Prior to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933, American military intelligence on the Red Army was limited to what it could glean from foreign military sources and travelers who had observed the Red Army inside the Soviet state. Thus, from 1920, the end of the period of Russian Civil War and Allied Intervention, to 1933, information on the Soviet military establishment was gathered by American military attachés from European diplomatic and military officials in Riga, Berlin, and Warsaw. To a lesser extent, intelligence on the Red Army was also available in London, Paris, Vienna, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Peking. American military intelligence dispatches and reports during the period reflected the heavy reliance upon secondary and indirect sources, although the information was often remarkably accurate. But with the American diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union and the opening of an American embassy in Moscow, American military intelligence gained the opportunity to supplement information received from foreign military sources with data received directly from the American military attaché.

The first American military attaché to the Soviet Union was Maj. Philip Ries Faymonville (1888–1962), a U.S. Army ordnance officer who had previous acquaintance with Russia and prior experience as a military attaché. A graduate of Stanford University and the United States Military Academy (class of 1912), Faymonville was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Coast Artillery in June 1912, and served on the Mexican border and in the Philippines before the American entry into World War I. In August 1918, he was posted to Siberia to serve as chief ordnance officer and judge advocate in the American Expeditionary Force under Gen. William S. Graves and as a member of the Inter-Allied War Materials Committee. During 1920, he supervised the repatriation of prisoners of war in Germany and, returning to the United States in August of that year, served as ordnance officer at Ninth Corps headquarters in San Francisco. In January 1922, Faymonville was dispatched to Chita in Siberia as American military observer. From May 1923 until January 1924, he served as assistant U.S. military attaché to Japan, and then as the military attaché in Tokyo until May 1926. Between his return from Japan and his departure from the United States to assume his post in the Soviet Union in June 1934, Faymonville received advanced
training in ordnance, chemical warfare, military industrial production, and was a student at the Army War College (August 1933–June 1934).  
Immediately upon his arrival in Moscow in July 1934, Faymonville rapidly “put himself on friendly, if not intimate” terms with Soviet military officials. His previous experience in Russia and his fluency in Russian facilitated the establishment of friendly relations with the Red Army leadership and he soon became privy to much military information, a significant accomplishment in Stalin’s Russia. But Faymonville’s cordial relations with Red Army officers and his professional esteem for the Soviet military were criticized, first by his colleague, the acting naval attaché, Capt. David R. Nimmer, U.S.M.C, and later by others in the American embassy and the War Department. Nimmer complained to his superiors that Faymonville was too sympathetic to the Russians and, alluding to Faymonville’s reports, declared: “I have heard evaluations regarding the great capacity of the Russians in all things, made sincerely by high officials of ours, which to me seemed wholly erroneous.”

That Nimmer possessed a disdain for Russians and all things Russian was apparent in the tenor of his dispatches to Washington and especially in a report on August 15, 1934, in which he informed the director of naval intelligence that all Soviet war material was “definitely inferior to items of like manufacture produced by Western powers” and that, instead of being an asset as an ally, the Soviet Union was an “overwhelming LIABILITY” to any power foolish enough to accept it as an ally. In Nimmer’s opinion, the prospects for the culturally and materially inferior Soviet Union were extremely bleak:

If given continued, intensive instruction (on his own soil) it will take many generations before the average Russian will attain the ability to think clearly along practical lines and for himself; and when, still speaking of the average, he reaches his zenith in capacity to think nor-

2. Standley, Admiral Ambassador, p. 238.
3. Capt. David R. Nimmer, “Report to the Director of Naval Intelligence, November 17, 1934,” Record Group 38, Military Intelligence Division, National Archives. We are indebted to Mr. Charles J. Weeks for the information on Capt. Nimmer used in this article.
mally he will still be sluggish as against the average American who by comparison and from a practical standpoint is agile and a giant in intellect and action . . . [The USSR is] not capable of successfully concluding a war with any comparable 1st class power.6

It is not strange that Nimmer would find so much to criticize in the reports of Lt. Col. Faymonville, since their attitudes toward the Soviet Union, the Russian people, and the Red Army were so diametrically opposed.

By the time Faymonville began reporting on the Red Army, the Soviet military establishment was already attracting the attention and favorable comment of many foreign military and civilian observers. The rise of Hitler in Germany, and the resulting increase in European tensions (evoked by Hitler's belligerent rhetoric and by German rearmament), caused Soviet leaders to accord a high priority to the development of the Red Army. The fruition of nearly a decade of military reform begun by Mikhail Frunze in 1924–25 and the relative success of the First Five-Year Plan in expanding Soviet industrial production (especially in metallurgy), endowed the Red Army with a new professional polish and an impressive modern armament. Moreover, military collaboration between the Reichswehr and the Red Army during the 1920s, combined with many years of Soviet military experimentation and innovation, gave rise to futuristic strategic and tactical features in Soviet military, thought and practice, especially in the deployment and use of armored forces. These developments, and the commensurate increase in Soviet military strength, had been noted by American military observers in the military journals and intelligence reports for several years.6 Indeed,


early in Faymonville's sojourn in Moscow, the American military attaché in Riga, Maj. W. E. Shipp, emphasized the originality and novelty of Soviet armored tactics and strategy, asserting that such innovation formed a central theme extending throughout the fabric of Soviet military doctrine. This feature of Soviet military theory, wrote Shipp, was "not surprising" because "Soviet military authorities are not bound by traditions and are deeply interested in the employment of modern motor-mechanized forces." Thus, the favorable tone of Faymonville's reports was not without precedent.

Faymonville attended the annual autumn maneuvers of the Red Army in 1934 and was impressed by the competence and youth of the company grade officers he observed. To Faymonville, the rise of these young officers and the "tremendous stamina" of the individual Soviet soldier would "make the Red Army a powerful military machine." In November 1934, Faymonville reported that he had observed a military demonstration in which the "quality" of the display was "excellent" and the "Marching was extremely good." The dispatch stressed "the splendid physical condition of the military units" and the "continued emphasis on tanks" in Red Army exercises.

While much in these two reports from Faymonville was supported by intelligence from other sources, his favorable observations were frequently contradicted by the reports of other American military attaches during this period. Thus, Faymonville's estimate of the quality of the lower-echelon officers was in direct conflict with the report of the American military attaché to Warsaw, Col. Albert Gilmor, who found many things to admire about the higher level Soviet officers but was extremely critical of the middle and lower level officers, emphasizing their doctrinaire inflexibility and lack.
Col. Philip R. Faymonville

of initiative. The acting American military attaché in Berlin, Capt. James C. Crockett, and Major Shipp in Riga agreed in part with Faymonville for both expressed great respect for the inherent hardiness of the Soviet soldier. But, like Gilmor, Crockett and Shipp criticized Soviet officers for lacking expertise, flexibility, and initiative.

On the other hand, articles appearing in the military press and intelligence reports from other military attachés seemed to support Faymonville’s emphasis on the significance of the use of armor by the Red Army in its tactical exercises and maneuvers. Indeed, Major Shipp carefully described the vast mechanization of the Red Army, noting the military significance of this development when coupled with Soviet tactical and strategic doctrines and practices. In his analysis, he emphasized the great military potential of the strong new Soviet “shock-army” in the opening phases of a war. Shipp also supported Faymonville when he wrote: “The Soviets envisage the use of tanks in almost every tactical situation; [and] some of their ideas appear to be rather advanced.”

In response to the threat posed by the Fascist powers, a “Popular Front” policy was proclaimed at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Third International (Comintern) in July and August 1935. The Comintern declared that henceforth Communist parties would cooperate with all political groups opposing Fascism, thereby abandoning hostility to bourgeois liberals and Social Democrats, and intimated that the Soviet Union was prepared to participate in international wars against Fascist powers. Reflecting on the military implications of this development, Faymonville predicted that the Red Army would become a very potent factor in European power politics when he wrote:

The Red Army as a force in international wars has not heretofore been considered as a possible pawn in the European diplomatic game.


It has been an army for the defense of Soviet frontiers, for assuring internal stability and for educating and indoctrinating the younger generation of Soviet citizens. Its training has not adapted it for use as a military force outside Soviet frontiers. With the adoption of a new formula permitting communistic participation in international wars, it is necessary to add the Red Army to the other military establishments which may conceivably be lined up in a general European war. Even though the employment of the Red Army in Central Europe be only a remote possibility it is likely to have discernible effects on international relations.15

In its 1935 autumn maneuvers, the Red Army, in the presence of several specially invited foreign military observers,16 successfully carried out an operation without precedent in military history, involving vast airlifts and parachute drops of large formations of Soviet troops. This revolutionary breakthrough and its potential for practical application in warfare was the subject of many articles by Walter Duranty and other commentators in the New York Times for several days.17 Although Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky had begun to experiment with military paratrooper units as early as 1929,18 and the Soviet development of this arm had been noted from time to time by American military observers,19 the 1935 autumn maneuvers profoundly affected Western military observers and practices. Both military intelligence and the New York Times reported that the French, Italian, and Czech military observers were favorably impressed by the Soviet military operation.20 In fact the French observer, Gen. Henri Loiseau, was moved to eloquent praise of the maneuvers21 and was so stirred by the potential of military airborne operations that, on his return to France, he arranged for the French Army to establish a paratroop arm (the French paratroopers received training from Red Army instructors).

This development was later accepted by the military establishments of the other major Western powers.\(^{22}\)

Like his European colleagues, Faymonville reacted favorably to the performance of the Soviet officers and units in the maneuvers. "The tactical decisions," he observed, "seemed appropriate and were carried out promptly and without confusion" and "reconnaissance was efficiently conducted by air squadrons." Moreover:

The impression was gained that commanders of all ranks have been adequately trained in the minor tactics involved in the given situation, that the general scheme of maneuver was well planned and well executed by leaders of both sides . . . the Red Army units were adequately trained, equipped, and supplied for such movements as were included in the scheme of the maneuver.\(^{28}\)

On March 4, 1936, Faymonville dispatched a report from Moscow on the political significance of the Red Army's training program. He described this program as a highly selective process and most important insofar as it engendered a symbiotic relationship between the Soviet political and military authorities.

The result of this system is to put into the hands of the Soviet Government a powerful, loyal, and intelligent military force thoroughly indoctrinated in the Socialist ideas which form the basis of governmental action and thoroughly alive to the foreign threats which the Government constantly emphasizes. The relation between the Army and Government in the Soviet Union is as close as in any country in the world and the loyalty of the Army to the Government appears to be beyond doubt.\(^{24}\)

In a second report rendered on the same day, Faymonville related that he had witnessed recent Red Army maneuvers and, in his opinion, "The physical condition of the troops was excellent and their military proficiency very good."\(^{25}\)

Somewhat later, Faymonville visited Frunze Academy. He equated its importance to that of the U.S. Army War College, and commented favorably on the quality of the curriculum and the students.


The most able officers of the Red Army are undoubtedly those detailed for duty . . . at Frunze Academy. The course seems well adapted to the higher training of these officers and for preparing them for higher posts of command in the future. The feature which is most striking about the personnel of the student officers is their youth. It is obvious that rigorous selective processes have brought them to the top . . . the typical product of the school is therefore an alert, intelligent, keenly ambitious officer, in the prime of life and eager to carry into practical effect the lessons learned at the academy.26

During the summer of 1936, the emigré Russian general, Nikolai Golovine, published an article in the Infantry Journal which analyzed the Red Army and its evolution since 1924. Noting that the Red Army had almost trebled in size since 1933 (from 562,000 to 1,300,000 men), Golovine emphasized that the Red Army in 1936 outnumbered the Imperial Army of 1912 (1,284,155) and that the difference was a measure of the Soviet effort for military preparedness. Of equal significance was the incorporation of the territorial militia into the “regular” standing army—a change which would improve military efficiency and enhance the Soviet mobilization capability in the event of war—and the development of a modern aviation arm. The Red Army, he declared, was purchasing the best foreign airplane models and engines and incorporating the best features of these foreign prototypes into domestic aircraft construction. The same procedure was being followed with mechanized equipment, and the mechanization of the Red Army was extensive and increasing steadily. However, Golovine was convinced that the benefits of the modernization had been undermined by political and security measures implemented by the Soviet leadership to assure the army’s ideological purity and its loyalty to the regime. Thus, officers were selected on the basis of class origin and membership in the Communist Party, rather than on the basis of demonstrated competence, which minimized the number of former Imperial officers serving in the army. This policy resulted in a decline in “the general cultural level of the personnel” and a decrease in the competence and efficiency of officers and noncommissioned officers. Golovine considered these consequences “a heavy price to pay for loyalty to political dogma” and raised the following questions: “Can a ‘primitive’ officer personnel be depended upon to handle a modern army? Will it be equal to the complicated and tactical problems involved in training, equipping and leading large masses of men?” Nowhere, according to Golovine, were these problems more apparent than in the highest echelons of the Red Army officer corps. The people’s commissar for defense, Klimenti Voroshilov, was criticized for his “scanty

general education and his total lack of military education [which] render him totally unfit for such high command.” Golovine also denounced the chief of the General Staff, Aleksandr Yegorov, and the commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Army, Vassili K. Blücher, as incompetents, but commented favorably on the ability of Tukhachevsky, the second assistant to the people’s commissar for defense in matters of armament and supply of the Red Army. In concluding the analysis, Golovine asserted that the highest positions in the Red Army are held by political generals rather than by military experts. Moreover, the entire officer personnel represents a low level of culture and is trained primarily for “primitive” methods of fighting that are characteristic of a civil or revolutionary war. This renders most doubtful the intelligent employment of the gigantic military machine that the Soviets have built. The more complex its weapons the more inefficient is their direction and control likely to be.

The recent changes in the Red Army have tended to raise it to the level of other European armies. Its outward appearance attracts many observers and creates, in fact, an impression of exceptional power . . . based on superficial analysis. The close observer will come to the inevitable conclusion that the Red Army colossus has entrails of straw.27

Golovine’s article evoked a strong protest from the Soviet embassy in Washington which denounced his statements as “derogatory to the Soviet Army.” The assistant chief of staff, G-2, U.S. Army, Col. F. H. Lincoln, informed the chief of infantry that the Soviet embassy specifically objected to Golovine’s criticisms of Voroshilov and the officer corps and the “entrails of straw” passage.28 From Moscow, Faymonville reported that Golovine’s data could neither be confirmed nor repudiated, because of the inaccessibility of reliable military information. His report conceded that much of the general thrust of Golovine’s article was widely accepted by other military attaches, but he was unable to accept Golovine’s estimate unreservedly because he did not know whether Golovine had “based his statements on reliable sources or . . . on conjecture.” More specifically, he was convinced that Golovine’s prediction that a long campaign would culminate in the collapse of the “Red Command” was not “warranted by the facts.”29

In October, Golovine’s statement that the aviation and armored branches of the Red Army received the highest priority in funding, equipment, and personnel was confirmed in a dispatch from Faymonville. In addition to

aviation and armor, reported Faymonville, the fledgling Red Navy also re-
ceived favored treatment and emphasis on the development of these branches was having the negative result of allotting inferior personnel and material to the other military units. This discrimination in personnel allotment was most noticeably unfavorable to the artillery, and Faymonville observed that “the general education level of artillery recruits, while rising, is not yet satisfactory, and does not compare for instance with the general education level of even the most stupid batch of American recruits.”

On February 19, 1937, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, recorded, in his diary, a conversation with the German ambassador, Count Werner von der Schulenburg, and the German military attaché, Gen. Ernst Köstring, in which Köstring evaluated the Red Army in response to a request from Davies. Köstring told Davies that the Russian army, generally speaking, was a good army; that the human material—manpower—was excellent, physically strong, brave, and fine soldiers; that the mechanized forces were good, not as good as the German army, but good; that the air force was numerically strong; their flying [fighters (?)] and reconnaissance planes were good, but that their bombers were heavy and poor. That as a whole, barring superiority in numbers, it could not compare with the German air force; that the Russian fliers were, however, superb—none better; that their parachute troops were excellent.

Faymonville seemed to concur with Köstring’s evaluation of the Soviet soldier when he reported on March 11 that “the excellent physical appearance of the individual Red Army man and his successful accomplishment of severe tasks under difficulties testifies to the success of the physical culture training program of the Red Army.”

By 1937, the Red Army had succeeded in achieving a high level of professional expertise and many foreigners were moved to comment favor-

31. Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), p. 83. The German military attaché, Köstring, enjoyed a distinguished reputation as a “military expert” on the Red Army in the Moscow diplomatic community. According to the German diplomat, Herbert von Dirksen, Köstring’s parents had owned an estate in Russia before 1914 and “he had spent his youth in that country and had acquired, quite apart from a perfect command of the language, a deep and almost instinctive understanding of the Russian mentality.” Highly respected, Köstring was “the model of an old-type Prussian cavalry officer, straight, chivalrous, intelligent, and courageous [and] enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the Red Army commanders as well as [that of] his colleagues.” Herbert von Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo, London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952), p. 121.
ably upon its progress and to rate it as one of the most significant and powerful military forces in the world. These experts included the Chinese diplomat, Hu Shih; the Polish general, Wladyslaw Sikorski; the American military attaché to Riga, Maj. G. B. Guenther; Ambassador Davies; the German general, Erwin Haudan; the military pundits, Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart and Max Werner; and the political commentator, “Balticus.” Indeed, the German diplomat, Herbert von Dirksen, later wrote that by 1937 Soviet officers had achieved a professional expertise that “corresponded—at least so far as the generals and staff officers were concerned—to approximately the same standard as had been exacted by the old [Imperial] German Army from its leaders” and that many Soviet generals “may be classified at the same level with the best types of German generals.”

Unfortunately, when the Red Army had finally come of age as a military organism and had begun to earn international respect, Stalin launched a purge of the army that decimated the Soviet officer corps, destroying the most progressive minds in the Red Army. That this purge was at once unnecessary, unwarranted, and disastrous to the progress and modernization of the Red Army is the verdict of most scholars. The purge, which lasted almost two years, not only weakened the morale and initiative of military personnel but seriously diminished the quality of Soviet officers and led also to a virtual abandonment of strategic and tactical experimentation with modern armor and mechanization in the Red Army.

An early sign of the impending purge was the demotion of Tukhachevsky from assistant commissar for defense to commander of the Volga District


34. Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo, London, p. 130.

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and his replacement by Marshal Yegorov. Faymonville apparently failed to comprehend the full significance of this development, and viewed the demotion as merely a disciplinary measure resulting from Tukhachevsky's name having been mentioned in one of the civilian purge trials. In a report, Faymonville noted that Yegorov's appointment was "based wholly on merit and comes as a result of Marshal Yegorov’s excellent work during the years he has served as chief of the General Staff of the Red Army" and described Yegorov as "a man of great energy and exceptional organizing ability." But the second secretary of the American embassy in Moscow, Loy Henderson, was more perceptive and, in reporting the demotion of Tukhachevsky on June 8, predicted a wholesale purge of the military by Stalin on charges of treason based on fabricated evidence. Analyzing Stalin’s motivation as an attempt to eliminate any potential rival or opponent to his consolidation of personal power, Henderson also predicted that the purge would severely damage the Red Army. Henderson's subsequent reports on June 11, 13, and 23 declared that events had thus far confirmed his initial analysis and reiterated his conviction that Stalin’s purge would seriously impair the military efficiency of the army.

Another omen of the purge was the revival of the power and authority of the political commissar in the command structure of the Red Army. The power of the commissars increased perceptibly as the tempo of the purge quickened and the list of officers liquidated or imprisoned increased. This development was noted early by Faymonville and others who agreed that restoration of the commissars' power would prove unsound and disruptive in the army.

Most of the foreign military attaches in Moscow and other foreign military observers were convinced that the purge of the military and the reinstatement of political commissars had adversely affected the military effectiveness of the Red Army and, accordingly, the "alliance value" of the Soviet Union had been reduced in European power politics. Such diverse military commentators as the Japanese general, Masaharu Homma, the American

40. Erickson, Soviet High Command, p. 468.
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military attaché to Riga, Major Guenther,41 and the prominent Nazi, Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring,42 concurred that the Red Army had sustained extensive damage as a result of Stalin's terror. Moreover, as a result of his conversations with the several military attaches in Moscow on the condition of the army after the purge, Loy Henderson reported that almost all agreed that

the fighting efficiency of the Red Army has been adversely affected as a result of the purge and the institution of political commissars. It may be added that this opinion is so generally accepted among the circles of Military Attachés in Moscow that discussion in that circle is confined to the extent of injury and the time and manner in which such injury may be remedied rather than as to whether an injury has been received.

The foreign Military Attachés appear to be almost unanimous in expressing the opinion that so long as the political commissars are permitted to exercise the power they now have, the Red Army will not be the effective fighting weapon which a military organization of its size, equipment, and technical level should be. Their opinions differ as to the length of time which would be required for the wound which the Army has suffered to heal in the event that the principle of unity in command should be restored. Most of them appear to believe that it should be possible within two or three years to restore the Red Army to its former level if the rulers of the country would again display full confidence in its commanding personnel and permit its commanders to proceed to reorganize it on a non-political basis.43

Of all the military attachés and military observers, Faymonville was one of the very few, perhaps the only one, who insisted that the potential power of Stalin's army remained intact.44 Indeed, Faymonville was later reported to have insisted that the Red Army was substantially undamaged by the purge because the army was organized along defensive lines and "the loss of [general] staff officers is not so vital to the defense strategy."45 Significantly, Ambassador Davies retained complete faith in Faymonville's judgment and relied completely upon his military estimates even though Faymonville was

45. Demaree Bess, "General Called the Turn," p. 102.
virtually isolated in his optimistic views of the purge's impact on the army. Thus as late as June 1938, Faymonville's influence was apparent in many of Davies' dispatches. In his last official dispatch to Washington before returning to the United States, Davies conceded that although the consensus among foreigners in Moscow was that the purge of the most able and experienced Soviet generals had weakened the Red Army considerably, he was inclined to "agree with our military attaché, Colonel Faymonville, that while this is measurably true, it is much exaggerated." As Davies' dispatch of June 6, 1938 indicated, reports that the purge had had a severely debilitating effect on the Red Army were accepted as axiomatic in most Western capitals and, therefore, played a significant role in the events then unfolding in Europe and Asia. On July 4, 1937, Ambassador Davies reported that Stalin's military purge had destroyed the "confidence" of Western European officials, especially in Britain and France, in the strength of the Red Army. This development certainly encouraged Hitler's aggressions, a point apparent in a conversation between the German and British military attachés in Moscow during May 1938. General Kösstring told his British colleague that Stalin's purge had crippled the Red Army, thereby neutralizing the Soviet Union as a factor in Berlin's considerations, and that Hitler would not have attempted the annexation of Austria had not Stalin weakened the Red Army. The low esteem in which the Red Army was held in London, Paris, and Berlin also contributed to the outcome of the Munich Crisis. During that fateful summer of 1938, as Britain and France capitulated and allowed Nazi Germany to absorb Czechoslovakia, the Red Army was still considered much too enfeebled by the toll of the recent purge to implement the Soviet Union's pledges to assist Czechoslovakia in the event of hostilities with Germany. The British historian, E. H. Carr, later recalled that an official in the British Foreign Office remarked during the crisis that the Soviet Union could only act "politically" on behalf of Czechoslovakia because of the dubious military value of the Red Army. Similarly, the American military attaché in Riga, Major Guenth'er, described the Soviet pledge of military assistance to Czechoslovakia as sheer bluff—lacking substance because "Soviet Russia will not risk a war at this time due to the unsettled con-

46. Vagts, Military Attaché, pp. 66 and 332.
49. Vagts, Military Attaché, p. 58.
ditions of internal political affairs and within the army." Hence, the purge had the effect of depriving Britain and France of any reasonable assurance of Soviet assistance in checking the expansionist policies of Hitler, a development with disastrous consequences for Czechoslovakia.

Faymonville, however, remained convinced that the negative effects of Stalin’s purge on the Red Army were “exaggerated,” even though immediately subsequent events did not appear to sustain him. While Hitler prepared to exploit Soviet weakness and Anglo-French timidity in the West, the Japanese escalated their probing of Soviet Siberian and Mongolian defenses in border skirmishes which were to culminate in the battles of Changkufeng and Khalkin-Gol. When Japanese forces occupied two islands in the Amur River, and Soviet forces withdrew from the islands after a brief military confrontation (June 21–30, 1937), the Soviet withdrawal was duly noted in American military journals and was interpreted by segments of the civilian press as reflecting the weakness of the Soviet Far Eastern Army. But Soviet leaders promptly acted to buttress their Asian defenses and, in mid-August 1937, Faymonville reported from Moscow that “the entire Soviet Far East still gives the impression of being a widely extended armed camp. Detachments of the Red Army . . . are in evidence at even the smallest stations and at intermediate points. Members of the Air Force and the Tank Corps especially are noticed everywhere.”

On October 18, 1937 Faymonville wrote that Soviet industry was being reorganized to enhance its centralized structure for a more expeditious mobilization of resources and for a rapid conversion from peacetime to wartime production in the event of war. He was convinced that the Soviet economy was adequately developed to support wartime requirements of the Red Army. During the following month, Faymonville reported that the military display at the festivities commemorating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution indicated the Red Army was still in good condition and that “the Red Army is continuing to train efficiently each yearly draft of conscripts and
that the general rating of the troops is very satisfactory." 65 Ambassador Davies included Faymonville's views in his report when he observed that

the show which the naval and military forces put on was distinctly impressive. The equipment, the manpower, and the officers of the various outfits appeared to be first class. The mechanized units—tanks, mounted machine guns, and artillery—which shot across Red Square at a high rate of speed were exceptionally impressive.

The general report of the military attaches, as I understand from Colonel Faymonville, is to the effect that it was a first-class exhibition of military strength. 66

Meanwhile the increased incidence of Soviet-Japanese border clashes (as one commentator pointed out in the spring of 1938, there had been over 400 border incidents between the Soviet Red Banner Army and the Japanese Kwantung Army during the preceding months 57 ) evoked much speculation about the possibility of a full-scale Soviet-Japanese War or of Soviet intervention in the Sino-Japanese War on the Chinese side as a result of continued Japanese provocation. Accordingly, in early March, Faymonville rendered a report to Ambassador Davies on the state of Soviet military preparedness and the condition of the Soviet Far Eastern defenses in which he stated that the Soviet government had accumulated sufficient supply stockpiles in eastern Siberia to sustain military operations for one year independent of supplies from European Russia. In comparing the Red Banner Army and the Kwantung Army, Faymonville described the Japanese artillery as "more effective" than that of the Red Army and Soviet-Japanese air power as "possibly equal." Nevertheless, Faymonville reported that since the Soviet defensive positions were strong enough to inflict heavy losses on the Japanese in the event of an attack, the prospect of a full-scale Japanese offensive against Soviet forces was highly unlikely. 58 Although the American military attaché in Riga had earlier discounted reports that the extensive supplies in Siberia were adequate to support "prolonged" Soviet military operations without supplies from Euro-


56. Report 735 from Davies to the secretary of state on the Celebration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, November 15, 1937, Davies, Mission to Moscow, p. 326.


pean Russia. Ambassador Davies later forwarded much of the information provided by Faymonville on the Soviet supply stockpiles and fortifications in Siberia to the secretary of state.

As the purge continued to decimate the Soviet officer corps, those officers who escaped Stalin’s liquidation and survived were the subject of great interest to Faymonville and other Western observers. On March 30, Faymonville reported on Stalin’s old Civil War comrades, Marshals Voroshilov and Semen Budennyi. He wrote, somewhat inaccurately, that “to Voroshilov belongs much of the credit for the building up of the Soviet Union’s fighting forces.” In a second dispatch dealing specifically with Budennyi, Faymonville stated that “Marshal Budyonny may be classed as an energetic and skilful field commander. He has had little formal military education but his fame as a Civil War cavalry leader is already legendary.”

European tensions continued to mount as Hitler’s designs on Czechoslovakia became apparent and the possibility of Soviet intervention on behalf of Czechoslovakia was considered in some quarters. Responding to German-inspired rumor that the Red Air Force planned to bomb Berlin with 30,000 (!) planes, Faymonville asserted: “This canard was so ridiculous that it can hardly have carried conviction even in Nazi circles.” At about the same time, the American military attaché in Czechoslovakia, Maj. Lowell M. Riley, seemed to share Faymonville’s widely expressed opinion that the Red Army, despite the injuries suffered as a result of the purge, was still capable of exercising considerable influence in the welter of events unfolding in Central Europe. “Russia, whether red or black, is and will remain the greatest territorial power, and its voice supported by the greatest army and greatest aircraft will be decisive in any political crisis, especially in the questions of Eastern Europe.”

In early 1939, Faymonville completed his tour of duty in the Soviet Union and returned to the United States to serve on the technical staff of the U.S. Army Chief of Ordnance in Washington, D.C. Faymonville re-

60. See Davies to the secretary of state, April 1 and 6, 1938, F.R.U.S., 1933–1939, pp. 547 and 556.
64. War Dept. Bio Data, 25-73875-50. Alfred Vagts asserts that Faymonville was
mained in Washington until October 1940, when he was assigned to Fourth Army headquarters in San Francisco as ordnance officer. A month later (November), he was promoted to colonel. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Faymonville was still at the Presidio in San Francisco.65

After the startling successes of the Wehrmacht in Poland and Western Europe, the expectation was widespread that the Red Army would be crushed quickly by Hitler's armored legions, that the Stalinist regime would collapse, and that a state of chaos would develop. The American chargé d'affaires in the Moscow embassy, Walter Thurston, later conceded that a similar opinion prevailed among Westerners in the Moscow diplomatic community.66 The American military attaché to the Soviet Union at the time of the invasion, Maj. Ivan Yeaton, predicted imminent Soviet collapse throughout the summer months and even as late as October 1941.67 Yeaton's pessimism was shared to some degree by the U.S. Army chief of staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, and the reaction to the invasion by U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, was a somber expression of concern.68 Almost alone, Faymonville refused to accept predictions of a rapid Soviet defeat and, as Admiral Standley later recalled, “was one of the very few who insisted that the Russians would not surrender and would fight to the bitter end.”69 Because American military intelligence reports and summaries also predicted a quick German victory, Faymonville's views were extremely unpopular.70

Meanwhile, as arrangements to extend Lend-Lease assistance to the Soviet Union were being made in July 1941, Maj. Gen. James H. Burns of

recalled from Moscow in 1939 because many officials in Washington doubted the validity of his reports on the Red Army. Vagts, Military Attaché, pp. 85 and 332.
69. Standley, Admiral Ambassador, p. 239.
the Division of Defense Aid summoned Faymonville to Washington for consultation and soon afterward transferred Faymonville to his staff. With his fluency in Russian, Faymonville was very useful in the negotiations with the Soviet military mission, which arrived in Washington on July 23, and in the series of conferences with the Soviet mission in the War Department during August 9–11 held “to determine the extent of American aid and the means of furnishing it” to the Soviet Union. When, in September, President Roosevelt directed his special representative in London, Averell Harriman, to go to Moscow with a British mission led by Lord Beaverbrook for parleys with the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Harriman’s “Special Mission for War Supplies to the U.S.S.R.” included General Burns, Admiral Standley, Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, W. L. Blatt—and Faymonville, as secretary. The Harriman mission resulted in the First (Moscow) Protocol (October 1, 1941) committing the United States government “to make specific quantities of supplies available to Russia” by June 30, 1942.71

Following the negotiation of the First Protocol, Harriman (at the request of Harry Hopkins, administrator of the Lend-Lease program) left a special mission representing the civilian-controlled Lend-Lease Administration in Moscow.72 Hopkins also specifically directed Harriman to leave Faymonville in Moscow to direct the special mission. “This appointment,” wrote Robert Sherwood, “led to a great deal of controversy between Hopkins and the War Department, for Faymonville was one Regular Army officer who was sympathetic to the Russians and confident of their ability to hold out against the powerful German forces. . . .”73 Faymonville was not on good terms with the chief of Army Intelligence (G-2), Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, whom Faymonville blamed for “several serious blunders” and for having “fossilized” army intelligence.74 It may have been the apparent ill-feeling between Miles and Faymonville that was at least in part responsible for Miles’ memorandum to Gen. George C. Marshall on September 30 objecting to the retention of Faymonville in Moscow and recommending “the assignment of a Brigadier General” to replace Faymonville as chief of the special mission.75 Miles’ memorandum apparently inspired General Marshall

72. Ibid., pp. 25 and 65.
73. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 395.
74. On September 14, 1941, Faymonville complained to Gen. Lee that Miles was “behind the times, and stupid and completely out of the picture as far as the pace of events is concerned. . . .” Leutze, Journal of General Lee, p. 398.
75. Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, pp. 25 and 66.
to write to Harry Hopkins: “I don’t know him [Faymonville] well, but I do know that competent men who have served with him, such as ex-Ambassador Bullitt and Mr. [Loy] Henderson of the Russian Division of the State Department, have serious doubts as to his judgment and his impartiality wherever the Soviets are concerned.” Marshall, however, deferred to the recommendation of his deputy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore, and to Hopkins’ complete lack of confidence in the judgment of Major Yeaton. As a result, Faymonville remained in Moscow as chief of the special mission representing the Lend-Lease Administration, first as a representative of the Division of Defense Aid and then as a member of the Lend-Lease Administration, until his return to the United States in late 1943. Nor was anything done to alter the status of Faymonville’s mission except to establish a U.S. military mission to the USSR under the command of Maj. Gen. John W. Greely in late November 1941. Since the relationship between the new military mission and Faymonville’s mission was not clear, he was assured (in reply to his query) that Greely’s group did not replace his mission. Faymonville’s position appeared enhanced when he was promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general on January 22, 1942.

But the appointment of Adm. William H. Standley as ambassador in Moscow during March 1942, augured trouble for Faymonville. Standley was not only annoyed by Faymonville’s “autonomous control of Lend-Lease matters,” but much irritated when he was informed that his authority “did not extend to Philip Faymonville.” Indeed, Standley later asserted that he could not tolerate Faymonville’s “running wild around Moscow” and demanded that President Roosevelt place Faymonville “under my administrative direction and control.”

While Standley conceded that Faymonville was “a most valuable aide,” he also complained that Faymonville’s activities were an “almost constant source of difficulty and embarrassment.” In addition to his irritation with the fact that Faymonville was not directly under his authority, Standley characterized the choice of Faymonville to head the U.S. supply mission in the Soviet Union as “unfortunate” because “Faymonville was too sympathetic to the Russians.” Standley contended that Faymonville was overly generous and accommodating with Soviet officials, freely distributing American aid without demanding public Soviet acknowledgment of such assistance or other concessions from the Soviets, and he blamed Faymonville for the difficulties

76. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 395.
77. Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, p. 25.
which the new American military attaché, Col. Joseph A. Michela (later promoted to brigadier general to give him rank equal to that of Faymonville), was experiencing with Soviet officials. Michela supported Standley and a bitter feud developed between the three individuals which was not resolved until Standley took his case against Faymonville directly to Roosevelt.80

One of the results of Roosevelt's involvement in the affair was the recall of the disputants from Moscow. Michela and Faymonville were reduced in rank to colonel, and Faymonville was posted to the Texarkana Ordnance Center.81 After his retirement from the army in 1948, with the rank of brigadier general, Faymonville served as an advisor to the Department of State on matters relating to Japan, the Soviet Union, and China.82

In addition to Standley, the most notable American officials who considered Faymonville unreliable during 1939-41 were General Marshall, the assistant chief of the Division of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, Loy Henderson (who had served with Faymonville in the United States embassy in Moscow during the 1930s), and the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt. All three officials thought that Faymonville was excessively pro-Russian and uncritical in his estimates of the Red Army.83 However, Bullitt's views must be taken with some qualification since he had become a staunch advocate of a hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union after his disillusionment with the Stalinist regime in the early 1930s. His animus against Stalin and the Soviet Union surely contributed to his criticism of Faymonville as overly sympathetic to the Russians. The views of Marshall and Henderson are more difficult to dispute since both men, and especially Henderson, who was greatly respected for his knowledge of Soviet affairs, were unusually competent public servants.

One of the few officials who defended Faymonville was Gen. John R. Deane, the chief of the American military mission to Moscow after 1943, and previously the U.S. secretary to the Combined (Allied) Chiefs of Staff. Deane later described Faymonville as "the Army's outstanding student of Russian affairs, who had long service in Russia and who spoke the language fluently."84 Similarly, the émigré Russian historian, Dimitri Fedotoff White,


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regarded Faymonville as an American officer who "knew a great deal about the Red Army and did not permit any prejudice to stand in the way of his informed judgement." Fedotoff White's views were shared by the renowned Soviet aircraft designer, Gen. Alexander S. Yakovlev, who praised Faymonville for his "objective" reports on the Soviet-German war. Faymonville was "not in the good graces of his superiors," Yakovlev later averred, because his reports were "very much at variance with the stream of falsehood . . . coming out of the American embassy in Moscow. . . ." The German military historian, Alfred Vagts, also wrote favorably of Faymonville and compared him to the German military attaché to Moscow, General Köstring, who like Faymonville was unable to prevent his superiors from underrating the Red Army.

Nevertheless, Faymonville's views of the Red Army were discredited and his reputation was somewhat tarnished by the taint of being overly sympathetic to the Soviets and the label, "the Bolshevik." Yet, although some in the army thought he was "taken in" by the Russians, only Faymonville's judgment, and not his loyalty, was ever questioned.

In retrospect, it is difficult to evaluate Philip R. Faymonville. On the one hand, many of his critics were knowledgeable and capable individuals who had great experience and competence in Soviet affairs, and, indeed, his attaché reports were distinctly uncritical of the Soviet Union, the Stalinist regime, and the Red Army. Moreover, there were many American military attachés during this period who, although they respected the strength of the Red Army, did not hesitate to point out its weaknesses. But, on the other hand, Faymonville's conviction that the Red Army would not be crushed by the Wehrmacht and his courage in asserting this unpopular view in 1941–42 are a matter of public record. During this period, his critics incorrectly assumed that a German victory in Russia was only a matter of weeks or perhaps months.

The fact that Faymonville, as a military attaché, often ignored the weaknesses of the Red Army does not detract from the validity of his contention that the Red Army would fight long and hard. Ultimately, the triumph of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht in World War II seemed to confirm his

general judgment. Relative to this point, it is germane to consider Alfred Vagts’s observation that “the acid test of an army is war—not the good opinion it entertains of itself or wins by ‘indoctrination’ or other ‘promotional activities’ before the war or even sometimes after a defeat. War is the criterion, and war only. The rest is advertisement. . .”