

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

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Abstract: This article examines the breadth and depth of anti-Americanism in contemporary Latin America. Using individual-level data from 2012, we employ regression analysis to understand why some Latin American citizens are more likely than others to distrust the government of the United States. By examining the attitudes of citizens of countries that are part of different groupings—such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas and the Pacific Alliance—we find great variation in the levels and predictors of anti-Americanism. While citizens' ideology is a common predictor in most countries, other variables such as the receipt of remittances, the perception of insecurity, and nationalism appear as predictors in only some. Furthermore, although there is a positive correlation between presidential approval and anti-Americanism in countries where leaders have an overtly anti-American discourse, this relationship disappears in countries where the president is perceived as neutral, and it is inverse in countries where the president is perceived as pro-American.

The December 2014 announcement by US president Barack Obama that diplomatic relations with Cuba would be reestablished after fifty-three years opened possibilities for a rapprochement between the United States and Latin America after a decade in which US–Latin American relations had seemed to deteriorate. Although Latin American leaders across the region welcomed the end of the diplomatic rift between the two countries, US policies toward Cuba remained a contentious issue on the inter-American agenda. This was evidenced at the December 2014 meeting of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, when a resolution supporting the restoration of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States was delayed for several hours because Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua had proposed mentioning the US embargo in the joint declaration. The long delay ruptured the image of consensus that some

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members wanted to portray (Ayuso 2014).¹ Although President Obama's decision on Cuba sets the stage for improved relations between the United States and Latin America, the goal of hemispheric unity remains elusive, and significant tensions remain even among those countries considered to have friendlier relations with the United States.

This changing reality raises a series of important research questions: How widespread is anti-Americanism in contemporary Latin America? Is there variation in the levels of anti-Americanism in the different countries of the region, and if so, what are the prevailing patterns? Which factors explain why some Latin Americans hold anti-American views and others do not? Which factors influence an individual's perspective about the United States? These research questions are significant for several reasons. Most obviously, anti-American beliefs in the Western Hemisphere are of direct policy relevance to the United States. Put simply, beliefs matter. Corrales and Feinberg (1999) argue, for example, that "Yankee-phobia" and other anti-hemispheric intellectual traditions in Latin America have consistently undermined cooperation between the United States and Latin America; conversely, cooperation advanced when Latin Americans viewed the United States as reliable and trustworthy. Understanding the root causes of anti-American sentiments, therefore, can help inform American foreign policy making while also helping strengthen economic and cultural ties with the region (Shifter 2004). Furthermore, in view of the renewed potential for improved ties between the United States and Latin America after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, it is important to understand the factors that can foster or hinder these ties.

The current wave of anti-Americanism in Latin America merits particular attention, as it is arguably "the most widespread resurgence of anti-Americanism ever in Latin America" (McPherson 2007a, 52). Anti-Americanism has manifested in recent years in the domestic and foreign policies of certain elected leaders throughout the region who have challenged United States leadership of the hemisphere. A concrete expression of this attitude is that Latin American leaders have created a series of new multilateral bodies that deliberately exclude the United States from their membership; examples include the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The decline of US influence in the region in the past decade left many wondering how the United States "lost" Latin America (Valenzuela 2005; BBC 2006; Hakim 2006; Crandall 2011). Anti-American sentiments have also coincided with the decline of the United States' status as the region's most critical trade partner (Arnson 2011).

Although it is evident that certain leaders have an anti-American discourse and have taken concrete steps to challenge American foreign policy makers, it is not clear which factors shape the views of the Latin American public with respect to the government of the United States. This article seeks to address this

1. Although Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua signed the final declaration expressing satisfaction with the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, they included footnotes on their position about the embargo.

gap by presenting new empirical insights into individual-level determinants of anti-American attitudes in contemporary Latin America. We examine the breadth of anti-Americanism as well as the underlying determinants of anti-American attitudes in the region using 2012 survey data from the AmericasBarometer. We develop an ordered logistic regression model based on general theories of anti-Americanism, incorporating variables that have been found to be relevant in other regions of the world and adapting them to the political environment of Latin America. We test our regression model on the whole region and on different country groupings.

We find that the predictors of distrust in the US government vary within the region and that the only variable that explains anti-Americanism across most countries is left ideology. Other variables such as the receipt of remittances, the perception of insecurity, the perception of the national economy, and nationalism are explanatory variables in only certain countries. We also find a relationship between presidential approval and anti-Americanism: the correlation between these variables is positive in countries where the president is overtly anti-American; the relationship disappears in those countries where the president is neutral toward the United States; and finally, the relationship is inverse in countries where the president is pro-American. In summary, we conclude that anti-Americanism in contemporary Latin America is a complex phenomenon influenced by ideology, national context, and personal contact with the United States.

THEORIES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

The scholarship on anti-Americanism evidences several key points of consensus. First, scholars agree that anti-Americanism is a complex (and often contradictory) phenomenon that comes in many forms. Rubinstein and Smith (1988), for instance, argue that anti-Americanism has at least four variations: issue oriented, ideological, instrumental, and revolutionary.² The revolutionary variant of anti-Americanism, for example, "is found among opposition groups seeking to overthrow regimes closely identified with the United States" (Rubinstein and Smith 1988, 42). Similarly, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) find no fewer than six permutations, including liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, radical, elitist, and legacy anti-Americanism.³ For instance, legacy anti-Americanism "stems from resentment of past wrongs committed by the United States toward a respondent's society" (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 37), with Mexico and Iran serving as key examples. In summary, there is a broad scholarly consensus that anti-Americanism is a highly variable phenomenon.

Second, most scholars agree that there is no "grand explanation" for anti-Americanism. That is, recent studies reject the premise that anti-Americanism

2. Rubinstein and Smith (1988, 36) define anti-Americanism as "any hostile action or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States."

3. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, 12) define anti-Americanism as "a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general."

can be explained simply as a reaction to (or rejection of) US power, US foreign policy, or American values. While these factors certainly contribute to anti-American sentiments, recent scholarship emphasizes that the domestic political context in which anti-American attitudes take root is no less important (Krastev 2004; Blyaydes and Linzer 2012). Krastev (2004, 8) is particularly emphatic on this point, stating that anti-Americanism has less to do with America than “the intrinsic contradictions of postideological politics,” in which anti-Americanism functions as a stalking horse for other grievances. Similarly, scholars such as Rubinstein and Smith (1988, 41) emphasize that anti-Americanism can be used in an “instrumental” fashion, meaning that the political elite “instigates and manipulates hostility toward the United States in order to mobilize domestic support.” They add that the use of anti-Americanism among third-world elites is often quite seductive, as “it is convenient, easily generated, and relatively cost free” (41).

Turning more specifically to the scholarship on anti-Americanism in Latin America, one is struck by how little systematic research has been conducted on this topic. Furthermore, there is no consensus on the root causes of anti-Americanism in the region. To be sure, American military interventions in the region may have fueled what Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) refer to as sovereign-nationalist and legacy anti-Americanism. However, scholars disagree on the lasting legacies of American interference for the formation of anti-American beliefs. Roett (1988, 41) observes that anti-Americanism is generally strongest where American economic and military penetration is greatest. He argues that anti-Americanism is “less strident and more pragmatic” in South America than in nearby Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, where the presence of the United States has historically been greater (Roett 1988, 68). Scholars such as Ballvé (2005), McPherson (2007b), and Sweig (2006) argue that the current wave of anti-Americanism in Latin America has been fueled especially by discontent regarding the neoliberal economic policies associated with the Washington Consensus, as well as a rejection of Bush-era foreign policies. In contrast, John Means (1971, 8) cautions against a purely political and economic explanation of anti-Americanism in Latin America, arguing that its roots go deeper than simply “the activities of North American corporations and government agencies which allegedly retard national development.” Means views anti-Americanism as a cultural and ideological phenomenon, noting that “anti-Americanism has become substantially a national state of mind in Latin America” (10).

In a more recent contribution to the debate, Baker and Cupery (2013) challenge the idea that the legacy of US imperialism explains contemporary attitudes toward the United States. They demonstrate that those countries that have historically suffered the most US imperialist aggression (i.e., those geographically closest to the United States) tend to be the most pro-American today. They argue that economic linkages between Latin America and the United States, such as trade, aid, migration, and remittances, provide a more compelling explanation of why countries closer to the United States have more favorable opinions of the United States. However, in contrast to our analysis here, their statistical analysis relies on a series of macro-level variables to explain individual-level attitudes in Latin America. Furthermore, even though they highlight the existence of important

cross-national differences, they do not distinguish subregional groupings in their analysis.

Although the aforementioned studies elucidate the complex manifestations of anti-Americanism, surprisingly little work has been done at the individual level to explain why some people hold anti-American views and others do not.⁴ Giacomo Chiozza's (2007) work is an important exception. In addition to assessing the influence of sociodemographic variables he theorizes that four causal mechanisms could lead people to hold anti-American beliefs. First, in Chiozza's information-and-contact hypothesis, he conjectures that individuals who watch international news and visit and/or correspond with friends and relatives in the United States are less inclined to hold anti-American views. Next, in his traditional worldview and anti-market hypotheses, he argues that individuals' normative and ideological predispositions may clash with core American values such as social and economic liberty. Thus, some individuals might object to American beliefs about gender equality and sexual liberalization (traditional worldview), whereas others might resent the emphasis on unregulated market competition associated with the United States (the anti-market hypothesis). Finally, in Chiozza's scapegoat hypothesis, he conjectures that individuals who are dissatisfied with domestic and international affairs might blame their plight on the United States.

Using data from the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, Chiozza found some evidence to support each of his hypotheses, but he did not include Latin America in his analysis.⁵ Using opinion of the United States as his dependent variable, Chiozza (2007, 119) found strong support for the information-and-contact hypothesis, noting "widespread support . . . across attitudinal dimensions and world regions." The evidence in favor of the traditional worldview hypothesis was less consistent. With respect to the anti-market hypothesis, Chiozza (2007, 121) found confirmation that "people who expressed a preference for equity over efficiency, by disagreeing that the market makes people better off in general despite the inequalities it engenders, tended to be more inclined to distance themselves from the United States." Finally, with respect to the scapegoat hypothesis, the author found a strong association between anti-American attitudes and dissatisfaction with the state of world affairs; however, only in industrial democracies were respondents likely to scapegoat the United States when dissatisfied with the state of affairs in their own country.

Building on this literature, our research examines individual-level data from Latin America with the goal of answering two descriptive research questions. First, how widespread is anti-Americanism in contemporary Latin America? Second, is there variation in the levels of anti-Americanism in different Latin American countries, and if so, what patterns exist? Our main analytical research objective is to explain the individual-level causes of anti-Americanism in contemporary Latin America through the use of regression analysis.

4. A study by Martínez i Coma and Lago Peñas (2008) evaluates individual-level attitudes toward the United States in Mexico.

5. Chiozza's (1997) study uses data from Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Canada.

HOW WIDESPREAD IS ANTI-AMERICANISM IN LATIN AMERICA?

Despite its relevance, anti-Americanism at the individual level has not been thoroughly examined in Latin America. Two region-wide public opinion surveys contain questions that can help determine the extent of anti-American views among Latin American citizens.⁶ The 2012 round of surveys of the Americas-Barometer included a question that looks into levels of trust in the US government with the specific question, “Do you think the United States government is trustworthy?” Respondents were given four options: “very trustworthy,” “somewhat trustworthy,” “little trustworthy,” “not trustworthy at all.” Most global surveys ask about the opinion of the United States, which is really a mixture of public perceptions about government, culture, economy, and the people of the United States. We believe that tapping into levels of trust is an important focus of inquiry, one that political scientists since Robert Putnam (1993) have considered relevant. Furthermore, given the history of US intervention in Latin America, it is plausible that Latin Americans’ feelings regarding trust in the US government are stronger than the more general feelings captured by the “opinion of the United States” question. Figure 1 shows that there are important differences in terms of the percentage of citizens who trust the government of the United States vis-à-vis those who have a positive opinion of the United States. While the ordering of the countries based on levels of trust in the region is overall similar to the ordering of countries based on citizens’ opinions of the United States, the percentages are strikingly different. In most Latin American countries, the percentage of citizens who in 2012 indicated that the US government is very trustworthy or somewhat trustworthy (positive answer) is much lower than the percentage of citizens who in 2011 indicated a very good or good opinion (positive answer) of the United States. In short, an examination of trust in the government of the United States offers new insights into anti-American attitudes that prior studies have neglected.

Whether one uses the trust or the opinion question, it is clear that there is major variation in pro-American (and in consequence anti-American) sentiments among the citizens of different countries of Latin America. Overall, the highest levels of anti-Americanism are found in South American countries, and the lowest levels of anti-Americanism in Central America and the Caribbean. These findings contradict Roett’s (1988) observation that the highest levels of anti-Americanism are found in the countries that have endured more interventionism from the United States. Another interesting finding is that individuals in ALBA member countries—namely Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua—display some of the lowest levels of trust in the US government.⁷ However, it is noteworthy that citizens of several other non-ALBA countries also have low levels of trust in

6. In addition to the AmericasBarometer and the Latinobarómetro, both of which include the eighteen Latin American countries covered in this study, there are other surveys that ask about the opinion of the United States, but they only include some countries in the region; examples include the Pew Research Global Attitudes Survey and a survey conducted regularly by the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE).

7. Cuba is the other major Latin American country that is part of ALBA, but there is no reliable public opinion data for this country. The other members of ALBA are smaller Caribbean islands.




Figure 1 Trust in the US government vs. positive opinion of the United States. Prepared by the authors with 2012 AmericasBarometer (trust) and 2011 Latinobarometer (opinion) data.

the US government—the more salient cases are Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Mexico.

In addition to looking at cross-country variations, it is also useful to consider whether Latin American attitudes toward the United States have changed markedly in recent years. Using opinion of the United States as their key dependent variable, Baker and Cupery (2013) found that general attitude patterns remained the same between 1995 and 2010 in that the countries of Central America and the Caribbean tended to have a more positive opinion of the United States than did countries in the Southern Cone. Regrettably, regional surveys do not contain comparable time-series data that measure individuals' trust in the US government, our dependent variable.⁸

METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES, AND VARIABLES

As noted in the literature review, we did not come across previous studies that use individual-level data to assess why some Latin American citizens are more likely to have anti-American views than others. We seek to break new ground by testing whether the theories that have been developed for other regions of the world can be applied to Latin America, and by uncovering the variables that motivate anti-Americanism at the individual level. We test these theories using survey

8. A survey conducted by the University of Pittsburgh in the capital cities of Central America in the early 1990s included the trust question. The comparison of the earlier data with the 2012 data shows an increase in the levels of anti-Americanism among citizens of those cities.

data gathered in 2012 by the AmericasBarometer. We employ ordered logistic regression analysis to examine the variables associated with distrust in the government of the United States. While drawn from theories on anti-Americanism in other regions of the world, the independent variables are adapted to the particular political and economic context of Latin America. In the following paragraphs we organize our hypotheses and operationalize our variables around these different theories.

Contact-and-Information Theory

Our first independent variable is related to Chiozza's (2007) information-and-contact thesis. We examine a form of contact that has become particularly relevant for many people in Latin America: whether the respondent is a recipient of remittances from abroad. It is known that remittances sent by relatives living (legally or illegally) in the United States have become a main source of foreign income for several Latin American countries, particularly Mexico and the northernmost Central American countries. In the latter, remittances have come to represent at least 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and overall remittances represent around 17 percent of the official flow of foreign income into the region (World Bank 2010). Remittances are sent by relatives living in the United States to virtually all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and they have increased in recent years despite economic slowdown in the United States. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the United States is the source of about three-quarters of the remittances received in Latin America and the Caribbean (Maldonado, Bajuk, and Hayem 2012; Orozco 2012).⁹ Our specific hypothesis on the contact and information theory follows:

H1: Citizens who do not receive remittances are more likely to display anti-American attitudes.

Scapegoat Theory

The next two variables are related to what Chiozza (2007) identifies as the scapegoat thesis, that is, the notion that citizens might blame the United States for problems in the world and in their own societies. While *scapegoat* may not be the most appropriate word (in that it implies that the United States bears no responsibility for Latin America's woes), we want to test whether current issues have any effect on perception of the US government. Given the strong presence of the United States in Latin America, it is likely that citizens praise or blame the United States for

9. We are aware that not all Latin Americans with relatives in the United States receive remittances, which go particularly to low-income families, and that there are other forms of contact such as traveling to the United States for tourism or business, consuming products, or watching TV programs and movies. The AmericasBarometer survey does not contain questions that measure these variables. Since we want to maintain individual-level analysis, we employ only the remittances variable. Baker and Cupery (2013, 125) demonstrate that at the aggregate level, the impact of emigration to the United States is less substantial than that of aid or trade.

conditions in their own country. The two major regional surveys in Latin America, the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro, have shown that the economy and citizen insecurity are issues that citizens identify as the most important problems facing their country (Lagos and Dammert 2012; Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2012). We test two variables related to this thesis. The first examines economic issues and measures respondents' perception of the state of the national economy. The 2008 economic downturn in the United States had a varying impact in Latin America. The smaller countries of Central America were more affected than the countries of South America, which during the years following the crisis experienced steady economic growth rates, important reductions in poverty levels and inequality, and an expanding middle class. As much as the economic crisis in the United States hit certain countries more than others, it also hit the poor more than other social groups. In view of that, it is important to evaluate whether those affected by the economic slowdown blame the United States for their plight.

We also include one variable that has become highly relevant across Latin America, particularly in Mexico and the so-called Northern Triangle in Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador): personal insecurity. Latin America has been identified by international organizations as one of the most violent regions in the world, with Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala among the most violent countries. There are several reasons for increasing insecurity, but as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in 2011, drug trafficking is one of the most important. Several Latin American leaders have expressed the need to adopt different policies to combat drug trafficking; indeed, the issue was the central topic of discussion at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in June 2013. Whereas some presidents have promoted decriminalizing certain drugs as a viable option, others have asked for dialogue to seek alternatives to the aggressive approach long favored by the United States. Those who support decriminalization argue that as long as the United States does not reduce demand for drugs, the war on drugs cannot be won (Forero 2012). In addition, the presidents of Mexico and Central America have repeatedly asked the United States to halt the flow of weapons, which often end up in the hands of drug cartels (Rodriguez and Weissenstein 2012). Although the Obama administration has been reluctant to engage in a serious dialogue about policy alternatives in the war on drugs, former secretary of state Hillary Clinton in a visit to Mexico in 2009 acknowledged that "America's appetite for drugs and its inability to stop arms crossing the border were helping fuel the violence" (BBC 2009). Given that the United States is heavily involved in the fight against drug trafficking in the region while it is also the main market for drugs and an important source of illegal arms that fuel that violence, it is important to assess whether respondents' perception of insecurity plays a role in their sentiments toward the United States. In addition, the increasing presence of gangs in the Northern Triangle also plays an important role in the levels of violence in those societies; gangs were originally imported from the United States and thousands of gang members continue to be deported from the United States to Central America every year (Azpuru 2014). Insecurity and crime victimization in Latin America, after all, have been linked to lower trust in domestic state

institutions such as the courts and police (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2012). Our hypotheses on the scapegoat theory are the following:

H2: Citizens who perceive that the national economic situation is not good are more likely to display anti-American attitudes.

H3: Citizens who perceive higher levels of personal insecurity are more likely to display anti-American attitudes.

Anti-market Theory

Ideological issues are potentially the most important predictors of anti-Americanism in Latin America. The last variable derived from Chiozza's (2007) theory is related to what he calls the anti-market hypothesis. According to this idea, normative and ideological predispositions that conflict with American values of economic liberty can generate anti-American feelings. Our regression model includes one key variable that taps directly into respondents' ideology by asking them to identify their ideological stance: "According to the meaning that the terms 'left' and 'right' have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?" The scale, as is customary in surveys around the world, ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right).

Citizens on the ideological left may be more inclined to hold anti-American views for several reasons. Chiozza (2007), for instance, emphasizes that those who favor equity-enhancing social welfare policies might not look favorably at a country so closely associated with the values of free-market capitalism. But in Latin America, there is also an important historical dimension to ideological anti-Americanism. During the Cold War in particular, Latin Americans on the left—especially those who sympathized with communism—were inevitably in opposition to the United States. Those on the left were also particularly victimized by the blunt human rights violations of US-backed authoritarian regimes during that period.

The rhetoric of Fidel Castro since his rise to power in Cuba in 1959 is symptomatic of the type of anti-Americanism embraced by the Marxist left in Latin America. Once the Cold War ended, American policy toward Latin America changed dramatically and the United States openly supported a dual transition to democracy and a free-market economy in Latin America (Azpuru and Shaw 2010). Nonetheless, the traditional left did not change its view of the United States, and during the 1990s it found new reasons to promote anti-Americanism in its opposition to the neoliberal policies adopted in the region under the umbrella of the Washington Consensus.

While left-leaning political elites remained relatively isolated from power in the early years of the third wave of democratization in Latin America, they were reenergized after Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999. Since then, the left has made important strides in various countries. Levitsky and Roberts (2011, 1) noted that by 2009 about two-thirds of Latin Americans lived under some form of left-leaning national government. Several scholars have pointed out, however, the many differences between what Weyland (2009) labeled the "moderate left,"

which rose to power in countries such as Uruguay and Brazil, versus the radical (and populist) left that rose to power in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador.

To understand the differences in the degrees of anti-Americanism in the region, it is important to be aware of the lack of uniformity of the left governments in the region. One area in which differences have been more marked is foreign policy, particularly in terms of leaders' anti-American rhetoric. Whereas the radical left leaders constantly display an anti-American discourse at home and abroad, the rest of the leftist leaders display a more pragmatic tone.¹⁰ In 2004, the more radical countries, beginning with Cuba and Venezuela, joined forces to create ALBA. In a provocative move, at their June 2012 meeting the leaders of ALBA passed a resolution to expel the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from their countries (Wyss 2012). Bolivian president Evo Morales acted on that resolution and expelled USAID from Bolivia in May 2013 (Neuman 2013); this action was preceded by the expulsion of the US ambassador to Bolivia in 2008. Under pressure from Rafael Correa's government, USAID shut down its operations in Ecuador after fifty-three years in October 2014 (Otis 2014). Following the death of Hugo Chávez, tensions between Venezuela and the United States have continued since President Nicolás Maduro took office in April 2013. The sanctions imposed by the United States on several Venezuelan officials in 2015 fueled a backlash from Venezuela, but also from the region. CELAC's (2015) position opposing the sanctions was clear: "The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States . . . reiterates its rejection of the application of unilateral coercive measures against International Law." In summary, there is a powerful historical association between left ideology and anti-American attitudes in Latin America, both at the elite and at the mass level. Thus, our hypothesis related to the anti-market theory is the following:

H4: Citizens who self-identify as leaning to the left of the political spectrum are more likely to display anti-American attitudes.

Sovereign-Nationalist Theory

In keeping with Katzenstein and Keohane's (2007) notion of sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, we also include a variable that evaluates nationalism by asking respondents how proud they are of their country.¹¹ According to Katzenstein and Keohane, the sovereign-nationalist variant of anti-Americanism reflects two values: "the importance of not losing control over the terms by which

10. Russell (2007) notes that even the radical leaders tend to be pragmatic and have not broken all commercial ties with the United States. It remains to be seen whether the discourse of these leaders will change after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. The Summit of the Americas in Panama in April 2015 was a good barometer of the attitudes of the leaders toward the United States.

11. The extent to which citizens are proud of their nationality is customarily used in global surveys to measure nationalism. The question in the AmericasBarometer survey gives the respondent the possibility of answering on a 1–7 scale.

polities are inserted in world politics and the inherent importance and value of collective national identities" (32). The historical power asymmetry in the relationship between Latin America and the United States (and especially breaches of state sovereignty by the United States) has been a source of long-standing discontent among political elites in the region and has encouraged anti-imperialism and nationalism among the masses (McPherson 2007b; Smith 2007). We anticipate that individuals who are strongly nationalistic are more inclined to hold anti-American views. Our specific hypothesis is as follows:

H5: Citizens with high levels of nationalism are more likely to display anti-American attitudes.

Instrumental Theory

The premise behind instrumental anti-Americanism is that political elites might instigate and mobilize anti-American attitudes for their own political agendas (Rubinstein and Smith 1988). In recent years some Latin American presidents, notably those from ALBA countries, have continuously used anti-American rhetoric and actions to reinforce their domestic agendas. What is not clear is whether they have been successful in stirring anti-Americanism among their constituents, or whether their constituents already had entrenched anti-American sentiments. The causality of the relationship is difficult to establish because there is no longitudinal data measuring the levels of trust in the US government before these leaders came into office. However, by using anti-Americanism as both a dependent and an independent variable in two different regression models, we can shed some light on the issue.

First, we test whether there is a link between citizens' distrust of the US government (our dependent variable) and approval of the incumbent president. We employ the same ordered logistic regression model across different groups of countries: those with outspoken anti-American leaders (i.e., ALBA countries) and those whose leaders are either pro-American or neutral in their stance toward the United States. We expect that a positive rating of the incumbent president will have a varying impact on anti-American views, depending on the political context. Our specific hypothesis is the following:

H6: In ALBA countries, where leaders are overtly anti-American, citizens who give their president a positive rating are more likely to display anti-American attitudes. This is not the case in non-ALBA member countries.

A second approach is to establish whether mass anti-Americanism played a role in the reelection of anti-American leaders in each of the four ALBA countries included in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. We employ a logistic regression model to test whether distrust of the US government (this time as an independent variable) was a factor in the reelection of the following presidents: Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in November 2011, Evo Morales in Bolivia in December 2009, Rafael Correa in Ecuador in April 2009, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2006. We include in the model other standard variables often linked to vote choice in Latin

America. We hypothesize that anti-Americanism will be one of the predictors of vote choice in all ALBA countries:

H7: Anti-Americanism is strongly correlated to the vote for the incumbent left candidate in the respective elections in each of the four ALBA member countries.

All our regression models also include standard control variables, namely gender, age, education, and wealth. To acknowledge country effects, the model includes a dummy variable for each of the individual countries.¹²

EXPLORING REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL DIFFERENCES

To test the first six hypotheses, we develop an ordered logistic regression model and apply it to the whole region (eighteen countries), as well as to different regional groupings. One of our main arguments is that context matters; thus, citizens will perceive the US government differently if they live in countries facing particular problems such as drug trafficking and/or insecurity or if they have a leader who is openly anti-American. We include the following groupings in our analysis, taking into account their configuration at the time of the survey in the first semester of 2012:

1. Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA): At the time of the survey these countries all had presidents who to a greater or lesser extent used anti-American rhetoric and, in some cases, had taken measures to distance themselves from the United States. The incumbents were Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. All four presidents were considered as radical left.
2. Pacific Alliance: This more recent group has been considered the opposite of ALBA; its leaders embrace a free-market economy and are open to strengthening ties with the United States.¹³ At the time of the survey the incumbents were Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia, Sebastián Piñera in Chile, and Ollanta Humala in Peru.¹⁴
3. Mercosur: The presidents of these countries at the time of the survey were generally considered on the moderate left, maintaining a friendly but independent relationship with the United States. The incumbents were Cristina Fernández in Argentina, Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, José Mujica in Uruguay, and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay.¹⁵
4. Mérida and Central America Regional Security Initiative: This grouping includes the countries in the northernmost part of Latin America (Mexico, Guatemala,

12. Religion was not included because the percentage of non-Christian respondents (particularly Muslims) in the sample is minimal.

13. On September 25, 2013, the presidents of the Pacific Alliance met with more than two hundred American business people in New York to formally introduce their project of economic and commercial integration (Saiz 2013).

14. As discussed later, we exclude Mexico from this grouping because it is used as part of the Mérida and CARSI group.

15. Paraguay was suspended from Mercosur after President Lugo was removed from power by the Paraguayan Congress. We exclude Venezuela from this grouping because it is part of ALBA; Venezuela joined Mercosur only in mid-2012.

El Salvador, and Honduras), which are closer geographically to the United States and have, in recent years, experienced high levels of violence related to drug trafficking. They have also been part of two major security cooperation programs established by the United States to help in the fight against drug trafficking: the Merida Initiative for Mexico and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).¹⁶ In addition, the three Central American countries and Mexico represent the top four countries of origin of undocumented immigrants living in the United States (Brick, Challinor, and Rosenblum 2011, 5) and are, as a consequence, among the top recipients of remittances. The presidents of these countries at the time of the survey were generally seen as pro-American: Felipe Calderón in Mexico, Otto Pérez in Guatemala, Porfirio Lobo in Honduras, and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador.¹⁷

RESULTS

We begin with a discussion of the results for the overall model that includes the region as a whole. We find strong evidence in favor of several of our hypotheses. The variable related to the contact-and-information theory turns out to be a significant predictor: citizens who do not receive remittances are significantly more likely to express anti-American attitudes. Conversely, those who do receive remittances (and who can be assumed to have relatives in the United States) are prone to have more positive attitudes. With regard to the variables related to what Chiozza (2007) labels “scapegoating,” we find that individuals’ sense of insecurity is correlated with anti-Americanism: Latin Americans who have a higher perception of physical insecurity are more prone to distrust the United States. In line with our hypothesis on the anti-market theory, those identifying themselves as leaning to the political left are also more likely to hold anti-American views. In short, remittances, insecurity, and ideology are all important predictors of anti-Americanism in Latin America. Nationalism turns out to be a determinant of anti-Americanism, but not as expected: having lower levels of pride in one’s nationality is correlated with higher levels of anti-Americanism. Additionally, one sociodemographic factor, age, is also inversely related to distrust in the US government, with younger Latin Americans more likely to have higher levels of anti-Americanism.

When the model is applied to specific subsets of countries interesting results emerge and the impact of context can be fully appreciated. The reception of remittances is a predictor in those countries that are known to have a higher number of migrants in the United States and in which remittances make up an important part of the GDP, namely the Mérida and CARSI countries. Similarly, the per-

16. The Merida Initiative was established in 2008. In 2010 the Central American component of the program was named Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The other countries in Central America are also included in the initiative but have significantly lower levels of crime than the so-called Northern Triangle countries, which receive most of the funding (Meyer and Seelke 2014; Arnson and Olson 2011).

17. Although Funes belonged to a left party (the FMLN) he resisted pressure to get closer to ALBA countries and maintained a close relationship with the United States (García 2012).

Table 1 Determinants of anti-Americanism in Latin America in 2012

Independent variables	All countries (18)	ALBA (Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela)	Pacific Alliance (Colombia, Chile, and Peru)	Mérida/CARSI (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras)	Mercosur (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil)
Household receives remittances	-.002* (.001)			-.002* (.001)	
Perception of national economy		.006* (.002)			
Perception of insecurity	.002* (.001)		.005** (.002)	.004** (.002)	
Ideology (1–10 scale)	-.080*** (.008)	-.095*** (.016)	-.092*** (.023)		-.100*** (.018)
Nationalism (pride)	-.004*** (.001)		-.007** (.003)	-.006** (.002)	
President's approval		.016*** (.002)	-.011*** (.003)	-.007** (.002)	
Age	.030* (.014)				
Education			.158* (.081)		
Gender (male)			.202* (.100)		
Wealth		-.075* (.032)			
Pseudo R ²	.172	.146	.081	.100	.159
N	8,444	1,929	1,446	1,886	1,750

Note: Standard error in parentheses. All models include country dummies as fixed effects, but are not shown in this table. To avoid duplication, Mexico is included only among the Mérida/CARSI group and Venezuela is included only among the ALBA group. The Mercosur countries represent the original members up to mid-2012.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

ception of insecurity is relevant in those countries where the drug war has hit harder, including Mexico and the Northern Triangle in Central America, as well as the Pacific Alliance countries, which include two states, Colombia and Peru, with serious problems with drug production (BBC 2013). The impact of insecurity is particularly evident in the Mérida and CARSI countries, as figure 2 shows. Ideology is a predictor in all groupings except the Mérida and CARSI group. In this group of countries, particularly in Central America, even people on the political left have lower levels of anti-Americanism than in the rest of Latin Amer-




Figure 2 Perception of insecurity in Mérida and CARSI countries. Prepared by the authors with 2012 AmericasBarometer data.

ica, as figure 3 shows. Nationalism is a predictor in the Pacific Alliance and the Mérida and CARSI countries, but the relationship is inverse to our hypothesis: anti-Americanism is correlated with lower nationalism.¹⁸ The state of the national economy is a predictor only for ALBA countries.¹⁹

As figure 4 depicts, the most notable divergence between groupings is related to the approval of the president. There is a positive relationship between presidential approval and anti-Americanism in ALBA countries, where presidents are overtly anti-American. These two variables are also correlated in the Pacific Alliance and the Mérida and CARSI countries, but the relationship operates in the opposite direction: citizens who give higher approval to the president are likely to have lower levels of anti-Americanism. In these countries the presidents (at the time of the survey) were generally perceived as pro-American. There is no relationship between presidential approval and anti-Americanism in the Mercosur countries, where the presidents, although on the left, were seen as neutral vis-à-vis the United States.

Determining the causality of the relationship between presidential approval and anti-Americanism in the ALBA countries is challenging because there is no

18. A preliminary analysis of the data (not shown) indicates that this may be due to ideology: in the Pacific Alliance and the Mérida and CARSI countries people on the left have significantly lower levels of nationalism than people on the right. It may be that they are unsatisfied with the structural conditions of the country, which makes them less nationalistic. Since they are on the left, the government's good relationship with the United States is also a reason for dissatisfaction. This does not happen in ALBA or Mercosur countries. In fact, the left in the ALBA countries shows significantly higher levels of nationalism than any other group. It may be that the left feels that being in power allows them to see the structural changes that they expect in society.

19. This should be explained in connection with the other predictors: in these countries citizens who show anti-American feelings are more likely to be on the left, to have lower income, to have high regard for the performance of the president, and to feel that the national economy is going in the right direction.




Figure 3 Anti-Americanism among the left in Latin America. Prepared by the authors with 2012 AmericasBarometer data. Respondents on the left are those who answered 1 through 4 in the 10-point ideological scale.




Figure 4 Approval of president's performance and anti-Americanism by grouping. Mexico is included as part of the Mérida/CARSI group and Venezuela as part of ALBA. Prepared by the authors with 2012 AmericasBarometer data.

data measuring the level of distrust in the US government before 2012. Therefore, we are unable to compare levels of anti-Americanism that existed before overtly anti-American presidents first came to power. One approach, however, can at least clarify whether their reelection was associated with anti-Americanism. We ran a logistic regression for each of the four ALBA countries included in

Table 2 *Vote choice for the incumbent in ALBA countries*

Variable	Chávez 2006	Correa 2009	Morales 2009	Ortega 2011
Anti-Americanism (distrust of the US government)	.016** (.006)	.010** (.004)	.022*** (.005)	.013* (.005)
Ideology	-.251*** (.071)	-.064 (.047)	-.056 (.071)	-.189*** (.050)
Perception of national economy	.027** (.009)	.015* (.006)	.010 (.009)	.034*** (.009)
Perception of personal economy	.007 (.011)	.006 (.007)	.021 (.012)	.009 (.008)
Perception of insecurity	-.011 (.007)	-.007 (.004)	-.004 (.006)	-.001 (.005)
Perception of corruption of incumbent government	-.017* (.008)	-.010* (.004)	-.001 (.006)	-.020*** (.005)
Nationalism	.025 (.014)	.013* (.005)	-.004 (.008)	-.001 (.011)
Age	-.041 (.153)	.194* (.087)	.044 (.106)	-.120* (.121)
Gender (male)	-.504 (.386)	-.113 (.229)	.539 (.299)	.158 (.411)
Wealth	-.319* (.156)	-.070 (.090)	-.249* (.120)	.043 (.114)
Education	-.012 (.055)	-.005 (.030)	-.075* (.037)	-.101 (.043)
Size of place of residence	-.122 (.183)	-.045 (.078)	-.044 (.091)	.218* (.113)
Pseudo R ²	.548	.143	.249	.332
N	668	802	514	767

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Respondents were asked what president they voted for in the last election.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

this study, using the vote for the incumbent in the reelection of the presidents of the ALBA countries as the dependent variable. Distrust of the US government (anti-Americanism) is an independent variable in the model, which also includes ideology, perception of the national economy (sociotropic voting), perception of personal economy (egotropic voting), perception of insecurity, perception of corruption, nationalism, and typical sociodemographic variables (e.g., age, gender, wealth, education, the size of residence). As table 2 shows, in all cases—the reelection of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in December 2006, Rafael Correa in Ecuador in April 2009, Evo Morales in Bolivia in December 2009, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in November 2011—anti-Americanism was a significant predictor of vote choice for those candidates. While a complete discussion of the results is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth noting that in the case of Morales, distrust

in the US government trumped economic concerns.²⁰ These results seem to imply that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the anti-Americanism of leaders and that of the masses.

CONCLUSION

This research has focused on examining anti-Americanism in Latin America. Most studies on anti-Americanism have focused on other regions of the world, where the United States is perceived as having more at stake, particularly in the post-9/11 era. Latin America, however, has become more relevant for the United States in recent years, and its relevance is likely to increase after the reestablishment of relations between the United States and Cuba. The emergence of overtly anti-American leaders in some countries of the Western Hemisphere and their recent efforts to tighten political ties with extraregional actors such as China and Russia, and particularly Iran, has created concern in Washington and prompted discussion at think tanks and universities in the United States.²¹ From an economic perspective, the growing presence of nontraditional trade partners in Latin America may be one reason the United States acted to approve bilateral trade agreements with Colombia and Panama in 2011. It may also explain why American politicians and business leaders continue to tout Latin America as an important region for American trade and investment. In the first semester of 2013 President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Kerry all visited Latin America. The expansion of organized crime—particularly drug cartels—into Mexico and Central America in recent years has also sparked the attention of scholars and the US government at different levels, although fighting drug trafficking in South America has been on the US foreign policy agenda for many decades. In addition, immigration from Latin America has become an important issue in the United States, particularly in view of the migration of thousands of unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle of Central America, which reached crisis levels in summer 2014.

One general conclusion we can derive from our research is that anti-Americanism in Latin America is not a uniform phenomenon. The magnitude varies markedly from countries with high levels of anti-Americanism, such as Ar-

20. Preliminary analysis of the average ideology of the voters for the different presidents included in this research (not shown) produces interesting results: the voters who reelected the ALBA presidents are on the moderate left of the ideological scale (4.13 for Ortega, 4.17 for Chávez, 4.75 for Morales). There are, however, other presidents whose voters also come from the left but whose approval ratings are not associated with higher anti-Americanism; the cases of Mujica in Uruguay (3.51) and Funes in El Salvador (4.52) are clear examples. Furthermore, one of the ALBA presidents, Rafael Correa, was elected by centrist voters (5.14) rather than left-leaning ones. The voters of the Pacific Alliance and the Mérida/CARSI presidents are all ideologically moderate, slightly tilted to the center-right. This could indicate that the anti-American stance of leaders can have an effect on citizens, regardless of the preexisting ideology but further analysis is needed to understand this relationship.

21. Furthermore, it has prompted action from the US Congress, which on December 12, 2012, passed a House bill aimed at limiting the role of Iran in the Western Hemisphere. The bill, HR 3783, is the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012. The bill specifically mentions the concern over the cooperation of ALBA countries with Iran.

gentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to countries with moderate levels, such as Peru and Brazil, and others with low levels of anti-Americanism, such as the Dominican Republic and most Central American countries, except Nicaragua. Surprisingly, the variations in anti-Americanism in the region show little correspondence to the history of past military interventions by the United States.

With regard to the determinants of anti-Americanism, ideology is a strong predictor. Citizens who self-identify as on the political left are more likely to hold anti-American feelings; however, there is also great fluctuation in the levels of distrust toward the United States among the left in different countries in Latin America. We also found evidence in favor of our hypothesis that citizens of countries with presidents who are vociferously anti-American are more likely to distrust the United States, particularly if they approve of their president's performance in office. This scenario is very clear in ALBA member countries. In non-ALBA countries, particularly those that had pro-American leaders in power at the time of the survey, the tendency is in the opposite direction: having a positive opinion of the president is correlated with lower levels of anti-Americanism.

Building on theories formulated in other regions of the world, we also tested for a series of additional independent variables. We found that receiving remittances diminishes the possibility of distrust in the United States. Another relevant finding, particularly in view of the ongoing drug war in Latin America in which the United States is heavily involved, is that the sense of physical insecurity heightens anti-American attitudes.

In summary, our research findings suggest that anti-Americanism among Latin American citizens can be the product of long-standing predispositions (i.e., ideology) but can also be triggered by more immediate contextual issues. In other words, in some individuals it may stem from strongly held beliefs, but it can also emanate from certain circumstances or conditions such as insecurity. Altogether the image of a typical anti-American citizen across Latin America does not hold. On the contrary, we found important variations among citizens of countries that are part of different groupings.

Our research also suggests a number of important policy implications with respect to the United States. First, our research demonstrates that remittances can have a positive effect on the image of the United States abroad, more specifically in the case of Latin America. Second, the fact that insecurity negatively affects the image of the United States in Latin America suggests the need to design policies to combat drug trafficking that take into account the opinion and suggestions of Latin American leaders. The image of the United States can also be improved by establishing domestic policies that seek to curtail arms trafficking to Latin America and to reduce consumption of drugs within the United States itself. Third, the United States should be aware that the presence of leaders who are overtly anti-American can trigger a negative image of the country among the masses in Latin America, particularly among those with lower income. At the same time, however, there must be awareness that anti-Americanism goes well beyond these leaders. Our research clearly indicates that Latin Americans who place themselves on the political left have a predisposition to be anti-American. Yet the degree of anti-Americanism among those on the left varies across the region, and for that reason

the possibility of establishing cooperative relationships with governments that are at the left of the political spectrum should not be discounted.

These findings represent a starting point for further empirical studies on anti-Americanism in contemporary Latin America. Including more variables in future surveys can help researchers improve our understanding of anti-Americanism in the region as a whole and in particular countries. It would be important for future scholarship to assess the effect of certain issues on the image of the United States and the trust in the US government among Latin Americans such as immigration and deportation policies,²² the flow of arms from the United States to Latin America, and other types of contact with the United States beyond remittances.²³ It would also be worthwhile to examine whether President Obama's decision to reestablish full diplomatic relations with Cuba has any positive impact on Latin Americans' trust in the US government. Finally, in view of our finding that a positive perception of the economy is correlated with anti-Americanism in ALBA countries, it is also important to test whether the economic downturn in countries like Venezuela due to the decrease in oil prices has an effect on perceptions of the United States.

The United States and Latin America have had a close but often rocky relationship for more than two centuries. A closer and positive relationship can be achieved through a better understanding of how citizens "south of the border" feel, what their concerns are, and particularly, what are the factors that generate antipathy toward their northern neighbor.

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22. For example, the 2014 decision on halting deportations by President Obama on the one hand and the stringent immigration laws adopted in certain states such as Arizona (2010) and Alabama (2012).

23. The United States and Mexico have drastically different regulations concerning gun ownership (Cave 2012).

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134 *Latin American Research Review*

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