Peace and War

More than a century and a half before Spanish officers tried to turn semisedentary Apaches into reservation-dwelling farmers, Franciscan missionaries conducted a similar experiment by attempting to convert them into town-dwelling Catholics. The deerskin-clad members of “the great Apache nation” live “in tents and villages (rancherías)” surrounding the Rio Grande pueblos of New Mexico “on all sides,” reported Friar Alonso de Benavides in 1630. Like hundreds of other European observers, Benavides noted that Ndé men were “very valiant in battle” and frequently moved “from one mountain ridge to another, looking for game.” But he also occasionally challenged this narrow vision. “Each main village has its own recognized territory in which they plant maize and other kinds of grain,” he revealed, and “they take great pride in telling the truth.” Since Ndé people already were self-sufficient and possessed strong moral values, taming the alleged belligerency of their young men was apparently the best justification Benavides could come up with for Catholicizing them.

Contrary to popular belief, many Ndé groups responded favorably to Franciscan conversion efforts. The powerful Chihene nantan Sanaba, who governed “the province of the Xila Apaches,” enthusiastically embraced the Catholic faith. From a pueblo situated fourteen leagues west of the Rio Grande Piro pueblo of San Antonio de Senecú, Sanaba reigned over the extensive Chi’lla (“land of the red paint people”), which encompassed modern southwestern New Mexico (see Map 1.1). A regular attendee at Benavides’s weekly mass in Senecú, Sanaba also personally preached and converted his own people, making Benavides’s job uncharacteristically easy. Before Benavides could visit Sanaba’s
people himself, the Chihene leader instead came to see Benavides and presented him with a rolled deerskin. After spreading it out, the priest observed a green sun above a dark gray moon, each surmounted by a cross (see Figure 1.1). Puzzled, Benavides asked Sanaba to explain the painting, and the Chihene headman stated, “I have ordered the cross painted over the sun and over the moon” to symbolize our understanding of your teaching “us that God is the Lord, and creator of the sun and moon and of all things.” Although Sanaba’s explanation makes perfect sense, it is also important to remember that he and his people continued to revere the sun and moon, which the artist made the most prominent and brightly painted shapes on the deerskin, as important sources of spiritual power. This indicates the Chihenes were syncretically fusing Catholic elements with their own set of spiritual beliefs rather than replacing them. Yet, Benavides considered Sanaba’s entire “pueblo of Xila” converted by 1628.

The Ndé residing east of the Rio Grande were equally enamored with Catholicism. Following Sanaba’s lead, the leader of an ancestral Mescalero group, whom Spaniards named Apaches del Perillo (“little dog”) after a spring, also traveled to Senecú to hear Benavides preach and brought a hundred of his people to Sanaba’s Xila pueblo to “be instructed and baptized.” Buffalo-hunting “Vaquero” Apaches east of the Rio Grande, who included ancestral Jicarillas, Mescaleros, and Lipans, also initially embraced Catholicism. Their leaders traveled to a Santa Fe chapel to visit La Conquistadora, a statue that Spanish priests claimed was an image of the Virgin Mary, and Friar Benavides had personally brought there. After the most influential Vaquero headman gave his word that he would become Catholic, the greed of Spanish civil authorities fractured the peace. New Mexico Governor Felipe de Sotelo Osorio ordered an enemy chief to bring him as many Vaquero captives as he could capture so that they could be sold into slavery in New Spain. The chief and several
young men callously killed the Vaquero leader, despite the fact that he had held up a rosary from Benavides from around his neck.\(^5\) And yet, several years later in 1629, after a brief uprising, Vaquero Apaches still wanted to become Christians. Within five years not only had many converted, but they were “all at peace” with Spaniards.\(^6\)
Considering Governor Osorio’s cruel and violent response, it is not surprising that most scholars have forgotten that Ndé leaders were once receptive to Catholic conversion and got along with Spaniards. Catholic conversion was just one of several major cultural adaptations the Ndé made to Spanish colonialism prior to residing on Spanish-run reservations in the late eighteenth century. Others included the adoption of the horse and gun, southward and westward territorial expansion, becoming a primarily mountain-dwelling people, and incorporating Spanish resources into their daily subsistence and raiding and trading networks. In the hundred and twenty years since Sanaba’s Catholic conversion, Ndé men became so adept at plundering Spanish livestock and avoiding capture from presidial troops that officials in Nueva Vizcaya would declare an all-out war against Apaches in 1748.

This chapter examines Ndé cultural origins, environmental adaptations, and cultural transformations prior to 1700. It argues that, although the Ndé were fully capable of committing violent acts throughout their history, their relations with their indigenous neighbors and Spaniards remained predominately peaceful prior to the 1660s. The Ndé of the central and southern plains were engaged in a prolonged struggle with ancestral Wichitas and Jumanos for control of the regional political economy, and all Ndé groups retaliated against Spanish and Pueblo slaving expeditions. The available evidence suggests, however, with those notable exceptions, that Ndé violence in these years was confined to resource and captive raiding, and their northern relatives, the Diné (“the people”), or Navajos, and Spaniards were embroiled in the most intense warfare in the region. In a period of widespread drought-induced famine and disease from 1667 to 1672, the Ndé adapted to environmental stresses and Spanish colonialism by intensifying their resource raids on Spanish missions and villages, transforming themselves into mobile equestrians, and actively participating in the Pueblo and Great Southwestern Revolts.

NDÉ ORIGINS

Before discussing Ndé adaptations to Spanish colonialism, it is important to consider their cultural origins and transformations prior to Francisco Vásquez de Coronado’s arrival in the region in 1540. Much like Christians, the Ndé themselves believe in a creator named Ussen, Giver of Life, who created the universe and the two other progenitors, White Painted Woman (Ish son nah glash eh) and Child of the Water (Tu’ba scyne), who...
created the earth. After warning White Painted Woman of a coming flood, Ussen had her take refuge in a large abalone shell, in which she floated on the surface of the water for several days, passing by the crest of White-Ringed Mountain, which stands south of modern Deming and was the only mountain visible from her shell. When the flood waters receded, she came to rest in the sandy area of today’s San Agustin Plains. After emerging from the shell, Ussen told her to kneel down in the sand. The first three times she kneeled, nothing happened. But then Ussen told her to kneel a fourth time and let water drip from her. She did and gave birth to Child of the Water. Child of the Water, in turn, created the Ndé people.7

According to anthropologists, Southern Apacheans most likely arrived in the Southwest from subarctic Alaska and northwestern Canada via multiple routes between 950 and 1550 CE. In multistage, multipronged movements across a wide Rocky Mountain “corridor,” these hunting, gathering, and farming groups began living in the river valleys of the southern plains by 1450 and the Rocky Mountain highlands of modern New Mexico and Arizona by 1550. Demonstrating a long-standing commitment to reciprocity, Eastern Apacheans intermarried, formed commercial alliances, and possibly established political confederacies with individual Pueblo villages prior to European contact. Although ancestral Southern and Western Apache interaction with neighboring ancestral Puebloans and Hopis appears limited, they likely had close contact with eastern Utes and Shoshones as they moved southward, based on shared elements in their origin stories; their ritual practices; and especially their dome-shaped, brush-covered dwellings.8

Although prominent nantans such as Sanaba could exercise authority over one or more named bands, the power of most Ndé headmen, especially among southern plains groups, was more limited and concentrated in networks of extended families known as a local group or in a clan. Local groups and clans were the basic cooperative social, political, economic, ceremonial, and military units, and each family resided seasonally in a separate dwelling in a large encampment, or ranchería, in the same named geographic area. Just as each band had specific names for their goyas, or sacred places, so each local group and clan laid claim to its seasonal places of residence by creating vivid names such as Be’ilton (“yellow valley of flowers”) based on the plants they harvested, crops they planted, or the landscape’s most distinctive features. The Ndé preference for matrilocal residence meant that the husband resided with his wife’s extended family, and the wealthiest men, who were typically the most effective nantans, medicine men, and war leaders, often married multiple
women. By marrying women from distinct bands, the most ambitious Ndé leaders effectively broadened their political power.9

Ndé men initially adapted to their new environments by becoming more efficient seasonal hunters of bison, elk, antelope, deer, and bighorn sheep. Having already adopted side-notched projectile points, and bows and arrows in the arctic, Apachean men further improved their hunting proficiency by stealth – disguising themselves as their prey or as native plants and slowly and silently approaching from upwind or firing arrows from behind brush blinds at water holes. Like other native peoples, they also improved their hunting efficiency by shaping the landscape – burning the woods to attract more game.10

Ndé men also refined and expanded their arsenal of weaponry for hunting, raiding, and warfare, by drawing on the abundant resources of the river valleys, mountains, and deserts in their southern plains and southwestern environments, which some scholars have mischaracterized as marginal. Apachean men fashioned their four-foot-long bows from seasoned hardwoods and softwoods such as mulberry or cedar. On the eve of Spanish contact, the Vaqueros of the plains had distinguished themselves from their western kinsmen by employing large Turkish-style bows. All Ndé groups constructed flint or bone-tipped arrows with distinctively colored and constructed shafts. Chokonens used desert broom, while Western Apaches relied on reeds or cane from the Gila River and other water sources. Over time, some groups learned how to drop a deer at a mere eighty yards by dipping their arrows in poison concocted from lichen or a deer’s spleen, roots or stalk of nettles, and plants with a burning taste such as chili. Quivers came from deer, wolf, wildcat, or, best of all, mountain lion hides. Ndé men constructed their spear shafts from sotol stalks and whittled their blades from mountain mahogany, which were fastened with animal sinews, covered with buckskin, and often adorned with feathers. They fashioned their war clubs from hardwood branches and round rocks, which they covered with animal hide.11

At the same time, Ndé women became increasingly more adept at tanning hides; gathering wild plants, herbs, berries, and nuts; farming corn, melons, and pumpkins; and, of course, cooking. Ndé women and children harvested numerous edible wild plants including mescal, sotol, soapweed or palmilla, mesquite beans, and the fruits of several species of yucca and cacti, especially the tuna of the prickly pear. In the fall they also harvested wild potatoes; gathered acorns, walnuts, and piñon nuts; and picked grapes, strawberries, raspberries, mulberries, and gooseberries, among dozens of others. One of the most important new foods Ndé
women and children obtained was mescal from the agave, or century plant, which they began harvesting annually on southward-facing arroyos and mountain slopes. Although mescal hearts typically ripen in April and May at the same time that the red agave flowers bloom, the Ndé learned to harvest a wide variety of the plants for food and fiber from November through early June. Selecting only those “woman” plants bearing a flower stalk, Ndé women and children efficiently dug out the white crowns of the plants by trimming the leaves with a broad stone knife and pounding a rock against a three-foot oak stick with a flattened tip. After roasting the crowns overnight in rectangular pit ovens lined with bear grass and heated flat stones, Ndé women either served them immediately as a sweet-tasting treat or pounded, dried, and stored them for future use. For a delicious and nutritious meal, Ndé women then soaked the desired amount in water and mixed them with ground piñon seeds, walnuts, or juniper berries. Of course, roasted mescal crowns could also be made into the alcoholic beverage mescal. After pounding the crowns into a pulp and placing it in a hide pouch, Ndé women buried the pouch underground for several days. They then squeezed the juice from the pulp into a container and fermented it for three days, at which point this extremely potent beverage was ready to drink.\textsuperscript{12}

Ndé men and women also shaped the landscape to facilitate horticulture. Like their Navajo relatives, whose name means “large area of cultivated lands” in the Tewa Pueblo language, Chihenes of Chi’laa, Dzilgh’és (“On Top of the Mountain People”) of the White Mountains, and T’iisibaans (“Cottonwood in Grey Wedge Shape People”) of the Pinal Mountains and Tonto Basin burned to encourage small herbaceous plant habitats for seeds. Although experts disagree on whether Apacheans practiced agriculture prior to arriving in the region or learned it from Western Pueblos and Navajos, they concur that Apachean groups living in the higher elevations of today’s western New Mexico and eastern Arizona, where there was adequate rainfall, probably cleared small fields in the forest, planted maize and other crops with digging sticks, and weeded them with wooden hoes. Western Apaches believe that they first obtained corn and learned to farm from their Hopi and Pueblo allies, who they called “People of the Rock,” and their Piman-speaking O’odham (“the people”) enemies. Like the Akimel O’odham (“river people”) of the Salt and Gila River Valleys and San Juan Pueblos, these same Ndé groups learned to soak corn kernels in water prior to planting. Chihenes, Western Apaches, and Jicarillas also practiced canal irrigation, which they likely learned from Western Pueblos. Although Ndé groups were not able to
farm extensively enough to rely solely on that activity for subsistence, the vast majority adapted to the ecological instability of their environment by combining farming with hunting and gathering. This means that prior to Spanish contact most Apaches were semisedentary rather than nomadic and had clearly defined home territories centered around their cultivated fields.¹³

That said, Ndé men and women clearly still traveled to hunt, gather, trade, visit relatives, and fight their enemies. They used dogs to carry their belongings and trade goods in small packs on a travois, and most Ndé women also used carrying baskets and baby carriers. On the eve of Spanish contact, Ndé groups generally got along well with neighboring native peoples, including their Dine kin to the north, eastern Utes and Shoshones from the Great Basin, Pueblo peoples along the Rio Grande, and Caddos on the southern plains. They exchanged origin stories, trade goods, and ideas about home-building, religious ceremonies, and agriculture with these groups. Their primary commercial competitors in the early 1500s were the Teyas or ancestral Jumanos, who, like eastern Ndé groups of the southern plains, traded bison meat and robes, deerskins, and tallow to Pueblos and Caddos. In addition, eastern Apacheans traded Alibates chert, finished tools, freshwater shell ornaments, and pottery to these groups in a trade network that extended at least as far northward as the Jemez Mountains and westward to the Pacific Coast.¹⁴

The Ndé and their neighbors also worked together to overcome environmental challenges to subsistence and quality of life before and after Coronado’s arrival in the region. Two of the most serious were periodic widespread droughts and the extreme cold brought by the Little Ice Age beginning in 1350. The colder weather initially prompted Ndé groups to move southward in tandem with the game animals they hunted. The resulting wetter climate, however, also led to a rise in the bison population and increased trading of bison-related products across the region from 1450 to 1550.¹⁵

Although archaeologists have demonstrated that warfare was commonplace across precontact Native North America, thus far, they have uncovered minimal evidence of Ndé-initiated violence against their neighbors. O’odham oral tradition and archaeological evidence indicate they probably participated in the destruction of the Hohokam trade center of Casa Grande around 1400, but that is not certain. Given that the word “Apache” most likely derived from the Zuni word for the Navajos, ápachu (“enemy”), and that Apaches themselves regarded the O’odham and Jumanos as enemies, they must have committed some violent acts
against these peoples prior to Spanish contact, but one should not assume they were inherently warlike or the most violent people in the region.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Ndé Spanish Policy: From Avoidance to Resistance}

In contrast to their embrace of Friar Benavides, the initial Ndé response to Spanish military exploration of their territory was avoidance. The Ndé likely first learned about Spanish slave-raiding expeditions from their conversations with native peoples in Sonora prior to the arrival of Francisco Vásquez de Coronado’s expedition in 1540. The three encounters that Coronado eventually had with so-called Querecho or Vaquero Apaches of the southern plains, however, were all peaceful. According to one Spanish member of the expedition, the Vaqueros were “a kind people and not violent” and “hold faithfully to friendship.” Given that Coronado and his men noted their frequent exchanges of bison and deer products for Pueblo maize and blankets, the evidence suggests that Vaqueros also continued to get along well with neighboring Pueblos. As late as 1665, Chihepes were still “asking for baptism,” and Franciscans were “settling and giving ecclesiastical ministers” to them. As one scholar convincingly argued more than fifty years ago, prior to 1667, the Diné were the Athapaskan-speaking group who demonstrated the most frequent and intense hostility toward Spaniards and Pueblos.\textsuperscript{17}

Rather than resorting to raiding and warfare, the Ndé of the southern plains, who Spaniards called Querechos, Vaqueros, and Perillos, began acquiring Spanish horses indirectly through exchanges with Pueblos, and by the early 1640s they were obtaining them by direct trade with \textit{nuevo-mexicanos}, including the Spanish governor. Eastern Ndé groups most frequently continued to travel westward to acquire horses from Pueblos along the Rio Grande villages of Pecos, Picuris, and Taos. On several occasions, however, Spanish hostilities compelled Pueblos to move eastward to live with Ndé groups on the plains of modern eastern Colorado and western Kansas, which meant that Pueblos sometimes brought horses, as well as architectural and agricultural expertise, to Apaches. In 1639, for example, Taos Pueblos rebelled against the aggressive policies of New Mexico Governor Luis de Rosas by moving in with their Plains Apache allies, constructing a pueblo that Spaniards called El Cuartelejo (“The Far Quarter”), and planting crops.\textsuperscript{18} In October 1696, Santa Clara and Picuris Pueblos repeated the pattern, when in opposition to Governor Diego de Vargas’s efforts to reconquer the region they, too, relocated to El Cuartelejo, where most remained for another decade.\textsuperscript{19}
On at least one occasion in 1650 Pueblos also attempted to drive Spanish horses to Ndé living west of the Rio Grande. After uniting in an alleged pan-Pueblo and Athapaskan plot to overthrow the Spaniards on the night of Holy Thursday, Pueblos paid a heavy price for their efforts. Spaniards arrested as many Pueblo leaders as they could find, hanging nine and selling the rest into slavery. The principal goal of this intertribal alliance, however, was not to acquire horses in order to become more formidable Spanish adversaries, but instead to deprive Spaniards of their horse supply so that Apaches could live in peace. Given the propensity of New Mexico governors to authorize Spanish troops and Pueblo auxiliaries to conduct horse-mounted punitive expeditions into the Apachería, Ndé leaders understandably deemed the horse “the principal nerve of warfare” against them, and they simply wanted to “be left in freedom, like their ancestors, in ancient times.”

Of course, Ndé men were fully capable of raiding Spanish missions and settlements to retaliate against such offensives or to acquire horses for food and transportation. But the available evidence indicates that, prior to the late 1660s, they did so less frequently and intensely than some scholars have supposed. Bison-hunting Ndé groups of the central and southern plains, who were expanding southward after 1400, forged reciprocal political, economic, and kinship ties with surrounding sedentary and semisedentary agriculturalists and wintered with them. As of 1540 the Ndé held accords not only with northern Rio Grande Pueblos at Taos, Picuris, and Pecos but also with Caddoan-speaking ancestral Wichitas and Pawnees of Quivira and the Central Plains.

By the 1600s a central policy goal of these Ndé was to gain control of the regional political economy, which meant that they now tried to cut Wichitas and Jumanos out of Rio Grande Pueblo markets. The increased Ndé sale of Wichita slaves at Pecos during the 1620s suggests heightened conflicts with their former allies. By 1660 ancestral Jicarillas, Mescaleros, and Lipans had succeeded in pushing Wichitas eastward and Jumanos southward, gaining commercial access to Humanas Pueblo. The idea, however, that Spanish colonizers “proceeded from the beginning under the cloud of Apache terror” is a gross exaggeration.

Ndé men began carrying out raids on horseback at least as early as 1671. In a period of food and resource scarcity, which began during the severe droughts of the late 1660s, mounted Ndé began targeting Piro horse herds in the Rio Abajo region. At high noon on August 1, 1671, a mixed group of equestrians consisting of ancestral Mescaleros from east of the Rio Grande whom Spaniards called Siete Ríos and Nantan El
Chilmo’s Chihenes successfully captured large numbers of horses at the Piro pueblo of Senecú, where the former Chihene leader Sanaba had regularly attended Friar Benavides’s mass more than forty years earlier. They then struck the Tompiro villages east of the Manzano Mountains in 1672, most notably sacking and burning the convent at Abó and killing Fray Pedro de Ayala. Although the Ndé regarded Pueblos as intruders in their territory, this violent aggression, in combination with drought-induced famine, nevertheless caused the abandonment of all of these pueblos, a disruption in regional trade, and the relocation of more than 1,100 Pueblo families.²²

Horses, however, were not nearly as revolutionary an acquisition as some scholars have supposed. The Ndé of the southern plains never struggled so much with their dogs as beasts of burden that they desperately begged Spaniards and Pueblos to trade them horses. Although the Ndé were initially curious about the new animals and recognized their value as a potential food source, it took them much longer to adopt them as a more efficient mode of transportation and begin revering them for spiritual power. Eastern Ndé groups were still using dogs to carry their trade goods nearly a century after Spanish contact in 1626, and they continued to rely on them until at least 1719.²³

Like the dog and travois, the bow and arrow also persisted long after Spanish contact and continued to be the Ndé’s preferred weapon for hunting and making war until well after 1800. Apaches and Spaniards alike recognized that bows and arrows were more effective weapons than harquebuses and muskets, and they were easier to maintain. Indeed, in the late eighteenth century, Ndé men could still fire four to ten times as many arrows as Spaniards could fire bullets.²⁴

Southern Athapaskan military culture was not timeless, however. The Ndé acquired enough Spanish products through trading and raiding that they began modifying and improving many aspects of their material culture. The changes in weaponry alone illustrate this trend. Although arrows persisted, flint and bone points were gradually replaced by iron and steel ones. Mounted Ndé men also made excellent use of the fifteen-foot-long Spanish lance in hunting buffalo and in raiding and warfare, which Comanches soon imitated. Guiding their horses only with their knees, charging Ndé lancers held their weapons with both hands above their heads. Lipan Apaches began acquiring French guns, powder, hatchets, and sword blades through trade with the Bidais, and neighboring plains groups to the north began acquiring them more slowly by raiding their French-allied enemies. Bows, arrows, and lances, however,
remained more important weapons than firearms for Apaches and every other Southwestern equestrian indigenous group in the colonial era.25

Contrary to Hollywood imagery, mounted Ndé men and women did not ride their horses bareback in any era. The closest they came to this was placing a robe over their horse’s back when attempting to ride with the utmost speed. In general, however, the Ndé, like all other native North American equestrians, used European saddles. They first acquired these from Spaniards, along with iron stirrups and bridle with Spanish bits. Blending the best of native and European technological traditions, by at least 1694 Ndé young men were protecting their horses and themselves from enemy arrows with leather armor made from buffalo skins, and by the 1720s eastern Ndé groups were painting it red, blue, green, or white. Since pedestrian Ndé already wore leather armor prior to Spanish contact, they were not simply copying Spaniards in this case either. They were syncretically improving on their own native tradition.26

LOYAL ALLIES: THE NDÉ ROLE IN THE PUEBLO AND GREAT SOUTHWESTERN REVOLTS

Regardless of whether the Ndé initially embraced or despised Spanish horses, as Pueblo allies and active participants in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 and reverberating Great Southwestern Revolt, they began increasing the frequency and intensity of their livestock raids. Although one scholar contends that “Gila Apaches took no part in the Pueblo Revolt, being far to the south,” the reality is that they and other Ndé groups played a major role in both conflicts by welcoming fleeing mission Indians into their camps, assisting rebelling missionized indigenous groups, and attacking any missionized Indians who were serving as Spanish allies.27

The extent of Ndé-initiated destruction of Pueblo villages during the revolt, however, has been exaggerated both by Pueblos themselves in Spanish documents and by scholars who uncritically treat Pueblo testimony at face value. When a mixed Pueblo group of Piros and Tiwas apologized to Governor Antonio de Otermín in December 1681 for taking up arms against Spaniards because “they had believed themselves ambushed by Apaches,” it should be taken with a very large grain of salt.28 These informants were clearly only telling Spaniards what they wanted to hear.

Blaming acts of indigenous violence solely on Apaches in the presence of potentially hostile Spaniards was far less risky for Rio Grande Pueblo groups than implicating themselves or their kinsmen as traitorous rebels
because Apaches were much harder for Spaniards to locate and punish. Pueblos were simply depicting Apaches as the malicious warriors that Spaniards believed they were. After retreating southward to El Paso (modern Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua) in the fall of 1680, Spaniards had assumed that the bold and allegedly more numerous Apaches would wage relentless war on Pueblos, for they mistakenly believed that Apaches “have always oppressed them in this manner.” And when Governor Otermín first returned, he expected to find the province in shambles. Instead, although Spaniards admittedly encountered some of the expected destruction, they were shocked to find Pueblos “allied and at peace with the Apaches.”

Only a small percentage of native participants were mounted during the early years of the Pueblo Revolt. According to a Spanish officer in December 1681, slightly more than ten percent of an estimated 1,000 rebel Indians they encountered were on horseback. Those rebelling Indians who were mounted, however, still proved highly effective at intimidating Spanish troops and slowing their efforts to reoccupy the province. In late December 1681, for instance, a mixed equestrian force of more than fifty Pueblos and Apaches commanded by Picuris Pueblo leader Luis Tupatú appeared on a high bluff northeast of Isleta pueblo and caused Governor Otermín’s force to retreat southward to the town to regroup.

Although evidence is thin, it appears that by 1682 Chihenes had acquired a surplus of horses in part by raiding southward into northwestern Nueva Vizcaya. In March they made their first documented livestock raid in the province on a ranch near Casas Grandes, perhaps in conjunction with neighboring semi-nomadic Suma allies, whom Spaniards later found in their camp. In the same month, a recently escaped Jumano captive reported that “Apaches of the plains” traveled to the country of the “Apaches of the Sierra of Gila” in the Pinos Altos and Mogollon Mountains to acquire the horses they used to trade for at Pecos, which suggests that upland-dwelling Chihenes possessed more horses at this time than eastern Ndé groups on the southern plains. This makes sense, given that long-standing Rio Grande Pueblo trade networks had been disrupted by drought, disease, famine, and increased violence during the revolt and that the Ndé of the southern plains were at war with recently mounted Caddos within the year. Here, then, during the early years of the Pueblo Revolt, is clear-cut evidence of intergroup cooperation between Chihenes, Sumas, and Ndé groups east of the Rio Grande. It also constitutes the first solid evidence of Ndé livestock raiding beyond the
boundaries of their immediate territory in combination with expansion in any direction, which some historians have also mistakenly argued started much earlier.  

Although Chihenes were now engaged in at least some horse trading, the primary purpose of large-scale Ndé and Pueblo horse raids on Spaniards in the years preceding the Spanish reconquest was, quite obviously, to prevent Spaniards from reconquering native territory and reoccupying New Mexico. Imperialistic empire-building was not part of the equation. Small-scale raids were often motivated by hunger. Again, these were drought- and disease-ridden years marked by violence. Since Isleta was the only Pueblo village that had an abundant harvest in fall 1681, these Indians subsequently sought Spanish aid because they feared that rebelling Pueblos and their Navajo and Apache allies would target their crops.  

The Pueblo, Diné, and Ndé war for independence in New Mexico spread southward, inspiring other oppressed native peoples around Parral and El Paso to war against Spaniards as well. In 1683, laboring mission Indians left the mines and farms in and around Parral and fled to the surrounding mountains, where they organized and launched attacks that “totally shut off” Nueva Vizcaya’s interprovincial communications. The fact that this spin-off revolt took place near Parral is potentially significant because it is the primary place where New Mexico governors and semisedentary Manso Indian allies had sold Apache captives into slavery to work in Spanish mines, homes, and fields from the 1630s through the 1670s. Thus, Apache slaves in Parral may have participated in the uprising (see Map 1.2).  

The following spring, Jano and Suma mission Indians at Janos (in northwestern Nueva Vizcaya) and El Paso boldly followed suit. Originally planned as a Manso revolt in El Paso on Easter, Spanish officials got wind of it and promptly arrested eight leaders, including Manso and Jano principal chief Luís and several Apaches living among them. On May 6, recently arrived Jano Indians and twenty-year resident Sumas at Janos mission proved more successful, burning the mission to the ground with the help of some of Chief Chiquito’s independent Mansos and escaping with several Spanish captive women and children. A week later, missionized Sumas who had intermarried with Janos at Casas Grandes (seven miles southeast of Janos mission) left their mission as well. The revolution then spread quickly eastward to Sumas and Mansos in the Franciscan-run El Paso missions before reverberating southward again to the Conchos and other tribes living near Parral. Although it is clear that these groups
MAP 1.2 The expanding Ndé homeland, 1670–1718.
Source: Adapted from Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 90, 122, 154, 237, 242; Gerhard, North Frontier of New Spain, 280, 315; Moorhead, Presidio, 28; Eiselt, Becoming White Clay, 73–74.
were not ethnic Athapaskans, many of them intermarried with Apaches, may have worked side by side with enslaved Apaches at Casas Grandes and Parral, and soon formed a pan-Indian alliance that included Apaches in what one astute scholar has called the Great Southwestern Revolt.\textsuperscript{38}

In mid-September 1684, unnamed “enemy” Indians attacked the Franciscan-run mission and settlement at Casas Grandes, burning Spanish homes and supplies and running off the horse herd and a large number of livestock. The surviving residents were so “annihilated and destitute” that “everyone moved into the church,” where they remained for at least the next nine months. In less than a year the rebelling Indians in Nueva Vizcaya had captured “more than 2,000 cattle and horses and almost another 2,000 smaller animals,” which Captain Ramírez de Salazar believed they were doing simply because they “have nothing else to eat.”\textsuperscript{39} While hunger was a logical contributing factor, these native peoples were certainly resourceful enough to hunt and gather for food. A more likely primary goal was to weaken Spaniards’ ability to wage offensive military campaigns against them and enslave their people, just like in New Mexico.

By the spring of 1685, it was clear to Spanish officials that, like Pueblos in New Mexico, revolting mission Indians in Nueva Vizcaya were destroying missions in that province and Sonora with Apache help in an apparent drive to reassert their sovereignty and independence. As Captain Ramírez de Salazar lamented in April, “The sacred vessels have been profaned, the holy vestments have been trampled, and Our Lord has been again crucified by a new breed of [savages].” In contrast to New Mexico, many of these sacked missions – the Jano mission of Soledad at Casas Grandes; the Suma missions of Santa Gertrudis, Torreón, and Carretas; and the Chinarra settlements – were never revived. Others, such as the Concho, Toboso, and Julime missions of San Pedro; San Francisco; Nombre de Dios; San Gerónimo; and San Antonio de Julimes, Spaniards would work to restore. The precise level of Ndé involvement in all of this violence prior to 1686 remains fuzzy, however. The only clearly documented Ndé-led raids in this region in 1685 were livestock raids conducted in the spring on the Tigua and Piro missions southeast of El Paso. With little left to destroy in Nueva Vizcaya, the revolting Indians turned to Sonora in the Spring of 1685, launching three attacks on the recently completed Ópata mission of Bácerac on the Bavispe River, which was the first Spanish mission established in that province in forty years.\textsuperscript{40}

As Spaniards frantically began constructing five new presidios including Janos to contain this resurgent native revolution in 1686, Chihene
groups west of the Rio Grande and so-called Siete Rios groups east of it retained their political alliances and family ties with Sumas, Mansos, Janos, and Jocomes. Fed up with Spaniards coercing them to work in surrounding silver mines and Spanish livestock trampling their crops, missionized Conchos, Tarahumaras, Sonoran O’odham, Tepehuanes, and numerous other Nueva Vizcayan bands joined the action in the spring of 1690, along with Piman-speaking Sobaipuris from the San Pedro River Valley and Seris in Sonora in 1691. In the southwestern corner of the Sierra Tarahumara these rebels deliberately killed Spanish horses and livestock and burned the missions, just as Pueblos did in New Mexico. As the Christianized Concho Indian Francisco clearly stated, “All we want to do is live like we used to.”

Some of the earliest evidence of coordinated southwestern expansion among Ndé groups west of the Rio Grande and their southern neighbors occurred in the spring of 1688. In May of that year and the following June, Chihenes, who “before this seemed to be contented” along the Gila River “and never invaded” Sonora, joined Jocomes, Sumas, and Janos and twice struck the Ópata pueblo of Santa Rosa north of Cuquierarachi. According to six Manso emissaries at Janos presidio, Chihenes, Janos, Jocomes, Sumas, O’odham, and Sobas together crossed into Sonora again in March 1691, targeting Bacachito pueblo near Chinapa. In August 1691 Spaniards discovered a multitribal confederation of Chihene Apaches, Chief Chiquito’s Mansos, Janos, Sumas, Jocomes, and O’odham all residing together in the Florida Mountains north of Janos (south of today’s Deming, NM, in Luna County), and Governor Vargas noted frequent communication between groups of two to six mountain-dwelling Apaches who visited Manso converts in El Paso and intermarriage between independent Apaches and rebelling Mansos and Sumas.

In response to the perceived threat of this Chihene-led pan-Indian alliance, Spaniards launched one of their earliest punitive expeditions into the Chi’llaa from Nueva Vizcaya in October 1691. This coordinated campaign, which departed from Janos presidio under the command of New Mexico Governor Vargas and Captain Juan Fernández de la Fuente, initially failed to engage any enemy Indians whatsoever. But after returning south to the Ópata pueblo of Teuricachi, Sonora, for provisions, and proceeding northward to the Gila River, “they came upon rancherías of Apaches” on both sides of the river and succeeded in capturing two of their men and twenty-three women and children. According to Fernández, they attacked the right group. He claimed these
Apaches “used to make war” on Spaniards settled in New Mexico and were the same ones “making a very raw war” around El Paso, Janos, and in Sonora. Despite this campaign’s seeming “success,” its main result was an escalation of Chihene-led indigenous violence around Janos in the ensuing months. 43

On the heels of a bloody battle near Janos in February 1692, however, the Chihenes and their allies asked for peace, which Captain Fernández granted. The Janos commander issued Chihene leaders gifts of clothing and supplies, which resulted in a one-month cease fire. While a duplicitous Fernández prepared for a spring attack against the Chihenes in spite of the peace agreement, Chihenes and their allies responded with a deadly ruse of their own. After showing up at Janos under the guise of peace, they attacked and wounded several Spaniards, which one scholar has argued was an act of revenge for the prior October campaign. 44 But these were not typical Apache fighting tactics, and Chihenes had likely already avenged those deaths with their attacks on Janos from the previous November through February. What seems more likely is that they discovered that Fernández was treacherously preparing a spring punitive
expedition against them, and they decided to respond proactively, just like Fernández, by employing the very same treacherous tactics that Spanish officers routinely used against them.

Throughout the late seventeenth century, Spanish officers in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora generally understood the Apaches they fought to be Gila Apaches whose home base lay at the headwaters of the Gila River and extended southward across the region of modern New Mexico, not Chiricahua Apaches based in the Sierra de Chiricaguí (today’s Chiricahua Mountains) or Western Apaches residing north of the Gila River in today’s Arizona. That said, Spanish forces and their Indian allies periodically engaged confederated Chiheños, Janos, and Jocomes camped in the Chiricahua range during the 1690s, who were beginning to use these mountains as a stronghold and should be considered ancestral Chokonens (Chiricahua). One of the earliest references to “Apaches of the Sierra of Chiguacaguí [Chiricaguí]” (Ópata for “mountains of the wild turkey”) is from November 1692, when Captain Francisco Ramírez traveled up the San Pedro River from Sonora to Aravaipa Canyon and convinced the Sobaipuris to sever their alliance with this Apache group and become Spanish allies through tactful diplomacy.

In 1696 Spanish troops also attacked Janos, Jocomes, and Apaches, who may have included resident Chiheños, in the Pinaleño Mountains, which Spaniards called the Sierra Florida. In November 1697, as Sobai-puri O’odham scouts guided the Italian-born and German-educated Jesuit Father Eusebio Kino to Casa Grande, he identified the north bank of the Gila east of these ruins as part of “the very extensive Apachería,” and in early March 1699 Piman-speaking guides told Captain Juan Mateo Manje that the Verde River “takes its rise in the land of the Apaches,” suggesting Ndé lived at its headwaters. In November 1697, Captain Manje, who accompanied Father Kino to Casa Grande, identified the same “Sierra de Santa Rosa de la Florida” (Pinaleño Mountains) as a range “where many Apaches have their habitations,” and he praised them as “the most resourceful and intelligent people found in these parts.” These groups should be regarded as ancestral Western Apaches.

Even in this violent era, Spaniards routinely exaggerated the extent of Apache-led hostilities in the region and underestimated their ability to remain self-sufficient in their home territory. Although Apaches sometimes targeted Spanish horses, mules, and cattle in New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Sonora, in many cases they were inaccurately blamed for the transgressions of their allies or of resident mission Indians themselves. In
July 1691, for example, after Governor Vargas initially received word that Apaches had stolen livestock from the relocated Piro and Tiwa (Tigua) villages of Socorro and Isleta del Sur near El Paso, he later learned that it was actually Sumas from Guadalupe mission. When Governor Vargas passed through the land of the alleged “enemy Apache” south of El Morro in early December 1692, he was surprised to discover through his Zuni guide Agustín, El Cabezón, that a maize-planting ranchería of Chihenes whom Spaniards called “Apaches Colorados” resided in the well-watered Sierra Peña Larga southwest of Acoma Pueblo, which lay near the headwaters of the Gila River and likely corresponded to the Mogollon Mountains.48

After reoccupying Santa Fe in December 1693, Spaniards worked to revive friendly relations with ancestral Jicarillas, Mescaleros, and Lipans of the southern plains. In March 1694 emissaries from “the far-flung rancherías of the Llanos Apache nation” traveled from Pecos to Santa Fe to resume peaceful relations with Vargas and the Spaniards in New Mexico. In the same month, a delegation from three of their tents proceeded to trade “buffalo meat and buckskins” to Spanish soldiers and settlers at Pecos and promised to return there in October to peacefully barter as they had in the decades preceding the devastating droughts of the late 1660s. Another Ndé headman, whom Governor Vargas called a Faraón during a May visit to Santa Fe, insisted that he be baptized, but Vargas and the priest refused, claiming that he “needed to know the prayers” first. In early July, Captain Antonio Jorge found another Apache ranchería friendly with Pecos Governor Juan de Ye camped along the road near Taos Pueblo, where they were waiting to trade. To symbolize their friendship with the Spaniards, the Ndé headman and his people all personally shook hands and embraced Captain Jorge and Governor Vargas, “surrendered their weapons,” and “willingly took the holy cross that the captain was carrying . . . to set up within sight of the sierra.” Such overt displays of accommodation may have concealed a larger Ndé policy goal. Several days later Governor Vargas found a group of Plains Apaches guarding the entrance to a funnel canyon where an at-large Taos Pueblo ranchería had camped, which suggests that the principal objective of this Ndé leader and his people was to protect their Pueblo allies from Spanish attack. Finally, the following May, an ancestral Lipan group known as Chilpaines, whose summer camp was probably on the Canadian River, traded at Picuris Pueblo and solidified an alliance there with Spaniards in October.49
To the southwest, however, things still proved more volatile. Despite the creation of a Spanish and O’odham-manned flying column headed by General Domingo Jirónza in March 1693 (or perhaps precisely because of it), Apaches, Jocomes, Janos, Sumas, and “barbarous” apostates continued to raid for Spanish livestock, kill Spaniards, and, most recently, helped paralyze “the transportation of ore from the mines.” In late September, a Spanish official in Parral described three well-traveled raiding routes taken by Apaches and their allies into resource-depleted Sonora through the Caaguiona, Bavispe, and Teuricache Valleys. The Indians’ “constant raids” through these points of entry caused the Real de Nacozari mining camp to be “nearly depopulated.”

Once in the province, Apaches and their allies tried to minimize their losses by not simply waging an all-out war. Depending on the circumstance, they alternated between resource raids and revenge raids, which the most astute Spanish observers recognized more than two centuries earlier than American anthropologists would. When the Indians sought horses, mules, and cattle, they employed stealth, traveling in small groups of three to four men, and watching “the ranches and pastures, and upon the slightest carelessness, they drive off all the animals.” By the time Spaniards could mobilize a response, the Indians typically had a twenty-to thirty-league head start, and sought refuge “in the roughest parts of the mountains,” where it was impossible for cavalry to reach them. If they did happen to be overtaken, which was most likely to happen if they were driving off slow-moving cattle, they would typically kill some of the animals with arrows “in order afterwards to come and eat them.” In their more violent attacks, Apaches and their allies most commonly targeted Spanish wagon trains along the Camino Real. Employing the same kinds of guerrilla tactics as in their resource raids to minimize their losses, they would fall on the most weakly guarded pack trains “in the narrowest and mountainous passes,” where Spanish horses could not travel quickly. After first “striking down the horses” with arrows, the Indians then proceeded to capture or kill the defenseless escorts, depending on their level of advantage.

Frustrated Janos acting commander Juan Fernández de la Fuente, who knew these raiding Indians very well, lamented another rebel Indian raiding strategy, which Apaches would rely on for centuries. The officer noted that Apaches had united and “always travel together” with “Janos, Jocomes, Mansos, Sumas, and Chinarras” through the undefended and impenetrable mountainous extension of their homeland along the territorial border between Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora “where they always
have their habitations.”

This represented significant southward territorial expansion for Apaches in this time period.

In June 1695 Spanish officers tried to negotiate peace terms with many of the rebel Indians. On the afternoon of June 17, Generals Domingo Terán de los Rios and Juan Fernández de la Fuente left Janos presidio in command of a mixed force of Spanish troops and Yaqui, Seri, Tepoca, Ópata, and O’odham allies. After a brief skirmish on a Sonoran hilltop near the confluence of the Cajón Bonito and San Bernadino Rivers with a group of Indians that included Suma, Chinarra, and Jano families carrying only food, they trailed the group to their camp in the Chiricahua Mountains, where several captives and an emissary led them to believe they would find all of the Indians – Janos, Jocomes, Sumas, Chinarras, Mansos, Apaches, and their Ópata captives. By the time General Fernández and a seriously ill General Terán reached that sierra on June 29 and met with Jocome leader El Tabobo (“Great Chief”), however, they learned that only two Apache rancherías remained among them. Fernández initially found the interethnic force of Janos, Jocomes, Mansos, Sumas, and Chinarras to be well armed with muskets, swords, and lances and some to be “mounted on Spanish saddles.” After visiting the Indians’ freshly swept camp, which they had arranged to look like a church, Spanish soldiers reported seeing “a high cross and three very small ones,” which El Tabobo explained symbolized “their desire for peace.” From the Spaniards’ camp along Turkey Creek near modern Paradise, AZ, General Fernández then regaled Suma, Janos, and other native male and female emissaries with rations of meat, pinole, tobacco, and flour through three rounds of peace talks. Ultimately, however, the two sides failed to reach an agreement because of mutual mistrust and the fact that the neighboring O’odham had launched their own rebellion to the west several months earlier.

Sonoran troops and Jesuit priests had helped to precipitate this latest round of indigenous violence through their own aggressive and coercive practices. In 1694 Lieutenant Antonio Solis from the recently founded Fronteras presidio unethically murdered three Piman-speaking men near San Xavier del Bac who he thought were eating stolen horse flesh, but were actually only consuming venison, and then treacherously massacred fifty unarmed Christian O’odham Indians from mission San Pedro de Tubutama in the Altar River Valley after promising to grant peace to them. Although the Indians at Tubutama had revolted prior to this and killed three Christian Ópatas, their actions were in direct response to Spanish coercion perpetrated by Jesuit priests, who employed heavy-handed
Christian Ópatas as O’dodham overseers at the mission. These abusive and excessively violent practices led to an escalation and expansion of O’dodham violence, as O’dodham from Oquitoa and surrounding villages joined those from Tubutama, destroying Altar and murdering the Sicilian-born Jesuit father Francisco Xavier Saeta at Caborca on Holy Thursday. Not to be outdone, former New Mexico Governor and General Domingo Jironza’s Sonoran flying company and some Seri allies launched a punitive campaign into the Pimería, killing innocent women and children and destroying their crops at Caborca, which led to a full-fledged O’dodham rebellion. But this was not all. Recognizing that they had failed to kill those responsible for killing Father Saeta, Father Kino and the Spanish military worked together to punish them in the middle of peace proceedings by beheading one and killing nearly fifty others, who included several innocent O’dodham leaders, most notably the peaceful headman of mission El Tupo. Now a full-scale O’dodham-Spanish war broke out until August 1695, which, given the similarity of causes, seems like an extension of the Pueblo Revolt.\(^5^4\)

At the same time that Fernández and his men rushed westward to help Sonoran troops quell the O’dodham uprising, a group of “fourteen young men” from an intermarried Jocome and Apache ranchería captured horses from the Ópata pueblos of Bacanuchi and Teuricachi. What El Tabobo considered to be young men hunting livestock to feed their hungry people, General Fernández regarded as acts of “war” that violated their “truce” and justified Spaniards waging war “with fire and blood.” The truth of the matter, however, is that the two sides never reached an agreement, and Apache leaders whom Fernández considered to be “in a state of rebellion” by not attending the peace talks were actually following a policy of neutrality, which should not have resulted in Spanish aggression.\(^5^5\) If this hunting or raiding party was guilty of anything, it was violating Spanish law, and a reasonable Spanish response would have been to reacquire the stolen animals, return them to their rightful owners, and have El Tabobo punish the men involved on their own terms. But in the midst of a widening interethnic Native rebellion, which Jocomes and Apaches had indeed participated in, Spanish officers viewed even the smallest indigenous transgressions as acts of war, which perpetuated a cycle of reciprocal violence and ensured an ongoing state of war.

In September 1695 Spaniards confirmed through their own observations that several Apache families had been living in the Chiricahua Mountains with equestrian Sumas, Janos, and Jocomes. As they walked through the Indians’ hastily abandoned camp, Spanish soldiers and their
Native allies learned that these Indians had acquired branded “horses, mares, and a burro” from the Ópata mission of Cuquiarachi, which was located thirty miles south of modern Agua Prieta on a tributary of the Fronteras River. The Indians were mounted, eating the horses for food, and the women had been tanning hides, which likely came from these same animals. From native informants General Fernández learned that the perpetrators of this raid were from the Apache leader El Salinero’s ranchería, which Jocomes had joined, and were camped “on the west side of the Santa Rosa Mountains” (today’s Pinaleño Mountains). Another Ndé ranchería was camped in the woods along the Gila River near modern Safford, AZ, with Mansos, Sumas, Janos, and Chinarras. As one female Indian captive clearly stated, “the Apaches had been friends with the Janos, Jocomes, Sumas, and Mansos for a long time and always traveled together.”

On September 16, 1695, the Jocomes at last agreed to make peace with General Fernández under the same terms discussed two months previously at Turkey Creek. Both sides were war weary and suffering from illness. The Jocome governor and two emissaries were too ill to participate in the negotiations and Generals Fernández, Terán, and Jironza were all too sick to ride a horse. The symptoms, which an untold number of rebel Indians, Spanish soldiers, and Indian allies were also suffering from, included fever, chills, and convulsions. By late September, approximately 170 Piman-speaking O’odham and Ópata allies, constituting 85 percent of a mixed force of O’odham, Ópata, and Concho auxiliaries, deserted the Spaniards, while others, including General Terán, became so sick that they died. According to one Spanish officer, they contracted the illness from drinking stagnant water “poisoned by enemy Indians,” but the more likely source was a virus from the contaminated water itself. After decades of fighting rebellious mission Indians and their allies, Spanish troops and two hundred Indian allies had made one of their deepest penetrations into the Apachería. Camped near modern Apache Pass, they stood a mere thirty leagues from their adversaries along the Gila River. But in a most profound irony, both sides were bedridden with the same deadly illness and compelled to make peace with one another. After collecting as much information as he could from his compliant captives, who consisted of three male Jocomes and two female Indians, and having them baptized, General Fernández promptly ordered them shot and hanged in front of his entire disease-ridden camp, in an attempt to foster honesty and loyalty via fear.

Meanwhile, as Governor Vargas’s reconquering force reentered New Mexico from El Paso, recently pacified Pueblo leaders kept them off
balance by spreading rumors of impending pan-Indian attacks. In the spring of 1696, for example, Governor Bartolomé de Ojeda of the Keres pueblo of Santa Ana stated that a group of “Chilmo and Faraón Apaches, Tanos, and Mansos” were gathered at Acoma Pueblo and were waiting for the Zunis and Hopis (Moquis) to join them so that they could collectively “destroy this kingdom.” Although this was an exaggeration, it contained elements of truth. El Chilmo’s Chihenes, Mansos, and the Keres Pueblos of Acoma were allies, and Pueblos knew that preying on Spanish fears of Apaches by playing up Apache violence was an effective way to divert Spanish attention. The fact that some pacified Pueblo groups did revolt again in July and made their way to well-watered and game-plentiful Navajo territory to the northwest and El Cuartelejo to the northeast also demonstrates that at the very least the rumor of forthcoming indigenous coalescence, if not actual violence, bore truth. Further evidence of the ongoing harmonious relations between Pueblos and Apaches east and west of the Rio Grande in 1696 is that Governor Vargas sought to break up an alliance between Acoma Pueblo and “Faraón and Salinero Apaches, the rancherías of the sierra of Gila, and the Chilmo Apaches, who command all the Apaches of this sierra.”

In spite of the strong trend of indigenous alliance-building, Spaniards managed to regain a foothold in New Mexico over the next two years and subsequently rebuild alliances with Apache groups east and west of the Rio Grande. Governor Diego de Vargas and the Spaniards had reasserted control of Santa Fe by January 1694, and his successor, Governor Pedro Rodríguez Cubero successfully quelled a second Pueblo revolt launched in June 1696, and pacified the Pueblos of the upper Rio Grande Valley in December 1698. By April 1702, eastern Ndé groups and El Chilmo’s Chihenes were all at peace with Spaniards in New Mexico.

From an Ndé perspective, making peace with the Governor of New Mexico had no bearing on their relations with Spaniards in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. Confederated Apaches, Jocomes, Janos, Sumas, and Mansos targeted the corn and livestock-rich villages of the Spanish-allied Sobaipuri and Akimel O’odham in seasonal acts of war in early 1698. After sacking and burning Cocósperra pueblo and wounding Father Ruiz de Contreras in late February, they then destroyed the Sobaipuri ranchería of Santa Cruz de Gaybanipitea at dawn on Easter Sunday in late March 1698, which prompted the usual retaliatory expeditions by Spaniards and their Piman-speaking O’odham allies. This time, however, the O’odham were unusually successful. El Coro, the principal Sobaipuri leader from neighboring Quiburí, had just returned from San Xavier del
Bac, and engaged the Apaches and their allies at Santa Cruz with five hundred O’odham armed with poisoned arrows, killing between 168 and 300 Indians, who were predominately Janos and Jocomes. Despite the fact that El Coro’s Sobaipuris immediately relocated farther westward out of fear of Apache- and Jocome-led retaliation after this victory, they had inflicted enough casualties on this confederation that several of these war-weary groups sought peace at Janos and El Paso.60

NEGOTIATING PEACE

By the spring of 1698, then, Spanish, Ópata, and especially O’odham offensives had taken their toll and the pan-Indian Great Southwestern Revolt was losing steam. In October a Jocome emissary initiated peace proceedings with General Juan Fernández at Janos presidio on behalf of a portion of independent Ndé and Janos, Jocomes, Sumas, and Mansos. As a symbol of their collective good faith, the Jocome leader gave General Fernández an intricately painted tanned deerskin, just as Chihene leader Sanaba had done for Friar Alonso Benavides more than sixty years earlier. The deerskin depicted a sun surrounded by twelve stripes, which symbolized the number of days that they had been in favor of making peace, and perhaps also was supposed to correspond with the number of Jesus’s disciples. Six large circles near the sun delineated six Ndé tents who “come to give obedience to His Majesty” on behalf “of their nation.” An additional “one hundred and twenty marks . . . painted as jacals . . . in four divisions” represented the General and “three principal chiefs” of the “four rancherías of Jano, Jocome, Manso, and Suma Indians with their families” who negotiated “the said peace.” As a reciprocal sign of Spanish good faith, General Fernández had given gifts to these leaders, which were also depicted on the deerskin, and “two short stripes” symbolized that the treaty would commence within “the time of two moons.” The deerskin also contained an image of Janos presidio and five drops of ink signifying the short five-day journey that the Indians had taken to reach it. If these symbols were all that the deerskin contained, they would seem representative of a potential enduring peace between the former adversaries. But the Jocome emissary explained that two stripes on a different part of the deerskin “are a sign that one who flees, once settled in peace” will be punished by “hanging.” Taken at face value, these marks represented the Indians’ desire to comply with Spanish law. The emissary’s reference to “hanging,” however, almost certainly referred to General Fernández’s callous killing and hanging of innocent Jocome male
and female informants in the fall of 1695. When viewed in conjunction with the events that followed, this likely indicated the confederacy’s lack of trust in the capacity of this officer and the Spanish military to ensure a just peace.61

Following these talks, the Janos settled at Janos presidio, the Sumas (and probably the Mansos) at El Paso del Norte and Socorro, the Chihenes, and, most importantly, the Jocomes, remained independent. The Janos and Sumas agreed to serve as Spanish allies against any “hostile” O’odham. Although Chihenes remained in their homeland of Chi’lalaa, in early August 1699, Indians whom Father Kino called “Apaches nearest the Rio Colorado,” who were either Western Apaches or Yuman-speaking Yavapais on the Verde River, followed the lead of the Janos, Jocomes, and Sumas to some extent by negotiating peace indirectly with him at the head mission of Nuestra Señora de los Dolores (Our Lady of Sorrows) at Casari in the Pimería Alta. Kino himself had initiated the accord from San Andrés in March by sending a “cross, letter, gifts, and messages” to these “Apaches” via the Hopis, and the Indians responded by making peace with the Yuman-speaking Opas and Cocomaricopas and the O’odham, and sending emissaries from these three groups to present Father Kino with “four buckskins,” on behalf of all four pacified groups, in the tradition of Sanaba and the recent Jocome leader at Janos.62

In late August Father Kino’s superior, Father Antonio Leal optimistically believed “that the Apaches were going to be reduced and embrace our holy faith” as part of a “choice Christendom,” and, for a while, Chihene actions seemed to bear this out. Regardless of what language Kino’s Verde River-dwelling “Apaches” spoke, the key point is that they were successful in negotiating peace with the Chihenes, and a Chihene delegation traveled to Dolores with the Sobaipuris to meet with Kino in October 1699. Nine years later in 1708 Kino himself still believed that the O’odham conversions would lead to “the reduction and conversion of the neighboring Apachería” and expanded northeastern trade networks with Hopis, Zunis, and New Mexico. In 1716 Kino’s successor, Father Luis Velarde, similarly believed that Apaches and all surrounding Indians could be converted if only “there were enough priests.” But there is no record of any more Ndé visits to the Jesuits after October 1699. Jesuit priests enjoyed far more success in pacifying and converting the O’odham than the Apaches.63

Although Apaches and Jocomes did not enter Spanish missions or camp near Spanish presidios, their leaders apparently still did their best
to honor their peace agreements with Spaniards by remaining independent, reducing their raiding and warfare, and adopting a policy of neutrality toward them. This is a significant change, especially in combination with missionized Janos and Sumas also remaining at peace. According to Jesuit Father Luis Velarde in 1716, ever since the Sobaipuri defeat of the confederated Apaches, Jocomes, Janos, and Sumas at Santa Cruz de Gaybanipitea in late March 1698, “there have been no enemies disturbing” any Sonoran town, which suggests peace had endured in that province for at least eighteen years.64

Yet, not all first-hand observers agreed with Father Velarde. In 1703, Velarde’s predecessor, Father Eusebio Kino, noted that Apaches, Jocomes, Janos, and Sumas continued pushing deeper southward into Sonora and farther westward into the Pimería every year, as they had been doing since at least the Janos uprising of 1696, and, more accurately, since the Suma uprising of 1684. This trend of seasonal southward and westward raiding would continue, with periodic cycles of peace and more intensified revenge raids, for most of the eighteenth century. In February 1701, more than two hundred Apaches, Jocomes, Janos, and Sumas renewed their assault on the semisedentary Ópatas, attacking the exposed rancho of Saracachi on the San Miguel River, which lay fifty miles south of Cocóspera, killing six, wounding seven, sacking all but two homes, and carrying off horses, mares, and “all the sheep and goats.”65

Most Spaniards, however, believed they had reached a turning point in pacifying surrounding Native peoples as of 1698. Regardless of the fact that Apaches and the remaining confederated and affiliated former mission Indians remained independent and outside of Spanish control, the seemingly endless series of revolts by missionized Indians across northern New Spain – the Great Southwestern Revolt – had ceased. Spanish officials in Sonora viewed the 1720s and 1730s as decades of relative peace. Missionized Indians would not rebel against Spaniards again until the Yaqui and Mayo uprising of 1740, and Apache raids would not reach the same level of intensity as the 1690s until the 1750s in conjunction with the O’odham rebellion of 1751.66 In the meantime, enough O’odham, Ópata, Tarahumara, and Pueblo men were serving Spanish interests as Indian allies to reassert control of New Mexico’s Rio Grande Valley and of northern Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora and to prevent Apaches from completely overrunning the region.

From an Ndé standpoint, a less clear-cut turning point had been reached.67 Their most significant postcontact cultural transformations
had occurred after 1670, when Ndé men became equestrians and expanded their territory southward, eastward, and westward in conjunction with the creation of new Ndé subgroups. This transpired most rapidly and endurably west of the Rio Grande, as Chihenes expanded their territory southwestward into western Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora in conjunction with Chokonen and Western Apache ethnogenesis. At the same time, bison-hunting eastern Ndé groups expanded southeastward, pressuring Jumanos, Coahuiltecs, and Caddos to seek protection in Spanish missions in South and East Texas in the early 1680s. By 1686 ancestral Jicarillas, Mescaleros, and Lipans of the central and southern plains, whom Spaniards called Palomas, Cuartelejos, Carlanas, Jicarillas, Faraones, Natagés, and Ypandes, were the “owner[s] and possessor[s] of all of the plains” of “Cíbola.” The majority of these groups maintained peaceful commercial relations with Spaniards and Pueblo groups in New Mexico, while defending their central position in the regional political economy against surrounding Jumanos, Caddos, Wichitas, and Pawnees and encroaching Utes and Comanches between the 1680s and 1720s. This escalating war over control of the regional buffalo, horse, and slave trade would prove much more transformative and disruptive than any peace agreements or military engagements with Spaniards in New Mexico, Texas, Nueva Vizcaya, or Sonora prior to 1750. 

Out of these intertribal wars, the Jicarilla, Lipan, and Mescalero groups would emerge. In the first half of the eighteenth century Ndé groups would continue to target Spanish livestock at missions, presidios, and ranches in seasonal raids, while doing their utmost to protect their women, children, and elderly and retain control of their territory. As long as Spanish troops and their growing number of Indian allies continued to campaign against Ndé families, and Spanish missionaries and presidial officers failed to offer Ndé families the same gifts, livestock, housing, and protection they offered their other Native allies, the Ndé believed they were completely justified in reciprocally taking these resources for themselves and offsetting their own captured, killed, and enslaved kinsmen by capturing Spanish and Indian women and children. Attempting to resolve this contradiction, some Spanish priests and military officers negotiated mutually beneficial agreements with Apache leaders after 1700, much like Friar Alonso de Benavides and Sanaba had once done in 1628. The next chapter explores the origins of this understudied pattern and the development of Spanish-run reservations for Apaches by the 1780s.
Notes


2 Benavides, *Benavides’ Memorial*, 43–44; Benavides, *Memorial*, 264, 133–136. Chihene Nde Nation of New Mexico Chairman Manuel P. Sanchez believes that Sanaba’s pueblo lay near Monticello Box Canyon along Cañada Alamosa Creek (personal communication). Offering no citation, Frederick W. Hodge believed Sanaba’s “pueblo of Xila” lay “probably about the head of Corduroy canyon in Socorro County.” See Benavides, *Memorial*, 42. Hodge’s statement dates back to the first published version of Benavides’ Memorial of 1630. See Mrs. Edward A. Ayer, trans., Frederick W. Hodge, ann., and Charles F. Lummis, ed., “Early Western History: Benavides’s Memorial of 1630,” *The Land of Sunshine* 13 (December 1900): 439. As Sanchez has correctly determined, however, Corduroy Canyon is much farther west than the fourteen-league (approximately forty-two-mile) distance from mission San Antonio de Senecú that Friar Benavides gave for the location of Sanaba’s pueblo (personal communication). The Athapaskan word “Chi’laa” and definition are from Lorraine Garcia (personal communication). For Gila Apache territory encompassing “southwestern New Mexico,” see Schroeder, *Apache Indians IV*, 235.


and utilized in virtually the same manner as mescal. On the importance of agaves to indigenous cultures of the Chihuahuan and Sonoran deserts, see Cynthia Radding, “Agaves, Human Cultures, and Desert Landscapes in Northern Mexico,” *Environmental History* 17 (January 2012): 84–115.


For the Ndé attacks on the Piro pueblos, see Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 162–163,166; Schroeder, Apache Indians IV, 21–23. According to Schroeder, El Chilmo’s Gilas were probably ancestors of Warm Springs Apaches. The Ndé belief that Pueblos intruded on their territory comes from Lorraine Garcia (personal communication). For the Ndé attacks on the Tompiro pueblos and their abandonment, see, “Petition [of Father Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Mexico, May 10, 1679,]” translated in Hackett, Historical Documents, vol. III, 298; Escalante to Morfi, Santa Fe, April 2, 1778, translated in Twitchell, Spanish Archives, para. 2, 269; Schroeder, “Shifting for Survival,” 297; Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 170.


Jack S. Williams and Robert L. Hoover, Arms of the Apachería: A Comparison of Apachen and Spanish Fighting Techniques in the Later Eighteenth Century (Greeley, CO: Museum of Anthropology, University of
Northern Colorado, 1983), 48–52; Goodwin, Western Apache Raiding and Warfare, 259.


27 For the quotation, see Blyth, Chiricahua and Janos, 34. For contrary perspectives, supporting a more active Ndé role in these conflicts, see Eiselt, Becoming White Clay, 78; Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 163, 178–182, 190–193.

28 “March of the army from El Paso to La Isleta,” November 5–December 8, 1681, in Hackett and Shelby, Revolt of the Pueblo Indians, 208.


30 “[Declaration] of Diego López [Sambrano, Hacienda of Luis Carbajal, December 22, 1681],” in Hackett and Shelby, Revolt of the Pueblo Indians, 293.


33 Frank Secoy, for example, without citing any specific examples of Apache raiding, argues that Apache eastward expansion began in conjunction with Spanish enslavement of Apaches in Parral in 1659. See Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 22–23.

34 “Opinions given in the junta de guerra, Hacienda de Luis Carbajal, December 23, 1681,” in Hackett and Shelby, Revolt of the Pueblo Indians, 324.
“Reply of the Fiscal, Don Martín de Solís Miranda, Mexico, June 25, 1682,” in Hackett and Shelby, Revolt of the Pueblo Indians, 377.

Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 193. For quotation, see “Extract of a paper which Don Lope de Sierra wrote in regard to matters touching upon the kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya [undated; subsequent to the year 1683],” in Charles Wilson Hackett, ed., Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, vol. II (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), 219.


Captain Francisco Ramírez de Salazar to the viceroy the Marqués de la Luna, Casas Grandes Valley, April 14, 1685, in Naylor and Polzer, Presidio and Militia, vol. 1, 530.

For the quotation and the Ndé attacks on Bácerac, see Salazar to Luna, Casas Grandes Valley, April 14, 1685, in Naylor and Polzer, Presidio and Militia, vol. 1, 532, 532n17. For the fates of the sacked missions in Nueva Vizcaya and the mistaken argument that indigenous expansion into Sonora did not begin until 1686, see Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 205, 207. For the 1685 raids, see “Declaration of the sergeant, captain, and head of the presidio,” Roque de Madrid, El Paso del Norte, April 13, 1685 in Naylor and Polzer, Presidio and Militia, vol. 1, 541.

For the quotation and the attacks on Santa Rosa pueblo, see Juan Nentvig, S. J., Rudo Ensayo: tentativa de una prevencional descripción geográfica de la provincia de Sonora, sus terminos, y confines (St. Augustine: [Albany, Munsell, printer], 1863), 189. For an English translation, see Juan Nentvig, S. J., Rudo Ensayo: Arizona and Sonora in 1763 (1894; reprint, Tucson: Arizona Silhouettes, 1951), 139. See also Schroeder, Apache Indians IV, 20. This passage is omitted from the 1764 version of the document. For the multitribal confederation, see Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 226–229; “Diego de Vargas to the Conde de Galve, El Paso, 14 August 1691, LS,” in Diego de Vargas, By Force of Arms: The Journals of Don Diego de Vargas, New Mexico, 1691–93, ed. John L. Kessell and Rick Hendricks (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), 77, 116–153. For Sonoran expansion, see José Manuel Espinosa, “The Legend of Sierra Azul,” New Mexico Historical Review 9 no. 2 (April 1934): 129; Schroeder, Apache Indians IV, 27. Sobas were part of the Piman-speaking Tohono O’odham (Papago) who lived around Caborca in northwest Sonora. See Hodge, Handbook of American Indians, 608.

For the first quotation, see Letter of Juan Fernández de la Fuente, December 12, 1691, AGI, Guadalajara, 139, and for the remaining ones, see Report of Juan Fernández de la Fuente, April 29, 1692, AGI, Guadalajara, 139, both translated in Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 230–231.

For Gila Apaches and their home territory in the late seventeenth century, see Schroeder, “Documentary Evidence,” 144–145; Espinosa, “Legend of Sierra,” 129–130; “Diego de Vargas to the Conde de Galve, El Paso, 14 August 1691, LS,” and “Declaration of Captain Antonio Jorge,” El Paso, August 12, 1691, in Vargas, By Force of Arms, 76–77, 147. For allied Gilas, Janos, and Jocomes as ancestral Chiricahuas by 1700, see Schroeder, “Shifting for Survival,” 300–301. For an intriguing but unproven argument that “Jocome” is a Spanish derivation of “Chokonen,” and that Jocomes and the Athapaskan-speaking Chokonen or Chiricahua were the same people and occupied the same territory from the Chiricahua Mountains westward to the San Pedro River, see Jack Douglas Forbes, “The Janos, Jocomes, Mansos and Sumas Indians,” New Mexico Historical Review 32 (October 1957): 322–324. For a fallacious counterargument “that the Jocomes, Sumas, and Janos were in no way related to the Apaches,” see Schroeder, Apache Indians IV, 42 (italics are my own). Schroeder contends that Jocomes exhibited Yuman cultural characteristics and did not appear in northern Sonora until 1684. See Schroeder,
Apache Indians IV, 47, 53. Lorraine Garcia, while not going as far as Schroeder, still cautions about deeming the Janos and Jocomes to be Chihene or Chiricahua ancestors, when Mexican and Texas history place them in their place specific areas separate from traditional Apache areas (personal communication).

46 Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 244–245; Rufus Kay Wyllys, ed. and trans., “Padre Luis Velarde’s Relación de Pimeria Alta, 1716,” New Mexico Historical Review 6 no. 2 (April 1931): 238; Father Luis de Velarde, “description of the site, longitude and latitude of the nations of the Pimería and its northern adjoining nations, the land of California,” May 30, 1716, in Manje, Unknown Arizona and Sonora, 247. For the meaning of Chiricaguí, see Nentvig, Rudo Ensayo, 2113; Schroeder, Apache Indians IV, 117.


49 On the Spanish reoccupation of Santa Fe and subsequent alliances with eastern Apaches, see J. Manuel Espinosa, “The Recapture of Santa Fé, New Mexico, by the Spaniards, December 29–30, 1693,” Hispanic American Historical Review 19 (1939): 443–463; Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 250–257, 262. For the quotations, see Diego de Vargas, “Campaign journal[],” “28 January–30 March 1694, DS,” “30 April–7 May 1694, DS,” and “28 June–16 July 1694, DS,” “Diego de Vargas to the Conde de Galve, Letter of transmittal, Santa Fe, 1 September 1694, C,” and “Vargas to the Conde de Galve, Santa Fe, 9 May 1695, C,” in Diego de Vargas, Blood on the Boulders: The Journals of Don Diego de Vargas, New Mexico, 1694–97, ed. John L. Kessell, Rick Hendricks, and Meredith D. Dodge (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 177, 219, 292, 359, 628. The first two quotations are from 177, the third is from 219, and the remaining two are from 292. Historian Alfred B. Thomas mistakenly thought that this was the first use of the term “Faraon”; however, Spaniards had employed that word to describe Apaches living east of the Rio Grande from Pecos to El Paso since at least January 1675 because the Indians allegedly did not know or respect God. See Thomas, After Coronado, 23–24; Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 171; Willem J. de Reuse, “Synonymy” in Opler, “Apachean Culture Pattern,” 390. For Chilpaines as

50 For the respective quotations, see Manje, *Unknown Arizona and Sonora*, 5–6; the *maestre de campo* Don Joseph Marín to his Excellency the Count of Galve, Parral, September 30, 1693 in Hackett, *Historical Documents*, vol. II, 399.

51 For the classic articulation of mid-nineteenth-century Apache raiding and warfare tactics, see Goodwin, *Western Apache Raiding and Warfare*, 16–18. For the quotations, see the *maestre de campo* Don Joseph Marín to the Conde de Galve, Parral, September 30, 1693, in Hackett, *Historical Documents*, vol. II, 397. For Indian raids on Sonora’s Camino Real, see Diego García de Valdés to the *maestre de campo* Don Joseph Francisco Marín, Parral, September 26, 1693, in Hackett, *Historical Documents*, vol. II, 379.


53 Captain Juan Fernández de la Fuente to Gen. and Gov. Gabriel del Castillo, Janos, October 6, 1695, in Naylor and Polzer, *Presidio and Militia*, vol. 1, 587–596, 594n26, 648, 651. For quotations, see 594–595 and for “Great Chief,” see 648.


55 Captain Juan Fernández de la Fuente to Gen. and Gov. Gabriel del Castillo, Janos, October 6, 1695, in Naylor and Polzer, *Presidio and Militia*, vol. 1, 641–651. For the quotations, see 643, 651.


57 Captain Juan Fernández de la Fuente to Gen. and Gov. Gabriel del Castillo, Janos, October 6, 1695, in Naylor and Polzer, *Presidio and Militia*, vol. 1,
642–646, 643n84, 648, 653. For the quotation, see 643. On Ópatas, as Piman-speaking, see Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, 138.

58 For the first two quotations, see “Diego de Vargas to fray Francisco de Vargas, Reply to petition, Santa Fe, 8 March 1696, DS,” in Vargas, *Blood on the Boulders*, 679. For the July 1696 uprising, see “Diego de Vargas to Juan de Ortega Montañés, Santa Fe, 30 July 1696, C,” in Vargas, *Blood on the Boulders*, 861. For the last quotation, see “Diego de Vargas to the Conde de Moctezuma, Letter of transmittal, 24 November 1696, Santa Fe, DS,” in Vargas, *Blood on the Boulders*, 1065.


Bolton contends that these Indians were Yavapais, who were inaccurately called Mohave Apaches. See Bolton, *Rim of Christendom*, 424.


