

and aid the world revolution. Thus, after 1925 and until his exile, Trotsky argued only that the building of socialism in a separate, economically isolated country was impossible. Its construction in a single country participating in the world economy was entirely feasible.

These and other carefully qualified revisions and reinterpretations are accompanied by a refreshing critical-mindedness toward Trotsky the politician. While recognizing the intermittent fertility of Trotsky's theorizing, the author correctly notes Trotsky's enormous ability to make the most foolish political misjudgments at exactly the wrong time. He also exposes Trotsky's own later attempts at myth-making about himself and his economic programs, thereby posing a needed challenge to the Trotsky-Deutscher image of Trotsky.

Thus although one might have wished for more explicit reference to the historians Professor Day is challenging in this book, this work is an important contribution to Soviet economic and political history. Any future analysis of the intraparty feud, of the industrialization debate, or of Trotsky himself must take account of this dense, well-written book.

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AGAINST STALIN AND HITLER: MEMOIR OF THE RUSSIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT, 1941-1945. By *Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt*. Translated by *David Footman*. New York: John Day Company, 1973. 274 pp. \$8.95.

Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt was the German officer closest to Andrei Vlasov during his "leadership" of the "Russian Liberation Movement" on the German side in World War II. A Baltic German, once a tsarist officer, later a businessman in Riga, he became an articulate advocate of a more decent and intelligent German wartime policy toward Russia. Strik-Strikfeldt has the reputation of an essentially apolitical man of integrity with good connections. His role has been dealt with sympathetically in several studies, such as George Fischer's *Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Harvard University Press, 1952) and "Sven Steenberg's" *Wlassow: Verräter oder Patriot?* (Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968).

*Against Stalin and Hitler* is Strik-Strikfeldt's own version of his activities. It is a book whose time has passed. Had it been published twenty-five years earlier, it might have been revealing. Except for some details, there is nothing here that adds significantly to our knowledge or understanding. This is a revised version of a manuscript written at the end of the war from notes which had "no names and no dates." We are not told what was "revised" and why. Strikfeldt also repeatedly quotes at length from remarks by Vlasov and others—from memory.

Strikfeldt's view of the Vlasov crowd is benign and generous. He cannot be expected to provide a critical or balanced portrayal of men he identified with, in a volume which is not only a record but also a plea. He is bitter not only about Nazi stupidity but also about the moral obtuseness of the Americans, who after the war extradited the Vlasovites to Stalin.

Strikfeldt has his own blind spots. In 1941, he writes with regret, Hitler "had still the opportunity to refashion Europe on a basis of freedom, justice and equality. But, blinded by *hubris*, Hitler did not recognize this opportunity." With unshattered illusions about the potential attractiveness of his collaborators, he exclaims, "What might not Germans and Russians together have achieved even [after Stalingrad],

had they only acted as loyal allies to free Russia and the world from the Bolshevik yoke"! Some participants will question whether the effort was indeed directed as much against Hitler as against Stalin.

The translation contains some regrettable errors and imprecisions.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA. Edited by *Ivo J. Lederer* and *Wayne S. Vucinich*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. xii, 302 pp. \$9.95.

Since Moscow's entry into Arab politics in 1955, the Soviet attitudes toward and relations with the states of the Middle East have attracted considerable professional attention. The quest for a better understanding of Russia's position was given additional impetus by the events preceding and following the outbreak of the June 1967 war. To shed more light on Moscow's policy, a number of scholarly conferences were held in this country and abroad. The more notable of these were the meetings at Columbia (1968), Stanford (1969), and Tel-Aviv (1971) Universities. The papers presented at Columbia and Tel-Aviv were published some time ago and reviewed in this journal. The gap left by the delay in publishing the proceedings of the Stanford conference has now been filled, and the result is a welcome addition to the literature on the subject.

In a politically volatile area such as the Middle East, the five-year delay in publishing the conference papers could have made them hopelessly out of date. However, the volume holds up remarkably well both in comparison with the two other symposia and in its own right, because of the generally high level of scholarship, sophistication, and sound judgment exhibited by the various contributors. Without denigrating the others, this reviewer found the essays by John C. Campbell, George Harris, and Nadav Safran particularly impressive.

The main criticisms which could be raised are those applicable to most symposia: the volume lacks a unifying framework, and some papers are stronger than others. As for the book's own peculiarities, the editors would probably have done better to leave the essays in their original form rather than insisting that they be brought up to date (in this instance, mid-1973). Since the contributions apparently have not been rewritten but only amended by deleting or adding sentences and paragraphs, the result is occasionally superficial updating which contributes little to the initial arguments and in some cases actually detracts from them by glossing over material that deserves more attention. In the end, as with most efforts to present "current" analyses, the volume falls short of the mark, overtaken as it has been by the war of October 1973. The only essay which the author (P. J. Vatakiotis) chose to leave unchanged appears to have gained rather than lost by his decision.

All in all, however, these are minor matters. In making the proceedings of the Stanford conference available to a wider audience, the editors have performed a valuable service to the scholarly community.

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