

elsewhere. It is good to have all this safely nailed down on paper, but whether or not the modest returns warrant an effort of such magnitude must, at least in my opinion, remain open to question.

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THE SURROGATE PROLETARIAT: MOSLEM WOMEN AND REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, 1919-1929.

By *Gregory J. Massell*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. xxxvi, 448 pp. \$18.50.

Relying heavily on a full range of documentary, contemporary, and recollective literature in Russian, and well grounded in the recent products of sociopolitical theorizing in the West, Professor Massell has written a masterful historical and analytical account of Soviet efforts during the 1920s to develop a productive strategy for social change in Central Asia. The concept of directed, or planned, social change looms large in this study, and Massell's handling of it in the context of Soviet-Central Asian relations is highly instructive for the answers it provides to two key questions posed by the author in the introduction: how and to what extent can engineered social change be imposed on a society (particularly a "traditional" one) through the deliberate use of political power; and, conversely, how and to what extent can a traditional society resist and obstruct engineered revolution from above and outside.

Basically this is a study of the modernization of a traditional society, with an added, complicating dimension: modernization in Central Asia was not self-imposed by native leaders but was the result of outside (Soviet Russian) vision and planning. Introducing drastic and far-reaching change into a traditional society is never an easy task. Massell's inquiry shows that in Central Asia an already difficult situation became nearly impossible when change was the product of alien Soviet assault on the traditional way of life. The native reaction, extensively presented here, was understandably indifferent at best and hostile and violent at worst, and it led to the realization among many Bolshevik cadres that they were confronting, in Massell's words, "a milieu that turned out to be far more elusive to direct manipulation than Russian society, and far less comprehensible in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology" (p. 38).

The "failure" of Central Asians to respond positively to Marxist-Leninist perceptions of social and political norms forced the Bolsheviks to search for different "access-routes to Central Asia's societies" in an effort to "subvert established native solidarities" (pp. xxii-xxiii) and bring about the desired social and political transformation. As the basic thesis of his study, Massell argues persuasively that the search for "access-routes" led the Soviets to adopt the theoretically unorthodox approach of exploiting the sexual tensions within Central Asia's Islamic society in the absence of real or substantial class tensions—that is, to exploit the disadvantaged status of the women in the absence of any real working class. Thus they created a "surrogate proletariat where no proletariat in the real Marxist sense existed" (p. xxiii). That Muslim women came to be viewed as a surrogate proletariat in Soviet eyes becomes abundantly clear as Massell delves into the process by which the regime sought to modernize Central Asia, and

thoroughly examines the many approaches considered, debated, and often discarded by Bolsheviks on both the local and the national levels.

A review of this length can hardly do justice to the complexities of the subject treated by Massell, or the rich and varied insights offered by the author. Except for several typographical errors, I found little to mar the total effect of the work. I was, however, mildly surprised by the omission of sources in any of the Central Asian languages. It would be remarkable if Massell were able to conduct research in all of these languages, and one cannot fault him for his apparent inability to do so. Yet I wonder whether important published sources of information on native attitudes and aspirations—including the periodical press—are still to be explored, and whether their use might have some significant bearing on the subject. Based on my own observations with regard to the Tatars during the same period, I can attest to the existence of vitally important political and social commentaries that were never published in Russian, but nevertheless were often from the pens of Bolsheviks.

Despite this, what Massell has produced is a study of outstanding merit and quality on a subject that has never been treated previously with anything approaching the same depth, skill, or methodology. At the very least, this book belongs in the collections of all those interested in Soviet historical and political development, Soviet nationality policy, and the problems of modernization.

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LEON TROTSKY AND THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ISOLATION. By  
*Richard B. Day*. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1973.  
vii, 221 pp. \$10.95.

The author's basic goal in this work is to confront and destroy the historical myths that have surrounded Trotsky's program for economic development after the October Revolution. He has succeeded admirably in this task and in many others, producing a work that revises a number of important interpretations of this Soviet leader and of the various and constantly changing economic programs offered by the contenders for power in the USSR during the 1920s. The author convincingly demonstrates that after the Revolution and until 1925, having cast aside as irrelevant for the present situation his theory of permanent revolution, Trotsky preferred Russia's economic isolation, fearing dependence on concessions and credits from the capitalist West. He shows that even when Trotsky exchanged economic isolationism for integrationism (integrating the Russian economy into the world economy), he still did not—as is commonly argued—reject the possibility of building socialism in one country. Instead, Trotsky argued after 1925 that Russia's political isolation did not require its economic isolation and that building socialism in the USSR was quite compatible with—in fact, necessitated—the use of the technical skills of the capitalist West. Moreover, Trotsky's integrationist plan, favoring a balance between light and heavy industry and de-emphasizing internal capital accumulation, by no means coincided with that of Preobrazhensky. What Trotsky actually envisioned was that trade with Europe would prepare the way for Russia's later cooperation with a socialist Europe while benefiting Soviet industrialization. The integration of Russia's economy into the world economy through trade would both anticipate