their own sake upon scientific understanding and its fruits, upon aesthetic experience and its objects, upon securing and maintaining understanding between persons and so on. It was by similar transitions that he worked out the Platonic or Neoplatonic theses of his Gifford Lectures, theses which he took to express what was rationally defensible in the doctrines of Theosophy, doctrines which he had embraced at the age of sixteen and abandoned at that of twenty-one. It is from our capacity to be guided by impersonal considerations of value and from such experiences as those involved in the intentionality of reading a poem or following a proof that we on Findlay's view, apprehend ourselves as standing in a relationship to a metaphysical unity, a set of perfections, of which merely material beings could not be capable.

In 1960 Findlay had met John Silber and formed a friendship which endured for the rest of his life. It was Silber's persuasions which induced him both to emigrate to the United States, where he taught at Texas and Yale, before coming to Boston in 1972, and to reopen and extend his philosophical enquiries. The extraordinary outcome was the writing of two books on Plato, books which affronted the conventional pieties of contemporary Platonic scholarship, but which continued and revived the Neoplatonic tradition, and of *Kant and the Transcendental Object*, published in 1981 when Findlay was seventy-eight years old. This latter is a book both outstanding in itself and remarkable in its appropriation and criticism of the work of others, so that a deeper and more comprehensive unified understanding of Kant emerges. It is towards the closing pages of this book that Findlay delivers his final verdict on Hegel. At its opening is a quotation from the *Tractatus*. It is notable that, while it was the reading of Prichard's book on Kant which first elicited Findlay's capacity for creative philosophical thought, so making his Hegelianism as much his own as it was Hegel's, it was the reinterpretation of Kant's own texts which brought his work to its splendid completion.

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Raya Dunayevskaya 1910-1987

Raya Dunayevskaya, who died in June 1987, was one of the most celebrated and renowned members of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. Although in England she is remembered principally as Trotsky's former secretary in Mexico in the 1930's, in the United States she has been seen as one of the founders of Marxist humanism in America. She wrote prolifically on a range of philosophical and political issues but her central life interests lay in Marxism, racism and feminism.

Dunayevskaya came to America from Russia as a child in the early twenties. Settling in Chicago, she was soon involved in opposition to anti-semitism and corporal punishment in high school. Expelled from the youth movement of the Communist Party in 1928, she joined the Trotskyist movement. Although she broke with Trotsky in 1939, she remained politically active, seeking to build an organization grounded in Marxist humanist ideas and founding the worker-edited newspaper *News and Letters* in the mid-fifties, serving on its editorial board until her death. During her life, Dunayevskaya was immersed in black struggles and in the American labour movement, contributing to the organization of black sharecroppers in the 1930's and reporting on the miners' general strike of 1949-50. Although primarily a political activist she sustained an interest in philosophical and theoretical debates, educating herself, and always applying philosophical and political concepts to concrete social issues. In *Marxism and Freedom* she considered the impact of automation on struggles in the production process and in *Philosophy and Revolution: from Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao* she developed her analysis of human liberation. Reviving Marxism in the United States in the wake of Stalinism, Dunayevskaya can be seen as constituting a link between the ideas of the Russian revolution and American labourism. Although never an established figure within academic philosophy and social science, Dunayevskaya's ideas attracted the interest of radical groups and theorists world-wide and contracts were maintained with numerous liberation groups and political organizations throughout her life. Her writings were translated into several languages, including Farsi during the Iranian Revolution and were circulated in East Europe, China and Chile and in the United States, among Amerindian activists. She was writing and lecturing until the very end of her life and before her death had commenced work on a new book on anti-vanguardism and spontaneous forms of organization, entitled *Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy*. She was buried at Waldheim Cemetery close to the monument to the Haymarket Martyrs of 1886 and extracts from her own works and from Marx and Hegel's were read at her funeral. Dunayevskaya's papers and writings have been donated to Wayne State University in Detroit, the city where she had been living in recent years.

An indication of Dunayevskaya's political interests and philosophical preoccupations is given in *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* and in *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future*. In *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (Sussex, Harvester Press, 1982) Dunayevskaya pursues three objectives: a survey of the life and work of Rosa Luxemburg, an interpretation of Marx's work and an appraisal of modern feminism. While commending the wide scope

and high quality of contemporary feminist theory, Dunayevskaya nonetheless is critical of modern feminists for failing to acknowledge the contribution of Rosa Luxemburg to twentieth century feminism and for dismissing Marx's work too readily. This rejection of Marx's work is attributed partly to an over-identification of Marx with Engels, resulting in the loss to feminist theory of a crucial aspect of Marx's work, namely his philosophy of revolution. Dunayevskaya's study of Rosa Luxemburg, published in the early 1980's, was written in response to the emergence of new liberation movements of the seventies but was also precipitated by the publication of Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* in 1972 which, she argues, affirms Marx's divergence from Engels.

Rosa Luxemburg is seen by Dunayevskaya as a critical figure for feminist theory because of her concern with the questions of organization and spontaneity and her sceptical attitude towards vanguardism. A descriptive account of Luxemburg's life and work is offered and her continuing interest in women's issues and in women's role in working class movements and her collaboration with Clara Zetkin are emphasised by Dunayevskaya, who argues that these concerns have been overlooked by feminists. At the same time she is critical of Luxemburg for her inability to see sources of revolution outside the proletariat until towards the end of her life, her failure to break totally with the party organization and for the traces of mechanical materialism she finds in her thought. Moreover while elements of a theory of permanent revolution may be found in Luxemburg's work, argues Dunayevskaya, these are not fully developed.

What Dunayevskaya found of value in Marx's work, however, was that he did not separate the philosophy of revolution from actual revolution; this concern with the day-to-day relationship of philosophy to social reality is, she argues, also essential to the success of the women's movement. As well as developing this philosophy of revolution, with its emphasis on the need for radically new social relations, Marx's contemporary significance lies in his awareness of the diversity of paths to revolution, his growing realisation of the possibility of revolution in underdeveloped societies and his concept of permanent revolution. Dunayevskaya's argument for the contemporary relevance of Marx's work rests principally on the *Ethnological Notebooks*. These notes from Marx's last decade enable us to see Marx's interest in gender and in the role of the peasantry as a revolutionary force as continuing concerns in Marx's work. Containing studies of Morgan's work on ancient society, these notes, she argues, reveal the deep gulf between Marx and Engels. Engels' unilinear view of historical development is contrasted by Dunayevskaya with Marx's multilinear dialectical model which inhibited Marx from offering blueprints for the future. Instead of interpreting the move from matrilineal to patrilineal societies as constituting the world-historical defeat of women, as Engels did in *Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Marx recognised

the possibility of new revolutionary upsurges. Further, Marx did not distinguish as sharply as Engels between the primitive and the civilised and saw the sources of the oppression of women lying within primitive communism and as the origin of early modes of stratification. Marx's comments on women in the labour market in his discussion of the shortening of the working day in *Capital* are also cited by Dunayevskaya as evidence of his lasting interest in gender relations and of his recognition of women's role within working class organizations. But it is Marx's realisation that revolution can be achieved only by a total uprooting of social relationships, developed in the 1840's, and by seeing it as permanent that Dunayevskaya sees as of most significance.

Underpinning Dunayevskaya's interpretation of Marx's work is her emphasis on the continuing influence of Hegel throughout Marx's life, shaping his concept of revolution. Her own interest and research in Hegel spanned several decades and she was the first to translate Lenin's 1914 *Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic* into English.

Dunayevskaya is also critical of contemporary feminists for ignoring or marginalising the black dimension of early feminist movements and of more recent struggles. She challenges the view of black issues as a diversion by pointing to feminist struggles in the fight against slavery and against racism and patriarchy in for example Southern Africa and East Timor.

The difficulty with *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*, however, is that the above ideas are scattered across different sections of the book and the overall effect is that the text is rather disjointed. Trying to cover exegesis of Marx's work and the material on Luxemburg's life and to address issues in modern feminist thought, inevitably means that the philosophical discussions are truncated and although stimulating in suggesting new ways of approaching Marxian ideas, do not really deal with those ideas in sufficient depth. In this sense the book is mistitled and might perhaps have been better presented as a collection of essays on a range of topics in the manner of her later work *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution* rather than as a substantive study of Rosa Luxemburg's relationship to Marxism and feminism. For example, the notion of permanent revolution and the philosophy of revolution in Marx's work, which she sees as central to her argument, require further elucidation to demonstrate their relevance. If the discussions of Luxemburg, Marx and feminism had been distinguished more sharply, this would have enabled her to develop her analysis further but she seems to have integrated three areas in order to facilitate the application of philosophical insights to empirical questions.

She also tends to exaggerate the rejection of Marxism by contemporary feminists when even the most radical feminists, such as Delphy, have developed their critiques of patriarchy by building on concepts drawn from Marx's theory of history and his analysis of the relations of production. Her criticism of feminists for failing to take sufficient account of the significance of philosophy as a tool in feminist struggles is also problematic in the light of the infusion of philosophy into feminism in the last decade in which the limitations of western political philosophy have been exposed and the need to develop new analytical tools to counter the androcentrism of dominant philosophies of science has been recognised. However, in the last few years of her life Dunayevskaya had been in communication with various feminist theorists and was furthering her interest in current feminist work.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the value of Dunayevskaya's work is that her analysis of contemporary feminism is grounded in an historical approach; her active involvement in politics entails a familiarity with struggles world wide that is missing from many contemporary works of feminist theory. Her awareness of the pressure of historical forces is combined with a recognition of the uniqueness of individual struggles whether it is women's contribution to the Russian revolution, for example the role of women in the Vyborg textile factory, or women in the Igbo uprising and in the Portuguese revolution. While there may be more comprehensive accounts of Marx's relationship to Engels, Dunayevskaya does seek to transcend the gulf between philosophy and social reality and in doing so has earned greater international recognition and interest than many more sophisticated Marxian theorists.

In *Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future*, (New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1985) Dunayevskaya brings together essays published from 1950 to 1985. Although the range of topics covered is broader than in *Rosa Luxemburg*, the recurring themes are similar, namely the need for total revolution to eliminate exploitation, the challenging of racism and patriarchy, the demonstration of Marx's continuing adherence to Hegelian ideas, the distance between Marx and Engels, and an early draft of the conclusion to the *Rosa Luxemburg* text is included. Further references are made to the importance of the *Ethnological Notebooks* in offering a new view of Marx's work as a whole and of the possibility of revolution in underdeveloped societies. Women's contribution to the building of revolutions in Russia and Persia is surveyed and attention is drawn to the ways in which their role has been distorted by commentators who focus on their courage rather than on their development as Reason.

Again she is critical of feminists who ignore the work of Luxemburg and Marx. While praising feminist writers for their systematic critiques of contemporary ideas, such as psycho-analysis, Dunayevskaya argues that they have failed to seriously take

account of working class women's ideas and activities but instead have dismissed them as lacking the requisite levels of consciousness. The legacy of elitism and vanguardism which Dunayevskaya finds within contemporary feminism is attributed partly to a failure to develop an analysis of the relationship between theory and revolution and in part to the lack of interest in Luxemburg's critiques of vanguardism, issues which Dunayevskaya herself was addressing in her last unfinished work on the dialectics of organization.

The emphasis on Marx's Hegelianism is also evident in this collection, in which the Hegelian dialectic is described as a great voyage of discovery illuminating opposing forces in society, recognising freedom arising from servitude and thereby allowing Marx to conceive of men and women making history as Reason. She cites Marx's view of John Brown's attack on Harper's Ferry as signifying not just the end of slavery but the beginning of a new epoch in human history. In stressing the importance of a philosophy of revolution, Dunayevskaya focuses on the need to tie philosophy to organization and on the transcendence of the division between mental and manual labour as a precondition for the development of new human relations. The text includes a paper on the implications of Marx's methodology in the *Grundrisse* for modern feminism.

Given the wide scope of the essays it is perhaps not surprising that the final result is somewhat fragmented, despite the recurring theme of the need for a philosophy of revolution; the abbreviated nature of the arguments is also more pronounced in this text than in *Rosa Luxemburg*, given the extremely short length of many of the essays. Many of the papers are written in a polemical style often based on lecture tours undertaken by Dunayevskaya. At the same time the collection bears testimony to the multifarious issues which engaged Dunayevskaya's attention including, for example, material on the role of Polish women in Solidarity which has not been fully recognised despite the considerable volume of literature on the Solidarity movement. Moreover while other writers have criticised political philosophers for ignoring or opposing the idea of women as rationality, what is striking in Dunayevskaya's work is the demonstration of women as Reason in the context of specific historical struggles.

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