

Correspondence

young manhood beating about the bush civilizing the natives.

Mr. Iiams's anecdote about devotion to soccer is reminiscent of an even more affecting tale related by Al J. Venter, a South African journalist, in his book *The Terror Fighters* (Capetown and Johannesburg, 1969). A Portuguese major at Luso told Venter about leading a platoon which came across a group of guerrillas gathered about a radio listening to the World Cup finals at Wembly. According to the major, whenever the Portuguese team was on the offensive or the name of Eusébio—the great Mozambican *futebol* hero—was mentioned, the "terrorists" cheered. His own men leaned forward to hear the game. So touched was he by this display of Lusotropical solidarity that he spared the "terrorists." Some of them, according to the major, were fighting with the Portuguese army; one or two were still to be seen around town.

Nationalism has been the most vital political force of modern history. Like all political forces, it is catalyzed by passionate minorities. These are not wanting in Portuguese Africa. Portuguese education and public life are supersaturated with nationalism, but one man's glory is another man's shame, and the educated African who has been inoculated with nationalist values by the Portuguese knows he is not Portuguese. He will not say it in public if he wishes to avoid a date with the DGS—the political police—but the feeling is there, sharpened by the sense of past and present wrongs. The past was slave trading, forced labor and general brutality; the present is, at best, unavoidable repression and second-class citizenship.

I believe the Portuguese colonies some day will be independent states ruled by Africans. It may be that Portugal will succeed for a fairly long time to hold on to its empire, fending off external foes, repressing internal dissent and perhaps even flourishing economically. It would be a good trick if it can be done, but not, I think, one which merits any cheers.

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says, "puts the argument under *evidential* strain." That is, there is little or no evidence for it. Indirect evidence can count not at all. Are we, for example, to say that the twenty million Russian lives taken in the destruction of World War II was, on Stalin's part, a case of *genocidal* sacrifice, "express malice" to sacrifice a part of the Russian people *as such* with the further intention of saving Mother Russia? That may not have been worth the cost, but it was certainly not genocidal.

The case of the specific intention of genocide can be compared to the specific intention directly to attack noncombatants "with further intention." One cannot conclude from the *actus reus* of large-scale civilian destruction that this was not destruction collateral to striking the legitimate targets (the insurgent fish). One also needs *evidence* of the *mens rea*, the specific intention of destroying noncombatants *as such*. If that is difficult to prove, it is *a fortiori* more difficult to prove specific genocidal intent. That would require a showing that the objective was to get rid of Vietnamese *as such*, and not to dry up the noncombatant "ocean" or separate them from the "fish." I think neither of these things can be shown with regard to our Vietnam military policy, no more than either is likely to be the reason for the unavoidable destruction of Omaha or Colorado Springs in an adversary's future possible nuclear strike on the bases there. Of course, in such events there *may* be a violation of noncombatant immunity or there may be genocide done. But either requires a showing of specific intent. The intents would be different; but in their specificity they are alike.

One can establish, I believe, that a food blockade, the oil embargo and the very design of insurgency warfare are indiscriminate modes of war. They strike by design at populations to get at governments. The oil weapon also has terrifying indirect impact, shattering agricultural production and increasing starvation the world over that can only be

compared to "fall-out" on Third World peoples in the event of nuclear war. Yet one should hesitate to characterize those "weapons" as "genocidal" without proof that such specific intentionality governs the policy. So many "shapers of opinion" have been so busy calling our war in Vietnam "genocidal" (or simply indiscriminately "immoral") that we have torn our country apart and at the same time lost our grasp of the moral discourse needed in appraising any of these political uses of forceful means.

To condemn a war policy as disproportionate is one thing. To say instead or in addition that it is indiscriminate or genocidal is an entirely different censure. To accuse political and military leaders of the destruction of a people or part of a people *as such* or of the destruction of noncombatants *as such* calls for an additional showing of those different specific intentions.

So much for the argument. The rest is "rhetoric" (in Bedau's bad sense).

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Father Ryan Responds to Critics

To the Editors: In my article "The Myth of Annihilation and the Six-Day War" (*Worldview*, September, 1973) I stated from experience that "anyone daring to challenge the myth may, on occasion, run into a hornet's nest of objections—even vilifications."

Vilification came from Philip Perlmuter, an official of the American Jewish Committee (Correspondence, November), and a host of objections from Carl Hermann Voss (Reader's Response, December). Professor Voss seems not to understand that his objections to the *substance* of my article must be directed not against myself but against the Israeli generals whose views I presented. (Incidentally, since the October,

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A shot against cancer?



One day the scariest thing about cancer may be the needle that makes you immune to it.

The theory: build up the body's defense to fight off a disease naturally.

Dramatic research in this direction is going on right now.

Scientists are working on mechanisms to make the body reject cancer.

And the promise for the future is staggering.

Wouldn't you feel good knowing you contributed to the research?

Feel good.

Please contribute. Your dollars will help further all our cancer research.

We want to wipe out cancer in your lifetime.

**American
Cancer Society**

THIS SPACE CONTRIBUTED BY THE PUBLISHER

The War at Home

by Thomas Powers

(Grossman; 347 pp.; \$8.95)

Fearing that the story of the antiwar movement may be cut out of history, the Pulitzer Prize winning author traces the movement from its beginnings up to President Johnson's announcement that he would not run for reelection. The tale is, for the most part, competently told, although there are some puzzling omissions and an excess of information familiar to every moderately conscientious newspaper reader. The chief point, made in different ways, is that "the opposition to the war did not cause the failure [of American policy in Vietnam]; it forced the government to recognize the failure."

The New Agenda

by Andrew M. Greeley

(Doubleday; 310 pp.; \$6.95)

The new agenda in question is for Christianity in general and Roman Catholicism in particular. Greeley offers a competent summary of questions currently disturbing Catholics, a lively polemic against the answers given by what he terms the self-styled liberated Catholic élites, and an altogether too facile synthesis. On too many questions Greeley makes judgments where he is simply not well informed. It will, for example, come as an unpleasant surprise to Wolfhart Pannenberg to discover that his work follows "the psychological or existential approach to religion," which, says Greeley, he is pursuing "in very distinguished fashion." This is a little more outrageous than describing Dean Rusk as a militant leader of the antiwar movement in the sixties. The book is, unfortunately, pockmarked by such errors. It is truly unfortunate, because many of the main arguments Greeley makes should be taken seriously. It is usual, and maybe unfair, to criticize Father Greeley for the speed with which he spawns

new volumes, bringing out as many as five a year. We would not urge him to slow down, lest we be deprived of one of our more spirited religious and cultural critics, but an investment of energy in more careful research and argument would be welcomed. Foreword by Gregory Baum.

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1973, war General M. Peled's general position has emerged vindicated.)

But Professor Voss's more fundamental misunderstanding is revealed in his final remarks that the October, 1973, war was "a threat to [the Israelis'] very existence" and that the Syrians and the Egyptians "sent their planes across Israel's [sic] borders to destroy her . . ."! Behold, a new annihilation myth is born.

A final point. Professor Voss, laying great stress on Nasser's closing of the Strait of Tiran, says this action was "in reality the first aggression, the *casus belli*, recognized as such by international law." Not every international lawyer would be so certain. Roger Fisher of Harvard, for example, says the question is debatable. In a letter to the *New York Times* he wrote: ". . . I, as an international lawyer, would rather defend before the International Court of Justice the legality of the U.A.R.'s action in closing the Strait of Tiran than to argue the other side of the case, and I would certainly rather do so than to defend the legality of the preventive war which Israel launched . . ." (June 11, 1967).

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