grand modernization strategies, an apolitical “speculator” trying to survive the harsh times, a dweller of Magnitogorsk doomed to “speak Bolshevik” until “a mass internal defection” of the late 1980s – historians have to answer yet how the epidemic “speaking Bolshevik” turned into “I no longer believe in socialism”,¹ a peasant rebel fighting collectivization for preservation of an ancestral culture, and a young man (Podlubnyi) fascinated with the Revolution (or, shall I say, blinded by it) to the point that he is not able to distinguish its ideals from the Stalinist reality.

Rossman documents with confidence the case of the resistance of the textile workers of IIR as a mass phenomenon. However, a tendency to project the discovered identity on to the whole Soviet working class and to present this type of behavior as “a dominant leitmotif” of the shopfloor response to Stalin’s revolution “from above”(p. 17) has yet to be justified. The author himself stresses the exceptional hardship in the textile industries in comparison with other industrial sectors, the specific gender, experience, age, and education composition of the textile workers of IIR. A detailed analysis of the situation in the IIR is only occasionally related to the situation in other industries. Moreover, Rossman documents that even this relatively homogenous group of workers demonstrates, at times, different types of behavior: male workers in the machine shop, for example, show more loyalty to the regime and patient behavior than the female textile workers (p. 100). And the most difficult question of them all still remains: does “speaking Bolshevik/Soviet” mean “thinking Bolshevik/Soviet”? To what extent does the class language of resistance of the mass of the textile workers represent their true beliefs, and to what extent is it a manipulation of the official rhetoric?

The importance of the conceptual debates should not obscure the empirical richness of this study. Rossman’s thorough research in the regional and central archives of Russia has produced a wonderful result – a vivid, intense, colourful and complex story of the worker struggle not just for bread but also for the preservation of the shopfloor democracy and self preservation of the working class as a political group. To paraphrase a title of a famous Soviet novel, the dramatic story that Rossman told could have been called “How the Working Class Was Silenced”.

Elena A. Osokina


Lonny Carlile’s Division of Labor analyzes the development of the Japanese labor movement from the 1920s to the 1950s based on a “globally contextualized comparative” approach, that is, putting the Japanese labor movement in the context of larger geopolitical processes such as World War II and the Cold War, through which not only the history of the Japanese labor movement, but also those of French, Italian, and German labor movements were shaped. More specifically, Carlile examines rivalries as well as collaborations between different ideological currents in the Japanese labor movement

(labor unions and political parties) in comparison with parallel developments of the labor movements in three other countries, identifying similarities and differences in the shift in ideological balance between the Japanese case and its western European counterparts.

Chapter 1, based on a historical review of western European labor movements in the interwar and wartime periods, presents a spectrum of ideological currents. Different ideas about how best the working class should advance its interests became apparent after World War I, with the formation of separate union and party organizations advocating these ideas in national as well as international labor movements. The evolution of national-level labor movements in the 1920s “refracted in varying patterns” the rivalry between international-level socialist, communist, and Christian labor organizations that exhibited ideological currents “in a more purified form.” At the national level, the conflict between ideological currents was most intense between the social democrat and communist camps. “Caught in the middle” were left socialists that attempted to bridge the intense ideological and organizational rivalry between the former two camps. In additions to the three ideological currents, there existed the ideological current of Christian trade unionism that, based on “organic interpretation of society,” rejected class struggles and called for harmonization of class differences.

Chapter 2 covers the evolution of the Japanese labor movement mainly in the interwar and wartime periods. It examines the intensification of ideological rivalry between social democrats, communists, and left socialists in the labor movement in the 1920s, which resulted in the formation of various labor unions and political parties. While the Japanese labor movement shared the experience of the division into the three ideological camps with its western European counterparts, it also exhibited a unique feature of the strong affinity between social democracy and “corporatist tendencies”. Carlile explains this unique feature by pointing out the absence of class-collaborative Christian unionism in Japan and the weakness of representative democracy. Toward the end of the 1930s, the social democratic wing made further “rightward shifts” by embracing the ideology of National Socialism.

Chapter 3 examines the development of the French, Italian, and German labor movements in the period immediately after the end of World War II. The French and Italian “left of center” postwar governments, established based on “Resistance coalition”, represented a wide spectrum of ideological currents ranging from Christian unionism to communism and experimented with “modified capitalist” economic reconstruction policies. In France and Italy, the centralized structure of union organizations due to the heritage of the Resistance, coupled with the strong partisan-orientation of the labor movements, brought about the weak institutionalization of workplace union organizations. The labor movement in West Germany, on the other hand, established “union identity and union organizational integrity” due to the absence of a partisan milieu, which was helped by a virtual absence of communists in the Western occupation zone.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the Japanese labor movement and its political and economic contexts in the early postwar period prior to the Cold War (1945–1947). Chapter 4 chronicles the efforts of the labor movement to reconstruct itself, describing the (re-) emergence of rivalry between social democrats, left socialists, and communists, and the formation of rival national centers in 1946: Sodomei (General Confederation of Labor), based on a coalition of social democrats, and Sanbetsu (National Congress of Industrial Organizations), whose key member unions were controlled by communist cells in 1946. Despite the organizational split, some efforts were made to bring together the different
ideological currents to form Resistance-like movements, such as a call for a popular front (“People’s Democratic League”) against the old ruling class by a prominent left-socialist intellectual and the formation of Zento as a committee for a planned (but eventually banned) general strike against the ruling conservative Yoshida government scheduled for 1 February 1947. Chapter 5 examines the visions of economic recovery held by the labor movement. Although the way such visions were framed were different between the two competing national centers, they sought to realize an economic recovery in which labor unions were to play an important role through “a system of representing workers in production-related decision-making” (most typically a Keiei Kyogikai [management council]) at the enterprise as well as industrial and national levels.

Chapter 6 examines the development of the French, Italian, and German labor movements under the increasing influence of the Cold War from 1947. In France and Italy, “(t)he competing pulls of the Catholics on the right and the communists on the left [...] reawakened differences in outlook and sensibility between social democrats and left socialists” in the socialist parties that had maintained unity in the period of the Resistance coalition governments. In Italy, Partito Socialista Italiano (the PSI) split over the “class versus mass” debate, with social democrats forming a new party. In France, a similar debate occurred in Section Francaise de l’Internationale Ouvriere (the SFIO), which intensified an internal tension but did not result in a formal split. The collapse of the “socialistic” economic recovery programs (in which workers were to be provided with “a minimum level of livelihood commodities” in exchange for their restrained consumption for the sake of production recovery) also aggravated the tensions within the socialist camps as well as between socialists and communists. In addition, the impact of the Cold War on the international labor movement, such as the establishment of the Cominform and the split of World Federation of Trade Unions (the WFTU) over the Marshall Plan, directly or indirectly promoted splits of the French and Italian national union organizations. In contrast to the French and Italian counterparts, the West German labor movement was “spared the convulsions over the Marshal Plan” due to the very weak presence of communists, and adopted the stance of “minimal engagement” toward foreign and economic policy issues associated with the Marshall Plan and the Cold War.

Chapter 7 chronicles the division of the Japanese labor movement and the confrontation between communists and the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in the context of Cold War politics from 1947 to 1949. A split started within the ranks of the communist-dominated Sanbetsu as non-communist union leaders grew increasingly dissatisfied with the “extremely harsh and heavy-handed” way of communists in exercising their control over unions. They formed “an informal association” of dissident leaders called Sanbetsu Mindo in the early 1948. The internal tension within the Japan Socialist Party (the JSP) between left socialists and moderate social democrats came to the surface over the failure of the economic recovery program of the center-left Katayama cabinet in its 1949 convention. As in the case of the SFIO, left socialists criticized the party leadership controlled by social democrats for the program’s failure to improve workers’ economic conditions, which in turn brought about “a leftward shift in the center of gravity of the party”.

In parallel with the intensification of the Cold War in Europe, the tension between the Japan Communist Party (the JCP) and the SCAP increased. The JCP began to take an openly anti-US line, and gave directions to communist cells in labor unions, particularly those in the public sector, to engage in militant struggle. These militant actions brought
about defections of numerous unions from communist-dominated union federations such as Sanbetsu and Zenkanko (a federation of public-sector unions). Moreover, “a policy of ‘armed struggle’” that the JCP adopted in 1950 in response to the Cominform’s criticism for its insufficient militancy against US imperialism and SCAP’s repressive measures against the party further weakened its organizational base, making the JCP a politically irrelevant actor.

Chapter 8 mainly chronicles the efforts of non-communist union leaders, mainly left socialists associated with Sanbetsu Mindo and Sodomei, to bridge the ideological division in the Japanese labor movement in order to form a unified union confederation. In an early initiative for building a new confederation, a prewar generation of union leaders attempted a “centrist line” realignment of the labor movement, but this ideology-based initiative was not able to bring together a large number of labor unions. A more successful initiative was started by a younger generation of union leaders who emphasized an organizational form of a new confederation rather than its ideological make-up as the principle of the realignment, making “the nationwide industrial federation the primary unity of membership.” The initiative based on this principle expedited the realignment process, which eventually led to the formation of Sohyo (National Council of Labor Unions) in July 1950 with 17 affiliates and 19 observer organizations.

Chapter 9 examines the re-politicization of the Japanese labor movement in the first half of the 1950s over the issues of peace and neutrality. The Japanese labor movement was confronted with important issues related to the Cold War, such as controversies over whether Japan should sign a “partial peace treaty” only with Western allies or an “all around treaty” with all of its former enemies including the Soviet Union and China, and over whether Japan should renounce armed forces or rearm itself, if in a limited way. The position of left socialists on these issues (“all around treaty” and opposition to rearmament) was embodied in the “four peace principles”, over which delegates of the JSP and Sohyo conventions in 1951 engaged in heated debates, and delegates of both conventions voted for the four peace principles by a large majority. The Sohyo convention also voted not to affiliate with International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (the ICFTU), because the international labor confederation’s position on the Cold War issues diverged from the four peace principles.

Sohyo strengthened its commitment to the movement for peace and neutrality in the first half of the 1950s under the leadership of its general secretary, Takano Minoru, who aimed to transform the national confederation into a “strategic pivot for a broad-based popular coalition” of workers and other oppressed people against the “reverse course” of reactionary tendencies of Japanese politics encouraged by US imperialism. Takano’s strategy based on mass-based struggles diverged from the confederation’s “original industrial union-centered ideal”, and gave rise to internal tensions in the labor movement, the most notable of which was the criticism of four pro-ICFTU and social-democracy-oriented industrial federations against Sohyo’s overemphasis on political struggles at the expense of rank-and-file members’ economic interests. Three out of the four federations eventually withdrew from Sohyo to form a rival confederation, Zenro (National Trade Union Congress), in 1954.

Chapter 10 examines the development of the labor movements in western Europe and Japan during the period after the mid-1950s, which was characterized by a decline in the salience of Cold War issues and by economic growth. Carlile shows that the labor movements in West Germany, France, and Italy began to shift their focus from political to
labor market issues, but that different wings of the movements, depending on their ideological currents, adopted strategies oriented to either adversarial or accommodationist tendencies in addressing labor market issues. The author describes a contest for control within *Deutscher Gewerkshaftsbund* (the DGB) between advocates of confrontational “maximalist” wage policy and those of social partnership (left socialists and social democrats), and similar contests between the communist and Christian wings of the French and Italian labor movements.

The Japanese labor movement’s responses to the changes in its political and economic contexts were similar to its western European (especially West German) counterparts, because it adopted two conflicting strategies: “a left-socialist initiative focused on wage struggles”, and “an economic democracy-oriented accommodationism.” The left-socialist-dominated *Sohyo* adopted a strategy of wage struggles based on industry-level coordination, called *Shunto*, in 1955 under the leadership of Ota Kaoru and Iwai Akira who took control of the confederation from Takano Minoru in its convention in the same year. *Zenro*, on the other hand, advocated economic democracy based on labor-management cooperation and opposed *Shunto* for of “maximizing wage hikes in the name of class conflict”. Instead of the “maximalist” wage policy, the confederation and its affiliated unions advocated labor-management cooperation in productivity improvement so that the gains from higher productivity would be distributed to workers in the form of wage increases.

Carlile’s study is an important addition to a still small number of studies in the field of labor history that analyze Japan (or other Asian countries) from a comparative perspective. Through the lens of comparative analysis, this study reveals similarities and differences in political dynamics of the labor movements between Japan, on one hand, and the France, Italy, and Germany labor movements, on the other, to which previous studies have not paid much attention. For example, the comparative analysis reveals that the fragility of communist influence in the Japanese labor movement in the early postwar period derived from the fact that Japanese communists lacked the experience of participating in the wartime resistance, while the participation of French and Italian communists in the wartime resistance gave them legitimacy and helped them establish solid support-base in the labor movements. This book also shed light on similarities in the political dynamics of the labor movements. For example, the “class versus mass” debate that took place not only in the Italian and French socialist parties, but also in the JSP’s 1949 convention. And the Japanese labor movement as well as its Western European counterparts took a similar set of labor market strategies (i.e., the “maximalist” and partnership-based strategies) when the impact of the Cold War on these countries’ labor movements became less salient.

The book also has several drawbacks. First, the book does not provide a clear analytic framework concerning conditions for the division and unity of labor movements that would have helped readers to read through rather lengthy and detailed descriptions of the labor movements, particularly those of Japan. Second, as the author acknowledges in his introduction, the book’s analysis focuses on “the thought and strategy of labor movement leaders”. However, by limiting the analysis to ideological debates within the labor movements, the book seems to have overlooked the gap between visions or ideologies that union or party leaders advocated and the actual behaviors of labor unions and their leaders. For example, the social democratic wing of the postwar labor movement (*Zenro*) accepted hyper-cooperative enterprise unions of its affiliates as being not incompatible with the social democratic principles that these confederations officially upheld. And third, in
explaining the continuing hostility between *Sohyo* and *Zenro* even after both confederations turned to labor-market strategies after the mid-1950s, Carlile largely overlooks the fact that the division between the two confederations increasingly reflected the three-way divisions of the labor market: while *Sohyo* tended to represent the interests of public-sector unions and unions of the small- and medium-sized firms where labor relations were adversarial, *Zenro* mainly represented the interests of enterprise unions of large private-sector firms where labor relations were harmonious.

Despite these drawbacks, *Division of Labor* is a book highly recommended for labor historians and social scientists whose main concern are cases in Anglo-American or European countries, because the book allows them to grasp details of the Japanese labor movement in comparison with the cases with which these researchers are familiar.

*Akira Suzuki*


In 1970 Korean tailor Chun tae-il committed suicide by self-immolation as a way of drawing attention to the inhumane and cruel working conditions of women garment workers in Seoul. Thankfully, his death was not in vain as it reignited women workers’ activism and ultimately the formation of a democratic union movement. We know from earlier research that women workers in Japan’s prewar textile industry also resisted against their harsh and inhumane working conditions, individually and collectively, and conducted the first recorded strike in 1886. From this present volume we understand that women workers in the postwar textile industry continued to resist patriarchal managerial control and restrictions on their private lives. This volume is a valuable contribution to the literatures on women, work and management strategies in a feminized industry.

Earlier studies demonstrate that the prewar textile industry was significant for Japan’s economic development and, as Macnaughtan’s analysis of the textile industry from 1945–1975 illustrates, the industry continued to be a significant industry in the postwar period. In particular the two decades 1955–1975 covered Japan’s period of high economic growth as well as its becoming the largest employer of women in the postwar period, when women entered the workforce in large numbers. The book details the development of the industry and its labour management practices from the Occupation period (1945–1952), when it was emerging from its wartime focus, until the mid 1970s when the industry underwent a programme of rationalization and diversification. As such, we understand the evolution of the industry during the period of rapid economic growth and its eventual decline as it tries to adjust to technological advances and developing low-cost textile industries in other countries in Asia.

The book sets the scene in discussing the industry’s prewar history and postwar transition and the configuration of Japan’s early postwar labour market. The remaining chapters