Two debates currently mark West German discussions of social history. The first centers around the contention of an “end of the labor movement.” The second focuses on the “New History Movement” with its related efforts to describe the everyday life of the past (Alltagsgeschichte) and to rewrite history “from the bottom up.”

Certainly the Social Democratic party (SPD), the trade union movement, and perhaps even the cooperative public-sector economy (Gemeinwirtschaft) consider themselves to be part of the continuity of the German labor movement. This view, however, is contested. Some observers see a general crisis or argue the demise of the “old” labor movement. While controversy raged during the years of the Weimar Republic over which faction represented the “legitimate” labor movement, such disputes today play an insignificant role. Current critics cast doubt not only on political legitimacy, but even question the idea of the labor movement as it now exists and its relation to the social base that it presumably represents.

The work of Theo Pirker has been particularly effective in publicizing the thesis of an end to the labor movement. Pirker argues that after 1945, the West German labor movement lost touch with its working-class constituency. The SPD, says Pirker, integrated itself deeply into the state, while the trade unions became little more than insurance agencies. He maintains that statism and reformism in the SPD and in the trade unions, as well as the self-imposed obligations of the cooperative economy, have made it increasingly difficult to speak of a genuine labor movement in the Federal Republic.

Pirker contends that the integration of social democracy into West German society took place without transforming either the capitalist system of production or established relations of political power. Such integration resulted from an abandonment of the party’s roots within working-class culture. Here we must draw an important distinction between “workers’ culture” and the culture of the labor movement. The former includes areas such as housing
and holidays, while the latter encompasses traditional organizations of working-class culture such as theater, sports, and singing groups. At the center of Pirker's argument stands the assertion that the social democrats purposefully jettisoned this second group of traditional aspects when the movement was refounded after 1945.

Pirker's intention in his critique is not to reorient the study of history and politics to a view “from the bottom up.” Rather, his interest centers on the question of the political competence of the working class and its organizations. His judgement in this matter is very skeptical; nor is he alone in his analysis. Above all, the reorientation of the Godesberg Program in 1959 and the SPD’s path to participation in government have also convinced other critics that, at the end of the 1950s, the party took a “final leave from the traditional labor movement and from its own roots.” This separation of the SPD from its working-class origins seems to have become apparent to many writers in the years of the Social Democracy’s participation in the West German government. The reform policies of the 1970s admittedly achieved a limited quantitative success in areas of social welfare, educational policy, and the politics of economic distribution. Durable traces of structural change, however, appeared only in Germany’s Ostpolitik and in the question of domestic security. In addition, these authors considered the SPD’s governing policies to have been “a continuing contribution to the dissolution of its own social, cultural and programmatic base.”

While these writers broach the issues of a dissolution of the social basis of the labor movement—although more as an indictment of the movement itself—other authors pursue the problem in a more fundamental way. These include Seymour M. Lipset and André Gorz. According to Gorz, “The crisis of Socialism is above all the crisis of the proletariat,” from which it became necessary to take leave. Gorz contends further that “With the disappearance of the versatile skilled worker, the possible subject of his own productive endeavor and consequently the possible subject of a revolutionary change of social relations, the only class which could have taken on the socialist project and brought it to reality disappeared.” The crisis of capitalist relations of production allowed the traditional working class to shrink to a privileged minority and allowed a “non-class of non-workers” to arise in its place. For this “post-industrial neo-proletariat of the statusless and classless,” work provides no source of self-awareness or possible power. For Gorz, not just the labor movement, but the class-conscious labor force—the essence of the proletariat—has reached an endpoint.

These diagnoses of the withering of the proletariat and the labor movement are, indeed, based on factors that must be taken seriously: increasing centralization and nonresponsiveness of the decision-making apparatus in both the trade unions and the Social Democratic party; accommodation of political goals and forms of action to the established social relations of power;
voluntary surrender of autonomy in questions of the cooperative, public-sector economy. The list of symptoms could be extended. Nor can one overlook important changes that are contributing to the dissolution of a class-conscious proletariat as the social base of the "old" labor movement. These changes include not only the increasing occupational and social differentiation of the labor force and the creation of new structures of production, but also the improvement of social and political living conditions. 

No one can deny that the debate over the end of the labor movement is simultaneously the expression of and the impetus for current political developments in the Federal Republic. Without doubt, the advent of new social movements has sharpened the perception of a problem, indeed even a crisis, within the traditional labor movement. These new movements started with the women's movement, moved through the peace movement to the environmental movement, and were enhanced by their successes at mass mobilization and the creation of a political party. With considerable success, the "established" labor movement, composed of the social democrats and the trade unions, has been challenged for its position as fundamental and principal opposition. This is true not only in single-issue areas such as peace or the environment. The new social movements have filled a gap that the labor movement has left open through its sweeping default on mobilizing action, its rejection of a concrete utopia, and its consequent lapse in the demand for an integrative context for living and for the spirit.

To what extent are these developments, noted by critics such as Pirker, structurally determined? It would seem that with the conceptual distinction between workers' culture and traditional labor movement culture, or with the separation of worker milieu from worker culture, that an historical continuity has been lost. We should note, first of all, that the current, broad concept of "workers' culture" is only a heuristic construct that is not anchored in the consciousness of the working class. Specifically, the cultural labor movement had always considered workers' culture as a political culture, an effort to alter relations of political hegemony. In this sense, it was to be a "counterculture" and, at the same time, a precursor of a later and higher social condition. The cultural labor movement thus located itself within a broader emancipation movement, which understood its own character to be primarily cultural. Indeed, the formation of a particular and politicized living context was underpinned by a concept of a "worker's day-in, day-out" that, while internally differentiated, also separated itself from other classes. These variegated worker-milieus provided, on the one hand, the necessary context for distinguishing a Christian labor movement from a socialist one. At the same time, however, such distinctions prevented the creation of a unified labor movement. It is this constellation of problems—the effort to create a vibrant working-class culture in response to societal and state suppression that resulted only in relatively nar-
row and closed mileus—that should prevent us from looking back at the manifold organizations and activities of the pre-World-War I era with nostalgia.

In addition, we should not be blinded by the blossoming activity of the cultural labor movement in the Weimar Republic. In these years the working class also remained fragmented and relegated to the social fringe. However, the beginnings of social democratic integration could already be perceived. The more that Social Democracy found the Republic acceptable and increasingly relinquished responsibilities and expectations to the State, the more apparent became the loss of the labor movement's own identity.

That this generalization was true in much smaller measure for the Communist party illustrates once again the reciprocal relationship between radicalism and exclusion, between development of a comprehensive living context and opposition to the system. While the communists understood themselves throughout the Weimar era as representatives of an explicit class culture, Social Democracy and the Christian labor movement sought to integrate their politics into a "democratic volksculture" that could bridge the gaps between various classes. In effect, however, the political culture of the Weimar Republic was neither fully democratic nor one strongly imprinted by the labor movement.

If one considers the structural relations between worker-milieu, state exclusionism, political radicalism, and labor movement culture, it is not surprising that, after 1945, the latter did not experience a rebirth or even a new flowering. Although research on the problem is not extensive, it appears that neither the organizers of reconstruction nor the mass of the working class itself possessed the wish to push a demand for labor movement culture to the fore. Reasons for this hesitancy reach back to the Weimar Republic and are grounded partly in sociological shifts and partly in related alterations of consciousness.

Two aspects of this problem deserve mention. The main objective for those living in a worker-milieu was not the maintenance of that milieu. It is reserved to us to look back and discover a romanticism in the dwelling kitchen or the back yard. Certainly the building wave of the 1950s and 1960s fueled the destruction of an earlier milieu. One cannot overlook the fact, however, that the rapid creation of living accommodations and the new practice of building in "green" areas corresponded at the time to the needs of many renters.

Furthermore, the inclusion of Social Democracy and the trade unions into the democratic political system and the market economy contributed to the improvement of the living condition of the working class. In addition, labor relations based on collective bargaining and collective regulation made it difficult to counteract the erosion of class consciousness. As a proponent of a democratic political culture during the Weimar Republic, Social Democracy represented a minority position, although the strategy had a mobilizing effect...
within the working class. This situation altered significantly after 1945. Parliamentary democracy with more or less explicit social components formed the fundamental political consensus of the Federal Republic.

Even though the organizations of Social Democracy and the trade unions have persisted, the movements themselves have changed along with a changing social background following the war. As a realistic social-reformism has wrestled for a parliamentary majority, the certainty has abated that the *avant garde* of human emancipation remains located in the proletariat. Exactly because many of the dreams of an earlier era—however provisional and compromised—have dissolved, other, newer aspects of the utopian vision have also been lost. Exactly because the proportion of the industrial labor force has continually declined in relation to the total working population, and because a homogeneity in sociology and consciousness of the working class—not to mention all of those who work—does not exist and cannot be created, scarcely a politically viable alternative remained other than an alteration of the "old" labor movement.

These changes in the labor movement and the dissolution of the traditional proletariat as the author of social change have generated at first disappointment, especially within scholarly discussion, and subsequently a search for a new bearer of social-reform politics. This is not surprising. It is also not surprising that this rethinking process has not been without influence on the writing of labor history and the social history of the working classes. For many, the key to uncovering a just society lies no longer in the organizations of the labor movement, but rather within the politics of daily life among ordinary people.

In the 1970s, research interests and topics were tied together in that the labor movement, for all the criticisms that it engendered, was seen as the motor of social progress. Not coincidentally, "critical historical scholarship with an emancipatory intent" took as its own the history of the labor movement. This trend was undoubtedly a response to the crisis of historical scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s. Even more so, however, these efforts reflected the political hopes of the student movement and reform movements of those years.

One could certainly criticize traditional studies of the labor movement as organizational history in which the fate of the laborers themselves comes only indirectly into view. In general, these works have replaced the grand historical personality with that of the grand organization in their efforts to describe and explain the process of social change. Even the proponents of organizational history have recognized the limits of their approach and have furnished at least one motive for the study of workers' daily lives in their questioning of the assumptions behind the behavior of the organizations.

In the 1970s, a vision of social history rapidly established itself that hoped to create an all-encompassing history of society. The conception and realiza-
tion of this trend was associated above all with the names of Jürgen Kocka and Hans-Ulrich Wehler. Social history thereby tied itself to the principles of enlightenment, modernity, and emancipation and took its standards for ideological criticism essentially from the idea of progress. These ideas now offer little to recommend themselves in an era when the concepts of modernity and progress have little positive connotation left. In addition, a systematic, analytic abstraction, together with a stress on theory-oriented research had a detrimental effect. Even if one admits that the writing of social history scarcely has an impact beyond the university, it is clear that the endeavor has never reached the awareness of those for whom it purports to speak.

Within the modern social history profession, a perspective gained currency which sought to reconstruct the world of the worker through an analysis of the structures of social change and the politics of labor organizations (including those of the cultural labor movement). This process was essentially independent of a politically-motivated discovery of working-class daily life. The pervasiveness of this research field in recent years, beginning near the end of the 1970s, has produced a number of highly noteworthy studies. One should mention not only a series of articles in collections devoted to working-class daily life, but also works on the history of the family, childhood and youth, housing, the experience of work, and patterns of conflict.

The models for this 'paradigm shift' came from France and England. The works of Eric J. Hobsbawm and Edward P. Thompson served as the impetus for this new perspective among the social historians of the Federal Republic, who soon established themselves as independent. The task of the historian, accordingly, has become "to empathize so deeply with the activities of the historical subject and its inner life that the historian is able to reconstruct the specific social logic, norms, patterns and ideas that shaped his subject's actions. Thereby the historian is able to decode the pathways of the subject's actions." Put another way, the most important perspective becomes not that of living conditions, but rather the less tangible situation, the mental mastering of the challenges of social change, the analysis of forms of thought and feeling. By contrast to organizational politics, the foreground of interest is now occupied by the integral character of living, the subjectivity of class culture, and the experiences of real people. Thus the historian should concentrate on documenting "material conditions and subjective forms of comprehending," specifically, the needs and life chances of people within the framework of the concrete realities of their lives.

As fast as the belief in progress began to crumble and the proletariat as subject of social change began to fail or to disappear, the new "paradigm" began to replace the old in historical scholarship. The proponents of this new trend intend finally to let those groups whom political decisions and historical processes have directly affected speak for themselves. What modern social his-
history could not achieve was produced rapidly by the history of daily life as a "history from below." In addition to scholarly writing and conferences, a wider movement developed that included history workshops. These groups amalgamated themselves in 1983 into a national organization. The endeavor expanded as well through the school competition for the President's Prize in German History. This competition put issues of the history of daily life very much at the center and finally reached audiences in the trade unions, the Young Socialists, and the SPD.

These projects have at least one point in common: the past should be reconstructed as nearly as possible from the viewpoint of those who lived it and were affected by it. This goal can best be achieved by the most specific, locale-oriented approach as possible. These changes in perspective toward viewing the "ordinary person" as the acting and patient subject and the focus of historical reconstruction of local sociocultural milieus required a change in historical methods. Oral history and the analysis of photographs and other material culture sources have become the essential methods of gathering information.

It is doubtful that the rapid success of the history of daily life is due only to its own attractiveness. One must also consider the possibilities of a political instrumentalism in the sense of an identity-creation that has contributed to this "history boom." In addition, one might ask if the turning to "home" and subjectivity represents an expression of, as well as a driving force for, a "new" sense of life, one that hopes to find in the certainty of a lost world the opposite of a present and dangerous reality. It is no coincidence that in daily-life history, as well as in the conservative conception of history, more is said of identity than of emancipation. Certainly the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. Identity as "emotional and rational certainty that one's own actions and plans possess a clear and recognizable context, meaning and goal," applies also to efforts toward an emancipatory view of history. At issue is the competition of differing identities. Whether in nation or region, in informal groups or formal organizations, the problem of identity is always related to collective and historical integration. However, the intensity of the search for historical identity masks a de-politicizing tendency which risks relativizing the catastrophes of German history, especially those of National Socialism. This possibility exists both in daily-life history and in the "new conservatism." Thus, for example, studies of the daily life of "ordinary people" in the Third Reich demonstrate a "propensity for resistance" on all sides. On the other hand, the attempt is being made to relativize the meaning of National Socialism within the framework of German national history.

In view of these trends one must caution against expecting an identity-creating power from the awareness of a "common" history. One must ask, in the light of differences in economic and political interests, if a simple,
locale-oriented identity might not prove deceptive. At any rate, a politics of reform geared for a whole society cannot confine itself to locale-oriented conditions. Small-group solidarity in work gangs, city sections, or neighborhoods brings security, creates islands of alternative culture and social reform. But these cannot replace an all-encompassing political program. One must note further that identity cannot be found or reinforced primarily through history, but rather only through the shared experience of conflict and action. In this respect, the daily-life history project—which seeks to discover a political potential in the lives of "ordinary people" without the mediation of organization—has also led into a blind alley. History of daily life, even when written about the labor movement, diminishes the political dimension of the struggle of the labor movement.

The conditions for success or failure in political and social emancipation remain obscure as long as collective and unified action within organizations remains undervalued and is not thoroughly and critically illuminated. When historians of everyday life view organizations, they see more than just constraints. Rather, they find that organizations function in part as a brake on the autonomous and authentic individual perception of interests. Dieter Groh speaks of the "pitfall of organization," which holds back the freeing of the working class. In fact, that which, "from a familiar viewpoint appears as 'progress' " can in "a changed perspective be understood as a process of disciplining that submerges much of what today is being rediscovered as a possibility for avoiding the demand for order from organizations and institutions."

Here lie the limits, if not the dangers, of daily-life history. In daily experience, one finds intact only communication and social relations, only the tendency to resistance, the refusal of the demand for social change and political hegemony, in short one finds only selfhood (Eigensinn). The supposed absence of politics from daily life could lead, on the one hand, to our losing sight of the "political," meaning the possibilities and obstacles within society for creating change. Without focusing explicitly on the political, we run the risk that it may fade in importance.

In addition, one must consider methodological problems. Locale-oriented analysis and the reconstruction of specific mentalities is only possible in isolated cases in which appropriate sources are available. Doubt about the relevance of these efforts and warnings of theory-empty collecting convinced Hans-Ulrich Wehler that, "without systematic concepts, without embedding daily-life history in a social history of all groups and classes, without avoiding one-sidedness and without a balanced treatment of the worlds of all social formations, the new path leads straight into a short cul-de-sac." Indeed, the analytical weaknesses (and sometimes also weaknesses in presentation) of daily-life history cannot be overlooked. Many local and regional studies offer only a "source-cemetery," reproducing merely the complexity of daily living.
Or such studies often indulge in the search for authenticity and present only a cabinet full of curios. The cult of the immediate, in which the silent supposedly receive voice and opportunity to convince, often ends only in an uncritical and unsystematic compilation of details, the relevance of which is never questioned.

Finally, the danger exists that daily-life historians themselves appreciate too little and too uncritically their own "situation" and their own "vulnerability." Such tendencies could transfigure too much the history of pre-industrial and early industrial periods. The coziness of the kitchen, the solidary milieu of the workers' district, the rough and hearty forms of communication in the workplace—all these may well account for a large part of the nostalgic temptation of daily-life history, as much from the insecurities of the present as from the distance of the past. Indeed, the "perniciousness of the fascination of the concrete" should not be overlooked.

Sharpening an awareness of the possibilities and limits of daily-life history should be the task of a "communicative historical scholarship" in which professional and "barefoot historians" could complement one another's efforts. Critical discussion is needed in which the weaknesses and dangers of social history and daily-life history can be elaborated. Such discussion assumes that social historians will accept daily-life history not only because of its didactical qualities, but will also make use of the power of this approach when explaining the presuppositions of political activity. By the same token, daily-life historians must reconsider their prejudices against organizations and the undervaluing of structure when they turn their attention to conditions under which political and economic interests prevail. Without such an analysis, these new historians will gravely reduce their ability to reinforce a comprehensive problem-awareness among "ordinary people" as a presupposition for increased political potential.

Translated by Ronald Shearer.

NOTES


In Search of a "New" Historical Subject


32. See the circular letters of the DGB-Project "Geschichte von unten"; and *Die andere Geschichte*, ed. Heer and Ulrich.


43. See, for example, the articles of Malte Ristau and Peter von Oertzen, in *Identität durch Geschichte*, ed. Ristau.


45. Langewiesche, "‘Politisches—Gesellschaft—Kultur,”” 367.
46. See, for example, Peukert, "Arbeiteralltag"; Steinbach, "Geschichte des Alltags"; Niethammer, "Anmerkungen."


48. As exception, see Lucas, Vom Scheitern.

49. Niethammer, "Anmerkungen," 238. See also Peukert, "Arbeiteralltag."
