are both a matter of record. The Soviet analyst Kalinin (in Mikhailov, 1964: 23) describes how some Cuban Communists during the preparation of the revolution maintained a "mistaken position" which kept the Party for a certain time from entering into "the active struggle." Goldenberg (1965: 166), Zeitlin and Scheer (1963: 110), Arnault (1962: 89), Julien (1961: 82) all stress the deep gulf that separated Castro and the Communists until the concluding months of the revolution. Sauréz (1967: Ch. I) points out that even by January 1, 1959, when Castro had won, the Communists had not definitely defined their position with respect to Castro. The reply given to Janette Habel (Castro and Habel, 1965: 49) by Blas Roca, leader of the Cuban Communists for many years, about what he believed to be the most important phenomenon of the Cuban Revolution may be decisive: "[The Cuban Revolution] is the first socialist revolution which had not been made [hecha] by the Communist Party."

Another question which arises in connection with all three revolutions is the nature and extent of United States influence. Madero used the United States as a sanctuary and secured weapons and munitions there, mostly at his

own and his family's expense. Ross (1955: 143) denies that the U. S. government was either a supporter of the Díaz government, or a cohort of the revolutionists, but that U. S. neutrality "strengthened the Madero movement morally and materially."

The fact that troops were massed along the border as the Ciudad Juarez campaign was reaching a climax has been described as pressure on President Díaz to resign. Vera Estañol (1957: 155) maintains that Díaz's cabinet believed that it was vital to avoid at all costs "any pretext or cause for the outbreak of hostilities with the neighboring country." Silva Herzog (1960: 156) also describes how "fear of our neighbors" alarmed Díaz's government and implies that Díaz felt the need to come to terms with Madero in order to avoid U. S. intervention. Parkes (1938: 320) and Cumberland (1952: 133) describe how the presence of American troops complicated the negotiating position of the Díaz government. Treatment of this issue in the secondary sources consulted does not provide sufficient evidence for conclusive judgment.

The United States ties with Bolivia were less close than those with Mexico and Cuba on the eve of the revolution. The United States was, nonetheless, a major market for tin and U. S. dealings with the Bolivian government in the months preceding the revolution were a subject of public attention and did not strengthen the hand of the authorities in the rapidly approaching revolutionary situation. Partly because U. S. financial interests in Bolivia were less extensive, the nationalization of the large tin companies and the agrarian reform in 1952 and 1953 created less strain in relations with the United States than comparable actions in the Mexican and Cuban Revolutions.

The question of United States influence on Cuba as Batista's term drew to a close is controversial and complex. During that period the U. S. maintained close relations with Batista and was providing economic assistance. At the same time, Castro received important support from Cuban exiles in the United States, and the 1958 embargo on military aid dealt Batista a severe blow. Burks (1964: 12) describes United States policy during this period as "unimaginative if well meaning confusion of the principle of non-intervention with that of neutrality . . . the lack of interest on the part of the administration in Latin America and the general belief, held until late 1958, that Castro could not win." U. S. policies towards Castro after January 1959 are sometimes interpreted as having an important influence on the course of the Cuban Revolution; most sources dealing with the pre-revolutionary period emphasize domestic trends and events in Cuba.

III

Works on the revolutionary process by Johnson, Eckstein, and others have

helped identify critical aspects of social revolution about which we know little and need to know much more. For example, under what circumstances and how do disorienting social processes, such as industrialization and urbanization, contribute to the development of revolutionary situations? What is the impact on political stability of changing social values and social structures? How does one relate the development of new classes or interest groups to revolution? What can be learned about the social origins, attitudes, and objectives of members of revolutionary or potentially revolutionary groups? Much is known about certain leaders, little about their followers. What decisions of incumbent elites tend to inflame, or dampen, revolutionary situations? What were the causes and the nature of the disintegration of the regular armed forces in countries which have experienced revolutions? Answers to such questions are likely to be found not only through the study of revolution, but as a result of increased understanding of social change itself.

Although our understanding of Latin American revolutions is at best in its adolescence, useful working hypotheses can be drawn on the basis of the foregoing survey of secondary sources. In a general way these hypotheses reflect the insight of some of the recent findings in social science about revolutions, but remain in the traditional framework of the literature on which they are based. Genuinely new conceptions about revolution await the design of sharper and more powerful analytical tools and their application to primary sources.

An underlying and fundamental cause of the revolutions in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba was the growing gap between the vast majority of the population and a small, ruling elite. The bedrock of popular discontent was in part due to the structure and functioning of the economic system. In Mexico and Bolivia there was an inefficient and inequitable system of land tenure on the colonial pattern. In Cuba the large sugar plantations and mills which overshadow all other productive activities proved incapable of leading the economy towards the modernization and diversification required. Díaz had done more than any other Mexican leader in history to develop the country, but he did so at the expense of Mexican peasants and urban labor. In Bolivia the traditional alliance of mining and landed interests, discredited by the Chaco War and weakened by internal division, appeared incapable of bolstering the faltering economy and maintaining peace in the mines. In Cuba the moderate and democratically oriented *Auténtico* leadership and its successor, Batista's military dictatorship, did not introduce the broad social and economic reforms to which they gave lip service, nor could they lead the nation confidently up the slope of economic development. All three revolutionary governments were closely linked with powerful trading and investment interests abroad which dominated the countries' foreign trade and controlled some of their important domestic industries. Popular criticism of the nations' economic dependence and of privi-

leged positions for foreigners was already strong on the eve of the revolutions.

Popular unrest, to the extent that it was due to economic problems, appears to have been insufficient to cause a revolution. At best similar conditions exist to a greater or lesser degree in almost all the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, few of which have experienced social revolutions. Opposition to existing regimes was based on broader social, even ethical grounds which touched men's hearts as well as their appetites. In all three countries the old regimes, having forfeited a claim to legitimacy, were rooted in a setting of corruption and social injustice. To oversimplify, Díaz had ruled too long and too despotically. The Bolivian "rosca" ruled too falteringly and too ineffectively. Batista ruled too arbitrarily and cruelly.

As a result, on the eve of the revolution all three regimes maintained themselves in power less and less through popular consent and more and more through coercion. And as they attempted increasingly through violent means to strengthen their faltering grip on the country, the popular reaction grew until the opposing forces exploded into revolution. On the eve of all three conflicts an old elite had been forced to take, or had chosen to take, a dramatic step which symbolized their alienation from the population at large and served, together with the rush of events, to precipitate the outbreak of violence.

The revolutionary leadership concentrated their fire on narrow political targets: Díaz and his coterie in Mexico, the "rosca" in Bolivia, and Batista and his military clique in Cuba. Madero's slogan was "no re-election; effective suffrage" and the rest of his program gave hope to many, alarming few. The MNR's program saved its main ammunition for the government and promised something to most sectors of society, including the middle classes. Castro's pre-1959 political program, in the tradition of the middle-of-the-road Orthodox Party, sought to attract support from most sectors of Cuban society. All three revolutionary groups claimed to be the legitimate heirs of a constitutional system which had been betrayed by an incumbent government. And all secured the active support, or at least passivity, of much of the nation.

The same social class dominated each of the three revolutions, but the admixture of participation by different classes varied. In Mexico representatives of many classes participated, but ultimately middle class elements predominated. Peasant resistance was probably more important relatively than in either Bolivia or Cuba, but peasants belatedly influenced the course of the revolution and never dominated it. In Bolivia the MNR leadership was, in the main, middle class, although miners and urban labor were important participants in the three-day insurrection. Peasants played at most an insignificant role. Castro's closest followers were middle class. His peasant support was not inconsequential, but also probably not decisive. Organized labor was on the periphery of his movement. In all three countries, the middle classes provided the core of the leader-

ship and the core of the rank and file. To anticipate, the middle classes have dominated the revolutions in both Mexico and Bolivia to this day; in Cuba, middle class interests were later sacrificed to those of urban and rural labor.

The revolutionaries won not because of their own virtues but because of the old elite's vices. Capitalizing on what became ultimately moral issues, the revolutionary leaders succeeded because they were able to mobilize, or neutralize, the great mass of the population in a struggle against despotic regimes. Political recruitment and mobilization were the foundation of their success, but these achievements were insufficient in themselves. In the end, each revolutionary group could unseat the incumbent regime only by a military defeat of the regular army. One such victory was sufficient in each case to permit them to capitalize on their political advantage.

Expressed in broadest terms, the three social revolutions represented the revolt of a wide spectrum of the population, or of groups which claimed to represent that spectrum, against a relatively small traditional or military elite which had lost its ability to govern the country effectively. Influences from abroad played only a peripheral role. The fundamental causes were essentially indigenous, arising from a new sense of national cohesion and national purpose. What distinguished these revolutions from others in Latin America was not so much how they seized the government, but what happened afterwards. This is true even in Cuba where guerrilla tactics were an innovation. The insurrections led ultimately to a far-reaching transformation of social systems, each with distinctive character of its own.

The nature of these transformations, and how they took place, are worthy of separate treatment.

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The works listed here do not purport to include all of the relevant literature on the Mexican, Bolivian and Cuban Revolutions. They represent a selection of what was found most useful in developing the issues discussed above and should lead to all relevant literature. Works on the contemporary period not dealing with the origins and initial phases of the revolutions, particularly in Mexico, are not included. Articles, dissertations, polemical materials, and primary sources are cited only to serve some special purpose; in general, the list emphasizes standard scholarly sources.

Reference tools on the Mexican Revolution, beginning with the González bibliography, are excellent. Arnade's bibliographical essay, so timely in 1959, is now out of date and there is no single up-to-date bibliography on Bolivia available. Apart from the bibliographical serials, there is no comprehensive bibliography covering the Cuban Revolution to 1966. As in the case of Bolivia, reading lists in individual works are the most useful available guides.

The General section refers to those works which are believed to have utility for the student concerned with social revolution in Latin America, even though they make no explicit reference to the area. This section also includes a few

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works which do not fit neatly in the country lists on Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba.

Some of the works listed below were not available to the author before this article went to press, but are included as promising sources for further research.

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