ABSTRACT: The Schuman Plan to “pool” the coal and steel industries of Western Europe has been widely celebrated as the founding document of today’s European Union. An expansive historiography has developed around the plan but labor and workers are largely absent from existing accounts, even though the sectors targeted for integration, coal and steel, are traditionally understood as centers of working-class militancy and union activity in Europe. Existing literature generally considers the role coal and steel industries played as objects of the Schuman Plan negotiations but this article reverses this approach. It examines instead how labor politics in the French Nord and Pas-de-Calais and the German Ruhr, core industrial regions, influenced the positions adopted by two prominent political parties, the French Socialist and German Social Democratic parties, on the integration of European heavy industry. The empirical material combines archival research in party and national archives with findings from regional histories of the Nord/Pas-de-Calais, the Ruhr, and their local socialist party chapters, as well as from historical and sociological research on miners and industrial workers. The article analyses how intense battles between socialists and communists for the allegiance of coal and steel workers shaped the political culture of these regions after the war and culminated during a mass wave of strikes in 1947–1948. The divergent political outcomes of these battles in the Nord/Pas-de-Calais and the Ruhr, this article contends, strongly contributed to the decisions of the French Socialist Party to support and the German Social Democratic Party to oppose the Schuman Plan in 1950.

“We are the territory that the Schuman Plan will affect first”, Fritz Henssler told a local congress of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Hagen in May 1951.¹

Hagen is (rather: was) an industrial town in the Ruhr area, and Henssler chaired the local SPD chapter, the party’s largest and most powerful one. Henssler explained to the congress that “we are in favor of Europe” but opposed to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was to become the first supranational organization of postwar Europe. The ECSC treaty, signed only a few weeks before in April, had resulted from a diplomatic initiative by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to “pool” Western Europe’s heavy industrial resources as a basis for European economic reconstruction after World War II. The plan was the brainchild of Jean Monnet (1888–1979), head of the French Planning Commission. The six nation community, which opened in 1952, began an institutional framework for postwar cooperation in Western Europe generally referred to as “European integration”.

The Schuman Plan, actually a speech read by Schuman at a press conference in May 1950, is the founding document of a community that has since evolved into today’s European Union. Public ceremonies, centrist politicians, and history books in Western Europe have long commemorated the speech as the moment when European governments abandoned their egoistic and self-destructive habits in order to build a more harmonious future in common. Western European elites built a public culture of commemoration around the speech almost the moment Schuman spoke his last word to the press. The first histories of European integration by the “federalist” school around Walter Lipgens were celebratory tales that sustained this mythology of Europe’s postwar rebirth. A second wave of historical interpretation, emerging in the early 1990s and led by Alan Milward, presented a more sober account of Europe’s “saints”, first and foremost Schuman and Monnet, and emphasized instead the work of administrators in economic and foreign ministries who constructed a weit hinter der Sache”. Fritz Henssler 1886–1953. Sozialdemokrat, Reichstagsabgeordneter und Dortmunder Oberbürgermeister. Der Nachlass im Stadtdarchiv Dortmund (Essen, 2003), pp. 132–141, 132. All translations from German and French are mine.

2. See for instance his account of the formative period: Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration. Vol. 1, 1945–1947: The Formation of the European Unity Movement (Oxford, 1982). The “federalist school” founded the historiography of European integration in the 1960s–1970s. Often personally active in federalist “European” movements while holding university posts, the work of its proponents blurred the line between activism and scholarship. They present a progressive and teleological account of European integration history, with a vanguard federalist movement nobly pressuring reluctant governments to abandon their outdated and dangerous attachment to national sovereignty in favor of supranationalism and European unity. Actors in their analyses are heroes or villains based on where they lie on a scale of “national” vs “European” attributions. For a critical analysis of the “federalist school”, see Daniele Pasquinucci, “Between Political Commitment and Academic Research: Federalist Perspectives”, in Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (eds), European Union History: Themes and Debates (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 66–84.
European community in order to secure national economic interests.³ A number of collective works on early European integration history from a variety of perspectives have added important nuances to this picture, by examining industries, employers’ organizations, political parties and, less often, trade unions.⁴ Workers, however, have played little if any role in most histories of European integration.

Recent historical studies have continued a skeptical view of European integration history, questioning its historical uniqueness, emphasizing the ECSC’s institutional continuities with interwar cartels in heavy industry, and tracing personal continuities with fascist and collaborationist administrations.⁵ This article will contribute to such critical readings of early European integration history by reversing the approach usually taken by scholars to study European integration. Instead of focusing, once again, on the impact of European integration on industries, workers, or regions, this article will consider how labor politics in industrial regions affected French socialist and German social democratic reactions to the Schuman Plan. The French Socialist Party (Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière – SFIO) campaigned for the plan in 1950–1951 while the SPD opposed it, a disagreement that undermined transnational efforts to rebuild socialist internationalism through inter-party cooperation on European reconstruction after the war.⁶ This article challenges existing literature on

the Schuman Plan that juxtaposes the SPD’s nationalism with the SFIO’s internationalism by exploring how intra-labor dynamics, regional politics, and goals for economic reconstruction intersected in different ways in France and Germany. It builds its claims on archival work in both state and party archives in France and Germany, on the complex historiography of the Schuman Plan, on regional histories of the Ruhr as well as the Nord and Pas-de-Calais departments and their local socialist chapters, and on historical and sociological studies of miners and industrial workers, a combination of sources that, so far, has scarcely been used in European integration history.

Reading the history of the Schuman Plan through the lens of labor conflict and politics in the Nord/Pas-de-Calais and the Ruhr,7 the French and German regions most immediately affected by the plan, will yield a new perspective on the relationship between industrial workers, left-wing political parties, and postwar reconstruction at the foundational moment of “European integration". The intense battles between communists and socialists for the support of these regions’ workers which had characterized the interwar period broke out anew after the war. Dire social conditions culminated in massive strike waves in both regions in 1947–1948, just as Cold War divisions were cementing into form. The SPD’s chair, Kurt Schumacher, argued in March 1951 that, “[t]he implementation of the Schuman Plan will have as a consequence the social disintegration of the Ruhr […] [it] will first of all threaten workers and their jobs”, and “the Communist Party will be given a [new] chance”.8 It is especially this aspect – how the SPD’s anti-communist struggle in the Ruhr affected its policy toward the integration of European heavy industry – which has remained under-considered by historians.

The Schuman Plan gave rise to similar concerns in the center of French mining, the Nord/Pas-de-Calais. Like the Ruhr, these departments had experienced bitter competition between communists and socialists in the interwar period and after 1945. However, whereas the SPD succeeded in gaining Ruhr workers’ allegiance against a communist party in decline, the opposite occurred in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais. Diverging political outcomes in the mines and steel factories of France and Germany in the aftermath of the 1947–1948 strikes thus created different contexts for party discussions at national levels in 1949–1951. Camille Delabre, a SFIO mayor of the mining town Courrières in the Pas-de-Calais, told the party congress in

7. For the sake of simplicity, the Nord and Pas-de-Calais departments are routinely identified in this article as one historical region of coal and other industries while from 1982 until recently they also officially functioned as an administrative region (and have been merged with Picardie as of the beginning of 2016).
May 1950: “The coal-steel pool worries miners because they are aware that the Ruhr deposits are important and have greater output; the miners know that they possess a very developed social security regime that influences the price of coal.” The next month, the SFIO announced its support for the plan despite the negative impact it would likely have on the French coal industry. In Germany, on the other hand, Schumacher and Henssler, after some initial hesitation, actively opposed the plan from October 1950 in order to consolidate the party’s gains in the Ruhr. This article begins by considering the role of coal and steel in the history of French and German industrialization and the importance of the industries’ workers for socialist parties, then examines how political competition between communists and social democrats in the regions intersected with postwar plans for economic reconstruction, and finally analyzes how divergent political outcomes in the industrial regions after the mass strikes of 1947–1948 are essential for understanding the parties’ different reactions to the proposal of a European common market for coal and steel in 1950. As I will show, it was the growing political preferences of Ruhr industrial workers for German social democrats, and for French communists in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais that made SPD leaders more reluctant, and SFIO leaders more willing, to embrace the Schuman Plan.

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POWER, THE “SOCIAL QUESTION”, AND WORKERS’ POLITICS IN THE RUHR AND NORD/PAS-DE-CALAIS

In the late nineteenth century, French industry fell behind in the second wave of European industrialization that transformed Germany into an industrial power. The French and German steel industries were by far the largest of continental Europe, but German steel produced roughly twice the volume of its French competitors. French industries were still largely family-run enterprises, like the De Wendel steel company. In Germany, in contrast, by the early twentieth century, professional managers ran much of the day-to-day business operations of the Krupp and Thyssen steel conglomerates. German industrial families became closely entwined with the financial industry, opening up greater lines of credit for expansion. In 1926, four steel
producers combined to form the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the largest of all businesses in Germany. This drive toward larger units experienced a certain degree of internationalization already in the interwar period, with the emergence of international steel cartels. These were built around “a notion of continental central-western European ‘core Europe’, comprised of Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg”. At the same time, a national and geopolitical outlook continued to mark the industry, and despite French reacquisition of the iron-ore fields of Lorraine after World War I, the French government chafed under the perception of French industry’s subordinate status in these cartels. After World War II, it was determined to transform the balance of industrial power between Germany and France.

This imbalance was in large part due to differences between the two nation’s coal industries: French coal was more expensive, of lower quality, and less abundant than coal mined in the German Ruhr. This territory was one of the most concentrated industrial areas in Europe, possessing a strong vertical integration economy that bound together coal and steel with transport and manufacturing. Ruhr industry prospered from the district’s abundant reserves of bituminous coal that it processed into high quality coke. The Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlen-Syndikat), founded in 1893, controlled nearly ninety per cent of total Ruhr coal production. Meanwhile, French coal mining was overwhelmingly concentrated in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais departments, although the Midi had a small number of mines and the southern industrial town Decazeville had a long-established coal mining operation as well. Under pressure from Ruhr coal exports, the Nord and Pas-de-Calais mining companies cartelized in 1891. This cartel was much less effective than its Ruhr counterpart, in part due to squabbling with coal producers in other French regions.

The northern French mines fell further behind as a result of World War I, when the western front calcified for years across the northern French plain.

Coal mining was the heart of national industrial ambitions in both France and Germany, but it was also the most conspicuous incarnation of “the social question” that shaped political and social discussions in nineteenth-century Europe. German miners had enjoyed privileged status under Prussian laws inherited from the economic reforms under Frederick the Great (1712–1786) but, during the nineteenth century, the status of miners had very much deteriorated. At the end of the century, the Wilhelmine

state took steps to improve working conditions, setting up social and medical assistance programs. At the same time, French coal miners, who had launched their first strike in 1833, were symbols of working-class militancy with a place next to the Communards in French socialist iconography. The history of French mining is punctuated by the infamous repression of the 1891 Formies strike, popularized in Émile Zola’s novel *Germinal*, and by the 1906 disaster at the Courrières Mining Company, when over 1,000 workers died. Jean Jaurès, the SFIO’s first leader, represented the Southern mining town of Carmaux, which was rocked by a traumatic labor conflict in 1892. French mining companies pioneered paternalist patterns of social control, offering free housing, coal, and other benefits that they rescinded if a worker terminated employment.16 Penalties, surveillance, privileges, and housing segregation between management, engineers and workers led to a segmented social system in mining regions largely based around class.17

A particularly dense form of social cohesion developed among miners, their families, and the small shopkeepers who serviced a working-class clientele and generally shared its values. Working, family, and leisure lives in the northern coal regions revolved around mining, a situation embodied in the term "*la corporation*", which originally referred to the world of craft guilds and was adopted for the mining communities at large. This cohesion facilitated the emergence of the Vieux Syndicat, the “Old Union”, that combined collective bargaining and political mobilization with mutual aid, pension, and associational activities. In 1908, it joined the Confédération générale du travail (CGT), France’s largest labor federation. Miners propelled the rise of Jules Guesdes’s Parti Ouvrier Français in the region, and other socialist groups as well.18 Many of the preeminent names of the founding generation of French socialism came from the northern federations. When the factions united to form the SFIO in 1905, the Nord was the largest federation of the new party, and the Pas-de-Calais was among the largest as well. The new party demanded the nationalization of the coal fields, a long-standing demand of the mining unions.

After World War I, SFIO mayors governed major cities in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, as well as mining municipalities. Allied with the Vieux Syndicat, they implemented a reformist program that mediated between miners and employers.19 In contrast to France, labor organization came

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relatively late to the Ruhr, in part because miners were overwhelmingly Catholic and suspicious of socialist and labor agitators. The Ruhr became the heart of the labor wing of the Catholic Center Party. Tensions ran high between the social democratic and Catholic trade unions. The German Revolution of 1918 marked a breakthrough for the SPD in the Ruhr. Franz Klupsch chaired the SPD’s western Westphalia section (Bezirk Westliches Westfalen) from his base in Dortmund, the most important city in the Ruhr. He and his deputy, Fritz Henssler, were closely allied with the Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB), the trade union federation aligned with the SPD. In January 1919, the moderate Majority Social Democratic Party (Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – MSPD) won 41.3 per cent in the Ruhr-based South-Westphalia electoral district and 30.6 per cent in the more agrarian North-Westphalia district, while the radical Independent Social Democratic Party (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – USPD) underperformed compared to its national average. The German Revolution resulted in a factory council law that granted miners a form of representation on corporate boards but, considering this insufficient, trade unionists demanded nationalization.

The schism that took place between socialists and communists in 1919–1920 in Europe after the Russian Revolution also shaped the interwar politics and culture of French and German industrial regions. Relations between members of the competing parties were bitter and often violent. When Wolfgang Kapp attempted a right-wing coup in 1920 against the “Weimar coalition” government, the German Communist Party (KPD) was able to gain a foothold in the Ruhr by taking an active role in defeating the coup. When communists then tried to seize power in the region, the social democrat Henssler demanded that soldiers crush this “terrorist minority” until “the last man of the red bands [is] disarmed”. SPD leaders collaborated with Freikorps troops called in to suppress the revolt. They failed to restrain the mass executions that followed. This kind of “white terror” fell especially hard on miners and industrial workers in the Ruhr and support for the SPD among workers fell substantially in 1920–1921. Still reeling from the traumas of war, revolution, and counter-revolution, the region then experienced not only a political, but also a social calamity when French

and Belgian soldiers invaded it in January 1923: Worst hit by the Ruhr occupation of 1923–1924 were the region’s industrial workers, who experienced sharply deteriorating working conditions under occupation and chronic shortages of food. The occupation upended local politics. The SPD emerged from the so-called “Ruhr crisis” a wounded party. Still a small minority force in 1922, the KPD came to present a formidable challenge to the SPD’s position in the Ruhr. In May 1924, the KPD won 29.4 per cent of the vote in Dortmund, becoming the strongest party, while the SPD only received a meager 16.2 per cent.

French Socialists at first were able to better withstand the French Communist (PCF) offensive in the industrial areas of Nord and Pas-de-Calais in the early 1920s. Intense competition for miners’ support accelerated when the PCF-aligned union, the Confédération générale du travail unitaire (CGTU), launched a campaign in 1928 to wrest power from the CGT. This resulted in a climate of hostility, including physical violence. The Great Depression from 1929 on invigorated support for communists among miners because socialist mayors seemed incapable of stemming the mass layoffs and pit closures that hit the region. In Lens, an emblematic mining community, the communist vote in national elections increased from nine per cent in 1924 to 15.9 per cent in 1928 and to 28.9 per cent in 1936. The implementation of the hated Bédaux system to increase miners’ productivity by replacing payment by teamwork with individualized wage rates caused an upheaval of traditional working practices. The number of mining injuries nearly doubled from 1932 to 1935. At the same time, the social composition of the SFIO leadership in the region was shifting from former miners to a younger, more radical, and more urban generation in which teachers predominated.

Though support for German communists in the Ruhr declined in 1925–1929, the KPD received new life during the early Great Depression. The communist Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts-Opposition) made substantial gains in Ruhr factories. In 1930, the Ruhr was

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27. Holter, *The Battle for Coal*, p. 34.
the strongest area of KPD support in Germany. Workers increasingly supported National Socialists as well. In 1932, as the crisis of Weimar Germany had already become evident, the KPD surpassed both the Center Party and the SPD, becoming the largest party in the Ruhr territory for the first and only time in its history. Nazi repression then hit the Ruhr hard. The regime’s minister for labor affairs severely curtailed the rights of miners and granted comprehensive employer control over the workforce.29 Fritz Husemann, the mine trade union leader, was shot in a concentration camp in 1935.30 At the same time, employment in the Ruhr swelled and new workers were recruited as Germany’s economy recovered and the rearmament program directed national resources to heavy industry. The Ruhr became the center of the Nazi wartime economy. Forced labor from conquered countries toiled in the Ruhr, many dying in the factories of Krupp and other enterprises. Social democrats’ resistance to the National Socialist government in the Ruhr largely involved circulating pamphlets, while the communist underground organized more effectively, also engaging in acts of sabotage.31 When Henssler returned to Dortmund in June 1945 after eight years in a concentration camp, he encountered a communist movement strengthened by the prestige it had earned among opponents of National Socialism and the war.

In France, communists played leading roles in the massive strikes that followed the Popular Front victory in the 1936 elections. The strikes won higher wages, the re-employment of laid-off workers and the abolition of the Bédaux system, an impressive accomplishment that brought almost the entire mining population into the trade unions. Employers struck back when the Popular Front fell in 1938, reintroducing the Bédaux system and prolonging work hours. The trade unions began to fall apart as relations between communists and socialists deteriorated. When war came in 1940, German occupiers detached the region from the rest of France.32 Miners and steel workers felt abandoned by their countrymen and betrayed by their employers, managers, and trade union leaders, whom they believed to be collaborating with the occupiers. Communists were the driving force for resistance throughout the nation, particularly in this region and its mines. They helped spark the first mass strike against Nazi rule in the northern mine basin in May 1941. The strike resulted in better working conditions but came at enormous cost: hundreds of workers were deported to German factories and to concentration camps. Dozens were

executed. Miners believed that their employers provided the name of strike leaders to German officials. A tense social climate continued for three more years of occupation and exploded with the liberation of France in 1944.

COMPETITION BETWEEN SOCIALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN FRENCH AND GERMAN INDUSTRY AFTER WORLD WAR II

After the war, working conditions in the principal industrial regions of France and Germany was closely interrelated with, first, the national program for economic reconstruction in France, and, second, with the Western Allied program for European reconstruction in non-Soviet occupied Germany. Local politicians in industrial regions, most prominently socialists and communists, had to come to terms with the complex interplay of local, national, and international pressures as well as the beginnings of the Cold War. European reconstruction required a rapid increase in production from the same industrial regions that experienced the fiercest competition between communists and socialists of any region of postwar France, and of the Western occupied zones of Germany, a competition that was intensely lived at the grass-roots level. An analysis of the experiences of regional political competition in the mines of France and in Ruhr heavy industry in 1945–1948 and of their divergent political outcomes is thus necessary to understand national SFIO and SPD debates on the Schuman Plan in 1950–1951.

National liberation in France and occupation in Germany created, of course, different contexts for the struggle between communists and socialists in these industrial regions. In the northern French mining basin, driving out the German troops had taken the form of a social revolution. French miners downed tools against the wishes of CGT leaders and refused to work for their former bosses, whom they accused of collaborating with the enemy. Purge commissions had difficulty proving miners’ accusations and, as happened as well in the Ruhr’s de-Nazification program, officials often found that purges and a rapid restoration of production were contradictory goals. In France, SFIO Industrial Minister Robert Lacoste decreed the nationalization of the mines in December 1944. He also set up comités d’entreprise, a form of worker participation in management throughout French industry. In the nationalized coal bodies, one-third of the seats on steering committees were now reserved for miners’ representatives. The French Assembly approved a new Miners’ Statute in June 1946, which satisfied demands mining unions had pursued for decades, like a retirement age of fifty-five and longer paid vacation. Lacoste raised miners’ salaries to

among the highest in industry. And only five months later, two former miners, SFIO deputy Paul Sion and the Socialist leader of the Nord federation, Augustin Laurent, oversaw the approval of a law guaranteeing healthcare to miners.35

Ruhr industry faced an uncertain fate under occupation. The Allied governments needed Ruhr coal to sustain Germany’s population and to fuel European recovery; at the same time, they also prepared a dismantlement program for the region’s steel and manufacturing industries. Wartime damage to these industries was surprisingly small, while destruction in the coal mines was considerably greater. The number of miners in the Ruhr fell sharply with the release of foreign forced laborers.36 Extraction had almost ground to a halt in April 1945, yet priority accorded to the sector led to a partial recovery and increased employment by the beginning of 1946.37 In August 1945, British occupation authorities arrested 160 leaders of Ruhr industry, including industrial titans Alfried Krupp, Hugo Stinnes, Jr., Fritz Thyssen, and Walter Rohland, the director of Vereinigte Stahlwerke. Polls showed overwhelming support for socialization among miners, a demand backed by the coal union IG Bergbau and the region’s social democratic and communist parties.38 Industrialists soon re-organized to resist socialization and took the initiative to create a new employers’ association, out of which grew the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI).39

At the first conference of the British zone Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), trade union delegates demanded co-determination (Mitbestimmung) in all industries, a form of employee participation in management. Sensing an opportunity, industrialists in Duisburg, Oberhausen, and Essen offered the trade unions parity representation on corporate boards in January 1947 in a largely successful effort to build a collective front to save the factories from closure and dismantlement.40 In November, trade unionists also achieved equal representation with employers on the advisory trustee organization created by the British authorities to manage the coal industry. Meanwhile, the SPD threatened to pull its delegates from consultative assemblies in the

35. Bernard Vanneste, Augustin Laurent ou, Toute une vie pour le socialisme (Dunkerque, 1983), p. 64.
Bizone (the occupation zone jointly administered by the UK and US) if the British authorities continued to delay socialization. In an act of intra-labor movement cooperation, social democrats and communists succeeded in passing a socialization law in the regional assembly in 1947, even gaining some Christian-democratic support, but US military officials scuttled the law. Hence, while French coal was nationalized in the Charbonnages de France, ownership of German coal and industry remained open and deeply contentious.

Nonetheless, there are clear parallels in the political situation of the Nord/Pas-de-Calais and Ruhr in the initial postwar years. First, socialists confronted mass communist parties with strong support among miners and industrial workers. In early postwar elections, communists won approximately 20–25 per cent in the Nord/Pas-de-Calais, about the national average, but also 20–25 per cent in the Ruhr, by far the highest in the western occupation zones of Germany. French communists took control of the CGT miners’ union, the Syndicat CGT des mineurs, in December 1944 and reinforced their majority by expelling union leaders accused of collaboration. Socialists lost municipal elections in mining towns that had long been socialist fiefdoms, most glaringly when Auguste Lecoeur, a communist leader of the 1941 strikes, was elected mayor of Lens in 1945. In Germany, communists had been operating illegally in the mines at the end of the war, and the British authorities mostly tolerated their activities when the region came under their control. The Ruhr communist party quickly recovered its support among industrial workers who had been party members in the early 1930s. In the September–October 1945 factory council elections, the KPD won a majority. A regional congress of the metal workers’ union elected a communist chair, Karl Küll, infuriating Walter Freitag, the social democratic leader of the national metal union (which in 1949 would become IG Metall). In IG Bergbau, the miners’ union, the communist Willi Agatz fell only thirteen votes short of election for chair of the miners’ union in 1946 against August Schmidt, the SPD candidate. Never before had communists had so much support in German industrial unions.

Second, the SPD and SFIO shared a prevailing view that communist success in industrial areas resulted from miserable working and living

conditions. The KPD gained its largest proportion of votes (thirty-two per cent) in the 1947 elections in Bochum, a city that had, with a calculated daily average of only 629 calories per person, the worst nutritional situation of the US–British Bizone. Conditions for Ruhr workers were indeed dismal: Wartime bombing had a disproportionate impact on urban areas. In many Ruhr cities, half of prewar housing lay in ruins. Heating, coal, and electrical shortages made for dark and cold winters. Food shortages were ubiquitous and rations fell to life-threatening levels. In addition, occupation authorities lowered wages and stripped Ruhr miners of their special health benefits and accident insurance. Miners and industrial workers often arrived to work exhausted from long commutes. Factory reports depict hungry workforces prone to apathy and gallows’ humor and workplaces marked by shouting matches and outbreaks of violence.

Meanwhile, in France, communist leaders announced a “battle for coal” in the aftermath of the war and exhorted miners with Stakhanovite imagery to produce more in the interests of the nation. PCF leader Maurice Thorez told a Nord mining audience in July 1945 that, “it is your duty as Frenchmen to raise production and “miners must love the mine”. Communists took leading administrative positions in nationalized coal. The CGT and PCF forcefully suppressed a strike that broke out in September 1945, reminding workers that nationalization “did not yet mean [that] the mine [belonged] to the miners”. Workers generally greeted the “battle for coal” with a mix of sarcasm, bitterness, and resignation. The campaign met the large quotas demanded by the government at the expense of miners’ health. The rate of injuries doubled and free health care was of little use, as doctors often saw hundreds of patients a day and did not have the training in some cases to address illnesses that plagued mining communities. A technological innovation in drilling resulted in workers swallowing large quantities of dust, which later resulted in increased rates of black lung disease (silicosis).

Finally, the Ruhr SPD and the SFIO in Nord/Pas-de-Calais were among the most anti-communist of their parties’ regional chapters and forcefully rejected postwar efforts to unify the two workers’ parties. Laurent, leader of the Nord-SFIO, and Henssler in the Ruhr worked tirelessly to sabotage

47. Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau, pp. 32–40.
unification. Guy Mollet, leader of the Pas-de-Calais federation and then SFIO secretary general, supported unification, but he faced resistance in his region’s mining areas, where bitter memories of interwar animosities predominated. Regardless of differences in their stances on unity efforts with communists, both parties vigorously competed for the support of miners and industrial workers in 1945–1946. Competition with communists thus affected socialist leaders’ calculations of how to face the harrowing social and political problems in mining and industry after the war. For instance, SFIO leaders sought to take advantage of the unpopularity of the PCF coal campaign, with the local socialist press writing that, “soon [the communists] are going to make the worker sleep in the mine”. Force Ouvrière (FO), a socialist minority faction in the CGT created in 1947, channeled workers’ discontent and condemned the “battle for coal”. This tactic yielded isolated victories: The socialist Sion defeated Lecoeur, who was then a communist undersecretary of state for the mines, in a 1946 election in Lens.

MASS STRIKES AND THE DIVERGENT POLITICS OF MINERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN NORTHERN FRANCE AND THE GERMAN RUHR

The parties responded rather differently when huge strikes broke out in French and German industrial regions in 1947–1948. In Germany, protests began in Essen in February 1947; by March, tens of thousands of workers were demonstrating in all major Ruhr cities. Over 300,000 miners went on strike in April. These were spontaneous, grassroots strikes driven by food shortages – as is evident in the image in Figure 1 – and punctuated with demands for socialization and co-determination. SPD leaders recognized that hunger was at the root of the protests, but they also interpreted them within the context of their anti-communist tradition and the escalating Cold War. The local SPD press suspected that a “communist orchestra director” was provoking the strikes to promote the KPD’s political schemes. It was true that communists often spearheaded wildcat strikes at the time; yet, more often than not they did so on their own initiative, not under orders from their leadership. In April, Agatz advocated a one day miners’ strike, a proposal approved by the miners’ union against the objections of August Schmidt, its social democratic chair. In response to the protests, the region’s SPD Economic Minister, Erik Nölting, introduced a point-rationing

system for coal miners that assured them a far higher ration than the rest of the population. Reforms succeeded in quieting the protests, but they broke out again in January 1948 as the Ruhr food supply reached its nadir. This time the impetus came from metal workers, rather than miners. The DGB and SPD leaderships, while split over whether to support the 1947 strikes, were overwhelmingly hostile to their repetition in 1948 and worked to hasten their end.

While Ruhr miners faced occupation authorities, the 1947 strikes in France pitted many Nord and Pas-de-Calais workers against a socialist-led government. National politics in France had transformed after communist ministers left the cabinet in May 1947. As the Cold War gathered pace, the SFIO Minister of Industry, Robert Lacoste, sharply cut CGT representation on the coal boards, scaling back the say in management miners had only recently acquired. Strikes broke out at Renault in April 1947 when the government announced lower food rations. They quickly spread throughout French industry and the mines, rising and subsiding through the year until they culminated in a mass railway and mining strike in November. The government forcefully suppressed the strike in a dark climate that also included a mysterious train derailment. Then, in 1948, the government issued decrees cracking down on absenteeism in the mines, forcing workers with “black lung” to return to work, and limiting medical and retirement benefits. An enormous miners’ strike called by the CGT to protest the decrees shook France in
October–December 1948. The strikes were responses to poor social conditions but, like in the Ruhr, they had clear political implications. The workers’ claims struck at core government priorities. Demands for wage increases for miners threatened to nullify the economic centerpiece of the socialists in government: the control of prices and wages to prevent inflation. They also threatened to deepen coal shortages and damage French industry. The government decided to crush the strike. Lacoste laid off ten percent of miners, cracked down on chronic absenteeism, and ended subsidies for the coal industry. SFIO Interior Minister Jules Moch sent in the national police to conquer the mines one by one. Skirmishes, sabotage, and shootings turned the region into a veritable battleground, a glimpse of which is captured in Figure 2. Some workers rebelled against the CGT, the leading union federation at the time, and tried to reopen the mines. The FO called for a return to work and split from the CGT, forming a new union federation informally aligned with the SFIO. It supported the SFIO’s policy on wages, as did Laurent, the leader of the Nord-

Figure 2. Demonstrators scuffle with police during the 1948 miners’ strike in the Nord/Pas-de-Calais.

Source: MaxPPP/Voix du Nord. Used with permission.

SFIO and a former miner.\textsuperscript{59} In December, the CGT surrendered, and those defeated miners who had not been dismissed returned to work.

The strikes of 1947 set off completely different political dynamics in the two countries, dynamics that also reflected the different contexts of state-led reconstruction in France and reconstruction under military occupation in postwar Germany. French miners and industrial unions, lionized as heroes in the initial postwar period, increasingly felt alienated from the state. The bitter outcome of the strike renewed support for the communist party among many industrial workers, who felt betrayed by socialists in government. After 1948, the Nord federation of the SFIO lost a high proportion of its dues-paying members, and votes for socialists in the mining areas of the Pas-de-Calais fell by over twenty thousand votes from the legislative elections of 1946 to 1951, while votes for communists rose by over ten thousand. The SFIO federations experienced less of a decline in the northern regions than elsewhere in France, but this was primarily due to their strength outside of mining areas, where communists consolidated their gains.\textsuperscript{60} The FO, the union federation now aligned with the SFIO, remained weak in industry and strong among public servants, the latter of whom made up much of the SFIO electoral base as well. The March 1948 comités d’entreprise elections in the Nord confirmed the FO’s weakness: the CGT won over fifty per cent of the vote; the FO received a disappointing fourteen per cent. Steel workers overwhelmingly preferred the CGT to the FO as well.\textsuperscript{61} The miners’ and metal workers’ unions became solid communist strongholds at a time when an acceleration of Cold War tensions encouraged socialist leaders to view their domestic dispute with the PCF through an international lens of threat and confrontation. Workers’ sense of alienation from both the socialists and the government had implications for how they viewed proposals for European unity: in November 1948, forty-two per cent of CGT members supported a European economic union and forty per cent opposed it, whereas eight-seven per cent of FO members favored economic union and ten per cent were against. Eleven months earlier, a poll had support among communists for a European federation at over sixty per cent, not far short of the seventy per cent of socialists who expressed a favorable opinion, the most supportive among all party memberships.\textsuperscript{62} The polls were not longitudinal or consistent in the question or groups measured. Still, the impact a year of transformative events in industrial


\textsuperscript{60} Henri Adam, Yves-Marie Hilaire, André Legrand, Bernard Ménager, Robert Vandenbussche, \textit{Atlas de géographie électorale Nord-Pas-de-Calais 1946–1972} (Lille, 1972), pp. 148–151.


relations and politics had on the sociological base of support for European unity, now clearly understood as Western European unity, is evident.

In Germany, on the other hand, the trade unions and SPD made a concerted effort in 1948–1951 to win the allegiance of Ruhr workers and succeeded in significantly reducing communist party influence in the Ruhr. The Ruhr factory councils were the largest bastion of KPD power in postwar western Germany and had acted as a counterweight to the DGB’s efforts to end the strikes. The Ruhr SPD thus intensified its campaign to defeat communists in the mines and factories. Henssler wrote Schumacher that the SPD must “activate our factory council groups to resolve the situation” because “the trade unions themselves unfortunately do not seem to clearly see the danger”. Further, communists came under increasing pressure after the Berlin blockade began in June 1948. The eastern German ruling party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), began exercising greater financial and political control of the western KPD. It forced through a policy of denouncing the official union leaderships, distributing eastern German propaganda in the factories, and pressuring the factory councils to take a pro-Soviet stance in the Cold War. This policy turned out to be increasingly self-defeating, and many communist trade union officials began distancing themselves from the KPD. In March 1950, DGB leader Hans Böckler called for a “purge” of communists, and communists lost most of their remaining seats on the factory councils, most dramatically in Essen. While the metal and mining unions expelled officials who refused to sign loyalty pledges or who publicly took pro-communist positions, they otherwise exercised a skillful policy of integrating communist officials and union members. Votes for KPD candidates in North-Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s largest region in which the Ruhr district is located, had already collapsed by half between October 1948 and August 1949. The KPD membership in the region fell by almost half from 1949 to 1953. In 1949–1950, the SPD cemented its role as the hegemonic party in the industrial Ruhr, a position it has held for decades since.

The social democrats’ push to stamp out communism in the Ruhr coincided with a French diplomatic offensive to gain control of the Ruhr’s industrial development. The June 1948 Allied London Accords promised the French government an International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) in

63. For the outlines of this campaign see, for instance, the following documents from March–April 1947: “Sozialdemokratische Partei, Bezirk Westliches Westfalen Entwurf Richtlinien für die Arbeit der Betriebsgruppen”, reprinted in Klessmann and Friedemann, Streiks, pp. 114–115, and “Brief W. Hansens an J. Kappius v. 21.4.1947 zum Richtlinientwurf für die Arbeit der (SPD) Betriebsgruppen, pp. 116.

64. Cited from: Lauschke, Die Hoesch-Arbeiter, p. 246.


exchange for French agreement to the creation of a West German state. There was substantial support for this agreement in the SPD national executive. With coal prices subject to Allied approval, over seventy per cent of Ruhr coal mines were operating at a loss, and there seemed little prospect of wage increases for miners under an international management dedicated to ensuring low prices for coal exports. Further, French oversight of Ruhr industry raised frightful memories of the political and social damage wrought by the interwar Ruhr occupation. The Ruhr SPD and SPD regional ministers in North-Rhine-Westphalia used their powerful positions to pressure the national party to oppose the IAR. It was their influence, to date largely overlooked in the literature, that set the national party’s intransigent line on French proposals for the Ruhr. Henssler in particular—pictured giving a speech in Dortmund in 1948 in Figure 3—was responsible for a

67. See the minutes of the SPD national executive: AdsD, SPD-Parteivorstand, Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss, 29–30 June 1948.
68. AdsD, Nachlass Fritz Henssler, Mappe 48, Henssler to Parteivorstand, 10 May 1948.
hardening of SPD attitudes over the following year. Such proposals threatened to undermine the progress social democrats had made against communists in the region. In a March 1949 article entitled “Ruhr Statute and Peace Settlement”, Schumacher explicitly linked the SPD’s position to its competition against the communists in the Ruhr: “The communists see here a chance for their politics. And they are saying that ‘The Ruhr must remain German!’.”

**FRENCH SOCIALISTS AND THE POLITICS OF COAL:**
**FROM THE “MONNET” TO THE “SCHUMAN” PLAN**

Ruhr coal and coke, meanwhile, were essential for the success of France’s program for postwar economic reconstruction. The postwar planning commission, led by Jean Monnet, intended to modernize the French economy by increasing the competitiveness of French manufacturing and capturing a larger share of global trade for French industrial exports. By 1950, however, the success of the “Monnet Plan” seemed highly endangered: Indifference by the other Western Allies and subversion by German industry and by the government of the newly established Federal Republic of Germany had paralyzed the IAR, which was designed to attain the lower energy costs required by the plan. German coal companies practiced “double-pricing”, a policy by which they exported coal at higher prices than they sold it on the domestic market. These higher coal prices raised costs for French industry. The Schuman Plan was an attempt by the French government to save its postwar economic program by offering the West German government an international framework it could accept. Jean Monnet’s idea was to create a European common market for coal and steel that would allow French manufacturing to compete on the world market on an equal footing with German industry. The modernization program required lower coal prices – if need be at the expense of the French coal industry and French miners. French communists had supported this policy until they left government in 1947. As the Cold War bolted the door behind them, the CGT and PCF fell back on a sectoral defense of industries where they had strong support from workers.

French socialists retained governmental responsibilities after the communists left office. When SFIO ministers harshly suppressed the 1947–1948 strikes, coal

69. See the dispute in the SPD national executive about whether to accept the Ruhr Statute in January 1949, in which the overwhelming majority in the executive supported Henssler’s opposition. The executive approved a resolution (with only two dissenting votes) that denounced the Ruhr Statute and launched a public campaign against it. AdsD, SPD-Parteivorstand, Parteivorstand, 21–22 January 1949.

and steel workers saddled them with much of the blame. This brought recriminations within the party but not a change in party policy. Although members of the SFIO parliamentary group condemned Lacoste’s “anti-worker” positions, they did so behind closed doors.\(^\text{71}\) Lacoste replied that French coal costs had to come down to compete with the lower price of foreign coal. At a 1949 party congress, the SFIO secretary general Mollet said that “especially in the mines […] a demagogic campaign against us has borne fruits”. After he noted that, “[w]e have lost many thousands of votes on the name of Lacoste”, an audience member shouted “Bravo!” Mollet icily replied, “No, not bravo, it is unfortunate, it is terribly unjust”.\(^\text{72}\) In 1949, less productive mines in northern France began to close down, and the planning commission lowered the targets for domestic coal production. These pressures reflected themselves within the SFIO, where leading representatives disputed with one another whether miners’ wages could rise without increasing coal prices.\(^\text{73}\) Meanwhile, socialists were especially attentive in this period to the growing concerns of French manufacturers. The business historian Matthias Kipping demonstrates how representatives of this diverse sector influenced economic policy in 1949–1950.\(^\text{74}\)

They became forceful advocates for the Schuman Plan, which was designed to decrease their production costs by lowering the prices of coal and steel. This was also the goal of SFIO economist André Philip (1902–1970), who told the 1949 congress that after the liberation it had been necessary to invest in French coal and steel, but new investments henceforth had to be shifted toward manufacturing. He was among the first to advocate a coal and steel common market in 1949.

The Schuman Plan thus grew out of a French domestic policy rationale of forcing its own nationalized coal industry to attain coal and steel prices in France at the levels of those prevailing in Germany. It sought to Europeanize the Monnet Plan and aid French manufacturing by extending its reach as purchasers to Ruhr coal. It was clear that competition within a coal and steel common market threatened to bring more layoffs of miners and perhaps of steel workers in France. The northern French mines had higher wages, poorer resources, and lower productivity than the Ruhr mines. An official of the French Planning Commission told the National Assembly’s Economics Commission that, “because of unequal productivity, there are at the moment clear differences in the conditions of coal production in Germany and in France”. These differences, he said, “may lead to a displacement of production, which means that German coal

\(^{71}\) Archives d’histoire contemporaine, Paris [hereafter, AHC], Groupe Parlementaire Socialiste, GS 1, 1 June 1949.

\(^{72}\) OURS, Congrès national extraordinaire, 13 et 14 décembre 1949.

\(^{73}\) See the discussion between Daniel Mayer and Christian Pineau, OURS, Conseil national SFIO, 6 November 1949.

will take the place of French coal in certain markets. André Philip was willing to accept this sacrifice because, as he and others noted, French manufacturing employed more workers than the coal industry. He concluded that it “seems necessary to close businesses that are not able to adapt to the new conditions [...].” Philip was often an isolated figure within the party but his view was also that of most SFIO ministers in government in 1947–1950, who accepted the possibility of mine closures in hopes of economic gains elsewhere.

The CGT immediately denounced the Schuman Plan employing a Cold War rhetoric: the common market was part of a US plan to rearm Germany and use Ruhr resources to launch a war against the Soviet Union. French communists also claimed that the planned coal and steel community would de-industrialize France and cause the “deportation” of French workers to the Ruhr, pictured as a kind of industrial Moloch. French industry would have to align salaries with the low wages of West Germany and even then it would probably not be able to compete. Many in the French steel industry had concerns as well. For instance, steel industrialist Humbert de Wendel thought that French steel could not compete with German industry. Georges Villiers, the head of France’s umbrella employers’ association (Conseil national du patronat français – CNPF), however, supported French manufacturing interests and endorsed the plan against the wishes of the French steel industry. The European Industrial Council, in turn (and with Villiers as president), criticized the terms of the emerging Paris treaty for granting to the community’s executive body, the High Authority, power it believed should be the prerogative of employers. The French business community was divided by competing interests and, on the eve of the ECSC ratification, the CNPF urged the vote be delayed. (The nationalized coal industry, as an arm of the government, had no independent say in these inter-industry debates.)

77. For André Philip’s role in the Schuman Plan debates, see Mattias Kipping, “André Philip et les origines de l’union européenne”, in Christian Chevandier and Gilles Morin (eds), André Philip, socialiste, patriote, chrétien (Paris, 2005), pp. 387–403.
In this clash of interests, the French Socialist Party chose to support manufacturing over the interests of French miners. That it could do so without a public clash was due to the positive attitude adopted by the SFIO federations that represented the Nord and Pas-de-Calais. Augustin Laurent, chair of the SFIO Nord federation, supported the Schuman Plan even though experts expected it would lead to layoffs and closures in the mining regions. Had he opposed the plan, he surely would have caught the party leadership’s attention like Henssler did in Germany. Mollet, for his part, had an iron grip over the Pas-de-Calais federation. As party leader, he was focused more on national than regional issues. With their constituencies shifting from mining areas to towns, the northern federations did not face the same pressures as the Ruhr SPD to defend the interests of miners. When the SFIO parliamentary group met to discuss the pending ratification of the ECSC on 11 December 1951, Guy Desson, who represented a mining district in the Ardennes, voiced miners’ concern that, “[t]he repercussions are going to be considerable for a great number of businesses, the ratification of the treaty will lead to an acceleration in the process of liquidation of unequipped businesses […] and it is the workers who are going to suffer”. He continued that, “we are going to plunge these regions into unemployment”. Another socialist, Jean Le Bail, replied that he could “not follow Desson’s argumentation for a very simple practical reason: we are going to ratify the Schuman Plan”. Despite his own “reservations about the Schuman Plan”, he said that, “it is not a good idea to make the mistake of giving reasons against” the plan that would assist its opponents “after having pushed the idea and in the end voting for it.”

Paul Ramadier, who represented the southern industrial town of Decazeville and had been SFIO Prime Minister in 1947, was also reluctant but in the end voted for the ECSC. Without support from the powerful Nord and Pas-de-Calais party federations or from Ramadier, the dissident Desson was isolated. A few days later, he was the only French socialist in the National Assembly to vote against the ratification of the ECSC.

DEFENDERS OF THE RUHR: GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, THE SCHUMAN PLAN, AND DISAGREEMENTS AMONG GERMAN TRADE UNIONS

In Germany, SPD leaders were at first unsure what to make of the Schuman Plan. Kurt Schumacher welcomed it in May 1950 but called it “a frame” without a “picture”. The SPD, he said, would not define a position until it had more information about the community’s design and its impact on
German coal and steel industries. The DGB was silent for ten days but then applauded the plan. A small team of trade unionists from the DGB executive and the miners’ union attended the Schuman plan negotiations in Paris as part of the German delegation. Hans vom Hoff, who led the DGB delegation, praised the atmosphere at the Paris negotiations and expressed optimism about its outcome to the DGB executive in July. Officials in the IG Metall union were less enthusiastic. Their exclusion from the ECSC delegation fomented suspicion that the DGB executive would not adequately defend their members’ interests, concerns that they passed on to the SPD leadership. Gustav Henle, a steel industrialist and a Christian democratic (CDU) deputy close to Germany’s CDU chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was enthusiastic about the plan. Most steel industrialists were skeptical though. They were pleased that the executive powers envisioned for the High Authority were reduced over the course of 1950 but were unhappy about plans to permanently sever the steel industry’s traditional links with coal mining. The SPD also fervently supported maintaining the Ruhr’s vertical integration economy.

The negotiations took a decisive turn when Monnet, heading the French delegation, suddenly insisted in September 1950 that the community’s High Authority be invested with legal powers to dissolve cartels, a power that would imperil not only the Ruhr’s vertical integration economy, but its coal sales syndicate as well. There was revulsion in German industry and in the unions against the new set of French demands. Henssler considered the sales cartel essential for the coal industry’s stability and for preserving jobs in less productive mines. SPD leaders also opposed ending the double-pricing of German coal, a policy that allowed the party and unions to push for wage increases for miners through higher export prices without damaging employment in other German industries by raising domestic coal prices. The SPD leadership thus came out in October 1950 against the coal and steel community, reviving its critique from 1948 against the IAR that French

proposals intended to colonize the Ruhr by exploiting its raw materials while stifling German industry. The SPD’s position matched the increasingly critical view in IG Metall. Freitag, the metal workers’ chair and a SPD member of the Bundestag, said that “under no circumstance can we approve the Schuman Plan”. The ECSC, he claimed, was a “reparation to France”, because it would build up the French steel industry using German coal at the expense of German steel.90 The specter of a communist resurgence in the Ruhr drove the party’s opposition to the ECSC. In May 1951, a month after the Treaty of Paris was signed, Schumacher told a SPD conference:

All of this means the beginning of a process of social disintegration of the Ruhr […] [with] dangerous political consequences. It has hardly been remarked by the public yet it is decisive for German politics that we have largely snatched the Ruhr territory from the communists. But social disintegration, whatever the [political] form [it takes], be it old-communist, new-communist or national-communist, would mean to incite the rebellion of the deprived people in the Ruhr […]. I have privately told the Americans: the Schuman Plan is the birth certificate for a new communist movement and [due to U.S. support for the Plan] you Americans are the state officials issuing the certificate.91

After the SPD began its campaign against the community, the DGB leadership decided to take advantage of the controversy over the plan to demand concessions on co-determination from the German government.92 By 1948–1949, co-determination was the norm in Ruhr mining and industry but business leaders were working to prevent its spread to other industries and to reduce labor’s representation on company boards. In November 1950, ninety-eight per cent of IG Metall members voted to go on strike if the German parliament did not approve a co-determination law and in January 1951 ninety-three per cent of IG Bergbau members followed suit.93 Under pressure, Adenauer conceded and the German parliament passed a co-determination bill in April 1951, the same month that six governments signed the Treaty of Paris to create the ECSC. The passage of the co-determination bill strengthened the hand of the pro-ECSC faction within the DGB. On 7 May, the DGB federal committee expressed approval for the Schuman Plan, though with a series of reservations that included the maintenance of the Ruhr coal sales cartel.94

92. This is the general thesis of Thum’s study Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie.
The DGB executive thus broke with the SPD, a situation which created considerable unrest in the unions. Riding a wave of discontent at the DGB congress the next year, Freitag defeated the pro-ECSC union leadership and became chair of the trade union federation. After years of unease and conflict that had begun with a split over the French plans on the IAR in 1949, social democrats were firmly back in charge in the DGB. From then on, the SPD and the unions would coordinate their approach in the new common market for coal and steel to defend the interests of Ruhr industry and its workers.95

THE LABOR PERSPECTIVE: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, SOCIALIST PARTIES, AND POLITICAL COMPETITION IN FORMER INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

Scholars have often explained the SPD’s decision to oppose the ECSC as resulting from the “nationalism” of party leader Kurt Schumacher,96 but German social democrats did not oppose the Schuman Plan because they were against “European unity”. They opposed it because they thought that it would damage their working-class constituency in the Ruhr that was increasingly turning their backs on the communists in this period in favor of social democrats. In 1945–1949, French socialists and German social democrats engaged in intense competition, particularly on a grass-roots level, with communists for power in the factories and mines of industrial areas rich with historic and symbolic importance. As this article has highlighted, SPD intransigence toward French policies and its opposition to the Schuman Plan were in large part an effort to thwart a communist revival in the Ruhr. Opposition to ECSC, in this context, should therefore be read less as a kind of “anti-European” stance than as the result of the party’s anti-communist policy. In France, on the other hand, the socialist party had lost its battle with communists for the support of a majority of miners in the Nord/ Pas-de-Calais and was willing to sacrifice French coal to attain broader economic goals. Divergent postwar political outcomes in the central industrial regions of France and Germany therefore contributed to the SPD’s rejection of the Schuman Plan, and the SFIO’s decision to accept it.

Fixated on politics at the national level, scholars have overlooked how regional influences and labor politics affected national party policies on European integration. For over half a century now, the Ruhr has been a SPD stronghold. The political dominance of social democrats in the Ruhr

95. Close coordination was ensured by the appointment of IG Metall trade unionist Heinz Potthoff as commissioner in the ECSC High Authority and by the presence of important trade unionists in the SPD’s delegation to the Common Assembly, especially Heinrich Deist (DGB executive) and Heinrich Imig (IG Bergbau).

was, to a high degree, an accomplishment of Fritz Henssler, who denounced the Schuman Plan due to the impact he foresaw it would have on Ruhr workers. The SPD responded to these concerns by naming Henssler as one of the party’s delegates to the emerging ECSC Common Assembly, the quasi-parliamentary body which opened in 1952. He died in 1953 after a long illness, and the defense of Ruhr workers in the community passed to other SPD officials. In the end, his fears of French exploitation of the Ruhr would not bear out. A tacit “grand coalition” of German industry, trade unions, social democrats and Christian democrats defeated the 1951 French vision of a coal and steel community free of cartels. By 1954, the SPD had made its peace with a community it had so doggedly opposed.

That same year, many French socialist supporters of the ECSC voted against the European Defense Community (EDC), a treaty for another supranational European community that failed to pass the French National Assembly in August 1954. Most French socialists who opposed the EDC were not against the idea of “European integration”, which was a novel and amorphous concept at the time, any more than were German social democratic opponents of the ECSC.97 Rather, they voted against German rearmament and for negotiations to peacefully end the Cold War. Here again, it seems less that those French miners who believed that their jobs were on the line when the Schuman Plan came to a vote were driven by “anti-European” feelings or were explicitly opposed to supranational forms of international cooperation. In the 1950s, CGT leaders denounced the initial steps of European integration using two levels of analysis: a geopolitical frame of Cold War aggression against the Soviet Union and a national-economic claim that the government and the Socialist Party did not care about workers’ problems. SFIO leaders, for their part, insisted that the forces that we today label as “globalization” required economic modernization, the reconversion of declining industries, and the retraining of their workers to other occupations. After the ECSC opened, the High Authority and later the European Commission made halting efforts to mitigate the protracted crisis of de-industrialization that hit Western Europe’s miners in the 1960s, and then its steel workers in the 1970–1980s.98

More recently, the far right has gained substantial support in former


98. For an analysis of the social dimension of the early European Community’s efforts at managing the decline of European mining as well as of the failed campaign by miners and their supporters to achieve a “European Miners Statute” in the early 1960s, see Nicolas Vershueren, Fermer les mines en construisant l’Europe. Une histoire sociale de l’intégration européenne (Brussels, 2013).
industrial areas with its anti-EU message, especially in the areas of northern France discussed in this article, where the socialist party is currently in crisis. It is worthwhile reflecting more deeply on why workers at times have opposed European integration – including, as discussed in this article, why a fair number opposed it before it even began.

**TRANSLATED ABSTRACTS**

**FRENCH – GERMAN – SPANISH**


Traduction: Christine Plard


Der Schuman-Plan zur “Zusammenführung” der westeuropäischen Kohle- und Stahlindustrien ist häufig als Gründungs dokument der heutigen Europäischen
Union gefeiert worden. Zum Schuman-Plan gibt es mittlerweile eine umfangreiche historiografische Literatur. Arbeiter und die Arbeiterbewegung tauchen jedoch in den meisten vorliegenden Schilderungen kaum auf, obwohl die zur Integration auserkorenen Sektoren (Kohle und Stahl) traditionellerweise als europäische Zentren der Arbeiterklassenmilitanz sowie gewerkschaftlicher Aktivität gelten. Werden die Kohle- und Stahlintustrien in der bisherigen Literatur im Allgemeinen als Objekt der mit dem Schuman-Plan einhergehenden Verhandlungen betrachtet, so wird in diesem Aufsatz der entgegengesetzte Ansatz verfolgt. Untersucht wird, wie die Arbeiterpolitik in industriellen Schlüsselgebieten wie dem Department Nord/Pas-de-Calais und dem Ruhrgebiet die Positionen zur Integration der europäischen Schwerindustrie beeinflußt hat, die von zwei bedeutenden politischen Parteien vertreten wurden: den französischen Sozialisten und den deutschen Sozialdemokraten. Als empirische Grundlage der Untersuchung dienen zum einen Recherchen in Partei- und staatlichen Archiven, zum anderen Studien zur Regionalgeschichte der Departments Nord und Pas-de-Calais und des Ruhrgebiets, aber auch zu den entsprechenden sozialistischen beziehungsweise sozialdemokratischen Ortsgruppen. Darüber hinaus wird auf historische und soziologische Untersuchungen zu Arbeitern aus Bergbau und Produktion zurückgegriffen. Der Aufsatz analysiert, wie die heftige Konkurrenz der Sozialisten und Kommunisten um die Gefolgschaft der Kohle- und Stahlarbeiter die politische Kultur der entsprechenden Regionen in der Nachkriegszeit prägte, um dann während der Welle von Massenstreiks in 1947 ihren Höhepunkt zu erreichen. Das politische Ergebnis dieser Kämpfe war im Department Nord/Pas-de-Calais ein anderes als im Ruhrgebiet. Das wiederum trug, so die im Aufsatz vertretene These, dazu bei, dass die Sozialistische Partei Frankreichs beschloss, den Schuman-Plan zu begrüßen, während die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands sich ihm widersetzte.

Übersetzung: Max Henninger

Brian Shaev. Las políticas obreras, el desafío comunista y el Plan Schuman: una historia comparada del Partido Socialista Francés y del Partido Socialdemócrata Alemán ante el primer tratado para la Integración Europea.

El Plan Schuman para “compaginar” las industrias del carbón y del acero en Europa Occidental ha sido celebrado de forma generalizada como el documento fundacional de la actual Unión Europea. De forma creciente se ha desarrollado toda una producción historiográfica alrededor del Plan. Sin embargo, el trabajo y los trabajadores quedan completamente ausentes de los estudios existentes, incluso a pesar de que los sectores objeto de la integración, el carbón y el acero, se han considerado tradicionalmente como centros de militancia de la clase obrera y del activismo sindical en Europa. La literatura existente generalmente ha considerado el papel jugado por las industrias del carbón y del acero como objetivos de las negociaciones del Plan Schuman pero este artículo da la vuelta a tal interpretación. En su lugar en él se analiza como las políticas laborales en los departamentos franceses Nord y Pas-de-Calais y en la región alemana del Ruhr, unas de las principales regiones industriales, influyeron en las posiciones adoptadas por dos partidos políticos prominentes, el Partido Socialista Francés y el Partido Socialdemócrata Alemán, en la integración de la industria pesada europea. El material empírico combina la investigación en archivos estatales como tanto en los centros de
documentación de los propios partidos junto con las historias regionales del Nord/Pais de Calais y el Ruhr, y las secciones locales de los respectivos partidos socialistas, así como la indagación histórica y sociológica de los mineros y los trabajadores industriales. En el artículo se analiza cómo la intensa rivalidad entre socialistas y comunistas por la adhesión de los trabajadores del carbón y del acero determinó la cultura política de estas regiones tras la guerra y culminó en una masiva oleada de huelgas en 1947. En el texto se señala cómo los resultados políticos divergentes de estas pugnas en Nord/Pais de Calais y en el Ruhr, contribuyeron de forma decisiva en la articulación de las decisiones del Partido Socialista Francés, a favor, y del Partido Socialdemócrata Alemán, en contra, respecto al Plan Schuman de 1950.

Traducción: Vicent Sanz Rozalén