

short biography which, like the pictures, emphasizes during the last decade the private life of Trotsky.

The book gives us a vivid and intimate picture of Trotsky's relations with his closest family and friends during the peregrinations from Turkey to France to Norway and, finally, to Mexico. We learn also about his emotional reactions to political developments—his anxieties, hopes, and moments of low morale, though never despair—and the volume as a whole substantially contributes to our understanding of Trotsky the man.

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ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1917–1921. Vol. 3: THE ANGLO-SOVIET ACCORD. By *Richard H. Ullman*. Published for the Center of International Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. xv, 509 pp. \$17.50, cloth. \$9.50, paper.

The publication of the third and final volume of Richard Ullman's study of Anglo-Soviet relations provides a welcome relief from the polemics which have marred historiography on this subject, such as are found in the pro-Soviet apologetics of William and Zelta Coates and the anti-British broadsides of Titus Komarnicki. *The Anglo-Soviet Accord* is of special interest to students of Eastern Europe because of the information it contains concerning British policy during the Soviet-Polish War of 1920. Ullman's use of extensive excerpts from the private papers of British officials and from Soviet diplomatic correspondence (the "intercepts") makes this book, like Arno Mayer's *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking*, a gold mine of valuable "raw" source materials. Like Mayer's work, however, the "finished product" of interpretation may be subject to scholarly dispute. For instance, regarding the celebrated "error" in Lord Curzon's note which delineated Poland's eastern ethnic border (leaving Lwów on the Russian side), Ullman chalks it up to honest ignorance and "carelessness" on the part of Lloyd George's private secretary, Philip Kerr, whose name he feels the famous line should bear. This view is at odds with the recent revelations of the British scholar Norman Davies, who points out that the Foreign Office had many detailed maps of Galicia, thanks to the efforts of Lewis Namier. Davies maintains that the line was drawn neither carelessly nor erroneously, but reflected Namier's belief that it followed the "straight ethnographic divide between East and West Galicia." (See his *White Eagle, Red Star*, p. 170.)

One wishes that Ullman had delved more deeply into the origins of Curzon's note, to which he devotes only about two pages. But his chief aim in this volume is to evaluate the policies and diplomatic tactics of David Lloyd George. The Welsh Wizard desired a trade agreement with Soviet Russia because he believed that commerce had a sobering, civilizing influence. Ullman feels that it was naive to think that Russia's Communist leaders could be sobered up from their intoxication with world revolution through economic concessions. The term that he uses (mostly in the conclusion) to describe Lloyd George's policy is "appeasement"—an unfortunate choice of words, for it seems to suggest that the British prime minister gave the Bolsheviks whatever they demanded, in an effort to placate them. But

the evidence he himself presents in the body of the book belies this conclusion. On several occasions during the Soviet-Polish War Lloyd George threatened to go to war with Russia. Although he may have been bluffing, since he lacked the wherewithal to carry through, he nevertheless used the stick of ultimata as well as the carrot of commerce in trying to prevent the Red Army from taking Warsaw. Whether or not his endeavors were effective can only be determined by an in-depth study of Soviet policy and strategy during 1920—a study which has yet to be made.

Ullman tends to dismiss British diplomatic efforts on behalf of Poland as useless, even asserting that Lloyd George was “prepared, once these measures were seen to fail, as he expected them to, to resume his trade negotiations with Moscow” (p. 212). But this implies that Lloyd George was pursuing trade for its own sake, rather than offering commercial concessions for diplomatic purposes. It also suggests that the head of a predominantly conservative coalition would (and *could*) have continued trade talks with a country whose army was occupying Warsaw and tearing up the Versailles settlement. This seems highly unlikely, especially since Lloyd George was on record as saying that “Poland—independent Poland—is essential to the whole fabric of peace” (p. 176).

Before we write off England’s attempts to arrange an armistice between Russia and Poland, it is revealing to consider what might have happened if those who opposed these attempts had been in power. Churchill, for instance, was ready to forget about Poland in favor of building up Germany as a “dyke” against the red tide (p. 202). Henry Wilson, chief of the Imperial General Staff, was even plotting to overthrow Lloyd George, convinced that he was a traitor (or a Bolshevik) because of his willingness to negotiate with Krasin and Kamenev. Ullman’s unraveling of this little-known conspiracy (chapter 7) is the most exciting revelation in this long, fact-filled volume. Equally interesting are the views of this “staunch anti-communist” regarding Poland. “I don’t mind either the Boches or the Bolsheviks over-running Poland,” Wilson confided to his diary, “as I want Russia and Germany to be touching. . . . I never believed in Poland being able to stand alone between those great countries” (p. 141). Considering these were the views of Lloyd George’s critics on the Right, it is perhaps fair to conclude that he was Poland’s best friend in her moment of trial. This is not Ullman’s conclusion, but it seems to flow from the mountains of evidence he has painstakingly unearthed. His mining of that mountain was truly a Herculean task, and the resultant study is a sturdy monument.

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THE COMINTERN AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 1928–1931. By
Richard C. Thornton. Far Eastern and Russian Institute Publications on Asia,
no. 20. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969. xviii, 246
pp. \$9.50.

“History, for all its apparatus, appears to us primarily as a form of intuition. To each his own labyrinth.” This quotation from Theodore Roethke, which Mr. Thornton has placed at the beginning of his book, sums up his methodological credo more aptly and tellingly than any reviewer could do. This is an important and useful work, which presents considerable new material and successfully