1 Reconfiguring empire: the British World

Introduction
The twenty-first century belatedly rediscovered empire. The forces of
globalisation – with their apparent lack of respect for national borders –
have propelled a remarkable revival of interest in our imperial past.
Whether perceived as precursors to modern globalisation, or its ‘first
wave’, empires are widely believed to hold the key to understanding glo-
balisation’s historical roots.¹ As one leading scholar has aptly remarked,
what were empires if not ‘transnational organisations . . . created to
mobilise the resources of the world? Their existence and their unity
were made possible by supra-national connections. Their longevity was
determined by their ability to extend the reach and maintain the stabil-
ity of these connections.’²

This belief that trans-national impulses and ideas were intrinsic to
the operations of empire, and had far-reaching historical consequences,³
goes a long way to explain why consideration of space and place has
loomed so large in the ‘new’ imperial history.⁴ A ‘radical re-imagining
of space and of human relationships to it’ was a concomitant of British
expansion overseas.⁵ Spatial concepts of empire have, of course, long

¹ For studies that bring together the diverse consequences of globalisation today, and
its important historical antecedents, see A. Hoogvelt, Globalisation and the Postcolonial
Macmillan, 2001); and S. Hall, ‘The Local and the Global: Globalisation and Ethnicity’,
in A. McClintock, A. Mufti and E. Shohat (eds.), Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation
and Postcolonial Perspectives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997),
Chapter 9.
² A. G. Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’,
³ K. Grant, P. Levine and F. Trentmann (eds.), Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and
⁴ D. Lambert and A. Lester, ‘Introduction: Imperial Spaces, Imperial Subjects’, in
Lambert and Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives across the British Empire: Imperial Careerings in
the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1–31
(p. 3).
⁵ H. Michie and R. Thomas (eds.), Nineteenth Century Geographies: The Transformation
of Space from the Victorian Age to the American Century (Rutgers: Rutgers University
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underpinned writing about Europe’s imperial experiences, whether British, French, Dutch, Spanish or Portuguese. Yet it is only relatively recently, after almost half a century of neglect, that the empire’s settler societies – those places where indigenous people were dispossessed, and where Europeans came to form a significant part of the population – have begun to be examined more explicitly, and indeed comparatively, by scholars of empire.6

In Britain’s case, it is apparent that territorial expansion was as much demographic as it was religious, military or bureaucratic.7 From the mid nineteenth century new forms of technology reconfigured the spaces between metropolitan Britain and the overseas ‘British’ societies of the empire, which, in an age of steamship, railway and telegraph, interacted in ways unimaginable even fifty years before. Recent studies focus on the movement of people, goods and capital within these regions of the empire, and the transfer of knowledge and experience among them. They move away from the old historiographical binaries of British ‘metropole’ and colonial ‘periphery’ to visualise the empire as an interconnected zone constituted by multiple points of contact and complex circuits of exchange. In doing so, they raise several significant questions. How did societies that imported a great deal of their population, cultural baggage, ideology and lifestyle, yet jealously guarded their powers of self-government, ‘work out their destinies’? How far did this process involve recognition of their common heritage, as well as ‘an informed appreciation’ of the efforts of British migrants elsewhere to adapt to their distinctive local settings while maintaining links to their imperial homeland?8 What, indeed, were the ties – ancestral,
institutional, linguistic, cultural – that bound this ‘British World’ together? In the words of an historian of modern South Africa: ‘Writing about the British World should do more than tell us about events which happened in that world. It should necessarily involve exploring how such a world was constructed and maintained in its various geographical parts through time . . . writing about the British World should involve “history-of-the-British World”, not just “history-in-the-British World”.’

Living in, thinking about and identifying with more than one country at once became a defining way of life for many inhabitants of this British World in the half-century before 1914. Various types of migration worked to stitch together the British peoples, with the result that political events, economic cycles and cultural fashions reverberated through the literal and imaginative domains of empire with greater frequency and power. Human movement and human memory, moreover, could often work together to reinforce each other. A cultural knowledge of ancestry and lineage could help to make sense of a connection that may have spanned generations, whether through personal items (such as photographs) or through the realm of material culture: goods branded by cities (lawnmowers from Birmingham, toilets from Staffordshire, cutlery from Sheffield and bicycles from Nottingham) were one way of evoking the proximity, even romance, of Britain.

It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that scholarship on the British World has evinced a marked enthusiasm for all kinds of trans-national history. Temperance reform, women’s movements and migration, marriage, child rescue and welfare, popular reading habits, labour

10 We are grateful to Saul Dubow for this observation.
11 For two key works exploring the role of empire in developing trans-national ideas and institutions, see A. Bashford, Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Grant, Levine and Trentmann, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880–1950.
disputes and doctrines,\textsuperscript{17} bourgeois consumption,\textsuperscript{18} penal police and criminal justice,\textsuperscript{19} and the evolution of land rights and forms of settler racial practices\textsuperscript{20} – each of these topics has lent itself to fruitful comparative analysis. Part of the attraction of focusing on settler societies as a way of writing trans-national history is that their ideas and institutions stemmed from common roots; they also faced similar problems, especially with respect to their indigenous populations and the political rights and legal status they were to be accorded. The British World concept has thus helped historians to climb out of their national bunkers, making them more aware of what hitherto they may have taken for granted about their own societies, and more mindful of the growing significance of non-national affiliations within them.\textsuperscript{21}

Yet as soon as we begin to re-imagine imperial geographies, we are faced with the tricky question of where power spatially resided.\textsuperscript{22} For the logic of a ‘networked’ or ‘decentred’ approach to studying empires published as \textit{The Portable Bunyan: A Trans-national History of the Pilgrim’s Progress} (Princeton: Yale University Press, 2004); C. Hilliard, ‘The Tillotson Syndicate and the Imperial Trade in Fiction’, paper given at the British World Conference, University of Auckland, July 2005.


\textsuperscript{19} See also B. Godfrey and G. Dunstall (eds.), \textit{Crime and Empire, 1840–1940: Criminal Justice in Local and Global Context} (Uffculme: Willan, 2005).


\textsuperscript{21} For the potential of cross-national, comparative studies to achieve these and other things, see especially G. M. Frederickson, ‘From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross-National Comparative History’, \textit{Journal of American History} 82 (1995), 587–604 (pp. 587–8, 604); Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future’, p. 217.

\textsuperscript{22} See, for example, C. Daniels and M. V. Kennedy (eds.), \textit{Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820} (New York: Routledge, 2002), which argues for peripheries occupying a more central position in the early modern colonial world, and carrying more power in relation to metropolitan centres than scholars have often allowed.
is that metropole and settler colony acted and reacted upon each other in complex ways, and that sovereignty in the colonies, far from being static or stable, was subject to constant negotiation and renegotiation by a variety of settler and non-settler groups.

Nor was the British World sealed off from the rest of the globe. Far from being exclusively British, many of the networks we study overlapped and intersected with other types of network, including those embedded in a wider ‘Atlantic world’, as well as in other western European (the French especially) and extra-European (Ottoman, Chinese and Russian) empires.23 If we are to understand how consumer, investor and merchant networks functioned in the colonies, they need to be placed in this wider international context. As people, goods, ideas and practices moved between and beyond different sites of colonisation, such movement in and of itself shaped and re-shaped experiences of overseas settlement. This, in turn, helps to explain the analytical purchase of categories like ‘space’ and ‘place’: they enable us better to appreciate what was global – and what was not – about Victorian and Edwardian imperialism.

The rest of this chapter explores three key themes that underpin our analysis of the interplay of culture and economy in this book: imperial networks, ‘Britishness’ and the Anglo-American relationship. The final section relates more recent writing on the British World to previous writing on the imperial economy, especially that on ‘settler colonialism’ and on the ‘dominion’ model of export economy.

**Imperial networks**

In a study of the relationship between empires, networks and discourses, the historian of Africa, Frederick Cooper, argues powerfully for the value of the network concept in analysing with greater precision long-distance connections over extended periods of time.24 Cooper’s working definition of a network is a good place to begin:

I am using network in a loose sense, although I am aware that this word is used in a highly formalised way. My interest is in forms of affiliation and

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23 For a striking example of this point, see C. Van Onselen, *The Fox and the Flies: The World of Joseph Silver, Racketeer and Psychopath* (Richmond: University of Virginia Press, 2007), which tells the chilling story of the trafficking of prostitutes, and related criminal activity, from Britain and France to the United States, southern Africa, Argentina and Chile, replete as it is with episodes of seduction, rape, deception, extortion, burglary and murder.

association that are less defined than a ‘structure’ but more than just a collection of individuals engaging in transactions. Networks are organisations which stress voluntary and reciprocal patterns of exchange . . . A network may or may not have ideological contents; it may consist of people with a set of strong commitments, or it may deepen and reconfigure the commitments participants have; it may be built around a set of norms, yet as its interactions work out areas of commonality and disagreement, it may define and redefine a normative framework.25

Building on this definition, we show how the networks studied in this book had three key characteristics, each of which betrayed their British origins. First, they were voluntary in nature – individuals belonged to them by choice. Voluntary associations, it will be recalled, were a unifying force in British urban society, a defining feature of the Victorian era. Second, these networks bound people together, nurturing as well as reflecting a sense of shared cultural, religious or ideological commitment and purpose among their members. Third, they transcended boundaries – in our case territorial boundaries. Indeed, what is striking about imperial networks is their capacity to transform the transmission of news and opinion across imperial spaces, and to markedly expand people’s mental horizons in the process.26

Imperial networks ranged from familial and communal forms of association to more formal structures such as humanitarian, administrative, scientific and educational bodies. Reconstructing their influence is vital if we are to appreciate how the British World ‘interacted through friendship, acquaintance, travel, business, correspondence, and . . . the sharing of news’.27 It also needs to be emphasised that business and commercial networks cannot be isolated from the other types of network that spanned the British World: economic knowledge moved through a variety of channels, including those along which all sorts of other information passed.

For those who participated in them, networks reinforced a sense of belonging to a worldwide British community. In fact, they have been

26 For how this might work in practice, see Elizabeth Elbourne’s study of the influence of trans-national networks, including, for example, newspapers, parliamentary chambers and courtrooms, in informing British policy towards, and shaping ideas and debates about, Aboriginal peoples: Blood Ground, Colonialism, Missions and the Contest for Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799–1853 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), and ‘Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks in the Early Nineteenth Century: The Politics of Knowledge’, in Buckner and Francis, Rediscovering the British World, pp. 59–85.
likened to the ‘cultural glue’ that held the British World together.\(^\text{28}\) They created strong personal and community ties that shaped people’s daily lives. They helped to make the imperial ‘centre’ more permeable – from the mid century, people were able to move in and out of it with increasing ease and regularity. And they opened up channels of communication between the colonies, as settlers developed a wider range of geographical reference and displayed a growing tendency to think of themselves, and their struggles, in relation to settlers elsewhere.\(^\text{29}\)

Migrant networks (discussed in Chapter 3) were powerful vehicles for disseminating British styles of architecture, fashion, fiction, food and music. Rapidly evolving communications meant people could move around the world with greater confidence. Steamships, telegraphs, ocean cables and newspapers took the ‘tyranny’ out of distance. Migrants began to imagine their social and political spaces in new ways, thereby making their migrations a defining aspect of their identity. Knowledge began to circulate more freely too, not least as a result of the press. It is widely recognised that news agencies such as Reuters were among the world’s first trans-national corporations. Yet it was not only Reuters that ushered in a new reciprocity to news distribution. A plethora of papers (national, regional and provincial), in both Britain and the colonies, helped to define the limits for the acceptable integration of Britain and its settler colonies.\(^\text{30}\) During the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were drawn together by what has been called an ‘imperial press system’. Newspaper enterprises across these societies yoked together the three main geographical bases for British identity – regional, national and imperial – with the emphasis shifting according to the commercial interests of the paper in question. As a result of voluntary co-operation between commercially driven newspaper enterprises, the flow of information and press communication

\(^\text{28}\) Bridge and Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, p. 6.
occurred predominantly within an imperial framework up to and indeed beyond 1914.  

Professional networks were also influential. The demand for professionally qualified accountants, academics, doctors, engineers, lawyers, nurses, teachers and others grew rapidly from the 1850s, in response to the pace of socio-economic development in the dominions. Professional people began to organise themselves more effectively, with the aim of securing recognition from the state and advancing the interests of their members. Some professional bodies had their headquarters in London and extensive branch networks across the dominions. Others formed more on a national basis but co-operated closely with kindred bodies elsewhere. Professional people, moreover, spearheaded the formation of other types of knowledge-based networks – literary societies, libraries, galleries and museums – that together helped to foster a ‘Britannic’ civic culture. In the fields of academia, law, medicine and science, for example, middle-class settlers saw themselves as a part of a wider British community, carrying not only their professional ideals and practices overseas, but, more generally, their beliefs about codes of civilised conduct and the proper ordering of society. Nor was this elite networking an exclusively male affair. By the end of the nineteenth century, women’s organisations were increasingly prominent in the spheres of migration, nursing, philanthropy, and war relief and commemoration.

31 Codell, Imperial Co-Histories, p. 212.
34 For the role of professional networks in transmitting knowledge about the empire, and how they could foster within the colonies a wider sense of imperial identity, see especially Saul Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility and Colonial Identity in South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
35 L. Chilton, ‘A New Class of Women for the Colonies: Female Emigration Societies and the Construction of Empire’, JICH 31:2 (May 2003), 36–56; K. Pickles, One
Chapters 3–5 explore the significance of these networks of contact and communication for patterns of economic behaviour and decision-making. In particular, they draw attention to the role of networks in forging shared cultures of consumption and setting norms of desirable lifestyles across English-speaking societies, and to their role in spreading new technologies and commercial practices across geographically disparate markets. These networks were not all equivalent, however. Some were more transient than others, some more powerful, and some impinging more on people’s day-to-day lives. Hence it is necessary to look closely at their content as well as their volume, and to be precise about their effects.

**Britishness at home and abroad**

The fact that British expansion was as much a demographic as it was a military, administrative or religious phenomenon has profound implications for the study of imperial culture within Britain. We take as our starting point the idea that the empire was of as much concern to those who settled in it as it was to those who administered it, or fought for it, or preached in it. Migration loomed large in the imperial imaginary: it was a force to be reckoned with in nineteenth-century British society. Crucially, it shaped people’s views of what kind of empire Britain possessed, and how that empire might be fashioned towards their own particular designs.


In remaking ‘British’ society and culture overseas, colonists were not passive recipients of empire. Rather, they developed and defined ‘Britishness’ in their own distinctive ways. Indeed, British migrants not only reaffirmed, they often sought to improve upon the communities they left behind. Many of the more positive aspects of ‘Britishness’ – responsible government, the secret ballot, universal manhood suffrage, free state education – were beamed back to Britain from its settler colonies. What propelled these exchanges? The markedly enhanced mobility of migrants from the mid century, including their increased rates of return to Britain (see p. 64), was one factor. There was also the greater facility with which migrants could stay in touch with and remain involved with family and community ‘back home’ through correspondence and remittances (see pp. 97–105), while knowledge circulated more freely through a growing body of networks that linked the British in Britain with the British overseas and carried information and ideas of all kinds between them (see pp. 78–97).

While many colonists were aware of a ‘living and enduring connection to their European beginnings’, the nationalism they espoused was based upon notions of co-operation, partnership and mutuality – notions intended to replace older forms of domination and control. Thus Keith Hancock (1898–1988), the first Australian elected to an All Souls Fellowship, and one of the foremost imperial historians of the inter-war era, insisted that it was ‘not impossible for Australians, nourished by a glorious literature and haunted by old memories, to be in love with two soils.’ Hancock’s constitutional-based histories of Anglo-Dominion


39 W. K. Hancock, Australia (London: Benn, 1930), p. 68.
relations set out to show how a wider pan-British identity could be reconciled with separate statehood. Firmly of the view that dominion nationalism did not preclude a sense of belonging to a wider British community, he argued that ‘national loyalties, so far from being disruptive of the Empire, were the stuff out of which it must be re-created’.\footnote{W. K. Hancock, \textit{Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs}, 3 vols., Vol. I: \textit{Problems of Nationality, 1918–1936} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 26–41. The quotation, originally from Richard Jebb’s \textit{Studies in Colonial Nationalism} (1905) is taken from p. 41 of Hancock’s book.}

The idea that ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ sentiment in the dominions could be mutually reinforcing is a running theme of twentieth-century imperial historiography. As early as 1969, Carl Berger’s pioneering study of Canadian political thought presented the conflict between imperial and anti-imperial positions in Canada in terms of divergent conceptions of the colony’s history and place in the world. More specifically, Berger argued that while Canadian imperialists could embrace the empire ‘as the vehicle in which Canada would attain national status’, Canadian anti-imperialists were inclined to see all schemes for co-operation as ‘reactionary and anti-national’\footnote{C. Berger, \textit{Imperialism and Nationalism, 1884–1914: A Conflict in Canadian Thought} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).}. More recently, John Darwin has revisited the Anglo-Dominion connection in order to posit a ‘composite Britannic culture’, or British ‘race’ sentiment, which was continuously reinforced by new migrants, and by a British-centred system of global communications transmitting news, ideas and values. Such was the purchase of this Britannic culture, Darwin argues, that as late as the 1950s it retained its capacity to reconcile national autonomy and imperial identity in the ‘old dominions’\footnote{J. Darwin, ‘A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics’, in W. R. Louis and J. Brown (eds.), \textit{The Oxford History of the British Empire}, 5 vols., Vol. IV: \textit{The Twentieth Century} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 64–87.}. Similarly, in a re-examination of the relationship between Dominion status and decolonisation, Tony Hopkins speaks of a ‘core concept of Britishness’ that continued, beyond the Second World War, to ‘give unity and vitality to a Greater Britain overseas’, and that only began to shrivel in the 1960s as the proportion of non-British immigrants increased and indigenous peoples began to assert more forcefully their equal rights with other citizens.\footnote{A. G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonisation’, \textit{Past & Present} 200 (2008), 211–47 (pp. 215, 218–9, 228–32).} Elsewhere Hopkins usefully contrasts the British diaspora of the ‘long’ nineteenth century with some of today’s migrant diasporas. As he shrewdly remarks, ‘imperial power promoted a form of cosmopolitanism that strengthened its own
sense of national identity, whereas the global forces that impinge on today’s world have challenged and often weakened national institutions and identities.\(^4^4\)

We now need to look in more detail at how a sense of British identity was reinforced and reconfigured by the settlement of large numbers of overseas migrants in a wider British World.\(^4^5\) It was the New Zealand-born historian, and pioneer of the ‘new’ British history, J. G. A. Pocock, who first called for British history to be written in terms of the ‘intercultural’ story of ‘conflict and crossbreeding between societies differently based’.\(^4^6\) This ‘new’ British history conceived of ‘Britishness’ as a multi-ethnic identity forged across the British Isles.\(^4^7\) It inspired historians of empire to cast their gaze beyond the British Isles to explore how ‘Britishness’ could be a powerful motivating ideology capable, within racially defined limits, of joining people together across the settler world.


\(^4^5\) There is also the separate, yet related, question of how English identities were affected by empire; see R. J. C. Young, *The Idea of English Ethnicity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), which argues that ‘Englishness was created for the diaspora – an ethnic identity designed for those who were precisely not English, but rather of English descent – the peoples of the English diaspora moving around the world: Americans, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, even, at a pinch, the English working-class’ (quotation from p. 1).

\(^4^6\) J. G. A. Pocock, ‘British History: A Plea for a New Subject’, *Journal of Modern History* 47 (1975), 604–5. See also his essays, ‘The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject’, *AHR* 87 (1982), 311–36, and, more recently, ‘Conclusion: Contingency, Identity, Sovereignty’, in A. Grant and K. J. Stringer (eds.), *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 292–302. Pocock delivered a plenary address at the Auckland British World Conference (14 July 2005), ‘British History and the British World’. His conception of British history beyond the British Isles goes back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and rests on the idea of an Atlantic ‘archipelago’ or ‘empire’ – British history, therefore, includes the reasons why American history ceased to be ‘British’. It was Britain’s entry into Europe, and, in particular, its disruption of the identity of New Zealanders (pakeha), that prompted him to consider the dominion dimensions of Britishness. On this point, see J. G. A. Pocock, ‘History and Sovereignty: The Historiographic Response to Europeanisation in Two British cultures’, *JBS* 31 (1992), 358–89.

If the British World was an ‘imaginary’ as well as ‘geo-political’ construct, held together not merely by political and military ties, but by a shared sense of identity, what precisely did being ‘British’ entail? A plurality of identities and their interconnectedness were part and parcel of the nineteenth-century British World. Shared traditions and values served for many as markers of their British identity, with loyalty to the Crown chief among these. Through royal tours, ceremonies and celebrations, the monarchy served to promote a sense of cultural identification with Britain, and acted as a powerful agent of political assimilation. The call of King (or Queen) and empire was most conspicuous during the Boer War and two world wars, when the British peoples rallied together and visibly demonstrated their unity. To what extent this unity was real or illusory is a moot point. It has been argued that these conflicts polarised opinion in dominion societies, exacerbating existing social and political divisions within them, and even sowing the seeds of the British World’s eventual unravelling. Others, however, insist that the intensification of dominion national consciousness resulting from the world wars did not undermine their relationship with Britain. Colonial public schools promoted and celebrated the war-time service

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50 For a spirited effort to unravel the complex effects of the wars on the Anglo-Dominion relationship, in particular their role in both creating and frustrating the impetus towards a Greater Britain, see J. Grey, ‘War and the British World in the Twentieth Century’, in Buckner and Francis, *Rediscovering the British World*, pp. 233–50.

of their ‘old boys’.\textsuperscript{52} The nationalist sentiment of dominion officers was inextricably linked to pro-empire traditions.\textsuperscript{53} The reading matter of dominion soldiers was pro-British and frequently jingoistic.\textsuperscript{54} At the end of both world wars, there was also considerable emphasis in the dominions on their British heritage and values in the commemorative ceremonies and memorials.\textsuperscript{55}

A continuing sense of attachment to Britain was likewise fostered through cultural practices and the use of language. The importation of British games and entertainments, the suppression of indigenous ones, and the ideological values that went with this process, combined as one means by which personal memories of Britain were preserved.\textsuperscript{56} So, too, was the material culture of settlers. Early generations of migrants surrounded themselves with furniture, pictures, books and other such items that reminded them of ‘home’. In fact, the very language of ‘home’ was a popular trope in settler discourse.\textsuperscript{57} English-speakers in South Africa referring to Britain as ‘home’ were roundly condemned by Afrikaners.


who took the utterance of this word as evidence of their implied disloyalty to the country. The use of such language was complex, however. ‘Home’ was invoked to refer to both ‘England’ and ‘Britain’, almost interchangeably, while settlers sometimes spoke of ‘home’ in the sense that it existed wherever people of English stock had chosen to settle. The etymology of the word, and the variety of meanings ascribed to it, merit further investigation. What is not in doubt is that the English language denoted a shared history and culture for white settlers, and that, for many non-white subjects, an ability to speak it provided a gateway to ‘respectability’ and ‘civilisation’.

The picture of what it meant to be British is further complicated by the fact of a moving racial and religious frontier. The appeal of the Crown as a source of justice, and of popular constitutionalist rhetoric as a source of equal rights, ensured that, rather than being a singular doctrine, Britishness had the potential to integrate a wide variety of settler and non-settler groups. The pro-imperial identity of groups that lay beyond the core of the ‘diaspora’ has been referred to as ‘adopted’ or ‘subaltern’ Britishness, the idea being that those settlers who were not directly of British descent could still identify with British symbols and espouse British values, partly to carve out a niche in colonial society, and partly as a way of framing their aspirations to self-government. The pro-British sympathies of Cape Afrikaners, French Canadians, and elite Scottish and Irish Catholics have all been presented in these terms. In each case

61 Bickford-Smith, ‘Revisiting Anglicisation in the Cape Colony’, p. 85.
64 M. Tamarkin, Cecil Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaners: The Imperial Colossus and the Colonial Parish Pump (London: Routledge, 1996).
a ‘liberal’ and ‘loose-fitting’ form of British identity is understood to have helped these groups to maintain their cultural identity and have conferred upon them a measure of political power.

Yet what of those non-white and indigenous groups seeking to negotiate for themselves a place in the British World? If Britishness was a contested identity, nowhere was this more so than in respect of the coloured communities of the settler empire.67 Demanding the rights of colonial citizenship, a variety of indigenous groups – Australian Aborigines,68 Maori,69 Cape Coloureds70 and Natal Indians71 – affirmed their belief in Victorian notions of free wage labour, secure property rights, equality before the law and a non-racial franchise. Some appealed directly to the Crown for help in their dealings with labour- and land-hungry settlers, in the hope of securing greater political representation. For the most part, however, they were turned away empty-handed, learning through bitter experience that their imperial loyalty was a one-way street. The language of ‘betrayal’ was never far from the lips of the British World’s indigenous peoples, therefore, particularly among those who protested their imperial loyalty.72

67 For Britishness as disputed racial territory, see D. Lorimer, ‘From Victorian Values to White Virtues: Assimilation and Exclusion in British Racial Discourse, c. 1870–1914’, in Buckner and Francis, Rediscovering the British World, pp. 109–34.
71 G. Vahed, ‘Race, Class and Loyalty to Empire: Durban’s Indians during the First World War’, paper given to the British World Conference, University of Cape Town, July 2002.
Across the empire’s settler societies, therefore, Britishness was a concept capable of a range of notions of identity. To be sure, we must be careful not to impute to these British identities a strength that they did not in fact possess. Even English-speaking settlers who proclaimed their Britishness often meant different things by it. Neither should we take such proclamations at face value. English-speakers were not always ‘celebrating a fully formed sense of community’; more likely they were ‘advocating the strengthening of an identity that they believed could, if properly cultivated, provide the basis for a pan-imperial unity’. Conversely, although skin colour was never in theory a bar to British citizenship, in practice it often proved to be so, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, those non-white groups who sought the protection and privileges provided by that citizenship increasingly found that Britishness was racially defined.

A ‘British’ or an ‘Anglo-’ World?

How far did the British World cast its geographical shadow? As an Anglophone cultural community did it embrace the United States? The boundaries of the British World remain decidedly ambiguous – and thus open to interpretation. Opinion is divided on the question of when or even whether the United States was lost to the British World. Some see the British World as synonymous with the self-governing dominions. The antipathy towards America that existed in parts of British society, and the isolationist and anti-colonial attitudes of the United States, reinforce their view. Others, however, speak of an ‘Anglo-World’, comparing the experiences of the frontier societies of America (and Argentina) to those of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. They draw attention to how ‘improving’ ideologies of

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74 For some perceptive remarks on this issue, see Bridge and Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, p. 10.
77 See especially J. Belich, ‘The Rise of the Angloworld: Settlement in North America and Australasia, 1784–1918’, in Buckner and Francis, *Rediscovering the British World*, pp. 39–58. We are grateful to Professor Belich for supplying us with a copy of his paper prior to publication.
migration, constructed around the rural ideal of the independent yeoman farmer, or its urban counterpart, that of the free British (skilled) labourer, circulated around an English-speaking world, to which the United States very much belonged. In a similar vein, studies of the Welsh ‘disapora’ have shown how settlers fashioned their cultural identity through American journals and newspapers – the print-media of Welsh migrants were particularly powerful in the United States. The similarity in British-imperial and American-republican racial discourses has also been noted. A study of the Anglo-American settler world argues forcefully that the idea of a ‘white man’s country’, and the exclusionary and discriminatory practices it fostered, were a transnational phenomenon: new ways of thinking about racial identification in these societies did not emerge simply in parallel but were ‘dynamically inter-connected’.

Britain’s demographic, commercial and financial ties to the United States are interwoven with our study of the British World economy. In the realms of migration (Chapter 3) and investment (Chapter 5) we are struck by the similarities in Anglo-Dominion and Anglo-American relations, while in the realm of trade (Chapter 4) we draw greater lines of differentiation. Of course, this is an over-simplification. Different patterns of migration within and beyond the empire led to different types of migrant experience (see, for example, the analysis of migrant remittance behaviour in Chapter 3). Conversely, notwithstanding the intensifying commercial competition between Britain and America during the late nineteenth century, intermarriage and consumption habits extending across an ‘Anglo-’ (not just a ‘British’) World acted as a counter-weight to the feeling that what had previously been regarded as a friendly offshoot of Britain was now to be viewed with a measure of jealousy and suspicion. One’s perspective on Anglo-Americanism changes according to one’s vantage point, therefore. A narrow focus on high society and politics runs the risk of elevating security and trade as the defining

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81 For the latest, synoptic study, see K. Burk, Old World, New World: The Story of Britain and America (London: Little Brown Book Company Ltd, 2007).
issues in this close if fractious relationship. Such a perspective gives little sense of the cultural depth to their interactions. The ‘underbelly’ of Anglo-American relations – the bonds of language, literature and kinship that underpinned this transatlantic exchange – merit more attention.

**The British World economy**

While explored as a political, cultural and ideological concept, the British World’s economic foundations have not received as much attention.\(^{82}\) This neglect should not surprise us. With the increased prominence of cultural studies, the economic dimensions of imperial history have, more generally, suffered from want of attention in recent years.\(^{83}\) However, before we turn to the relationship between migration, trade and finance, and the informal ties of culture, networking and association discussed above, it is worth recalling the commentary upon Anglo-Dominion relations provided by an older literature on the global development of settler capitalism and dominion export economies. Among the main consequences of the expansion of British power in the generations before the First World War was the creation of a group of settler societies with distinct economic characteristics.\(^{84}\) These hitherto sparsely populated regions occupied a privileged position in the first ‘global’ economy constructed by British free traders during the nineteenth century.\(^{85}\) With an abundance of fertile land, but a lack of capital and labour, they had an almost magnetic attraction for British investors and emigrants. Integration into the international economy was a sine qua non for their rapid development. By drawing in large numbers of immigrants and large amounts of capital, by building

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83 The role of finance and services in underpinning Britain’s continuing connection to the neo-Britains is a major exception here; see Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, esp. pp. 205–9, 241; and Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future’, pp. 206, 218, 232–3.


modern transport infrastructures and by exporting a narrow range of ‘staple’ commodities (mainly foods and raw materials), they were able to achieve impressive levels of growth and high per capita incomes. They tend to be referred to as ‘regions of recent settlement’, ‘temperate colonies’ or ‘white’ dominions. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Argentina are usually taken to be the centrepieces in comparative studies of their economies, although South Africa and Uruguay are sometimes also included.

The pioneer of this comparative study of dominion economies is Donald Denoon. His analysis of six settler societies (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), while allowing for differing responses to world economic conditions, nonetheless firmly places them in their own distinct category of development. Settler capitalists, separated from Europe by large distances and yet self-consciously ‘European’ in their attitudes and aspirations, pursued export-led growth to considerable material advantage. They were, of course, dependent on Britain for both capital and markets. Denoon, however, sees this relationship as a state of ‘unforced dependence’ that was perfectly compatible with ‘wide autonomy’, even if it dissipated the energies of some groups who might otherwise have driven these societies towards greater self-reliance.

Our study of the British World economy likewise sees significant strands of commonality among the dominions, even if our explanation of that commonality differs in certain respects from that outlined above. It is important, for example, to recognise how some parts of the British World were more than just primary producing export economies, and

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87 P. Ehrensaft and W. Armstrong also draw attention to the ‘privileged cultural, social and political linkage’ of settler societies to British imperialism, which they see as a defining characteristic of their economic development. Their study focuses on Canada, Australia and New Zealand (within the empire), and Argentina and Uruguay as ‘honorary dominions’ (outside it), highlighting how their colonial ruling groups were intent upon constructing labour markets from large-scale ‘free’ wage labour from Europe rather than from indigenous or indentured workers. See P. Ehrensaft and W. Armstrong, ‘The Formation of Dominion Capitalism: Economic Truncation and Class Structure’, in A. Moscovitch and G. Drover (eds.), *Inequality: Essays on the Political Economy of Social Welfare* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 95–105.

how the scale of manufacturing and service industry, by the later nineteenth century, was greater in provinces like Victoria and Ontario than is sometimes assumed. By this time, the cities of Melbourne and Toronto were richly diversified economies, much more than mere processing depots for the export of primary products. By world standards, of course, their manufacturing sectors were modest. Yet as early as the 1860s and 1870s, they were already showing some signs of rapid development that would follow, giving work to tens of thousands of artisans and labourers, and producing goods worth millions of dollars every year. Their manufacturers, moreover, were becoming much better organised, and exerting increased pressure on public policy, especially with regard to tariffs (See Chapter 4).

Our geographic frame of reference also differs from previous comparative studies of dominion economies. We pay closer attention to the United States as a recipient of British migrants and capital, and a link in the chain of ‘Anglo-bourgeois’ consumption. Furthermore, while recognising that South Africa’s integration into the world economy was different from that of Britain’s other dominions, and that its export-led growth was more mineral-based, we give it similar weight in our analysis to Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This is partly because contemporary conceptions of the British World did so, partly because (like the other dominions) it collaborated with Britain from a position of strength, partly because imperial networks developed there on a similar basis to those in the dominions, and partly because of the ‘non-market’ advantages enjoyed by British exporters there (see Chapter 4).

Conversely, while referring to Latin America (principally Argentina) as a point of comparison, we draw stronger distinctions between this region and other parts of the British World. Differences in political tradition and the origins of immigrant populations are significant here, as

90 The presentation of data on migrant remittances (Chapter 3) and overseas capital investment (Chapter 5) explains in more detail why we feel the inclusion of America to be necessary in any study of the economy of the British World. Also of relevance here are the late Charles Feinstein’s observations on export economies, and, in particular, the strong similarities he sees in small-scale, intensive homestead farming across the regions of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the type of growth this was able to sustain: *An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 91–2.
91 The case for South Africa’s inclusion is well made by Kubicek’s ‘Economic Power at the Periphery’, pp. 113–26.
92 So much is recognised by scholars who have placed Argentina, Canada and Australia in the same analytic frame; see, for example, D. C. M. Platt and G. di Tella, ‘Introduction’, in Platt and di Tella (eds.), *Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870–1965* (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 1–19 (pp. 2, 17).
is the very nature of the migration that took place. Take, for instance, the Italians who moved to Argentina. They did so as temporary or seasonal migrants, leasing pampas land on short-term contracts, or selling their labour during harvest. This diminished the risk and avoided the burden of fixed investments, while allowing them to accumulate considerable amounts of capital to remit home.\textsuperscript{93} Compare this with migrants to the Canadian prairies from eastern Canada, the USA and the British Isles, who made land ownership their main goal. They moved with an eye to setting up permanent enterprises, and their preference was for self-employment rather than for selling their labour.\textsuperscript{94} While the explanation for their behaviour rests partly in prevailing property relations (common-property commutation favoured large owners in Argentina, and smallholders in Canada), settler ideology also came into play. As noted above, within the British World of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a ‘secular utopianism’ entered into the emigrant creed; it was premised on the myth (or promise) of the yeoman freehold, and vigorously propagated by a plethora of emigrant literature.\textsuperscript{95} Hence the very nature of migration cautions against situating Latin America firmly within the British World. We return to this point in Chapter 4 when we examine the operation of migrant networks.

Another difference between our study and previous ones of dominion economies is that we are less concerned by class analysis, and more by the social science literature on networks. The ideas and information that flowed through imperial networks had a major impact on the economic development of the British World. Thus an examination of these networks — how they were formed, who belonged to them, and what they achieved — offers a way of reintegrating economic and cultural history, and, more specifically, of exploring the influence of culture and ethnicity upon economic behaviour.\textsuperscript{96} Imperial power, to be sure, has long

\textsuperscript{93} For example, we know that between 1889 and 1990, and 1913 and 1914, Italian migrants in Argentina remitted 7,386,869 lira or, at 1913 exchange rates, around £288,367 back home; W. Dean, \textit{Remittances of Italian Immigrants from Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and the USA} (New York: New York University Press, 1974), p. 3.


\textsuperscript{95} Belich, ‘The Rise of the Angloworld’.

been recognised as crucial to the mobilisation and distribution of material resources. Yet equally economic behaviour, like any other form of human activity, was influenced by cultural attitudes and beliefs. By merging cultural and economic histories we hope to anchor more securely some of the more ‘free-floating forms of cultural history’ in imperial structures, so that culture is not artificially separated from material conditions.97 We emphasise how culture served to enhance economic integration, and how economic activity, in turn, served to enhance a sense of cultural connectedness. We also show how ‘culture’, in the context of the networks upon which this study focuses, was to a large extent bounded by ethnicity. As dizzying as they often were, therefore, the economic possibilities of the British World were also racially circumscribed.

The next chapter draws upon new research from the social sciences to explore further the nature, origins and consequences of these transnational networks.