TOPICAL REVIEW

FOREWORD

Political violence in Latin America is no new phenomenon, but in recent years it has acquired some novel aspects. The image of Fidel Castro's successful insurrection in Cuba in the 1950s bedeviled the minds of the next decade's theoreticians and practitioners of revolutionary violence. The "lessons of Cuba" were applied elsewhere in the Hemisphere by revolutionaries who, in most cases, had little basis for understanding the Cuban insurrectionary process. Indeed, as Andrés Suárez points out in the following article, Castro's "road to power" has yet to be adequately charted. Until this is done, all analyses of the Cuban experience must be considered tenuous at best. Though imperfectly perceived, Castro's triumph galvanized elements in Latin American society which had long been prone to political violence. University and secondary-school students were conspicuous, if not predominant, in most Castro-inspired revolutionary movements of the 1960s. In the second article in this issue Jaime Suchlicki provides some guides for research on student violence in Latin America. The next issue of LARR will conclude this series on political violence with bibliographical essays on the recent internal armed conflicts in Colombia, by Russell W. Ramsey, and in Peru, by Leon G. Campbell. The collaborators on this series hope that their efforts will point the way to some fruitful research on this social phenomenon that traumatized the 1960s and is unlikely to disappear in the 1970s.

Neill Macaulay
University of Florida

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:
THE ROAD TO POWER
State of the Research
Andrés Suárez, University of Florida

THE PREVALENT THEORY OF REVOLUTION—AFTER RESTRICTING THE DIMENSIONS of the phenomenon under study to only one aspect, that ending with the seizure of power—distinguishes between preconditions and precipitants. Preconditions are "the crucial concern of men of affairs. . . ." Precipitants, "by their very nature," are ephemeral phenomena and cannot be anticipated. The conservative bias of this elaboration is obvious. By definition revolution is subsumed into the category of "civil strife," thus eliminating all those phases of the process potentially as creative as the one following the seizure of power. Theoretical relevance, then, is assigned only to those elements of the phenomenon susceptible of preventive treatment—the preconditions. Finally, the events able to unleash the revolutionary process are relegated to the conditions of accidents—"they only happen"—and, consequently, are disregarded.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100041510 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Meanwhile, outside the academic community a growing literature concentrates on the aspects that the theoretician disdains, by attempting to codify the revolutionary techniques and by elaborating the revolutionary ideology. Among this type of literature Debray's short study, *Revolution in the Revolution?*, occupies a special place. Its purpose is to summarize the Cuban experience in the form of a manual for the rest of the continent. Today the validity of that model has been seriously questioned and even Debray himself has qualified his work to such an extent that its value has significantly decreased. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored. First, it is a reminder that a revolution is much more than "civil strife." And second, it is a timely document for the study of that stage of revolution which is called here "the road to power," that is, the clash of wills between incumbents and revolutionaries within a specific historical scene.

This bibliographical essay, going beyond Cole Blasier's *LARR* article, will attempt to summarize the original sources available for studying the struggle that took place in Cuba from 1953 to 1958 between the government and its foes. Special attention will be given to the forces that contributed significantly to the collapse of the government of Fulgencio Batista. By original sources we mean those that come from participants and witnesses to the events. Although later interpretations are also mentioned, this inclusion does not intend by any means to be exhaustive.

**MONCADA**

The events that took place in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, made the name of Fidel Castro known to a great majority of Cubans. They served as the first step toward Castro's successful search for the national leadership which he enjoys today. Castro saw the significance of the events of July 26 to the point of naming the organization which he created for the date of their occurrence.

The present Cuban regime has been prolific in publishing material on the Moncada assault; the writings grow more voluminous with each anniversary. Three groups of works stand out among the growing material: 1) the narrations supplied by some participants; 2) the semiofficial version of the events by Marta Rojas, the journalist who attended the trial dealing with the attack on Moncada; and 3) the biographical sketches of those who died in the attack, based on data furnished by relatives and friends. One does not have to be a very perceptive investigator to discover the real purpose of the above literature, all of which has appeared after the date on which the socialist character of the Revolution was declared, April 16, 1961. With one exception the information was gathered after this date. The purpose is to raise the event to epic proportions and to give it an ideological congruity with the political orientation commenced on April 16, 1961. Nevertheless, the material is noteworthy not only because it is uniquely accessible, but because it poses a series of problems to the student who is interested in a genuine reconstruction of the historical events.

The difficulties begin with ascertaining the number of persons who actually departed from Havana for Santiago, to take part in the operation against the Moncada: 165 men, 2 women, and 1 doctor according to one source (*Relatos*, 23), and
158 men and 2 women according to another (La generación, 245). As far as we know, no one has published a list of all the members. The reason for this omission will be seen later. The martyrs, officially 76, have monopolized attention. (An analysis of their common characteristics is found in an appendix). Subsequent explanations insist that Fidel Castro was already the unqualified leader. But Jesús Montané attributes the leadership of the movement to 9 men (Relatos, 96). Raúl Castro mentions "a small staff" of 5 conducted by Fidel, and seconded by Abel Santamaria (Relatos, 20). Moreover, only 6 names appear in both lists. The plotters issued a manifesto signed by "La Revolución cubana,"13 whose authorship is attributed to José Gómez García, the "poet of the Revolution" (Mártires, 207). It is a rhetorical document, with an abundance of patriotic phraseology—including a verse of the national anthem—but devoid of program. It concludes with an invocation to the martyrs, the motherland, and honor to the centenary of José Martí's birth. Later Castro stated that the group also had "five revolutionary laws that would have been enacted after the taking of Moncada barracks."14 The text of these laws, according to Castro, had been destroyed by the police; thus, he had to reproduce the contents from memory at this trial. However, in a pamphlet that circulated "clandestinely" 60 days later (La generación, 107), Castro mentions 6, not 5, laws (La generación, 115). In a letter to Conte Agiiero on December 12, 1952, he repeats the claim of six.15 The latter two texts are identical. But they reveal appreciable differences with the first-mentioned text, which was published later. All sources agree in giving Castro the credit for the military planning. It was not an original plan. At least since the "guerrita de Febrero" of 1917,16 every group involved in subversive activities at one time or another planned a similar project. It is sufficient to recall the projected assault on the barracks on December 24, 1930. Batista's success on September 4, 1933, confirmed the possibilities of such a project. From that date to 1952, there were many such plans, one of which was frustrated in the last phase of its execution, the so-called "Conspiración de la Capa Negra" in 1946. On March 10, 1952, Batista refurbished the barracks, the attraction of such schemes. One year later Rafael García Bárcena and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria (MNR) attempted to carry out a similar operation.17 About the same time Aureliano Sánchez Arango and his "Triple A" were involved in an analogous plan.18

In all cases it was assumed that once the military were caught by surprise they would put up little or no resistance, as had been the case in Batista's successful ventures. Most of the time there were accomplices within the proposed target. The causes of failure were always the same: the military men equivocated or denounced the plan. But Castro made some interesting variations in his project. Instead of assaulting the Columbia barracks, near Havana, "where the assassins were vigilant," he opted for the Moncada barracks (La generación, 49). The idea was not totally original. Already in the 1930s, Antonio Guiteras had conceived a plan to attack Moncada using bombs thrown from a civilian airplane previously hijacked.18a Castro reduced the possibility of security leakage by informing only one or two men of the site selected. He dispensed with accomplices within the compound. He isolated his forces in a strange city in which his people could be kept under his complete control.
But the fundamental elements of the original conception remained: the idea of depriving the incumbents of their essential basis of domination, the army, without combat. “It was never our intention to fight the soldiers of the regiment,” Castro explained during his trial: “we intended to gain the weapons and control by surprise” (Selser, 37). One of the participants confirms Castro’s statement. In the harangue before departure to attack the barracks, “Fidel told us that the assault on Moncada would be a complete surprise and that probably there would be no bloodshed (Relatos, 104).

As is known, despite all the precautions the operation did not go according to plan. At Siboney, the meeting place from which the operation was launched, “a small group” refused to participate in the attack, and on the road to the objective several of the vehicles went astray (La generación, 243, 247) or their occupants deserted (Relatos, 25) or cowered. In any case, only 85 men and 2 women arrived at the attack site (Relatos, 25; Selser, 31).

Taking into account that 27 of the original group were diverted to capture the Bayamo barracks, an attack that also failed, we can assume that between 46 and 54 men (depending on the number accepted for those departing Havana) were not present at the moment that the operation began. Probably, it is reluctance to impugn the behavior of those missing at the time of the assault, some of whom survive, that prevents the publication of the whole list of participants.

With their numbers so reduced, the attackers had to confront the bloody battle that they had tried to avoid. The details of the combat are not clear. Pedro Miret insists that the operation took three hours and that it all took place at post three (La generación, 237). Revolutionary literature is obviously omissive about the personal role of Fidel. Nor was he very explicit at the trial about his role (Selser, 31). There is no doubt that the hero of the adventure was Pedro Miret. Revolutionary hagiography has not given him due credit. The losses of the attacking forces were relatively modest: 8 dead (Relatos, 109; La generación, 119); Taber mentions 5 dead and 4 wounded. This is not the proper place to evaluate the savage conduct of the victors once the battle was over. The works named here describe the scene with a luxury of detail.

GRANMA

The assault on Moncada and the subsequent trial, in which several irregularities were evident, gave Castro a vehicle for maximum visibility before national opinion, especially for the new generation. What Cubans call the Generación del Centenario, referring to the anniversary of José Martí’s birth in 1853, had an aversion to the preceding generation of the “Thirties,” which it mistakenly accused of being too speculative, and, with much reason, blamed for betraying the original program and having succumbed to the prevalent corruption. In consequence the new generation was oriented toward ethics and direct action.

Castro, chronologically, belonged to this new generation and he more or less identified with its orientation. However, he had two advantages over his contempo-
aries: his genuine vocation as a political leader and his experience as a participant in the political process of Cuba. Thus he understood the intrinsic fragility of the system, and he experimented with techniques that were required to modify or transform it.

From prison he started to mold the original group of his new movement. He made extensive use of the two women who had taken part in the attack and who remain among his most valuable collaborators (Relatos, 143). Soon after he was amnestied in May 1955, he founded the organization. It is incredible how little we know of the process. Even the date of the constitution must come to us from an article on another subject. To know the names of the members who composed the first Dirección Nacional (DN) we must resort to Guevara. In a 1969 issue of Pensamiento critico dedicated to the “26,” two articles appear, the first by an instructor of philosophy, and the second by the director of the History Department, both of the University of Havana. The two articles are full of sociological interpretations, strategic analysis, and eulogies of Castro’s clairvoyance, but they do not clarify the date in which the Movement was founded, the names of the members of the DN, or any other concrete data about the structure, membership, resources, and activities of the organization. The fact that among the names we find Armando Hart and Faustino Pérez suggests that there was a fusion with the MNR, or what was left of it.

But with this little information our sources are exhausted. It is obvious that this strange silence is related to the direction that was taken by the Revolution when the movement came to power. In his message to the Congreso de Militantes Ortodoxos on August 16, 1955, Castro affirmed that “the July 26th movement does not constitute a tendency within the Party: it is the revolutionary vehicle of Chibasismo. . . . We have never abandoned his ideals, and we have remained faithful to the purest ideals of the great fighter whose death we commemorate today. . . .” (Selsor, 104). But by this time the “Orthodox” Party included the same planters, latifundists, speculators, and political opportunists who were denounced by Castro seven months later (Selsor, 110). It is evident that when the revolutionary process later required Castro to be a more or less sophisticated Marxist this loyalty oath was embarrassing. (This points to a difficulty that confronts those in Latin America who attempt to follow the Cuban model: it is as if Guevara had entered Bolivia declaring his loyalty to the Victor Paz Estenssoro of 1952).

The Orthodox Party and Castro’s movement separated in March 1956 (Selsor, 102). Without doubt the political circumstances of the time explain the decision. In March, the mediation of the Sociedad Amigos de la República was given up (Suchlicki, 67). A new military conspiracy was ready to be executed. Castro had knowledge of the plot and his participation in the future government had been agreed to both by Castro and the military leaders of the plot. Castro must have been aware of the possibilities opened by his political independence. The plot was discovered on April 3, and Castro remained independent, but in exile, isolated, and with insurrection as the only option open to him, if he were to fulfill the role that he believed destiny had for him.

For the period between Castro’s release from prison in May 1955, to the depart-
ure of the Granma expedition, November 25, 1956, we have only fragments of information. Ernesto Guevara says that he met Castro "on one of those cold Mexican nights," and that they had a discussion on international politics (Obra, 259). But, while Guevara notes that by dawn he was already counted as one of the expedition members, he does not give anything more concrete. Surely he does not include Castro among those members of the "26th" for whom, Guevara feels, everything was reduced "to taking power" (Obra, 285). Ricardo Rojo, although picturesque, is disappointing. After an agitated conversation with Castro and his companions he came to the conclusion that in Argentina people like that were held at Vieytes, the asylum for the insane in Buenos Aires.27 On this matter, Teresa Casuso, whose house was used to hide some of the weapons, has nothing to add.28 Faustino Pérez writes about a political indoctrination "based on studies undertaken by technical committees of the "26th of July," of which we have no other information.29 Fernando Sánchez Amaya gives himself the credit for initiating courses of political instruction but is not specific as to content.30 We also have some writings by Castro: polemical articles in which he rejects association with Trujillo (Selser, 112), the communists,31 or the "grupos de acción" (Selser, 98), and the manifestos signed by the "26th" dated August 8 and December 10, 1955.32 In the first he affirms that the only solution to the Cuban problem is general elections without Batista and elaborates a new program of fifteen points. The absence of any mention of his La historia me absolverá speech in either of the manifestos or in any of his works until 1959 is striking.33 Guevara never mentions the speech.

It is obvious that from such data little can be known about the nature of the group that assembled in Mexico, about their ideas, their plans, or the internal conflicts which apparently took place. The difficulty is aggravated by the reticence of the participants who are now exiled to furnish information on these events.84 Everything seems to indicate that the veterans of Moncada were a small minority. Amaya states that "most of us had never seen each other before" (Amaya, 12). Guevara mentions a division that took place in Mexico within "the surviving nucleus of the assault on the Moncada barracks" (Obra, 260, 285). In a recent article "two Cuban revolutionaries" say that "it appears that in Mexico some contacts were also made with leaders of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) . . ." (Torres and Aronde, 58). K. S. Karol confirms this.35

From the point of view of revolutionary strategy the most important question is to determine how the revolutionaries planned the struggle that they were to undertake. In the Pact of Mexico signed in September 1956, by the "26th" and the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) it was stated that the method to be used was "an insurrection seconded by a general strike" (13 documentos, 37). We do not know of any more substantial plans. If they existed, they were not put into action. On its part the "26th" thought in terms of one expedition, the arrival of which would be coordinated with internal actions. Frank País disagreed with this plan, feeling that the "26th" did not have the organizational maturity to embark on open conflict.36 But nothing is clear. Faustino asserts that the expeditionaries planned to disembark at Niquero, where Crescensio Pérez was awaiting with about one hundred men. Then
they would capture the town, attack Manzanillo and help "a project of agitation and sabotage that would culminate in a general strike."\textsuperscript{37} We know from Celia Sánchez and Guillermo García that the men were waiting at Niquero (Lo\textsuperscript{s} 12, 54–5, 75). Crescencio Pérez confirms this information.\textsuperscript{48} However, Amaya states at least twice that "our objective would be the Sierra Maestra" (Amaya, 37, 44). Alberto Bayo seems to corroborate Amaya. He states that after his first conversation with Castro in July 1955, Fidel had asked him if he would commit himself to "teach guerrilla tactics to his future soldiers."\textsuperscript{39} Bayo's qualifications for such an assignment were, at the least, doubtful.\textsuperscript{40} Besides, the colonel of the Spanish Republican Air Force, promoted later to general by the government in exile, was already sixty-five years old. He composed verses and was an eccentric (Bayo, 1960, 33, 49, 61). Since he planned to take part in the expedition but was extremely fat, he decided to take advantage of the most intense period of guerrilla training to submit himself to a diet of his own concoction that consisted of nothing but water for twenty-four days (Bayo, 81). Of course this was debilitating; the training was undertaken "with the professor always in bed" (Bayo, 105). Bayo also states that Fidel and Raúl Castro rarely attended classes. It is difficult to conclude that such training or attendance would result in adequate preparation for the future guerrillas.

Casuso confirms this impression when she says of Bayo that "he played a much smaller part in the movement than is generally believed" (Casuso, 99). Nevertheless, Guevara states "we learned very much from General Alberto Bayo" (Obra, 260). Harold A. Aaron is contradictory: after saying that the training was far from effective, he later maintains that "it was vigorous and detailed."\textsuperscript{41}

A recent Cuban source affirms that "the initial plan was not the formation of a guerrilla foco," but the capture of Niquero, complemented by the action that took place in Santiago de Cuba (Torres and Aronde). Neither Lucas Morán, who points out some geographical factors\textsuperscript{42} nor Draper\textsuperscript{43} believe in the guerrilla plans. But Taber suggests that the action that took place in Santiago was "a diversionary action" (Taber, 76). He calls attention to some of the weapons that the expedition carried: "long-range weapons mounted with eight-power telescopic sights, weapons for a mountain campaign, not for close-in fighting" (Taber, 68). After analyzing all the sources available at the time of his publication he concludes that Castro, though confident of the planned operation, "was prepared to improvise if necessary" (Taber, 76). As can be seen, there is much to be done by a future investigator of the subject.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE GUERRILLAS

Whatever the original plans, they were frustrated with the failure of the revolt in Santiago de Cuba on November 30, 1956, and the rout at Algeria del Pío, five days later.\textsuperscript{44} For the period that starts with these events, nothing is as valuable as the Recuerdos de la guerra revolucionaria by Guevara. Unfortunately, these memoirs go only to February 1958. Nevertheless, the investigator should not trust implicitly in Guevara's accuracy about events, as can be seen by the following examples for which alternate sources are available.
According to Guevara's version of the clash at Algería del Pío, the surprise of the small expeditionary force was total, its rout by the army complete, and its flight was general and chaotic (Obra, 114, 262). Faustino Pérez with less detail agrees in general. But except for the surprise, nothing of this appears in Sánchez Amaya's narration. In his sector the battle lasts two hours. The army is very cautious in its attack and losses are small. The retreat is conducted in good order, the dispersion coming about when they enter the cane field that prevents visual contact (Amaya, 70–1). The number of casualties given by Amaya lend veracity to his account: dead and wounded among the expedition did not exceed “one dozen men” (Amaya, 83). In the face of such categorical data it is difficult not to agree with Morán’s critiques (Morán, 30). The defeat would not have become a disaster if a capable military leader had been present to foresee the inevitable dispersion of forces in the cane field. Orders should have been given to resist until nightfall, as was done in fact by Amaya. The fighting stopped at 5:55 p.m. (Amaya, 72). Guevara’s explanation that “the command of a leader was useless,” later amended to “Fidel attempted in vain to regroup his men in the nearby cane field,” not only confirms that the error had been made (Obra, 262, 115), but also is less convincing than Amaya’s testimony.

The second example deals with the slighting by Guevara of the role played by Crescencio and his men in saving the survivors from the hands of the army and helping them reach the Sierra Maestra. Crescencio was not a “widely respected Oriente landowner,” as one author describes him (Taber, 68), but a regional cacique, half politician, half bandit, familiar with all the folds and bends of the Sierra, who through Celia Sánchez decided to collaborate with the revolutionaries. As soon as Crescencio had news of the landing he mobilized his men to find the expeditionaries. One of Pérez’s followers had already served the newcomers by guiding some of the lost men back into the main column (Amaya, 61). After the rout, his men found the survivors, who were wandering in the hills. Crescencio’s men offered the guerrillas protection and guided them to the Sierra. Of course there were more than 12: Guevara mentions 21 (Obra, 121). In any case it is difficult not to recognize Guevara’s omissions. One must agree with Moran’s opinion that without the help of Crescencio “they would not have survived” (Morán, 72).

Two complementary sources for the study of this period are Robert Taber and Enrique Meneses. The former spent three weeks in the Sierra during April 1957. The latter arrived there on Christmas of that year and departed the following April. Neither compares with Guevara as a source. Meneses offers little of value. Taber, who has probably written the best journalistic account of the struggle against Batista, is a sympathetic and attentive observer who is capable of formulating incisive analyses. (Taber, 135–6). Taber refers to the military activity of the guerrillas as a “toilsome expedition through an interminable wilderness” (Taber, 135). Meneses confirms the monotony. Guevara, it appears, disagreed with this sound tactic practiced by Castro (Obra, 165) which obliged the guerrillas to forge their mettle. Later, in Bolivia, Guevara found himself free of their restriction, with well known results.

One of the most noticeable absences in the few sources that are available on the early days of the guerrillas is any reference to the social origins of the first recruits.
Here again the future investigator must be careful. Guillermo García has been called "the first peasant" to join the guerrillas. But Morán states that he was in reality a cattle merchant (Morán, 72). The same caution applies to Manuel Fajardo. In addition, both had been members of the "26th of July" before the arrival of the Granma and both were members of Crescencio's group on November 30 (Moran, 72).

THE APRIL STRIKE

In retrospect it is possible to see that once the guerrillas were established in the Sierra the most important event for the final resolution of the campaign was the unsuccessful general strike of April 1958. As pointed out above, the idea of a general strike had been since the beginning included in the plans of the leaders of the "26th." In July 1957, Pais believed that the excessive attention given to the guerrillas was leading to the neglect of the organization of the strike which he considered possible and necessary. Castro also referred to the strike in his letter of December 14, 1957, to the Junta de Liberación (Selser, 137). The spontaneous strike in Oriente brought about the death of Pais, and the role played by the workers' strike in the downfall of the Venezuelan dictator, Pérez Jiménez, in January 1958, re-enforced the theory of the value of strikes.

The best source for the April strike would be Faustino, coordinator of the "26th" in Havana, who as delegate of the DN cosigned with Castro the call for "total war against tyranny" (Selser, 141). Unfortunately his only known version was published in 1967 when Faustino was already a member of the Central Committee of the Partido Comunista. In it he clarifies one point: Fidel favored the strike order that was decided upon in the Sierra. But concerning the rejection of collaboration with the PSP which has usually been attributed to Faustino, he now mentions meetings with members of that party in which no accord was reached. Masetti, who arrived in Havana from the Sierra just after the failure of the strike, tells of interviews with Faustino and José María Aguilera that reveal disagreements among the leaders on the way the strike was led (Masetti, 169). And Meneses reproduces the prevalent accusations against the communists, blaming them for the failure (Meneses, 78). It is interesting to note Guevara's explanation. The strike was called "with proposals too radical for the reality of the moment" (Obra, 266).

As can be seen, the current state of data is far from satisfactory. Nothing significant exists on the labor movement from 1952 to 1958; especially concerning the sugar industry strikes of December 1955, almost all we know is the date of the event. Nothing is available on the relations of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) and Batista, who made the workers' leadership immune to revolutionary influence until the fall of the regime. No one has bothered to investigate the different levels of radicalization in the workers' movement. In Santiago the workers ignored their officials and went on strike from time to time. In Havana the workers submitted to the end. It appears obvious that until at least these questions are resolved the basis for understanding the April strike is seriously limited.
The struggle against the regime that resulted from Batista's coup d'état of March 10, 1952, was started by Havana students a few days later. The MNR and other fleeting groups shortly followed the students in resistance to the new government. The Moncada assault was an urban episode. Both the "26th" and the DR, which appeared at the end of 1955, were founded in Havana. But on March 13, 1957, the DR attacked the Presidential Palace, and the failure of that attempt seriously reduced the DR's operational capability. By this time the Granma survivors had been able to establish themselves in the Sierra, adopting the somewhat ambitious title of Ejército Revolucionario del 26 de Julio. Now, for all practical purposes, the "26th" had the field to itself.

But a struggle developed between two tendencies, which the combatants referred to as la sierra and el llano, or el clandestinaje—for the word guerrillero had disagreeable connotations for Cubans. It was this distinction which planted the seeds for the later speculation by Guevara, Debray, and the 1967 version of Castroism about the theory of the foco and the consequent underestimation of the urban revolutionary. Recently some fascinating data have appeared about the changing position of Guevara (Karol, 173). It seems that Che offered himself as a substitute for País, the underground urban leader, when the latter was killed in July 1957 (Karol, 174). We need more such information to determine how Guevara conceived and developed his theory of the foco. This process could be compared to the apparently very different one that Castro underwent. Rarely has Castro been so categorical as the later Guevara about the value of the guerrilla.

As early as December 1957, Castro affirmed that "in the Sierra Maestra the current action is not guerrilla war, but a war of columns" (Selser, 135). On August 1958, he was even more explicit: "The guerrilla war has ceased to exist and has been converted into a war of position and movement" (Karol, 166). In a 1969 speech he acknowledged the important contribution of the underground and then pointed out that the history of the Revolution has tended to "diminish" the role played by the urban fighter. In any case there is no doubt that the conflict within the "26th" has significant historical implications. It is necessary to go into some detail.

As soon as Castro shook off his pursuers, one of the first things he did was to send Faustino to Havana, primarily to verify Castro's presence in the country, which the government denied, and then to organize the aid without which Castro was condemned to extinction or irrelevance. Faustino was able to fulfill the first objective with the cooperation of Herbert Matthews. But toward the other objective his success was less than modest. Havana was too far away to guarantee the aid required in the Sierra. In addition, Faustino had to compete with a powerful rival, the DR. This group had already shown its mettle in action. It included the FEU President, José Antonio Echeverría, which facilitated access to the University, always a vital source of resources. It preached the need of "Tiranicidio." It reproached Castro for his second failure, and above all it was very irritated by Castro's conduct after the Pact of Mexico (Suchlicki, 73, 74). Of course, we have seen that by mid-March
of that same year the DR was almost eliminated, but this defeat affected the whole revolutionary movement in the capital. Fortunately for the survivors of the Seierra, Faustino's failure was remedied by aid from País in Santiago de Cuba. There the "26th" enjoyed undisputed prestige because of País' great leadership qualities and his role in the November 30 uprising. Help for the Sierra was rapidly organized. Money, food, clothes, and medicine were obtained. In February the first recruits were sent (Morán, 73). In March a nucleus of 58 armed men went to the Sierra. On May 18, the weapons salvaged from the attack on the Presidential Palace arrived after being transported by the underground across the island and entering by way of Santiago. With this aid Castro was able to obtain his first victory of military importance, the capture of the Uvero barracks on May 28, 1957. On July 26, 1957, País wrote to Castro, "We accept the responsibility to sustain you over there."59

Pais did not limit his activities to this aspect. We have already seen that he remained loyal to the general strike scheme. And it appears that he had no intention of subordinating himself to Castro, whom he had met only two or three times.60 He started to reorganize the "26th" as a fighting, centralized apparatus with political and revolutionary objectives. He created Resistencia Cívica to mobilize the professional and middle sectors of the populace.61 He proposed to create the Dirección Nacional Obrera. And most significantly he decided to open a new battle front under his personal control (Morán, 101).

It is apparent that during the first half of 1957 the budding guerrillas were completely dependent upon the cities for their survival, and if they noticed some political differences it was in their best interest to overlook them. But then a series of events began altering the "correlation of forces" between the two sectors. First, the attempts by País to open a new front were frustrated (Morán, 110). Second, after the Uvero defeat, the army attempted to resettle the peasants. But it soon gave up the effort and wrote off the Sierra to the rebels, becoming increasingly unwilling to enter the mountains (Morán, 106, 109, 116). Of course the guerrillas' trials did not decrease. But they started to get accustomed to their new environment and began to discover that while their companions in the city fell one after another they enjoyed a relative sanctuary. A tactic which they had not been aware of became evident. Finally, País was killed on July 30, 1957: thus disappeared the only leader who seemed capable of conceiving a strategy in which the guerrillas were only one element of the total struggle.

The meeting between the Sierra and Llano sectors that took place the following October 10–11 (Taber, 185), may have been prompted by the crisis created by the loss of País or it may have been caused by the politically cunning Castro as a means of extending his control over all the movement. Among the decisions made was to create a new Dirección Nacional. Taber, who assumes that Castro had been the undisputed leader since the beginning, underlines the nominal character of the new executive organ. The author, who believes that charisma is only proven by success and who cannot see any for Castro to that date, is inclined to see the meeting as a new episode, not the last, in the inevitable frictions imposed by the necessity of a struggle that de-
developed without a clear strategic plan, in two entirely different environments. In our judgment the conflict was resolved only after the failure of the April strike.

Another meeting took place on May 3, 1958, in the Sierra. The best source for this episode is a chapter by Guevara in his Recuerdos, significantly entitled "A Decisive Reunion" (Obra, 237). The most important result was that the two sectors, the Sierra and the Llano, came under the leadership of Castro. An analysis of this most important problem has been presented by the author elsewhere. He believes that it has been confirmed by later works. But other interpretations are possible.

Guevara himself, at a time when he was not yet so sure of the guerrilla's efficacy, wrote that the "companions of the Llano" were inclined "to certain 'civilian' attitudes, to certain opposition to the caudillo that they feared in Fidel" (Obra, 252). Mario Llemena used the publications of the so-called "Manifesto-Program" to underline the anti-personalist character of the "26th." Morán credits País with a similar anti-caudillistic position (Morán, 78, 79, 121). And Barbeito, who narrates the whole process with knowledge and insight, contrasts the civilian direction of the "26th" with the personal and militarist leadership of Castro.

As can be seen, the whole question needs to be clarified. Again the sources are scarce. The Cuban regime has been prodigal in its material on Moncada but on other matters, with the continued exception of Guevara, has produced only descriptions of isolated developments that increasingly become less original. As for the underground, we know almost nothing about the history of the urban "26th," Resistencia Cívica, the Frente Obrero Nacional, the DR, or any other of the lesser organizations that appeared in the course of the struggle.

Concerning the guerrillas a remarkable thing has happened. Attracted by Guevara's account and enticed by that genius of propaganda, Fidel, the investigators have fixed on the Sierra Maestra and have forgotten the other fronts, one of which might at least have had as much importance as Fidel's. The Segundo Frente Oriental "Frank País" had the greatest number of armed men and at the end of the struggle it controlled more territory than the Sierra. Guevara calls it the "best organized front on all counts" (Obras, 266). On that front, North American citizens were kidnapped, relations with the PSP were frequent, peasant and worker congresses met, and the first anti-imperialist manifestos were issued. The growing prominence of Raúl Castro in the current government as well as that of the men who fought under his command confirm the importance the author gives to this Front.

There remains to be analyzed in the future the Cienfuegos uprising; the invasion of Santa Clara headed by Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos; the role of the guerrillas headed by Víctor Bordón and Félix Torres; the campaigns of the DR; and the Segundo Frente de Escambray, all in the same province of Las Villas. The latter has been treated contemptuously; it deserves study to see if contempt is merited. Finally the front at Pinar del Río now has an account by Neill Macaulay. Among the merits of this book is the fact that it does not cover up one of the least publicized aspects of guerrilla activity, the executions. Morán also elaborates on this macabre aspect.
The current Cuban regime is the first government in history to bring about a so-called socialization of the means of production without being preceded, in the stage of the struggle for power, by the organization of a Marxist-Leninist party. This and the circumstance that his adversaries, since the Batista era had labeled Castro and his followers as communists, always with the purpose of obtaining American support, has created a loud polemic over the relations between the PSP and the "26th." Draper maintains the existence of an alliance, although previously he saw Castro "as the Pied Piper of the Communist movement rather than the Líder Máximo of a new one." Goldberg thinks in terms of an agreement concluded in November 1958. Suchlicki, probably inspired by the thesis of Robert J. Alexander, writes about a "dual strategy" (Suchlicki, 82). The author has maintained that the aid was not sought and was not significant. Recently Karol has agreed with the latter (Karol, 150). Finally, Khruschev—if he is the author of the "reminiscences" attributed to him—had added a humorous note. After confirming that the Communist Party of Cuba had no contact with Castro, he adds that "the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Cuban Party had even resigned from the Party in order to join Castro in the hills." The grimace made by Blas Roca on reading this can easily be imagined.

In my judgement there are two arguments against the thesis of a pact or alliance. It is difficult to see why Castro would hide the fact of a pact with the PSP when he published his Marxist-Leninist convictions on December 2, 1961. To reveal the facts of the alliance would have fortified considerably Castro's scarce merits to such an ideology prior to January 1959. In addition it does not explain why the leaders of the PSP, who have not been especially rewarded and in some cases have been imprisoned by Castro, would continue to cover up a pact that could have served them to claim greater influence or at least reduce their worries.

It is enough to mention Guevara regarding the significance of communist aid. Certainly it cannot be said that he would have wanted to diminish the role played by communist collaboration. After pointing out the lack of definition of the PSP and its lack of preparation for guerrilla warfare, Guevara adds that some members of the party joined the guerrillas only when "there was little time left for the end of the armed struggle and their influence was not felt" (Obra, 250). The fact that there is not a single guerrilla hero from that group appears to settle the argument. The author believes that the relationship between the PSP and Castro until 1959 is clear.

Only two minor points remain. The first refers to the existence of diverse factions within the PSP, one of which proposed unconditional aid to Fidel Castro. According to Karol, Aníbal Escalante headed this faction (Karol, 153). However, another work, without mentioning its source, attributes Escalante to be in opposition to unconditional aid. The second point has to do with the degree of receptivity that the "26th" as a whole had for the PSP offers. In general it appears that the leaders of the Llano rejected such aid. This attitude could be explained by the bourgeois and
petty bourgeois character of the Llano. But one must keep in mind also the type of struggle that the urban organization was conducting. Its basic activities were the acquisition of financial resources, and terrorism. It is difficult to see what the PSP could offer in either category. Proof of the above is that other groups had the same difficulties in their relations with the “26th.” The leaders of the “26th” were always willing to negotiate the two matters. But they became bored and disappeared when other subjects were broached.

Concerning the guerrillas, their welcome to PSP members depended upon the front. José Pardo Llada mentions the presence of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and Luis Mas, both of the PSP, in the Sierra, without giving them major importance.78 Later Rodríguez complained about the coolness toward him.79 Things were different in the front under Raúl Castro’s command.80 We have already seen how Guevara valued their help (Obra, 250). Macaulay does not mention them. Finally, in those fronts controlled by the DR and the so-called Segundo Frente del Escambray, there is not the least trace of communist participation. The Pact of Pedrero, signed by the DR and Guevara, calls on all revolutionary groups to support the “insurrectional forces of the territory” (13 Documentos, 64). But is says nothing about a pact or alliances.

With these sources and new data it might be possible to determine the degree of resistance or cooperation offered by the guerrillas to communist aid even without conditions. An investigation of this type would help to make clear if there is any validity to the interpretation which holds that the urban underground was the bourgeoisie and the guerrillas the proletariat of the revolutionary movement.

THE INCUMBENTS

History has seldom been generous with the defeated, or it has taken a long time to find enough merit to warrant giving them attention. It is necessary to confess that in the case of the Cuban incumbents from 1952 to 1958, such merits are scarce if they exist at all. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand any revolutionary process if one ignores the conduct of one of the contenders. Besides, in Cuba the fall of the ancien régime was so rapid and total that the complete record of its activities on all levels fell into the hands of the adversary. Rarely has such a treasury been spared for the historian: not only all the data on a regime but the data on a whole socio-political system are intact and awaiting investigation. Unfortunately, to this day the current Cuban government has ignored, or hidden, this voluminous fountain of information. For their part, the defeated, in exile, without their archives and with bitter memories, have contributed little worthy of mention. With his characteristic lack of veracity ex-President Batista has published one book after another enumerating the excel­lences of his regime and blaming his defeat on only two factors: the blindness of the United States government and the treacherous behavior of his most intimate collaborators.81 The latter have, of course, replied.82 (The educational value of this polemic, carried on at unpublishable levels, leaves much to be desired). Of all the lengthy diatribe only one work merits some consideration. It has been written by a close collaborator of Batista, who accompanied the latter in his flight to the Dominican Re-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100004150 Published online by Cambridge University Press
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: THE ROAD TO POWER

public. The book is careless, but furnishes some interesting information on the dictator and shows the incompetence, disorder, corruption, and cowardice that contributed in no small way to the triumph of the revolutionaries. The final demoralization of the armed forces is made apparent in a manuscript by Colonel Ramón Barquín (author's copy). Unfortunately, the last chief of army in the Oriente Front, General Eulogio Cantillo, until now has not offered any information in his activities including, it seems, contacts with Fidel Castro, beginning in October 1958, always with the consent of the dictator (Suárez Núñez, 98).

THE FOREIGN ACTORS

The book Linkage Politics analyzes the growing interdependence among political systems, affirming that for some of them the intention of studying internal development while ignoring external influences deprives the investigator of an essential element of understanding. Cuba, including its revolutionary process, assuredly was and is one such system. It must be pointed out, for example, that every revolutionary group or organization of any significance always had contacts of some kind with the United States embassy in Havana. These, of course, include the “26th.” Guevara, for example, thought that Armando Hart, Marcelo Fernández, and other members of the DN received instructions through the United States Embassy (Morán, 135). One of the several accusations made today against the Havana underground of the “26th” is “the contact made in April 1958, with the United States Embassy” (Torres and Aronde, 53). These were not the first or the last such contacts. In the reorganization that took place in May 1958, Castro placed a person of his complete confidence, Haydée Santamaría, in Miami. Karold believes that her mission was to persuade “Amer­icans that Fidel Castro was the only man capable of restoring genuine democracy in Cuba” (Karol, 176). It may be so, but it is also possible that Castro was informed of the contacts in Havana with the United States embassy and wanted his own “direct line” with Washington.

This speculation should not be taken as out of place. Today we know that when Castro came to the United States in April 1959, he did not hesitate to have an interview with “the highest authority of American Intelligence on the Communists in Latin America.” There is no reason to believe that he would reject similar contacts before his victory when he needed them most, no matter what his intention. In some cases the task of finding such linkages is relatively easy. For example, Castro’s ability for exploiting the American press for his own benefit is notorious. The work of ex­Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith is essential for ascertaining contacts at an official level. But in other cases identification requires some diligence. For example, in October 1958, the present Minister of the Cuban Armed Forces, Raúl Castro, declared that the freedom of Americans kidnapped by the Segundo Frente Oriental had been granted, “because the crisis in the Middle East and the need the American government had for the Marines . . .” (Selser, 425). He was referring to the crisis in Lebanon and the Pentagon’s need for Marines to dissuade the Soviets from intervening there. The purpose of the kidnapping had been to stop the aerial bombardment that was depriving the guerrillas of civilian aid.

19
But there is another type of linkage that is extremely difficult to discover because written sources are nonexistent, or they are unavailable to the researcher, or the participants deny their role in such contacts. A case in point is the claim that American intelligence ignored the presence of communists in the Sierra and the radicalism of Guevara. Yet from the first trip of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez to the Sierra in May 1958, of which the United States intelligence people were informed, they pursued at least in Havana the most minute traces of relations between the PSP and Castro. Regarding Guevara, an investigator who was persevering and capable of obtaining personal cooperation could discover much interesting data. Today the victorious Revolution refers to those who had such contacts as traitors. Nevertheless, important men in the revolutionary regime owe their lives to such connections. Among them are President Oswaldo Dorticós, and the Secretary of the Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba, Armando Hart.

The contacts during the last months of the struggle are of special importance. We have seen that General Cantillo was in touch with Castro beginning in October. It is doubtful that Cantillo would have initiated such contact without the knowledge of the United States. And it is even more doubtful that the agents who knew the steps of Rodríguez would ignore those of the head of a military establishment in which the United States had a military mission. Nevertheless, nothing is known about the official American reaction to such contact, which lasted until December 27, 1958. It would be very interesting to find out what Dante Fascell, member of the U.S. House of Representatives, meant when he explained to the House Castro's victory in these terms: "We . . . picked a leader who was in the mountains and he was the wrong leader."

As can be seen, the investigator who is interested in linkages has fertile ground to explore. On this subject it must not be forgotten that the radio station inaugurated on February 24, 1958, in the Sierra, entered Cuba with the collaboration of a United States consul. The "26th" had cells organized in the American base at Guantánamo, which served as a sanctuary for dozens of rebels. The flow of weapons from the base to the mountains was well organized (Morán, 99). Finally, the linkages were not only with the United States: Rómulo Betancourt and Wolfgang Larrázabal of Venezuela; José Figueres; and even Trujillo, could contribute material for an investigation of this type.

FIDEL CASTRO

Above all is the role played by Fidel Castro in the Revolution's road to power. Here the biggest mistake in my judgment would be to attribute to the Cuban leader at the outset qualities that emerge only in the course of the struggle and above all after the triumph of January 1, 1959. Despite what is generally believed it should be pointed out that an important factor in his final success was that no participant in the Cuban political scene, including Batista, discovered through personal contact with Castro or by examining his earlier political career, which was well known,
anything that revealed the extraordinary qualities he later displayed. Herbert Matthews was an exception, perhaps because he ignored Castro’s background. The scanty data we have indicate that during the first stages of the struggle Castro was able to impress only the young and among them especially the unemployed and those with little education. Teresa Casuso, a member of the revolutionary generation of 1930, has a shrewd observation. After visiting Castro and his companions imprisoned in a jail in Mexico she notes “they were not like the revolutionaries I had known, but much humbler and cruder”; and adds, “I thought some of them irresponsible” (Casuso, 94). It is evident that the exceptional qualities of Castro became visible to the majority of his fellow citizens only after his triumphs. The problem posed is: did they appear all of a sudden? Were they with him and did they reveal themselves to him during his experience in prison and in the heat of battle? Were they discovered by a reading of Lenin? Is Castro an intuitive Leninist? Or was he “pushed forward by the idea of social justice, as well as the urge to get power for himself, because he was a radical, anti-imperialist nationalist and regarded himself as champion of all the disinherited, frustrated, and poor, the humildes.”

Without going into the origins and without ignoring the later events, the author has maintained that the decisive factor to understand Castro is the experience that he acquired during the time he was involved in so-called grupos de acción. These groups appeared in Cuban politics with the frustration of the 1930 revolution and entered into a profound crisis after the March 10, 1952, coup. Karol seems to agree with this opinion when he explains Castro’s triumph in the following way: “he was one of the veterans of Cayo Confites, one who had shared all the political experiences of his generation” (Karol, 177). But Karol is not altogether clear on two accounts. First, it is incorrect to say that Castro shared all the political experiences of his generation. It is enough to know something of the background of those who surrounded him to know that he is an exception. No one else was involved in the grupos de acción. Second, Karol ignores the fact that, among other objectives, Cayo Confites was an operation conceived by President Grau San Martín to get rid of members of such groups by launching them off to the Dominican Republic. Castro again is an exception. As far as I know, none of his old comrades followed him in his later adventure in Cuba.

It only remains to add that here, as in all the rest, there is much to clarify. The generalities on Castro’s biography are well known, but particulars are far from complete. Teresa Casuso offers some information on his family relations which, if they are true, would require interpretations by an enterprising psychoanalyst (Casuso, 130). His participation in the Bogotazo appears to be clarified by the testimony of Enrique Ovares, one of his associates on that occasion (Suchlicki, 54). But on the matter of his activity at the university and his relations with the grupos de acción we know little, although Karol adds some data (followed by one explanation that seems to me rather naive) (Karol, 109–121). There are exiles who could make contributions as significant as Ovares’. But they put so much passions in their writings that it is hard to believe them.

In reference to the Sierra neither Taber nor Mesetti and even less Meneses
Latin American Research Review

showed the ability to write anything so penetrating as Lee Lockwood has done after his interview with Castro in 1965. Finally, Matthews cannot be ignored even if he must be read having in mind Leo Sauvage’s remarks about him: “the historian as a lover.”

Addendum: After this paper was written, a book by Hugh Thomas came from the press—a massive work of 1,969 pages. Chapter VIII (pp. 798–1034) is dedicated to the period 1952–1958. Thomas, a professional historian, has accumulated an impressive amount of data, has had access to some new sources, and uses interviews with quite a few of the principal actors in the research for his study. He has written undoubtedly the most detailed and cohesive history of this complex period available to the present. But his work is not free from defects. His Spanish does not seem satisfactory. He tried to demonstrate a familiarity with events and personalities that obviously he does not possess. Consequently, mistakes are too frequent. Only as examples, some appear in the notes below.

Serious distortions also exist. This is not the place to mention each one. It will be enough to refer to the brief episode during which Colonel Barquín was in command of Columbia Camp. It happens that this author remained with Barquín from 9 p.m., January 1, to 5 a.m., January 2. As far as I know, Barquín never was a member of the “26th” as Thomas writes (p. 1028). He never “telephoned Castro in Santiago to ask when Judge Urrutia should take over as head of state” (p. 1028). It was Armando Hart, the present member of the PCC Political Bureau, who repeatedly called Castro, erroneously believing that the leader wanted some personal connections with Barquín. Only at dawn on January 2 did Hart suspect that he was on the wrong track, asked Barquín for a plane, and fled to Santiago de Cuba, so opportunistically that he returned as the Minister of Education of the Revolutionary Government. Ernesto Guevara never “went straight” to La Cabaña Fortress “and took over” (p. 1029). At this time, Camilo Cienfuegos, not Guevara, was in command of the rebel force approaching Havana. It was Camilo who called Barquín, from “El Cotorro,” a small town near Havana, asking permission to place his forces in military camps. Permission was granted. Incidentally, the appearance of small rebel detachments at Columbia Camp was so depressing that recriminations among the Army officers against Barquín started, and the legend of Barquín’s treason began to be forged. This should not be taken as a vindication of Colonel Barquín. I am unable to judge his military qualifications. He was and is a fine gentleman, but he was not a leader.

In my judgment, Thomas does not contribute any startling discovery to the history of the period, although he has used sources overlooked by foreigners, and his narrative is plentiful in data and sophistication. In general he takes the position of a British liberal historian who has condescended to exert his professional abilities, writing the history of a small, Negro, and underdeveloped country. Since in such a country, men who profess ideals similar to Thomas’ do not have the protection of British law and police, but have to fight, arms in hand, against dictators like Batista, or unexpected radical revolutionaries like Castro, both supported by powerful armies and militias, they generally fail to go to jail, exile, or get killed. Instead of human understanding and generosity, Thomas shows scorn for those men. I wonder what
Mr. Thomas would have done in the same situation, and if they were so weak, in-efficient, and hesitating as he seems to think.

Appendix

"Mártires del Moncada" offers a list of the 76 victims, and a biographical sketch of 70 of them. Fifty-two were killed in Santiago de Cuba, and 13 in Bayamo, as an outcome of the assault. Four died later in the Gramma landing; 2 during the fight in the Sierra; and 3 perished in the underground. Using such very incomplete and doubtful materials we will try to compose a profile of the Moncada combatant:

**AGE**: N-66:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 years or older</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 29</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PLACE OF BIRTH**: N-71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in Havana</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in other cities</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in small towns and villages</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in &quot;finca&quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EDUCATION**: N-51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University graduates</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University students</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school students</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary grades</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OCCUPATION**: N-66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks (empleados)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different occupations</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s. as: Messengers, dishwashers, parking aids, vendors of flowers, newspapers, lottery tickets, ice or bread, waiters, grocery attendants, distributors of lunch boxes, construction and rural workers, stevedores, and one boxer</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Affiliation and Background**: With one or two exceptions all of them were members of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxos). One had been a member of the PSP from 1939 to 1944. Another, 39 years old, seems to have been a member of the party at the time of the assault.

"Mártires del Moncada" has an Introduction by Marta Rojas, titled "Social Composition," but this is totally unsatisfactory. The above data make very dubious the common assertion that students or middle-class elements prevailed among the Moncada attackers.

NOTES

7. Debray’s letter to the Monthly Review (Feb., 1969), and his recent interview in Chile, only partially reproduced in Latin America (Jan. 8, 1971), where he calls his pamphlet an abstract book, which operates "on an abstract level."
10. Marta Rojas, La generación del centenario en el Moncada (Habana, 1964).
11. Autores varios, Máximos del Moncada (Habana, 1965).
12. The story by Jesús Montané, originally published in La Calle (July 26, 1959) : Relatos, 87.
13. See the text in 13 Documentos de la Insurrección, 19 (Habana, 1959).
18. On the "Triple A" or "Frente Nacional Democrático (AAA)," see 13 Documentos, p. 23.
22. The confession of their failure—betrayal for the youngsters—made by such distinguished members of the generation of the "Thirties" as Jorge Mañach, Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla, and Raúl Roa, can be read in Actualidad y destino de Cuba (Habana, 1950).
23. See the two very perceptive works by Carlos González Palacios, "Revolución y pseudo-revolución en Cuba" (Habana, 1948), and Luis Aguilar León, Pasado y ambiente en el proceso cubano (Habana, 1957). González Palacios was a member of the generation of 1930, "which according to Aguilar León, who was 27 years old in 1952, 'had abnormally prolonged its influence in Cuba'" (p. 77).
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: THE ROAD TO POWER


25. The previous affiliation of Hart and Pérez was well known in Cuban revolutionary circles.

26. The author was involved in this conspiracy. Also the civilian delegate of the military group, Justo Carrillo, has corroborated such agreement in a communication dated February 18, 1971. Such collaboration continued after the conspiracy failed. In the Pact of Mexico, signed by José Antonio Echeverría and Fidel Castro, both declared: "The F.E.U. [University Student Federation] and the 26th of July consider Colonel Barquín, Mayor Borbonet, and the other officers in prison or demoted, the most dignified representation of our army." 13 Documentos, p. 38.


30. Fernando Sánchez Amaya, Diario del 'Granma' 18 (Habana, 1959).

31. Fidel Castro, "¡Basta ya de mentiras!" Bohemia (July 15, 1956).


33. Already in 1958 Castro acknowledged that History Will Absolve Me was written on the Island of Pines, and therefore it is not the text of the speech given by him at his trial in Santiago de Cuba. See Jorge Ricardo Masetti, Los que luchan y los que lloran, 201 (Buenos Aires, 1969). The preface by the author is dated September 1958. See also Francisco de Armas, "Como se editó en la clandestinidad la primera edición de 'La Historia me Absolverá,'" Relatos, p. 143.

34. The author has been expressly denied authorization by his sources to use some information about those events, collected in exile.


37. F. Pérez, op. cit.

38. Interview with Crescencio Pérez, Bohemia (Feb. 8, 1959).


40. See also Alberto Bayo, One Hundred Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla, In: Jay Mallin, ed., Strategy for Conquest, 310 (Coral Gables, 1970). Mallin furnishes some information both about the author and the pamphlet, p. 32 and 314, but it is obviously inadequate. He overlooks especially Bayo's activities in Central America. About these see Ricardo Argüello, La verdad en marcha (México, 1950), where very strong imputations are made of Bayo's integrity and his qualifications as a military man.


44. On this uprising see: the interview with Frank País, published in the underground newspaper Revolución (Feb., 1957), and reproduced in Pensamiento Crítico (June, 1969); E. Vázquez Candelas, "Evocación de los caídos del 30 de noviembre," Revolución (Nov. 30, 1960); Nydia Sarabia, "La jornada heroica del 30 de noviembre," El Mundo (Nov. 24, 1963); and Eduardo Yasells, "El 30 de noviembre," Verde Olivo (Nov. 28, 1965).

45. F. Pérez, op. cit.

46. Interview with Crescencio Pérez, op. cit.

Latin American Research Review


49. País, *op. cit.*


52. For example, the Triple A, already mentioned, under the leadership of the ex-Minister of Education Aureliano Sánchez Arango: Acción Libertadora, headed by Justo Carrillo, one of the members of the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario of the 1930s; and Organización Auténtica, under the control of ex-President Carlos Prío.


54. In Cuba the words "guerrilla" and "guerrillero" referred to those Cubans fighting with the Spanish Army during the two Wars of Independence.

55. I am referring to the extremist line taken by Castro from the middle of 1966 until 1968 and especially at the time of the First Conference of Latin American Solidarity. See *Primera Conferencia de la Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad* (Montevideo, 1967). According to the editors, this is a textual reproduction of the version published in Cuba. Also see *The First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO)*, a study prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on Security at its Ninth Regular Meeting, 1967 (OEAS/ER, L/X/11.18).


60. On Frank País, Jefe Nacional de Acción del "26," buried with the rank of Colonel, the only one in the Rebel Army, see "Documentos de Frank País," *Revolución* (July 30, 1964); *Bohemia* (July 30, 1965, and July 28, 1967). Also *Pensamiento Crítico* (June, 1969), and Moran, *op. cit.*, who worked in the under ground close to País.


63. Mario Llerena, "El Manifiesto Ideológico del 26 de Julio," *Humanismo* (México, July-August, 1957). Llerena was referring here to *Nuestra razón*, a document dated in Havana, Nov., 1956, but published in Mexico and written probably by Llerena himself. Under the title "Manifiesto-programa del Movimiento 26 de Julio," it appeared later in Enrique González Pedrero, *La revolución cubana* (México, 1959). It seems that a somewhat different version of this document was circulated in Cuba through the underground newspaper *Revolución*; see Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 79. But the "26th" never had an official program. Even after Guevara arrived at the Escambray, the National Coordinator of the "26th," Marcelo Fernández, talked to him about the need for such program. Guevara promised to send some ideas, but Batista collapsed without the program being written. Enrique Oltunski, “Gente del Llano,” *Casa de las Américas* (Jan.-Feb., 1967). The Manifestos issued by Castro from the Sierra Maestra are in Selser, *op. cit.* See also, Luis Rodolfo Sainz Montes...
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: THE ROAD TO POWER

de Oca, “La generación del centenario,” and “¿Por que luchamos?”, both written by a “26th” member in April and May 1957, and reproduced in Pensamiento Crítico, No. 22 (1968).

64. José Barbeito, Realidad y masificación: Reflexiones sobre la Revolución Cubana, 115 (Caracas, 1964).


66. La Sierra y el Llano (Casa de las Américas, Habana, 1969), is a collection of narratives previously published, some of them insightful, like the one by Rodríguez Loeches and the Campaign Diary of Raúl Castro. But the book does nothing to clarify the relations between the two sectors of the revolutionary movement. Complementary data on the military activities in the Second Oriental Front can be found in the collection of narratives written by some of the participants and edited by Luis Pavón as Dias de Combate (Habana, 1970).


71. Draper, op. cit., 34.


75. Suárez, op. cit.

Latin American Research Review

78. José Pardo Llada, Memorias de la Sierra Maestra, 88 (Habana, 1960).
80. For example, Raúl Castro, "Operación Anti-Aérea," op. cit.
81. Fulgencio Batista, Respuesta (México, 1960); Piedras y leyes (México, 1961; English trans., The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic, N.Y., 1964); Cuba Betrayed (N.Y., 1962); Paradigmas (México, 1963); Paradojismo (México, 1964).
83. Suárez Núñez, op. cit.
88. Suárez Núñez, op. cit., p. 142, states that he saw in the official records of the Dominican Republic the names of Pedro Miret and Antonio Díaz, both close collaborators of Castro, as visitors to that nation during the years of the struggle against Batista.
91. Suárez, op. cit. In "¡Frente a Todas!" Castro mentions his "indictment introduced before the Tribunal de Cuentas on March 4, 1952, and published in ¡Alerta! the following day, denouncing by full name the 2,120 positions that the groups had in the Government" (Selser, p. 98). Castro is referring here to the "action groups." This item does not appear in Bonachea and Valdés, Una Bibliografía de Fidel Castro, mentioned above. About such groups, crucial to understanding Castro's political style and techniques, see Raúl Roa, "La universidad y el gangsterismo," "Aún es tiempo," and "Paso al fente contra el bonchismo," in 15 años después (Habana, 1950); Mario García del Cuete, "Unión Insurreccional Revolucionaria," Bohemia (June 15, 1947); and Ambrosio Abedul, "Policarpo Soler: una vida el servicio del crimen y la traición," Bohemia (Aug. 30, 1959).
91a. Since this paper was written two important works have appeared about Castro and the action groups: Nélson P. Valdés y Rolando E. Bonachea, "Fidel Castro y la política estudiantil de 1947 a 1952," Aportes, No. 22, Oct., 1971; and the relevant chapters in Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (N.Y., 1971).
97. For example, the Justo Carrillo and Mario Llerena MS.
98. The group of officers involved in the conspiracy of April 3, 1956, was considered one of the more honest in the Army, and for this reason they were nicknamed "los puros" (from purity). But Thomas confuses "puros" in this sense with "puros" (cigars) and he writes, wrongly, that they were called "contemptuously" by Grau in the last sense (p. 884). On
another page (1032), Thomas refers to this group with the name of “Prustas.” I suppose he means “puristas.” But they were never called in this way, and for a very simple reason. “Puristas” were the members of Partido Unión Revolucionaria (PUR), a front party founded by the Communists at the end of the thirties, and no one ever suspected the “puros” had had anything to do with communism. On p. 821, Thomas calls the March 10th coup “the golpe of the sunsundamba.” I have never heard such an expression. What does “sunsundamba” mean? And who is the Col. Lambea mentioned on p. 839? One might continue at length with such specific queries.

99. The Director of the Escuela Normal de la Habana, Dulce María Escalona, is the sister, not the wife, of the communist leader Arnaldo Escalona (p. 798). Emilio Tró never was “the police boss of Marianao,” (p. 811), but an instructor at the Police Academy. Tró was not attacked at “the police headquarters of Marianao in 1948” (p. 840) but a year before, in 1947, and when he was visiting the house of a friend, Mayor Morín Dopico. It was not “unconsciously” that “Castro’s movement took for its colours the black and red of the anarchist flag” (p. 828): it was accidental. The original colors were black and orange, but it happened that the orange pieces of cloth were difficult to find in the market. And so on.

100. It seems to me revealing of this liberal approach to history the expression used by Thomas concerning Justo Fuentes, the vice-president of FEU, assassinated in 1949. He is called “a Negro gangster and part-time student” (p. 813). There are not similar expressions for the white gangsters and part-time students, some of them, by the way, killed in the fight against Batista.