
Professor James H. Bater's study of St. Petersburg explores the ways in which industrialization transformed the face of the city and the life of its population during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The book is organized around three central questions: First, how did the character of the industrial establishment in St. Petersburg change during the half-century before the First World War, and why? In response to this question, Mr. Bater provides a fascinating and richly detailed discussion of the fate of St. Petersburg's various industries and commercial endeavors, taking the reader beyond the generic term "industrialization" to a comparative examination of specific enterprises.

Second, Mr. Bater analyzes the spatial development of the city's industrial establishment, testing the extent to which St. Petersburg's industrial expansion conformed to the general tenets of location theory which urban historians have derived from the study of comparable cities. In doing so, he raises a series of related questions: What criteria were decisive in choosing sites for industrial expansion? To what extent did similar and related industries begin to cluster together in an effort to promote efficiency? Did the location of new industrial establishments foster the division of the city into clearly defined rich and poor neighborhoods? Finally, did St. Petersburg witness the development of suburbs so characteristic of comparable European and American cities? Mr. Bater's most original contribution lies in the answers he provides to these questions. He shows convincingly that, contrary to the "normal" pattern of spatial development (which he takes as his hypothesis), there was almost no tendency for related industries in St. Petersburg to concentrate. The main reason for the continued dispersal of businesses and industries was the absence within the city of an adequate and cheap inner-city transportation system. A long journey to work was not feasible for workers, and even factory owners and businessmen who could afford the trip preferred to reside near their work. Thus, inadequate transport made proximity to workers' housing the prime consideration in locating industry, and explains why factors, otherwise rational, such as major interurban transportation networks, were so frequently ignored. The absence of cheap public transportation meant that the city as a whole, despite the presence of some well-to-do neighborhoods, retained a mixture of rich and poor even in the best districts. Whatever segregation was brought about by wealth tended to be vertical rather than horizontal, with the poor occupying overcrowded cellars and attics throughout the city. The same lack of convenient public transportation also postponed significant suburban development until after 1913.

The final question addressed by Mr. Bater is how the conditions of life for the city's residents changed during the period under study. The most important fact to remember is that the size of the city's population quadrupled between 1850 and 1914. So rapid a growth created a real crisis in housing and placed an enormous strain on the city's already inadequate municipal services. The death rate from infectious disease was higher in St. Petersburg than in any other European capital, and because a large proportion of the population was composed of seasonal migrants, we can never know exactly how murderous the city's environment actually was. Mr. Bater's discussion of the city's efforts to deal with these multiple crises is particularly valuable because of the way in which he breaks down housing patterns, immigrant statistics, and death rates by district within the city.

Mr. Bater's book is based upon a broad variety of sources, from census data and city directories to newspapers, government reports, and a large number of obscure (but judiciously employed) travel reports. The numerous photographs have been
chosen well, in an effort to illustrate the main topics of the book. The forty-nine tables, twenty-one graphs, and seventy-two maps alone offer enough raw information to make it an invaluable reference work for all Russian historians. One of the book's major shortcomings is the author's tendency to rely on simplistically worded diplomatic reports for descriptions of complex domestic developments such as the Revolution of 1905 or even the industrialization process itself. Given the reasonably developed character of contemporary scholarship on these subjects, one is left puzzled by the absence of any reference to such historians as Leopold Haimson, John McKay, or Theodore von Laue.

The style of the book is quite uneven. In particular, the opening chapter, devoted in part to methodological problems, is badly written. Sentences such as "the locational trends as uncovered through hypothesis testing and how individual industries fit into the overall locational scene are points of interest" (p. 11) obfuscate rather than clarify the important problems raised in the book. One should note, however, that Mr. Bater's writing style improves with each chapter. It is as if the literary traditions of St. Petersburg itself finally triumph over the technical jargon of our own epoch.

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This is one of several recent collections of papers and articles by what might be labeled the alarmist camp—those who see a "present danger" in Soviet-American relations, who view détente as a measure of American utopianism engendered by either naïveté or the trauma of Vietnam or domestic chaos, and who perceive the Soviet Union (in James Schlesinger's words, in the preface to this volume) as a power animated by a "revolutionary zeal from which still flow[s] the motivating force behind Soviet policies. . . ." This volume presents an impressive barrage of heavy artillery by such figures as Robert Conquest, Theodore Draper, Paul Nitze, and Paul Seabury, over the imprimatur of Senator Henry Jackson.

More surprising, perhaps, than the fact that the quality of contributions varies greatly and that many (but not all) are strident and more polemical than substantial, is the somewhat perfunctory quality of most arguments: the authors have no doubt been through this exercise many times before, have argued the same points and responded to the counterarguments so often that it is unfair and futile to expect anything new. Except for the technically complex and competent arguments (be they right or wrong) by Albert Wohlstetter in the strategic realm and by Gregory Grossman in the economic, the basic lines of the argument are not only predictable but, in this reader's conviction, based on a profound misunderstanding of Soviet-American relations.

Some, like Schlesinger, insist that the Soviet view of détente is substantially the same as their view of the Cold War, and that this supports his belief in the "persistence" of Soviet strategy and tactics based on "deep-seated ideological convictions." Others, like Eugene Rostow, find expansionism "deeply embedded in the Russian mind. . . . The Czars never stopped pushing toward the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, as well as toward the Balkans, the Baltic, Korea, and Afghanistan. . . ." The sketches abound in references to the Mongol heritage, the "despotic" culture, with Russianness and communism reinforcing each other. As Robert Conquest asserts, "the Soviet rulers are the product of a long tradition. . . . They are not to be converted to new ideas by argument; hardly by experience." Even those who are not absorbed...