ment should make us more cautious about predicting its decline. It remains to be seen what forms dissenting Soviet opinion may take in the coming years.

Smith's statement that "not surprisingly, most Russians are apolitical" is true in our sense of participation in political life. But there is another sense in which the statement is untrue and this is not widely understood in the West. Russians are intensely political in sensitivity to the shifting boundaries and nuances of the permissible and the impermissible, and we are coming to realize that this process of sensitization begins early in childhood. It would be interesting to explore what and how children in Russia learn about the arrangements of power, first within the family and, later, between the family and other institutions of Soviet society.

In conclusion I would say that both of these books are written with admiration and sympathy for the Russian people and a sharp awareness of the controlling aspects of the Soviet system. I can recommend them as enlightening and useful to the general reader.

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ON WATCH: A MEMOIR. By *Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Admiral USN (ret.)*. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1976. xvi, 568 pp + 16 pp. photographs. $12.50.

There are few first-rate books about war not as drama, but as the most important causal factor in history. Admiral Zumwalt's report of his adventures in Washington as chief of Naval Operations between 1970 and 1974 belongs on an exalted shelf with Churchill's *Memoirs* and Solzhenitsyn's *August, 1914*.

Admiral Zumwalt's subject is American democracy and the way it reaches the decisions which determine our fate. His focus is naturally on his own experience. But his naval vantage point is not a bias. A sophisticated man, and an intellectual as well he sees the security problem whole, as a social, psychological, and political problem quite as much as a military one. And his book is alight with wit, insight, and an enthusiasm for absurdity which make it a joy to read. Zumwalt's passages on Admiral Rickover, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon, interservice rivalry, and a number of congressmen, senators, and other Washington totems are quite as iconoclastic in style and candor as his famous battle to liberate the Navy from racial discrimination and petty tyranny.

Early in his career, aided perhaps by the fact that his wife is a White Russian from Harbin, Zumwalt achieved a clear factual understanding of the nature of Soviet policy. And a tour of duty with Paul H. Nitze, when Mr. Nitze was secretary of the navy, helped to broaden and deepen his perspective on politico-military affairs. That experience also gave him a sure feel for the crucial but limited role of nuclear deterrence in the process it is no longer fashionable to call the Cold War. Unlike many participants in Washington policy making of the period, Zumwalt did not suffer from myopia or hysterical blindness in evaluating the evidence about the Soviet military build-up which accelerated so dramatically after 1962. He was never among those who found an endless supply of plausible reasons for denying the superobvious fact that Soviet policy is expansionist, and draws its strength only from military power.

The principal theme of *On Watch* is the struggle to translate these perceptions into effective American policy, both in handling the Indochina War and in building up the nuclear and the conventional deterrent strength of the United States and its allies in ways which kept pace with the military power of the Soviet Union. It must be said that if at an earlier point Zumwalt was among those who advocated military victory in Vietnam, that position was not made manifest during his term as CNO. In

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what he calls the Byzantine Administration of Nixon and Kissinger, he shared Secretary Laird's view that disengagement was the only politically possible course for the United States, even in the face of blatant North Vietnamese violations of their agreements with us. In both areas, Zumwalt's book is a dazzling portrayal of the human and political forces always mobilized against rationality. As Cornford pointed out long ago, there is only one reason for doing something. All the rest are reasons for inaction.

Admiral Zumwalt is a passionate democrat. He understands that public opinion is the only legitimate source for policy in a democracy, and that wise public opinion must be based on public understanding. Nothing offends Zumwalt more than politicians, officials, or bureaucrats who refuse to tell the public the truth, but seek to manipulate opinion by playing up to what pollsters and other gurus tell them the public wants to hear. The most important data in Zumwalt's book are damning contemporaneous memoranda of conversations on this subject with Nixon and Kissinger. During a talk with Nixon in 1970 about the rise of Soviet naval power, for example, Nixon agreed with Zumwalt's gloomy evaluation of our chances of winning a naval war with the Soviets. "Isn't it, therefore, important that we tell the people?" Zumwalt asked. "No," Nixon replied. "I think we have first to nail down, through negotiations, our advantage which now exists in the strategic field, get ourselves out of the war in southeast Asia which is making defense expenditures so unpopular, and then, after the 1972 election, go to the people for support for greater defense budgets."

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MODEL OR ALLY?: THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By *Richard Lowenthal.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. xii, 400 pp. $12.95.

Can states follow "purely" ideological paths? More precisely, can the USSR implement a "Communist" foreign policy? The poignancy of this question haunts every analyst who follows the tortuous ways pursued by the Kremlin in coping with the challenge posed by the "Third World" over six decades.

To be sure, Lenin moved realistically forward from the predominantly Eurocentric Weltanschauung that permeated the Communist Manifesto, the concept of the "Asian Mode of Production," Engels's famous letter to Kautsky in 1882, and other canons of the German fathers of the creed. Partly by default, he, and Stalin following him, concluded that the West, the principal adversary, might prove more vulnerable to attacks on "the weakest link in the chain," its rear echelon of "reserves," that is, the colonial and dependent areas, than to a frontal assault in Europe. However, the operational requirements of this assumption called for serious "sacrifices," at the expense, to be sure, of the Communist movement and not of the Soviet state. The natural ally in such an essentially diversionary strategy against the West, of course, had to come from the ranks of the nationalist elements in the "Third World," which were (and are) as varied in class origin as they remain eclectic in ideology. However, the Afro-Asian-Latin American national elites, almost without exception, strove above all for monolithic party and state structures; toleration of opposition from any quarter was rejected, especially from rival parties suspected of intimate links with foreign states, a definition that certainly included orthodox Muscovite (as distinct from home-grown, self-styled) Communists. From Lenin to Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership has attempted, without conspicuous success, to hide this sad fact from the more guileless adherents of the Communist Party under a variable flood of labels—from "National Bourgeoisie," "National Democracy," "New Democracy," and "Revolutionary Democrats," including the "Non-capitalist Path of Development," to even more exotic

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