

## Mediating estrangement: a theory for diplomacy

JAMES DER DERIAN

How does one live according to reason if the *other*, the *alien*, the *foreigner* whether remote or nearby may burst into one's world at any moment?

Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*

Diplomacy has been particularly resistant to theory. What knowledge we do have of the practice and principles of diplomacy is largely drawn from the works of former diplomatists like Abraham de Wicquefort's *L'Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* (1681), François de Callières' *De la Manière de Négocier Avec les Souverains* (1716), Ernest Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1917) and Harold Nicolson's *Diplomacy* (1939).<sup>1</sup> Conveying a view of diplomacy as a specialized skill of negotiation, these works seek to 'maxim-ize' that skill for the benefit of novices entering the profession. Understandably, their histories of diplomacy tend to be sketchy and rather anecdotal, and their theories of diplomacy, when they do exist, usually consist of underdeveloped and implicit propositions. Moreover, since the authors were serving governments at the apogee of imperial power, they were not interested in looking too widely and too deeply into a past which might undermine the foundations of skilful negotiation—order, continuity, and 'common sense'.

Neither is there to be found a substantial theoretical work on the subject in the contemporary literature of international relations.<sup>2</sup> Usually intending rationally to order the present or to prepare decision-makers for the future, the behaviouralist or 'scientific' school has shown itself to be preoccupied (for the most part methodologically) with the more empirical, policy-oriented side of diplomacy. The 'classical' or traditionalist approach in international relations offers a richer, more historical vein to mine. Its strength lies in the recognition that the origins and development of diplomacy, along with international law and a balance of power, were essential to the emergence of the European states system. A section on diplomacy can be found in almost all of the larger general texts.<sup>3</sup> However, the strength of the classicists often contains a hidden analytical weakness. By considering diplomacy chiefly as an exchange of accredited envoys by states, and as a valuable norm for the international order, they have demonstrated a conservative preference for the status quo in international politics.<sup>4</sup> Equally, they often have attributed an 'essence' or 'nature' to diplomacy which bears this preference, the best example being Nicolson's repeated claim that 'common sense is the essence of diplomacy'.<sup>5</sup> To be fair, this is not so much a weakness as it is a normative evaluation of diplomacy, or, as Martin Wight says, 'a statement of belief about the way international politics ought to go'.<sup>6</sup> The problem, however, is that as often as not the normative element of the classical works is implicitly and uncritically supportive of a teleological view of diplomacy. Left unexplored are the dynamic forces which originally created the need for diplomacy and defined purposes often antithetical to the traditional teleology. This is yet another reason why a theoretical enquiry is needed, to dig deeper into the past, to

offer an account of the *pre-history* of diplomacy which the classical school has neglected.

It could well be that diplomacy has suffered from theoretical neglect to the extent that power politics has profited—in theory and practice. When diplomacy is construed as a continuation of war by other means, as is often the *realpolitik* case, then little intellectual energy needs to be wasted on the illumination of power's shadow. However, I would argue that it is possible to recognize the paramountcy of the power relation in human affairs, *and* to assert the need for a theory of diplomacy. Like Hans Morgenthau and the other realists who have followed him, I believe that an analysis of power is necessary for understanding diplomacy. However, power alone is not sufficient to explain the origins and conduct of diplomacy. Martin Wight provides an important reason

Powers have qualitative differences as well as quantitative, and their attraction and influence is not exactly correlated to mass and weight. For men possess not only territories, raw materials and weapons but also beliefs and opinions. It is true that beliefs do not prevail in international politics unless they are associated with power . . . But it is equally true that power varies very much in effectiveness according to the strength of the beliefs that inspire its use.<sup>7</sup>

Diplomatic theory is needed if we are to understand the relationship between power and diplomacy, to investigate how this relationship has been historically manifested in the attempt to govern the ungovernable—the anarchical society—through discursive and cultural practices. Hedley Bull broached this terrain, the question of how international diplomacy, in the absence of a sovereign power, constituted and was sustained by a *diplomatic culture*, which he defined narrowly as ‘the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives’.<sup>8</sup> What he and others from the classical school have not explored in any depth is how this diplomatic culture was formed and transformed, and how its power of normalization in a Leviathan-less world has been reproduced. The need for a theory of diplomacy points, I believe, toward the need for a neo- or post-classical approach.

There are, of course, other reasons for diplomacy's resistance to philosophical comprehension, probably as many reasons as there are approaches to the study of international relations. The dominance of the power political approach can account for only one dimension of the theoretical lacunae in diplomacy. But if power cannot provide the conceptual, let alone theoretical sufficiency to explain the origins, transformations, and current state of diplomacy, what can? Taking into account the complexity and breadth of the subject, I cannot pretend that any one concept or theory is sufficient. I will argue, however, that there is a ready-made theory which has suffered from neglect in the field of international relations. I refer to the theory of alienation, as elaborated by Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Sartre, and others.

On what grounds can we justify its application to the study of diplomacy? First, alienation theory is highly suited for a *historical* analysis. It seeks to explain man's alienation from an ‘original’ state of solidarity: as a result of certain causes, new forms of alienation develop which manifest themselves in a historical framework. In Hegel, it is the self-consciousness which is alienated ‘to put itself in the position of something universal’; in Feuerbach, man alienates his essential humanity to religion, in the desire to find in heaven what he cannot find on earth; and in Marx, man is alienated from his ‘productive activity’ which leads to man's alienation from nature, himself, his product, and other men.<sup>9</sup> Thus, alienation has been interpreted as a ubiquitous spiritual, religious, or social process which has always been active in history. Second, the primeval alienation of man gave rise to estranged relations which

required a *mediation*. In the most general sense, the form this mediation takes, as estranged relations change, constitutes a theoretical and historical base for the study of diplomacy. Third, alienation theory is well-equipped to explain the emergence and transformations of diplomatic relations, because it is a 'systems' theory. It attempts to explain a system by studying the genesis of its internal relations, which are seen as expressions of alienated *powers*. Hence, instead of the conventional micro/macro dichotomy or bifurcated level of analysis, the mediation of estrangement on pre-, intra- and inter-state levels can be interpreted as the basis of the diplomatic system.

Finally, I believe that the interpretative dimension of alienation has something to offer to the classical approach to international relations. Because its history is usually back-tracked only to Marx, alienation's rich intellectual tradition as a concept in law, history, and philosophy has been forgotten or neglected. In the course of this essay I will use alienation theory to present some over-looked 'classics' which I hope might conceptually and textually stimulate the traditionalist ruminations.

### Definitions?

Not only the theories but some of the terms I will use are relatively new to the study of international relations. Equally, some familiar words will be used in unfamiliar ways. The most notable case is the term 'diplomacy'. Although the word does not become current in its modern sense, as the conduct or management of international relations, until the late eighteenth century, I will use it for lack of a better one to represent the earliest manifestations of diplomacy. In this enquiry I will offer a general working definition of diplomacy as a mediation between estranged individuals, groups or entities, which will be defended and become more specific in due course.<sup>10</sup> The word 'mediation' will be used in two senses. First, in the conventional sense (which emerges coevally with the modern meaning of diplomacy), mediation means a connecting link or, for the purpose of reconciling, an intervention between two or more individuals or entities. By utilizing this term, I admit to an interpretation which emphasizes the interdependent and reconciliatory nature of diplomacy yet acknowledges the necessity for interventions. The other sense of the term is derived from the theory of alienation itself, as drawn from the writings of Hegel and Marx.<sup>11</sup> There are two types, or orders of mediation. The first is between man (his powers) and nature (his needs). In this subject-object relationship, mediation refers to an activity, manual or intellectual, which brings man's powers and needs together; at the most basic level an example would be one which enables man's hunger to be fulfilled by eating. The second order of mediation is a historically specific one made necessary when man's activity, or the product of his activity, is alienated from him. Examples taken from Feuerbach, Hegel and Marx, of mediators acting between man and his alienated needs, would include God, the state, and money. All these mediations are essential to the authors' explanations of religion, politics, and economics to the extent that they are related to alienation. A mediation can also be alienated as instanced by Marx's analysis of the origins of money: acting as the necessary mediator between man and his wants, it comes to *be* what he wants. Marx describes this second type of mediation as 'an alienated mediation', and also as the 'mediation of a mediation'.<sup>12</sup> An example of how this type of mediation might be adapted to diplomatic theory would be to explain the passage of diplomacy from its early mythological phase to its first historical phases when one of the earliest Western mediations, Christendom (founded on man's estrangement from an original state of solidarity) is supplanted by the 'alienated mediations' of states (following their mutual estrangement from Christendom's institutionalized representatives, the papal state).

Of course, such an explanation would involve an extensive historical investigation—which is not the purpose of this essay. Not is its purpose to explain all aspects of diplomacy: otherwise it would include an account of its multifarious functions as a system of communication, negotiation, and information. Rather, the intention of this essay is to provide a theoretical foundation for an enquiry into a neglected area of diplomacy: its origins and transformations which are related to conditions of alienation, and the attempt to mediate those conditions through systems of thought, law, and power.

### The alienation of theory

The premise of this essay is that diplomacy is demarcated by alienation. To determine fully whether or not this has been the case from the inception of diplomacy would require a sifting through of the historical evidence. The task at hand, however, is to reconstruct alienation as an archaeological tool, that is, to consider changes in the nature of alienation and changes in theories of alienation which might enhance our understanding of diplomacy. This involves, I believe, four preliminary levels of comprehension: (1) demonstrate the validity of the idea of alienation for diplomacy; (2) provide definitions for 'alienation' and 'estrangement'; (3) give a short history of how the concept changed according to different relations of otherness; and (4) present the theories of alienation which can be used to investigate the development of diplomacy.

While the words 'alienation' and 'estrangement' are frequently heard in the discourse of international relations, the concept itself is for the most part a stranger to the discipline. In an utterly unscientific study of the media from 1981 to date I have noticed a resurgence of the terms, particularly in reference to international affairs. Understandably, they appear frequently in journalistic reports on areas of tension and hostility, like the Middle-East. For instance, a headline in the *International Herald Tribune* of 5 May 1982 reads 'Diplomats say Assad risks alienating Allies that oppose Teheran'. The *London Observer* reports on 4 July 1982 that if diplomatic sources are right, 'King Fahad's telephone call contributed to the estrangement between the President and the Secretary of State which led to Alexander Haig's resignation'. More recently, the *New York Times* of 14 February 1984 notes that 'The most agonizing decision the President faces is whether to sign the May 17 security accord with Israel. Signing it would alienate Syria; voiding it would alienate Israel.' However, it is the *International Herald Tribune* of 20 July 1982 which earns top honours for cramming the key terms into one short paragraph

Schultz passed one essential test in diplomacy: *alienate* no one without a purpose. The next test is to convince America, its *estranged* allies—and its adversaries, that the Reagan administration can operate with increased coherence in the world with its second Secretary of State.

What these terms mean in such contexts will be discussed in the following pages.

At one level, perhaps the highest level of international relations, alienation is not a stranger. It has, with some irregularity, visited the domain of international law. In the *Dictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit International* it is defined

Terme désignant pour un Etat le fait de renoncer à un droit, à une compétence, d'ordinaire en faveur d'un autre Etat ou d'une institution internationale. Terme employé surtout dans l'expression 'aliénation territoriale' pour désigner le fait pour un Etat de renoncer en faveur d'un autre Etat à sa souveraineté sur un territoire déterminé.<sup>13</sup>

It is also in this capacity, as a transfer of rights or power, that we shall examine the important historical and theoretical uses of alienation which have attracted little modern attention.<sup>14</sup>

At the level of disciplinary debates, it is hardly remarkable that the thinkers on international relations—including the diplomatic theorists—have ignored or avoided the theories of alienation and left the concept for sociologists and psychologists to (ab)use. ‘Value-laden’ and politically suspect, the concept might be considered by international political ‘scientists’ to be unsuitable for the precise quantification, and verification through statistical analysis, which are the hallmarks of their school. Equally, alienation might seem too vague, or even worse, too much in vogue, for the ‘classicists’ of international relations theory. Although the term was anointed by their noted forerunner, Thucydides,<sup>15</sup> it has yet to penetrate the *conceptual* framework of the modern classicists. The term does crop up in the writings of the British classicists like Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Maurice Keens-Soper, and Adam Watson, quite often in the context of diplomatic matters, but no effort has been made to reconceptualize or theorize about alienation or estrangement in reference to international relations.<sup>16</sup>

Other theorists who do not fit into the rather arbitrary categories of numerates and literates could legitimately transfer their criticisms of power—particularly its susceptibility to reductionism—to similar applications of alienation. Often stretched beyond its conceptual capacity, alienation has acquired a mystique which can express but not explain the mechanics of the real world. Also mystifying to realists would be the utopian assumptions of a pre-existing, or a teleological, state of non-alienation. And conversely, the meliorists or idealists might take issue with the bleak outlook alienation attaches to global interdependence.

Are these sufficient reasons to take another path, straw constructions to blow away, or just worthy criticisms to keep in mind? Some of each, but all, I would argue, over-ridden by the fact that theorizing itself is a process of alienation: we must ‘make strange’, as did the Russian formalists with literature, our habitual ways of seeing diplomacy. The process takes different forms; it can involve a distancing of ourselves from the events or a defamiliarization of the evidence in order to present them to ourselves—and to others—in new and edifying ways. For Hegel, rationality requires that this distancing step be taken

Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood. The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all its pros and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why.<sup>17</sup>

Although Marx offers his thoughts on alienation as a critique of Hegel, there are noted similarities in his view of its relationship to theory, as demonstrated by his often quoted remark that ‘The philosopher, himself an abstract form of alienated man, sets himself up as the measure of the alienated world’.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, the type of theorization I am suggesting entails scrutiny of a form of alienation, that is, alienation immanent in diplomacy. In effect, then, we are in diplomatic theory prepared to alienate ourselves from a form of alienation. We shall see in our study of the alienation theories of Hegel and Marx how they considered this process, which they called the ‘alienation of the alienation’, an essential step in making the real philosophically intelligible. For the moment, I shall simply say that alienation theories can provide a better understanding of diplomatic theory, or a meta-theory of diplomacy.

At other, less abstract—or at least more conventional—levels, we can find



evidence of alienation to justify a meta-theoretical approach. First, there is the nature of the discipline of international relations. It is relatively young, and estrangement is an essential part of growing up. In other words, developing a self-identity involves a willed detachment from one's environment (that is, the other social sciences). When it comes to the specific state of *theory* in the discipline, there is probably little agreement on this point and the differing views probably line up with the differing intra-disciplinary schools of thought.

On a second, perhaps safer level, there is the etymological nature of theory itself. It comes from the Greek *thea*, meaning 'outward look' and *horao*, that is, 'to look at something attentively'. Originally an Orphic word, it has been interpreted by Cornford to signify a 'passionate sympathetic contemplation', in which 'the spectator is identified with the suffering god, dies in his death, and rises again in his new birth.'<sup>19</sup> In this early use of theory it expresses man's primal alienation from nature: experiencing a Feuerbachian alienation, man seeks in heaven what he cannot find or understand on earth. This view is supported by Walter Kaufmann, who believes the alienation of theory goes back to the great classical thinkers: 'Plato and Aristotle remarked that philosophy begins in wonder or perplexity. We could also say that it begins when something suddenly strikes us as strange—or that philosophy is born of estrangement.'<sup>20</sup>

This use of theory is 'modernized', meaning that it is linked to the Judeo-Christian tradition, by Plotinus and, later, Augustine, who considered theory to constitute a spiritual understanding of the world, in contrast to the discursive thinking that posed as knowledge in the earthly city.<sup>21</sup> Theory can be said, both in its archaic and modern forms, only to accommodate that which is strange to us. However the renewed, often eclectic (some might risk opprobrium to say *post-modern*) interest in alienation as a theoretical approach, beginning with Nietzsche and the Russian formalists and continuing with Derrida, Foucault, Barthes and others, hinges on a reversed framework: to theorize, we must make strange what we have accommodated ourselves to.<sup>22</sup> And, as I stated before, that can include ourselves.

This brings us to the third aspect, the non-theoretical alienation of the theorists. As noted by Stanley Hoffmann, some of the greatest contributions to modern theories of international relations have come from strangers who have found themselves writing in a strange land before and after the Second World War.<sup>23</sup> Included in the foreign pantheon would be Arnold Wolfers, Klaus Knorr, Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, George Liska, and Hans Morgenthau. Later came Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. A partial, perhaps exaggerated, explanation of this phenomenon can be found in their collective caricature, Dr Strangelove. Estranged from the twin European catastrophes of power gone soft (appeasement) and power gone mad (Hitlerism), Strangelove in turn converts the innocents with his sophisticated argument for the 'flexible use' of the ultimate expression and instrument of alienation, the Bomb. To put the arguments more soberly, it is probable that the dialectic operating between the fear of and the desire for power has shaped more than one thinker's thoughts. We have a string of aphorisms as evidence, that knowledge is power, that power corrupts knowledge, in Cambridge, Washington, Hollywood, wherever. What is needed is an analysis of how alienated power, be it pedagogical, political or popular, produces and is sustained by theories of diplomacy.

### The terminology of alienation

The ultimate root of the English word 'alienation' is the Latin *alius*, meaning 'other' (as an adjective) and 'another' (as a noun).<sup>24</sup> It developed into *alienare*, which means

to make something another's, to take away or remove. It was used as a noun, *alienato*, in the early writings of Seneca and Cicero to denote the sale of a commodity and the transfer of rights appertaining to property. The juridical tradition of the term was continued in Middle English; Adam Smith notes that in this period 'the vassal could not alienate without the consent of his superior'.<sup>25</sup> The appropriation of this usage by the social contract writers and the resulting conceptualization of the word to explain *transfers* of power will be examined below.

Also prevalent in Middle English was the use of the phrase *alienatio mentalis* to describe a medical or psychiatric condition in which one is 'aliened of mind or understanding; or aliened and turned from reason'.<sup>26</sup> This meaning crossed or met in the mid-Channel around this period, since, according to Michel Foucault in *Histoire de la folie*, *alienation mentale* was also in vogue in eighteenth and nineteenth-century France. Its usage to denote psychological conditions continued into the early twentieth century, and in some countries, court psychiatrists kept the nomenclature of 'alienists'.

The *interpersonal* nature of alienation is already significant in the first volume of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1888). It firmly established the standard definition: 'To convert into an alien or stranger . . . to turn away in feelings or affection, to make averse or hostile, or unwelcome.'<sup>27</sup> Here we see one of the modern meanings of alienation, a relationship marked by separation, which will figure largely in a genealogy of diplomacy. The English term has expanded to include, among the meanings, the separation between individuals; between individuals and society, supernatural beings, and states of mind; between peoples; and more importantly for this enquiry, *between states*.

The central role of alienation in the thought of modern German writers makes a brief exposition of its German origins useful. The Grimms' *Wörterbuch*, tracing the term *enfremden* back to the late Middle Ages, defines it as 'to make alien, to rob, to take, to strip of'.<sup>28</sup> Here we can already detect an intermingling of the positive juridical and negative social connotations found in the English term. However, there exists another German term which was usually identified with the transfer or relinquishment of property: *Entäusserung*. Possibly one can make a terminological distinction between the words to find an English equivalent: the root *fremd* or 'strange' better corresponds to 'estrangement' and *aussen* or 'outside' with alienation. However, the conceptual distinction is even less clear-cut. As we shall see, philosophers often dip in and out of the multiple meanings of alienation.

### The conceptualization of alienation

In his magisterial work *Peace and War* Raymond Aron states that the 'ambiguity in "international relations" is not to be imputed to the inadequacy of our concepts: it is an integral part of reality itself'.<sup>29</sup> His statement can equally be applied to alienation, to explain partially some of the conceptual confusion which attends its use. Second, as alienation's conceptual use has multiplied, in social, economic and political theory, and philosophy and psychology, we can better understand why confusion has increased. Third, the meaning of alienation has from the outset been refracted by its see-saw history of evaluation and devaluation by Lutheran dogmatists, Soviet apologists, neo-Marxists and others. It is possible that the term carried this potential within it from the start. None the less, the purpose of this summary and partial *Wortgeschichte* is to draw as wide as possible boundaries for alienation, and to allow a broad enquiry into diplomacy to situate the concept in its historical and theoretical context.

We have seen that alienation in the sense of an economic or juridical transfer had a neutral connotation in the feudal epoch. Resting on the firm foundation of Roman civil and agrarian law, the concept fits in well with a hierarchical order where everything had its proper place. With the transition from feudalism to capitalism, however, we witness alienation being employed in a manner somewhat like a rear-guard action. The change is gradual, from the description of an arrangement whereby the vassal could not alienate without his lord's consent, to the thirteenth century sanctions that 'Le bourgeois ne peut pas aliéner la chose de la commune sans le commendement de roi'; and 'Chascun peut le rien donner et aliéner par sa volenté'.<sup>30</sup> The transition foretells the appropriation of this particular meaning by Enlightenment thinkers, who would use it in their critique of economic and social conditions. But generally, the concept in this period is relatively neutral on the value spectrum.

The same cannot be said about its related theological use. To avoid the dense area of religious origins, we will take the biblical account of alienation at face value for the present. The main idea conveyed by alienation is separation from God. In Ephesians 4:18, Paul says of the Gentiles that 'they are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, due to the hardness of their heart'. Here alienation clearly has a negative connotation which is repeated frequently in the theology of Augustine. In fact, alienation is central to his idea of two cities in opposition. Augustine states in the *City of God* that his purpose was to

... write about the origin, the development, and the destined ends of the two cities. One of these is the City of God, the other the city of this world, and God's City lives in this world's city as far as the human element is concerned, but it lives there as an alien sojourner.<sup>31</sup>

Protestant theologians, such as Luther and Calvin, continued this tradition and some commentators go so far as to claim that Hegel 'imbibed the concept of alienation' from them.<sup>32</sup> However, theoretical evidence points to another influence—the social contract writers.

But first, what was the nature of the concept before they grasped hold of it? To aid comprehension, it might be pictured as a coin: on one side a neutrally-valued idea of a transfer of property; on the other, a negatively charged meaning of an imbalanced separation between man and God. As agents and products of the Enlightenment, the social contract writers secularized the religious sense to attack old and accommodate new forms of social estrangements. In the process, they evaluated the juridical sense to explain and justify the free (and sometimes equal) alienation of rights and power. In their hands, the coin would undergo a radical revaluation.

Hugo Grotius has long been recognized as 'the father of international law', and more than one theorist of international relations has honoured him with his own paradigm, the 'Grotian', to categorize thinkers who considered the relations between states to constitute a legalistic-moralistic society in which 'Machiavellian' conflict was attenuated by 'Kantian' co-operation.<sup>33</sup> However, his seminal writings on social contract writing, particularly his original application of alienation to contract theory, have earned him hardly a second-cousin status in international theory.

The title of the sixth chapter in Grotius' *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* shows, in shorthand, the central role he ascribed to alienation in the relationship between property and sovereignty: 'Of acquisition derivative, by the act of man; and herein of the alienation of the sovereignty and its accompaniments'.<sup>34</sup> Grotius acknowledges that it is now (in the seventeenth century) considered natural that things shall be acquired and transferred from one person to another. When such an action is expressive of a



rational will, it requires an external 'sign', that is, natural, civil, or 'international' law. Which form of law depends on what level the transfer takes place, and on what series of rights and obligations have been engendered. In this context, we see alienation giving rise to social sanctions.

Taking quite a leap from his precursors, and in the logic of his argument, Grotius then asserts that this basic alienation be instrumental to the erection of a political authority

As other things may be alienated, so may sovereign authority by him who is really the owner, that is as we have said above, . . . by the king, if the authority is patrimonial: otherwise, by the people, but with the consent of the king; because he too has his right, as tenant for life, which is not to be taken away against his will.

Alienation appears to be a two-way street between the ruled and the ruler; but Grotius, an actor in and an observer of the tumultuous seventeenth century, is not prepared to take up this claim to challenge the 'imperial dignity' (as sovereignty was then known). Grotius' notions of a social contract and his use of the organic analogy would have radical international implications when future thinkers used them to assert 'inalienable' rights. But Grotius is cautious

In the alienation of a part of the sovereignty, it is also required that the part which is to be alienated consent to the act. For those who unite to form a state, *contract* a certain *perpetual* and *immortal* society, in virtue of their being integrant parts of the same, whence it follows that these parts are not under the body in such a way as the parts of a natural body which cannot live without the life of the body. The body of which we speak is of another kind, namely a voluntary combination: and this must not be supposed to have been such that the body should have the right of cutting off parts from itself and giving them into the authority of another.<sup>35</sup>

Grotius' movement towards a theory of popular sovereignty is a careful and tenuous one. To a democratic firebrand like Rousseau, Grotius' timidity was reprehensible

Grotius denies that all human power is established in favour of the governed, and quotes slavery as an example. His usual method of reasoning is constantly to establish right by fact. It would be possible to employ a more logical method, but none could be more favourable to tyrants.<sup>36</sup>

Grotius' position and purpose is understandable. Writing at the time of the Thirty Years' War, and anxious, perhaps even nostalgic, for the lost unity of Christendom, he was more interested in buttressing than tearing down the evolving society of absolutist states. Hence, it was only natural that he should place the concept of alienation in the service of *order*.<sup>37</sup> In contrast, Rousseau's priorities of equality and liberty necessitated a radical interpretation of alienation. As well, he thought Grotius' circumstances were to be deplored, not excused

Grotius, a refugee in France, ill content with his own country, and desirous of paying his court to Louis XIII to whom his book is dedicated, spares no pains to rob the people of their rights and invest kings with them by every conceivable artifice.<sup>38</sup>

Hobbes, another contract writer who incurred Rousseau's wrath, proffered rigid prescriptions for acts of alienation which would strengthen the hand of a Leviathan

outwardly facing a state of perpetual war. Hobbes never uses 'alienation' *per se* in the *Leviathan*, but he does make extensive use of the idea to refine Grotius' argument, albeit with more brutal interpretations of the international order. In Chapter XIV, 'Of the first and second natural laws, and of contract', he states 'to *lay down* a man's *right* to any thing, is to *divest* himself of the liberty, of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to do the same.'<sup>39</sup> He distinguishes the *renunciation* of rights from *transferring* rights: the former entails no necessary reciprocation in the form of obligations while the latter does. The ultimate end of this renouncing or transferring is in itself an *inalienable* right, namely, security—'of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not be weary of it'.<sup>40</sup>

The means of a mutual transference of rights is by contract, or, if it involves a deferral of an obligation (that is, promise), by covenant. In Part II 'Of Commonwealth', this basic contractual scheme is elevated to justify the establishment of the 'Leviathan' as sovereign power. It should be noted that estrangement is the major reason that men erect a sovereign power 'as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners'.<sup>41</sup> The Hobbesian renunciation of liberty for security, although mutual and revocable among individuals, is perpetual and decidedly one-sided between men and the Leviathan. The question Rousseau directs to Grotius in the fifth chapter of the *The Social Contract*, 'Slavery', could also be levelled at Hobbes: 'If an individual says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and make himself the slave of a master, why could not a whole people do the same and make itself subject to a king?'<sup>42</sup>

Rousseau's answer relies on alienation—and its sometime intentionally ambiguous use—to ridicule the possibility

There are in this passage plenty of ambiguous words which would need explaining; but let us confine ourselves to the word *alienate*. To alienate is to give or sell. Now, a man who becomes the slave of another does not give himself. He sells himself, at least for his subsistence; but for what does a people sell itself?<sup>43</sup>

Rousseau concedes that the despot may provide 'civil tranquillity'. But, he asks, what good is that if it comes at the price of wars and conflict brought about by the unchecked ambition and greed of the king and his courtiers? Rousseau mixes common sense and nonsense to make his point

A king is so far from furnishing his subjects with their subsistence that he gets his own only from them and according to Rabelais, kings do not live on nothing. Do subjects then give their persons on condition that the king takes their goods also? I fail to see what they have left to preserve.<sup>44</sup>

The solution Rousseau found in the social contract and the general will is familiar enough. Let it be sufficient to highlight the central role of alienation in his scheme with a significant excerpt from Chapter VI, 'The Social Compact':

These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total alienation of each associate together with all his rights, to the whole community; for in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.<sup>45</sup>

The last point I wish to make about the Rousseauian use of alienation is an important one for the future of the concept. Above all, Rousseau is responsible for 'socializing' the concept, and in the process, giving it a bi-valency. In the sense

outlined above, Rousseau has further extended the originally neutral economic meaning of the term to incorporate social transactions essential to liberty. *La volonté générale* (that is, free sociability) replaces Hobbes' *raison d'état* (that is, endangered viability) as the ultimate need and justification for alienation. The second sense is found more frequently in the *Discourses* and might be considered proto-Marxian in character. First, he suggests 'it is impossible to conceive how property can come from anything but manual labour'.<sup>46</sup> Then he asserts that alienated (that is, transferred) property becomes *estranged*. Reinforcing his link to early theorists of international relations, Rousseau cites the jurist Pufendorf to make his case

Pufendorf says that we may divest ourselves of our liberty in favour of other men, just as we transfer our property from one to another by contracts and agreements. But this seems a very weak argument. For in the first place, the property I alienate becomes quite foreign to me, nor can I suffer from the abuse of it, but it very nearly concerns me that my liberty should not be abused and that I cannot without incurring the guilt of the crimes I may be compelled to commit, expose myself to become an instrument of crime.<sup>47</sup>

Of course, Marx would claim, in contrast to Rousseau, that property as alienated labour can become estranged just as life and liberty can. But the point not to be overlooked is that Rousseau has linked (though in a rudimentary way) the economic and juridical sense of alienation (transference or relinquishment) to the early political and religious sense (estrangement or separation), with the innovative product being a socially critical concept. It was to be turned against St. Pierre's irenist writings, to influence Kant's cosmopolitan arguments for the constitution of a perpetual peace, and—most importantly—to resurface in Hegel's and Marx's theories of alienation.

### The theorization of alienation

In summary, and in the most general terms, the historical and conceptual path of alienation was an *ascent* from the state of nature (economic) to the nature of the state (juridical), and a *descent* from the heavens (theological and religious) to earth (philosophical and sociological). It should be clear from this exposition that the modern theory of alienation did not spring full-blown from the massive brow of Karl Marx. It is impossible to identify and trace all of the social phenomena and intellectual influences which converged to make a theory of alienation, as Marx would say, possible and necessary. And besides, it is probably more profitable in such matters to analyse the germ rather than study intensively who caught it from whom, especially since neither human nor international relations is a controlled experiment. None the less, some names may be given of those who were, so to speak, exposed. Others before Hegel and Marx who were concerned with the economic or juridical aspects of alienation were James Harrington,<sup>48</sup> John Locke,<sup>49</sup> James and J. S. Mill,<sup>50</sup> and Adam Smith.<sup>51</sup> And some of the more prominent theologians and philosophers who have entered at least the margins of the alienation discourse are Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart,<sup>52</sup> the protestant theologians Thomas Munzer, Calvin, and Luther,<sup>53</sup> and the German philosophers, Fichte, Schelling, and Schiller.<sup>54</sup>

### Kant

I have omitted Kant's name intentionally because he warrants a brief word on his own, not just because he plays the role of foil (as did Grotius for Rousseau) for much of Hegel's work on alienation. In an international context, Kant expresses hopes that

power might eventually be constitutionally alienable, and be transferred by treaty from states to a confederated power which could secure an eternal peace.<sup>55</sup> In the domestic context, Kant offers a more complex interpretation of alienation, relating it to his moral radicalism, and considering it to be a necessary action with sometimes reprehensible effects. In the standard usage, he states ‘the transference of one’s property to someone else is its alienation’.<sup>56</sup> But he adds a moral clause born seemingly out of changing social conditions. Hitherto, when people and labour were part of a static cosmic order, only *dead* property was alienated. But as capitalism made inroads into this feudal fixity, both people and their labour became ‘freely’ alienable (as was also true of property which was now considered a product of labour). In this process of alienation, Kant believed that this ‘living’ property became ‘deadened’, or ‘converted into a thing’ (*Verdingung*).<sup>57</sup> Here Kant is crudely forging a link between alienation and reification, one which imputes a value-judgement on the process of economic transfers. These rudimentary ideas of objectification reappear in the writings of Hegel and Marx—but as a system rather than a fragment of thought.

### Hegel

How can we account for Hegel’s radical reformulation of alienation into a system of thought? A partial answer can be found in the circumstances in which Hegel found himself, that is, the political and social fragmentation of Germany. Some evidence of this is to be found in his early writings. In *Fragment of a System*, he says that ‘disunity is the source of the *need* for philosophy and as the culture [*Bildung*] of the age it is its unfree, predetermined aspect’.<sup>58</sup> And Hegel believes the responsibility for this state of affairs can be traced to the foreign European powers. ‘In the Peace of Westphalia’, says Hegel, ‘this statelessness of Germany was organised. . . . Germany renounced establishing itself as a secure state power and surrendered to the good will of its members.’<sup>59</sup> However, always the dialectician, Hegel thought this situation would eventually produce a stronger, unalienated, Germany. As goes the Spirit, so too would the state: ‘a mind estranged from its age reproduces itself in scientific form’.<sup>60</sup> Intellectually brash where Kant was timid, certain that his systemization of knowledge was reciprocally related to the formation of a German system of power, Hegel, in effect, was as dogmatic as Bacon in the belief that ‘knowledge is power’.

Interpreting Hegel has been likened by Charles Taylor to the classic drama of hugging the shoreline and staying safely within reach of shallow conventional language, or of risking the open sea, where Hegel’s linguistic whirlpools await the unwary. The number and complexity of Hegel’s works make any lengthy exegesis of Hegel impracticable. Instead, I will rely mainly on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* to present a theory of alienation which will, I hope, make up in heuristic value for what it lacks in inclusiveness.

Alienation operates at two levels in the development of the human spirit. At the gnomic level, Hegel uses it to plot the individual’s emergence from an unreflective psychic unity to a bifurcated subjective consciousness moving toward reunification with its objectified consciousness. At the historical level the *Phenomenology* is a study first of the Spirit’s path from the original harmony of classical Greece to the imperfect unity of Christendom and subsequent discord, and second, of the Spirit’s potential for reunification in the wake of the French Revolution. At both levels, alienation is the driving-wheel. The Spirit can be conceived as an empty universal which only takes on specific content through its externalizations as something other than itself, and in turn, its overcoming of that otherness. In Hegel’s terminology it is a ‘mediation’ which is ‘nothing beyond self-moving selfsameness’.<sup>61</sup> Through the

negation of this negation, an estranged self-identity emerges from the spirit. In other words, through the mediation of particular alienated self-consciousnesses, the reunification takes place of the universal Spirit.

A concrete example of alienation in action, particularly one of significance for international relations can help elucidate matters: this would be Hegel's account of Lordship and Bondage in the section 'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness' (also known as the 'master-slave' relation). The opening sentence is a key one: 'Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact, that it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.'<sup>62</sup> Introduced here is what John Torrance refers to as the 'struggle for recognition': each individual, treating the other as an object of his need, is involved in a life-and-death struggle for independent self-consciousness.<sup>63</sup> Death, however, can only be the reified life of the subordinate ego. Otherwise the essential mirror for the dominant ego would be shattered. But how is it that one ego becomes dominant ('recognized') and the other subordinate ('recognizing')? Cannot the recognition be mutual *and* equal? Hegel does not preclude the possibility—but only in 'pure Notion' can we speculate about this possibility. Although the style may be convoluted it is worth repeating Hegel here, for the passage bears special significance for the transformation from suzerain to states system and the emergence of a secular diplomatic culture. Hegel says

Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.<sup>64</sup>

The import and the language of Hegel's claim becomes clearer in the following passage where he states that the individual who is not willing 'to stake his life' in the recognitional 'trial by death' is the one who 'is simply to live or to be for another'.<sup>65</sup> It seems, then, that the individual who risks his life in the death struggle proves his autonomy from determinate objects. Interesting parallels could be made with the nature of the mutual recognition of states, and with the distinctions later made by Treitschke and Ranke between great powers and lesser powers. Or, as Martin Wight has remarked, 'A great power does not die in bed'.<sup>66</sup>

As well, parallel patterns of imperial decline and 'the Third World revolt' can be detected in the next stage of the lord–bondsmen relationship, when the 'irony of history'—or dialectic—comes into play. The lord is still dependent upon the bondsman for recognition because full autonomy would constitute self-negation. But the bondsman is now thing-like, an instrument of the lord's purposes in both the spiritual and physical sense. Thus, the lord's self-consciousness comes to develop, because it is a reflection of a reified consciousness. The bondsman, however, possesses an alternative means to self-realization: his *work*. Moreover, his hostility to the power of the lord, internalized as fear, compels him to shape his own consciousness through the alien product of his own labour, rather than through the alien will of the lord. The outcome of his 'rediscovery of himself by himself', says Hegel, is that 'the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own'.<sup>67</sup>

In summary, we note the dialectical movement Hegel has evinced from alienation. First, in his philosophical usage: the positive alienation of Spirit for self-consciousness; its negative estrangement from the discord which follows; and a positive alienation of self-consciousness for a consensual social existence. Second, in his innovative systematic and sociological application: a negative intrapersonal estrangement created by the positive alienation of self-consciousness which can



potentially be overcome by the positive estrangement of labour. Do these expositions of alienation have some heuristic value for the study of diplomacy? At the entrance to the archives, I can only assert that Hegel's philosophical account of alienation can be used to explain two critical moments in the history, when the *mutual* estrangement of states *from* western Christendom gives rise to an international diplomatic system; and when the Third World's revolt against western 'Lordship' precipitates the transformation of diplomacy into a truly global system.

### Feuerbach

Before we acknowledge the contribution of the thinker who is most closely identified with the theory of alienation—Karl Marx, we must give Ludwig Feuerbach his due, for it was Feuerbach who put Hegel's feet firmly back on the ground and prepared the terrain for Marx's 'anthropological' theory of alienation. Marx willingly and frequently acknowledges his debt to Feuerbach. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic', Marx writes

Feuerbach's great achievement is to have shown that philosophy is nothing more than religion brought into thought and developed by thought, and that it is loudly to be condemned as another form and mode of existence of human alienation.<sup>68</sup>

An enormous enthusiasm greeted the publication of Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* in 1841, and its main thesis—that man alienating his essential attributes created God—generated a great deal of criticism. Regretfully, it is not possible here to reproduce Feuerbach's arguments on religious alienation; but I would argue that it provides an analytical framework for understanding the heavily mythologized prehistory of diplomacy which, for the most part, the traditional writers have neglected. From the representatives of the Amphictyonic league of the Greeks to the *missi* of the Carolingian empire, from the early papal legations to the mediatory role of the Pope today, we can find evidence of the role mythology has played in mediating the intractable, even preternatural problems that diplomats have perpetually faced. In particular, we could point to the early Middle Ages when the immunity of proto-diplomats, according to Gentili, was as much dependent upon a mythic relation to God's messengers, angels, as it was upon reciprocal interests.

### Marx

For the moment, I wish only to note the extent to which Marx's idea of alienation is similar to Feuerbach's: it is polemical, critical, secular, and above all, historical. But in Marx, the history of alienation begins with 'political economy', which only a theory of alienation can explain. First, says Marx, this is true because 'political economy starts with the fact of private property'; and second, because 'private property is the material and sensuous expression of estranged human life'.<sup>69</sup> Marx's critique, then, entails an evaluation of the economic-judicial meaning of alienation which he confronted in the works of the classical English economists and philosophers (James Stewart, James and J. S. Mill, and David Ricardo). This was possible because the theological meaning of estrangement had been 'brought down to earth'. Thus, when Marx states that 'estrangement (*Entfremdung*) forms the real interest of... alienation (*Entäusserung*)', he is not giving way to tautology; rather he is outlining his synthesis of alienation, that is the separation of man by the surrender of his labour.<sup>70</sup>

This separation is a social relationship, but it can arise from several forms of alienation. The individual can be estranged from: (1) his product; (2) the process of labour; (3) the means of labour; (4) the species; and (5) other individuals. This is not to say that *all* forms of labour constitute estrangement. According to Marx, the satisfaction of needs by productive activity is essential for human consciousness and a sensuous awareness of nature. Labour becomes estranged when it is *coerced* and 'merely a *means* to satisfy needs external to it'.<sup>71</sup> Under the control of another, it becomes a hostile alien force. Marx falls back on Feuerbachian metaphysics to describe the *zero-sum* relationship which develops

For on this premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the power he himself—his inner world—becomes. . . . It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself.<sup>72</sup>

But man's collective self-alienation has found a new elevated expression. Since the 'political emancipation' of man (that is, Enlightenment and French Revolution), religion has been supplanted by the 'spirit of *civil society*' (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) which Marx describes in his essay 'On the Jewish Question' as 'the sphere of egoism, of the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. . . no longer the essence of *community* but the essence of *differentiation*'.<sup>73</sup> Security becomes the civil society's paramount value: with each individual existing as a means for the other, he seeks political and legal guarantees for his self-preservation, his rights, and his property. But Marx denigrates this elevated concept, which in our time has been fetishized as the national security state: 'The concept of security is not enough to raise civil society above its egoism. Security is, rather, the *assurance* of its egoism.'<sup>74</sup>

Like Hegel, Marx considers the formation of the state to be necessitated by alienated particular interests both within and outside of civil society. And Marx sees its supposed universality to be as 'spiritual' (that is, mythical) as Hegel's abstract idea of the absolute Spirit. In short, particular *material* interests pose as universal abstract interests in the bourgeois state.

Therefore, the teleology of the Marxian concept of alienation is not aimed, as is Hegel's, toward some perfect Prussian state, but towards the ideal of statelessness. Marx is purposely vague about this non-alienated after-life, except to make it sound like a world of bucolic bliss where cows are milked in the morning and philosophy discussed after dinner. As Marx became more scientific and 'class' conscious in his later writings, his use of alienation as a concept diminished significantly, as did his ruminations on a mythical world of non-alienated individuals and communities. But the eschatology immanent in the Marxian concept of alienation flourished and certainly added to its appeal for later theorists in the social sciences. One subsequent side-effect has been to neglect the religious, juridical and philosophical expressions of alienation—the pre-history of the theory—in favour of a sociological orientation. Also left unexplored has been the systemic hermeneutic of alienation which might help explain the link between *intra-* and *inter-*state estrangement, that is, the dynamic of how the conduct of diplomacy under revolutionary regimes shifts from the mediation of particular states to the mediation of the universal alienation of humanity. It is hoped that this schematic summary redresses this neglect.

### Sartre

An overview of the theories of alienation is incomplete without mentioning a modern writer on alienation who stands out from all the rest: Jean-Paul Sartre. He

deserves a hearing, not just because he has been neglected in international relations theory, but also because of his enormous effort comprehensively to understand history and technology at (alienated) work; and because he is an archetype of Hegel's and Marx's 'estranged philosopher' (being at one time or another alienated from the State and the Party, and the East and the West). His major philosophical work, the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, is notorious for its density and neologisms. Its labyrinthine structure and Sartre's adaptation of Hegelian concepts present a challenge to the reader. But all of the difficulties and obfuscations are attenuated by one truth: even his blindspots illuminate areas of international relations theory which have been over-shadowed by the empirical *Realpolitikers*. This is especially true in the case of terrorism, for which I believe Sartre offers more insights on the history, motivations, and consequences than all of the present pundits engaged in learned repetition at the proliferating institutes of terrorist studies.

On the abstract personal level, Sartre's concept of alienation resembles Hegel's and Marx's positive views of labour as self-objectification. However, self-objectification in an historical context is an alienating activity because *scarcity* rules all human relations. Sartre presents scarcity as a given. This leads to 'a domination of man by matter and the domination of matter by man'.<sup>75</sup> It is clearly within a Marxian framework that Sartre considers economic alienation, which is characterized as 'a mediated relation to the other and to objects of labour'.<sup>76</sup> However, Sartre does not confine its negative value or explanatory value to capitalism, as did Marx. Since all types of praxis are alienable, and potentially hostile, the concept of alienation is expanded by Sartre to include other forms of domination through alienation. This means that there are multiple, often overlapping mediations at work in all sectors of society, including the international society. For instance, Sartre observes and analyses alienation in a bus queue, the family, and, significantly, in the East as well. He also finds states of non-alienation in some odd places, such as in a soccer team and a serial group of terrorists. As global surveillance and communications becomes the linchpin of modern diplomacy, Sartre's elaborate interpretation of the power of the Other's gaze is of particular significance; and in general, his rigorous extension of alienation to new areas makes, I believe, his work a valuable theoretical aid to the study of diplomacy.

### A meta-theory of alienation?

In the preface to the English edition of *Das Kapital*, Engels makes an apology to the reader

There is, however, one difficulty we could not spare the reader: the use of certain terms in a sense different from what they have, not only in common life, but in ordinary Political Economy. But this was unavoidable. Every new aspect of a science involves a revolution in the technical terms of that science.<sup>77</sup>

The study of international relations is relatively new, but it certainly does not constitute a science. Nor, for that matter, is the use of alienation in the context of international relations 'a revolution in technical terms'. Its use is quite common. What is missing is the *theoretical recognition* of that fact, a text for the preface, so to speak.

I have already given my reasons for undertaking an exposition of alienation. High among them was the proposition that new tools of analysis might assist the valuable classicist approach. Thus, some familiarization of theoretical instruments alien to international relations was necessary. That done, it is now possible to indicate some

of the basic features of alienation which might further our understanding of the development of diplomacy.

First, we have noted the transformations of the concept. The direction of these historical transformations might be viewed as vertical and bilateral. In the form of 'alienation' (that is, transfer or relinquishment) it has ascended from an economic to a juridical meaning. In the form of 'estrangement' (that is, separation marked by indifference to hostility) it has descended from theological and religious to 'anthropological' (in the sense Feuerbach and Marx used the term) and political meanings. The two concepts were then conflated, to some extent by Rousseau and Hegel, but most significantly by Marx when he related both concepts to the 'political economy' of industrializing Europe. In the case of the concept's evaluative transformations, we have seen how the relationship of the thinkers to the reality they wish to describe or explain through the use of alienation determines the critical, subjective nature of the concept. For instance, Grotius makes use of the concept in pursuing his purpose of preserving and peacefully reforming what was left of a disintegrating Christendom. By the time of Rousseau and Hegel, this prospect had diminished, and we see the rise of particularist interests accompanied by a radical change in the meaning of the concept, to signify a dialectical relation of estrangement. Within states the debate was entered over which rights were 'inalienable'; and between states the overriding question was how best to secure and to manage the powers alienated from Christendom. The question was then raised by Kant and other utopian writers how power and rights might be alienated by individual states to create a confederation or union of states. And in Hegel and Marx, the subjectivity of alienation becomes theoretically fixed by their professed political ends: for Hegel the state, for Marx the end of the state.

In the belief that the history of diplomacy is the history of the mediation of estrangement, I have attempted to provide a theoretical foundation for a historical enquiry into diplomacy. Only the first step has been taken in this exposition of alienation. What lies ahead is a journey to the archives, with the concepts and theories of alienation in hand. But I do wish to reiterate that alienation is not a philosopher's stone. It cannot provide laws of development for diplomacy, nor can it explain everything there is to know about diplomacy. I do not believe, however, that the neglected terrain of diplomacy's origins and transformations can be fully illuminated without the rich history, conceptual variations, and theories of alienation.

## References and notes

1. A. de Wicquefort, *L'Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* (Amsterdam, 1730); F. de Callières, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, A. Whyte (trans.), (Notre Dame, Ind., 1963); E. Satow, *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (London, 1979); H. Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London, 1963).
2. However, an admirable sequel to Nicolson's work has recently appeared, Adam Watson's *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (London, 1982). Watson's work is also valuable because it investigates early non-western views of diplomacy (such as Kautilya's *Arthashastra*), an area which will be peripheral to our enquiry into the form of diplomacy which spread to become the dominant global system, *Western* diplomacy.
3. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London, 1977); F. S. Northedge, *The International Political System* (London, 1976); Martin Wight, *Power Politics* H. Bull and C. Holbraad (eds.), (Harmondsworth, 1979); and *Systems of States*, H. Bull (ed.), (Leicester, 1977).
4. This is not to imply that the behaviouralist approach is inherently less conservative. Interesting (but certainly not sufficient) evidence of this is provided by its nominal origins. Seeking to avoid any objections from corporate trustees, the Ford Foundation changed a 'social' (too close to 'socialism') science research proposal to a 'behavioural' (thought to be more neutral in connotation) science proposal. See K. Deutsch, 'Problem Solving: The Behavioral Approach', in A. Hoffman (ed.), *International Communication and the New Diplomacy* (Bloomington, 1968), p. 75.

5. Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, pp. 20, 24.
6. Wight, *Power Politics*, p. 94.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
8. See Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 173–83, on diplomatic culture and Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 16, for a general discussion of diplomatic theory ('the generally accepted idea of the principles and methods of international conduct and negotiation').
9. Hegel, 'Spirit in Self-Estrangement', *Phenomenology of the Mind*, quoted in Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Dir Struik (ed.), (New York, 1967), p. 38; L. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, George Eliot (trans.), (New York, 1957); and Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*.
10. This enquiry shuns narrow definitions of terms. If I were to pretend that a single definition could capture the essence of diplomacy, then there would be no purpose for an enquiry. In fact, it would *negate* an enquiry, for its very rationale is to question the existence of a defining essence. Moreover, the high level of ambiguity inherent in international relations can render the attempt for exactitude in definition a specious activity. Specificity of terms should, of course, be expected from any historical investigation which would apply alienation theories.
11. See Bertell Ollman, *Alienation* (Cambridge, 1971).
12. Marx, 'Comments on James Mills Elements of Political Economy', MEWE, Suppl. vol. I, p. 463, quoted by I. Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (London, 1970), p. 91; and *Writings of Young Marx*, pp. 176, 229.
13. One example of a test-case states: 'L'idée que suggère tout naturellement le mot "aliéner" est celle de transmission d'un sujet à un autre: il semble toutefois que ce mot peut aussi j'en signifier "perdre volontairement se défaire de, renoncer, etc"'. *Dictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit International* (Paris, 1959).
14. See also H. Smit, *et al.*, *International Law, Cases and Materials* (St. Paul, Minn., 1980), pp. 175–7, for a modern use of the term in the treaty of 1931 which established a customs union between Germany and Austria and 'imposed a duty on Austria not to alienate her independence without the consent of the council of the League of Nations'.
15. For instance, see the address of the representatives of Corcyra to the assembled Athenian and Corinthian representatives on the question of gaining support from Athens against the threat of a Corinthian naval rearmament: 'If the Corinthians say that you have no right to receive one of their colonies into your alliance, they should be told that every colony, if it is treated properly, honours its mother city, and only becomes *estranged* [emphasis added] when it has been treated badly. Colonists are not sent abroad to be the slaves of those who remain behind, but to be their equals.' Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, R. Warner, (trans.), (Harmondsworth, 1954), p. 56.
16. For instance: Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 308–9 ('The Third World is alienated from the Western states not simply because of the latter's lack of high-mindedness but because of their overwhelming power...'); Keens-Soper, 'The Liberal Disposition of Diplomacy', *International Relations*, v (1973), p. 913 ('Here the issue is the sense of alienation with which newcomers from several different traditions of civility confront the predominantly European character of diplomacy.');
17. Wight, *Power Politics*, p. 32 ('Alien societies had different principles of existence from Europe...'); Watson, *Diplomacy*, p. 15 ('initially diplomacy appears as a sporadic communication between very separate states... [some] states remained alien to the cultural and historical assumptions which engendered the rules and conventions of European diplomacy').
18. Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit* (Oxford, 1979), p. 18.
19. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic', E. Fromm, (ed.), *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York, 1966), p. 174.
20. F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 201, quoted by Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1961), p. 52.
21. W. Kaufmann, 'The Inevitability of Alienation' in Preface to R. Schacht, *Alienation* (New York, 1970), p. xxvii. Kaufmann also notes that many of the great classical thinkers were estranged from societies which highly valued harmony and unity. He also asserts that many of the great modern philosophers suffered psychological or societal estrangement. He adduces the fact that Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Pascal, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Russell and Sartre lost one, in some instances, both, parents when young.
22. P. Ludz, 'A Forgotten Intellectual Tradition of the Alienation Concept' in R. F. Geyer and P. Schweitzer (eds.), *Alienation: Problems of Theory and Method* (London, 1981), pp. 24–5.
23. For an excellent synopsis of structuralist and post-structuralist approaches, see T. Eagleton, *Literary Theory* (Minneapolis, 1983).
24. See S. Hoffmann's valuable appraisal of the discipline, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', *Daedalus*, cvi (1977), pp. 41–60.
25. These definitions were compiled from the following books on alienation from which more detailed



- histories of the term and the concept can be found: Geyer and Schweitzer, *Alienation: Problems of Theory and Method*, pp. 21–33, 38–40, 68–70; I. Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, pp. 27–65; Schacht, *Alienation*, pp. 9–37; John Torrance, *Estrangement, Alienation and Exploitation: A Sociological Approach to Historical Materialism* (London, 1977), pp. xi–xvi, 3–20.
25. A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of The Wealth of Nations* (London n.d.), vol. II, p. 342, quoted by Mészáros, p. 34.
  26. H. Kirath and S. Kuhn (eds.), *Middle English Dictionary* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956), quoted in Schacht, *Alienation*, p. 10.
  27. J. Murray (ed.), *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (Oxford, 1888), quoted by Schacht, *Alienation*, p. 11.
  28. J. and W. Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig, 1862), quoted in Schacht, *Alienation*, p. 8.
  29. R. Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (London, 1962), p. 7.
  30. P. N. Rapetti (ed.), *Livre de justice et de plait* (Paris, 1850), p. 47; and A. A. Beugnot (ed.), *Assises de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1841), vol. I, p. 183, quoted in Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, p. 34.
  31. Augustine, *City of God*, H. Bettenson (trans.), (Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 761.
  32. Lewis Feuer, 'What is Alienation? The Career of a Concept', *New Politics*, I (1962), p. 117.
  33. See Bull, 'Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations', *British Journal of International Studies*, 2 (1976), pp. 104–8.
  34. H. Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, W. Whewell (trans.), (London, 1853), pp. 340–50.
  35. *Ibid.*, pp. 342–3.
  36. J.-J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, F. P. H. Cole (trans.), (London, 1966), p. 4.
  37. Contract and justice form the twin legal pillars of the Grotian order. Since alienation is given a central role in the formulation of both, it is an important conceptual foundation of that order. For further evidence see *De Jure Belli*, vol. I, chapter XX 'Of Promises', pp. 33–5; vol. II, chapter XII, 'Of Contracts', pp. 55–8.
  38. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, p. 22.
  39. T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, M. Oakeshott (ed.), (Oxford, n.d.), p. 85.
  40. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
  41. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
  42. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, p. 7.
  43. *Ibid.*
  44. *Ibid.*
  45. *Ibid.*, p. 12. See Book II, Chapter I, 'That Sovereignty is Inalienable', for the relationship between sovereignty, the general will and alienation. Here is one example: 'I hold then that sovereignty, being nothing less than the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign, who is no less than a collective being, cannot be represented except by himself: the power indeed may be transmitted but not the will', p. 20.
  46. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
  47. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
  48. See C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 41, 163–91.
  49. See J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, Peter Laslett (ed.), (Cambridge, 1960), Part II, sect. 26, 36, 173, 323.
  50. See Torrance, *Estrangement*, pp. 92, 143, 241.
  51. See A. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, II, p. 342.
  52. See Ludz, 'A Forgotten Intellectual Tradition', p. 25.
  53. See Feuer, 'What is Alienation?' p. 117; Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, pp. 33; Schacht, *Alienation*, pp. 15–16.
  54. See Ludz, 'A Forgotten Intellectual Tradition', pp. 26–7; Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, pp. 60–1; Schacht, *Alienation*, pp. 21–5, 30.
  55. See I. Kant, *Perpetual Peace and other essays*, T. Humphrey (trans.), (Ind., 1983), pp. 108–10, and 115–18. Kant also believed a 'spirit of commerce' might provide the opportunity for a natural alienation of power by states, leading to a treaty for perpetual peace (pp. 122–5).
  56. I. Kant, *Werke* (Berlin: Akademische Ausgabe, 1902), vol. vi, p. 271, quoted and trans. by Mészáros, p. 34.
  57. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
  58. G. Hegel, *Fragment of a System*, quoted by G. Lukasc, *The Young Hegel: Studies in The Relation between Dialectics and Economics*, R. Livingstone (trans.), (London, 1975), p. 263. This work is actually a collection of notes to which Herman Nohl gave the title *Systemfragment*. Hegel's quote on disunity as the source of philosophy also appears in *Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling* (1801) See F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 7, part 1 (New York, 1965), pp. 201–3.

59. Hegel, *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 219, quoted by Lukács, p. 307.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 91 in Lukács, p. 267. The same idea is more poetically expressed in the famous 1820 'preface' to *The Philosophy of Right*: 'The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk'.
61. G. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, A. V. Miller (trans.), (Oxford, 1977), p. 11.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
63. Torrance, *Estrangement*, pp. 24–5.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Hegel, p. 112.
66. Wight, *Power Politics*, p. 48.
67. Hegel, pp. 118–19.
68. Marx, *The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, in Bottomore, *Early Writings*, p. 44.
69. Marx, *1844 Manuscripts*, p. 106. and p. 137.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 175. The phrasing of 'separation through surrender' is derived from Richard Schacht's lucid account of Marxian alienation. See Schacht, *Alienation*, p. 120.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
73. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in *Early Writings*, p. 25.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
75. J.-P. Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, A. S. Smith (trans.), (London, 1976), p. 152.
76. Sartre, quoted by Schacht, *Alienation*, p. 236.
77. F. Engels, 'Preface to the English Edition' in K. Marx, *Capital*, vol. I (Moscow, 1974), p. 14. Unfortunately, Engels did not live long enough to witness the ironic decision of a Russian censor to allow the entry of *Capital*, not because it wasn't subversive but because he thought it too difficult for the general public.