possible to make more refined comparisons with small pockets of similar (shtetl) Jews in different surroundings?

Besides, it is not clear to me how specific the Jewish "cultural tool kit" is. The elements Morawska lists (rational belief in the control of their own fate, personal responsibility, optimism, but also the limited influence of human agency, p. 226) seem to me to be values that could also have been shared by small middle-class shopkeepers of another (or no) denomination. Simply positioning these beliefs against the "Slavs" who are different in this respect (p. 234) and citing Jewish inhabitants of Johnstown who state that these characteristics are indeed typically "Jewish" are not very convincing arguments. Comparisons with non-Jewish communities of small family businesses or middlemen would have enabled her to find out what is really Jewish about their attitude.

Further, I found it strange that the book lacks a formal conclusion, the author being content to restate the most important theoretical insights. It is not that insights cannot be found (there are many), nor that the author avoids being specific in this respect (on the contrary), but exactly because the book is so rich these insights would have deserved a separate evaluation. Now the reader is left with a short epilogue on the post-war period. Here the author shows - most fascinatingly - how the ethnically closed building of the Johnstown Jews disintegrated at a rapid pace. Which brings me to my final question. In view of the major changes that took place among the third and fourth generations, characterized in the epilogue by the one-liner, [now there are] "Jews in the community, but no community of Jews" (p. 252), this reader is even more interested in fundamental reflections on the implications of the long-term (four generations) outcome of this settlement process, especially because almost no case studies on immigrants in the United States go beyond the second generation.

Finally, many readers will loathe Princeton University Press for not including a list of references (it is available through the author, p. xxi). This decision - although very much in the spirit of the small-town shopkeepers central in this book - is an ugly stain on an important and superb analysis.

Leo Lucassen


Thomas Lindenberger's study, a dissertation written at the Berlin Technical University, considers the street as a social location in which contradictions within society otherwise articulated only in the conventional political arenas can be experienced immediately and articulated in direct action. The study examines "street politics" from below and from above at a high point of public conflict on the streets and in a city in which state power, industrial workers and the labour movement were more concentrated than anywhere else in Germany. At the same time, the analysis is not restricted to spectacular, explicitly political disputes, but also covers the day-to-day "guerrilla warfare" between the street public and the
police, which Lindenberger sees as the background experience behind the behaviour of both sides in the major political events on the streets in this period. The main sources are the liberal *Vossische Zeitung*, the files of police headquarters in Berlin and some records of trials.

The investigation offers a wealth of facts, themes and theses of varying range, without sacrificing coherence of argument and depth of analysis. (As for the presentation, some readers will regard many of the extensive source quotations and recapitulations of the argument as dispensable, while others will welcome them as illustrative and helpful.) Lindenberger begins with a very vivid sketch of typical street uses of the time, making good use of the arts and social pages of contemporary newspapers in his reconstruction. The next chapter, on “street police and public (dis)order”, examines the patriarchal and repressive practices of the Berlin police, which were directed less towards managing traffic and more to policing public order, showing the gross bias with which this force, composed mainly of former non-commissioned army officers, pursued its interpretation of public order: street users from the lower class were regarded in principle as the “rabble”, from whom the “better” street public had to be protected. There follows an analysis of 405 minor confrontations between police and crowds of people, as documented in the *Vossische Zeitung*; the actors, locations, causes, themes and forms of these events are subjected to a meticulous analysis. This is followed by an examination of so-called “strike excesses”, i.e. conflicts between strikers, strike-breakers and police either taking place on the streets or spilling over on to them. The unrest in Moabit in 1910, which developed from a strike by transport workers in the coal industry and at times resembled a civil war, has a separate detailed chapter devoted to it.

What seems particularly interesting to me are the observations and reflections on the component of violence in these actions. The investigation finds that both in the minor incidents and in the major “strike excesses” there was a widespread readiness to resort to violence, in which not only fists and stones were used, but frequently knives and sometimes even handguns too. This violence was directed not just at horse-beating coachmen, unpleasant barkeepers, landlords pursuing an eviction or aggressive strike-breakers, but also, over and over again, at the police. Interestingly, as Lindenberger is able to demonstrate for example in the Moabit strike unrest, those involved in contesting the state’s monopoly on violence usually came from an otherwise socially well-integrated working-class population; they were often the sons of “respectable” Social Democrats, and by no means a so-called “lumpenproletariat”, as the Social Democratic press usually stated (and probably believed). Lindenberger interprets the circumstance that the Social Democrat officials, with their legalistic orientation, had only limited success in winning over their followers as a “paradoxical result” of the political rise of social democracy. “The more the Social Democrats was able to establish itself among the workers as the legitimate representative of a class which had been deprived of its rights by the authorities in favour of the employers, the more working people developed a distinct self-esteem which was challenged […] by the continuing discrimination in everyday street life, and in particular in explicitly politicized situations of conflict” (p. 237). According to this argument it was the sense of outrage at being denied equal treatment under the law which led to a recourse to illegal means. “The revolt against the demeaning and discriminating treatment as ‘rabble’ was itself unable to dispense with the rabble’s manner of
behaviour, precisely because at that time and place this was the only way to express an attitude other than the subservient obedience demanded by authority" (p. 396).

At the same time, Lindenberger points out that it would be a one-sided view of the working-class and lower-class culture of the time to consider uproar, in its range from outrage to enjoyment, as its natural and therefore only option of protest. The same groups which at times allowed themselves to be drawn into street battles with the police also took part in the peaceful street demonstrations organized by the Social Democrats in their struggle against the Prussian three-class suffrage system. As Lindenberger argues with reference to cultural scientific analyses, the alternative to authoritarian order from above advanced by these demonstrations was not disorder, but the image of a new order, that of the “people’s state”; their orderly ranks, marching forward both calmly and determinedly, were intended to demonstrate the masses’ capacity for “self-control” and hence their capability of assuming political and cultural hegemony. Admittedly these peaceful yet threatening mass demonstrations which “conquered” the centre of Berlin were restricted to a relatively short episode before the First World War.

This brings us to the question of the historical development of street politics, which is also treated in detail in the study, even though it is structured by protest form and not by protest phase. The study identifies a peak phase of violent confrontations between crowds and police in the years 1906 to 1912; most of the “strike excesses” took place between 1910 and 1912, roughly the same time as the major franchise demonstrations, which reached their peak early in 1910. Lindenberger, following Dieter Groh, includes among the reasons for this concentration the discrepancy between the rising membership of the SPD and its lack of political success, which he sees as resulting in a search for activist alternatives; in addition, foreign events, and in particular the revolution in Russia, increased the potential for domestic political conflict by encouraging the workers’ side to take action and the state to take preventive measures. However, Lindenberger’s finding is that in the final years before the First World War there was an obvious reduction in both major and minor street conflicts. The study is clearly right in attributing an important role in this development to the hard line taken by the police in the Moabit disturbances of autumn 1910; this can probably be understood as a reaction to the mass demonstrations which had gone ahead successfully six months previously despite a police prohibition. In January 1911, under the influence of the police offensive in Moabit and simultaneous government threats against the social democratic movement, the SPD turned away from further demonstrations on the franchise and restricted itself to indoor public meetings. Lindenberger argues that the 1910 policy of active street protest was not resumed even at a later date. Certainly there were a number of major open-air Social Democratic rallies in the years up to 1914, and there were also numerous more minor demonstrations (such as the International Women’s Day demonstration from 1911 on), but in Lindenberger’s estimation these events had lost their potential for class struggle, since the authorized rallies did not produce much scope for conflict and the prospect of mass strikes, still potent in 1910, had been suppressed. Lindenberger also finds a gradual liberalization taking place in police street supervision at this time, which also helped to defuse the situation.

However, the study identifies not just a waning of Social Democratic street protests but also a political offensive on the streets by conservative and nationalist
groups. It refers, for example, to the mass demonstrations held in the “jubilee year” of 1913 for the hundredth anniversary of the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig and the Kaiser’s silver jubilee, which Lindenberger says “were certainly linked to the forms and contents of state and court ceremonial, but at the same time broke through into new dimensions of mass mobilization” (p. 376). These patriotic parades are interpreted as preludes to the demonstrations of July 1914, in which it was no longer the labour movement, as in 1910, but masses of enthusiasts for war (mainly but certainly not exclusively from middle-class backgrounds) who made the street their stage. Lindenberger sums up as follows: “The initiative in street politics passed to [the labour movement’s] political opponents” (p. 383).

This formulation does strike me as a bit overstated, however. Lindenberger certainly assesses the tendency of the development correctly, but I wonder whether he does not overestimate the importance of the 1913 celebrations and underestimate oppositional street activities between 1911 and 1914. Firstly, I am thinking here of the increasing public visibility of working-class sports groups, working-class cyclists, the demonstration-like parades of working-class youth and the increased number of public demonstrations on May Day (although admittedly all this did not take place in Berlin’s central business district). Secondly, it seems to me too dogmatic to describe the SPD’s mass demonstrations after 1910, which at times mobilized over 200,000 people, as “symbolic events with no further implications” (p. 383). It is certainly necessary to point out that demonstrations can become substitutes for action; but even if they have no political consequences in the narrow sense they can still exert a very important influence both externally and internally, as evidence and exercise of organizational ability and as the physical experience of political unity. Furthermore, it seems to me that Lindenberger also underestimates the countercultural character of the forms of demonstration practised at the time when he describes them as “the adoption of a preexisting bourgeois repertoire” without “significant innovations of their own” (p. 384). To describe the Sunday suits worn by many of the demonstrators as “bourgeois” is reasonable only within limits, and other aspects of the events should also be considered, such as the loud singing of working-class songs, the red flags which frequently made their appearance (despite being banned), chants such as “bloodhounds” (Bluthunde) (directed at the police), clenched-fist salutes at the statue of Bismarck, and so on. These clearly distinguish the conduct of the demonstration marches from bourgeois rules of conduct.

There are thus a number of points I would question. But I have no doubt whatever that the book fulfils all the requirements of a standard work on the history of political street culture. It is very much to be hoped that equally weighty studies will soon be devoted to the street politics of later decades, the 1920s in particular, and that these will manage to link political, social and cultural history in as productive a manner as Lindenberger has done.

Bernd Jürgen Warneken


Though archival research into the Soviet forced labour system is still in its infancy, Stettner claims to offer the first general survey yet to appear in print. It