

Shape-shifting NATO: humanitarian action and the Kosovo refugee crisis

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Abstract. The article deals with NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Instead of focusing on the military and diplomatic interventions, the article looks at how NATO developed a humanitarian interest in providing assistance and protection to the Kosovo Albanian refugees. In the name of the refugees—and to a lesser extent, of internally displaced persons—NATO entered a humanitarian field and was partly transfigured into a humanitarian agency during the crisis in Kosovo. The political significance of NATO's humanitarianism was that its reputation for competence and its image of respectability and honour depended to an extent on how well it supported the international assistance to the Kosovo Albanians. The stakes were not limited to the immediate Kosovo context, however. The symbolic struggle for reputation and honour resonated directly in the political struggle for the conservation and transformation of the European security complex. The success of the humanitarian operation became an additional element of demonstrating the value of military capital for acquiring political authority in the definition and management of security problems in post-Cold War Europe.

This article deals with how the Kosovo Albanian refugees, and, to a lesser extent, the internally displaced Kosovo Albanians, became a humanitarian question for NATO and with the political stakes of NATO's humanitarian operations. Although the argument is developed on the basis of an analysis of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, concentrating on the period between 1998 and June 1999, it aims at a more general contribution to the question of how to understand NATO's humanitarianism. More specifically, the article focuses on two questions. The first question is how NATO entered a humanitarian field and was partly transfigured into a humanitarian agency in response to the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. The approach presented here does not focus on the intentions and motives of NATO and its member states. The question is not whether NATO genuinely intended to help the Kosovo Albanians or whether it was motivated by the need to demonstrate its continuing relevance in post-Cold War Europe, for example. The analysis defines the humanitarian interest first of all structurally as the stake around which a particular field of practice is organised. It is the stake humanitarian agencies co-operate and compete for. During the Kosovo crisis, NATO partly transfigured into a humanitarian agency. The humanitarian capital it developed allowed it to become a contested but significant player in the humanitarian field that operated in response to the displacement of 1.5 million people. In the first and most extensive part of the article I will look at how NATO entered the humanitarian field and how it developed

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humanitarian capital. Humanitarian capital is ‘what is efficacious in [the humanitarian field], both as a weapon and a stake of struggle. It allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to *exist*, in the [humanitarian] field, instead of being considered a negligible quantity.’¹

The second question of the article focuses on the political significance of NATO’s humanitarianism. This analysis takes the value claims of NATO seriously. Rather than presenting the humanitarian language and practice as a cover-up of other interests, I will argue that they are an inherent part of the political struggle over the position of NATO in both the Kosovo crisis and the reconfiguration of the European security complex after the end of the Cold War.² The second part of the article develops this argument by looking at the double political stake for NATO in the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The immediate political stake for NATO was that its reputation for competence and its image of respectability and honourability depended to an extent on how well it supported the international assistance to the refugees and displaced Kosovo Albanians.

The political stakes for NATO were not limited to the immediate Kosovo context. The symbolic struggle for reputation and honourability resonated directly in the political struggle for the conservation and transformation of the European security complex. This is the struggle for international political authority in the conservation and transformation of the vision of the post-Cold War European security dynamics and of the principles of division arranged through these dynamics.³ There is a structural link between the symbolic struggle in the humanitarian field and NATO’s struggle in the contemporary European security complex. In both situations the translation of military power into political power, that is honourable problem-defining and -managing authority, is essentially contested. NATO is a key player in a collective defence game that emphasises the military and diplomatic protection of the member-states against external aggression, and increasingly also regional instability. NATO also increasingly positions itself in a civilisation game in which the construction of a pan-European community of values is at stake. Although the political capitalisation on military capital is relatively straightforward in the collective defence game, it is contested in the struggle about the Pan-European community of values in which dialogue and (universal) values have to be institutionalised. The conversion of military capital into political authority is challenged by organisations that embody economic capital such as the European Union and more direct value-institutionalising mechanisms such as the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe. By struggling to demonstrate the value of military capital for the assistance of refugees NATO struggled to credibly convert its military capital into political capital in the community of values game.

¹ ‘A species of capital is what is efficacious in a given field, both as a weapon and a stake of struggle, that which allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to *exist*, in the field under consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quantity.’ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 98.

² Buzan et al. define the security complex in their recent book as follows: ‘A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.’ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 201.

³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*. Edited and with an introduction by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 181.

NATO, refugees and the humanitarian field

The displacement of Kosovo Albanians featured as a concern in NATO's public statements on the Kosovo crisis from early 1998 onwards. For example, in the first half of 1998, the Albanian delegation seems to have regularly and to an extent successfully raised the issue of the Kosovo crisis in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. On 27 March 1998 NATO decided to send eight groups of experts to Albania in the following weeks. Among them were experts in the area of civil emergency planning who were going to help the Albanians prepare for a large inflow of refugees in the border regions.⁴ Although there may have been a humanitarian side to its concern, from what I can gather from *Atlantic News* the discussion in NATO was dominated by the possible impact of violence in Kosovo on regional stability. It is in this framing that we have to understand decisions like the NATO Permanent Council instructing the Political Coordination Group to study the possibility of developing a security belt at the border of Albania and the FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).⁵ In addition, there was also an interest in developing the substantial significance of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. Albania mobilised a PfP mechanism by requesting a 16+1 meeting on Kosovo.⁶

Before the Rambouillet negotiations collapsed and Operation Allied Forces started, NATO was not extensively involved in humanitarian actions for Kosovo Albanians. Although there were initial contacts with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and although the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) began to assist the UNHCR in June 1998, NATO's main field of action was the diplomatic one.⁷ In this field, the displaced persons emerged first of all as a sign of the human misery generated by the Serb leadership, the Serb military, the police and para-military groups. This situation justified to an extent NATO's support of the search for a political solution and the use of military threat against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in support of the diplomatic process. The statement of the Under-Secretary of Defence, Walter Slocombe, about the decision of the North Atlantic Council authorising SACEUR to issue an ACTWARN 'for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo' indicates this:⁸

This NATO action . . . sent a clear message that Milosevic has got to stop the offensive against the civilian population of Kosovo, has got to withdraw the forces that have been sent in to carry out this campaign of repression, has got to take the actions necessary to allow

⁴ *Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News*, 32: 3015 (3 June 1998), p. 2

⁵ *Ibid.*, 32: 3010 (16 May 1998), p. 1

⁶ *Ibid.*, 32: 2995 (11 March 1998), p. 1

⁷ Ambassador Sergio Balanzino, 'NATO's humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo crisis', *NATO Review* 47: 2 (1999). [[Http://hq.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-02.htm](http://hq.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-02.htm)]. See also the North Atlantic Council statement on 28 May 1998: 'we will prepare to support the UNHCR in the event of a humanitarian crisis in the area'. *Statement on Kosovo issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998*. NATO Press Release M-NAC-1(98)61. [[Http://hq.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm](http://hq.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm)]

⁸ An ACTWARN is not an authorisation to use force but it increases the level of military preparedness and allows the planning of the assets required for the air operation.

internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes and allow non-governmental organizations to operate and to provide the necessary relief and to begin serious political engagement toward negotiations for an interim settlement that will provide a basis for autonomy for Kosovo within the framework of Yugoslavia.⁹

Although the displaced Kosovo Albanians are an important aspect of this discourse, assistance and protection for these people is not what NATO provided in the diplomatic process nor in the ACTWARN. Protection was to follow from the withdrawal of the Serb forces as a result of the threat. The threat of air strikes also aimed at facilitating humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons. One of the purposes was that the Serb leadership would allow NGOs to organise relief operations. Hence, one could argue that the military threat also tried to facilitate the humanitarian practices. But this is not the same as supplying assistance.¹⁰

Although NATO used humanitarian language before, the Kosovo Albanians only transfigured explicitly into a direct humanitarian policy question shortly after the negotiations on an interim peace agreement for Kosovo in Rambouillet were suspended on 19 March 1999. This change was triggered by the fact that Kosovo Albanians were pouring out of Kosovo into neighbouring countries and into Montenegro after the suspension of the negotiations, the increase in the Serb use of force and the launching of the air strikes. The first two days after Operation Allied Force had started, about 15,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees showed up in the FYROM and approximately 18,000 remained in Albania.¹¹ The number of refugees would dramatically increase over the next two weeks. By 2 April the UNHCR estimated the total number of Kosovo Albanian refugees at 230,000.¹² Still according to UNHCR figures, on 4 April the number rose to 350,000 refugees, on 6 April to 400,000, and by 20 April 650,000 Kosovo Albanians had fled from Kosovo.¹³ By the time the military technical agreement was signed (10 June 1999) and the air campaign was suspended (11 June 1999), the total number of people forced from their home in Kosovo was estimated at 1.5 million, of which approximately 800,000 had fled Kosovo.¹⁴

The Kosovo Albanians quickly became an object of humanitarian policy for NATO (in addition to featuring as a face of human suffering that partly justified NATO's participation in the diplomatic process and the launching of its air campaign). The position of NATO changed in the sense that it did not only emerge as a military and diplomatic alliance but also as a humanitarian agency, that is an

⁹ Briefing by Under-Secretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe and Ambassador Vershbow, Defence Ministers' Meeting, Vilamoura 24 September 1998 [<http://hq.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980924b.htm>]

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ International Federation of the Red Cross, *Kosovo Refugees*. Information Bulletin No. 2. 26 March 1999 [<http://www.ifrc.org>]

¹² UNHCR, Press Release. *UNHCR's Ogata demands an end to expulsions as humanitarian crisis mounts*. Geneva, 2 April 1999. [[Http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990402.htm](http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990402.htm)]

¹³ UNHCR, Press Release. *UNHCR urges the world to receive Kosovo refugees as exodus grows*. 4 April 1999. [[Http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990404.htm](http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990404.htm)]; UNHCR, Press Release. *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees chairs emergency meeting on Kosovo refugees*, 6 April 1999. [[Http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990406.htm](http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990406.htm)]; UNHCR, Press Release. *UNHCR seeks more help from governments and urges states to keep borders open as refugee crisis mounts*. 20 April 1999. [[Http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990420.htm](http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990420.htm)]

¹⁴ UNHCR, Press Release. *UNHCR and other agencies resume aid program in Kosovo*. Geneva, 13 June 1999. [[Http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990613.htm](http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990613.htm)]

agency which directly enacts a humanitarian field.¹⁵ NATO built tent camps, coordinated humanitarian actions, offered protection, airlifted people out of the region, and so on. In other words, it used part of its resources for assisting and protecting the Kosovo Albanian refugees. The difference between NATO's humanitarian claims before and after 23 March 1999 was that NATO directly operated in a humanitarian field shortly after 23 March.¹⁶

In the humanitarian field practices are arranged on the basis of an interest in providing assistance and protection to victims of natural and human-made disasters. Assistance to refugees refers to different forms of aid such as providing shelter, food, health care, education and water. Protection primarily refers to the principle of *non-refoulement* and the arrangement of asylum. It includes questions about the resettlement of refugees, temporary protection, and humanitarian evacuation and transfer programmes. The interest of the field does not refer to an end of instrumental, conscious actions of the agents, but rather to what makes it worth playing in that field. Humanitarian agents are caught up or predisposed to being caught up in the quest for the provision of assistance and protection to victims of humanitarian disasters.¹⁷

The humanitarian interest emphasises the importance of people's lives, wants and fears in a context in which the state fails to do this to an extent. The failure of the state can have a variety of grounds and does not necessarily imply that the state itself is actively threatening its citizens, such as by persecuting people who have a specific political opinion. Natural disasters that create needs beyond the state's resources can be a ground for humanitarian action as well. State failure motivates a new ground for protection, that is the humanity of these people. In other words, humanitarian policies transfigure citizens or habitual residence into 'naked' human

¹⁵ A field is a historical set of relations between positions characterised by its own logic. It is a site of specific social practices. The actors, who have a particular position in the field, struggle over the possession of a specific species of capital that gives them access to particular profits. The struggle can also be about changing or preserving the specific logic that defines the field and the relations between the positions. The field is also a structure of domination and subordination and the site of a struggle for preserving and changing the relations of domination. See Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, *Reflective Sociology*, p. 97.

¹⁶ Humanitarian organisations were present in Kosovo before 23 March 1999. After new assaults on Kosovo villages in an attempt to surround the region of Drenica, one of the strongholds of the KLA, in early 1998, the level of violence increased again in Kosovo. As a result several hundreds of thousands of people were displaced within Kosovo in 1998 and in the first quarter of 1999. Humanitarian organisations like MSF (*Médecins sans Frontières*), the Red Cross, UNICEF, the UNHCR and Foundation Mother Teresa were assisting displaced Kosovo Albanians within Kosovo. NATO, however, was not extensively participating in this field in which humanitarian assistance and protection is the defining issue.

See the report Myriam Gaume made of her three weeks' travel with *Médecins sans Frontières*: Myriam Gaume, *Kosovo. La Guerre Cachée* (Paris: Editions Mille et Une Nuits, 1999); and Shep Lowman and Amelia Bookstein, 'Time Running Out in Kosovo', *The Washington Times*, 21 September 1998 [<http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/docfinder.pl?file=440998CL.OPE.html>]

UNHCR/OCHA, Press Release. *UN seeks \$54.3 million for Kosovo*. 8 September 1998. [<http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr980908.htm>]; UNHCR, Press Release. *Kosovo: Ogata condemns atrocities, appeals for access*. 18 January 1999 [<http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990118.htm>]; UNHCR, Press Release. *Ogata says situation deteriorating in Kosovo, urges action to avert disaster*. 11 March 1999 [<http://www.unhcr.ch/news/pr/pr990311.htm>].

¹⁷ This notion of interest is explained, as is its reliance on a theory of belief which interprets beliefs as the incorporated schemes of perception and appreciation through socialisation in contrast to a concept of belief as a conscious common knowledge, in Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 75–91.

beings with a legitimate need for protection and assistance deriving from (threats to) their humanity.¹⁸ Therefore, humanitarian practice articulates an interest in people above the state. Citizenship and the protection and assistance associated with it receive their significance in the context of a particular state, but humanity belongs to all human beings, irrespective of their citizenship. Humanitarian practices act in the name of a universal interest.

Humanitarian agencies cannot claim to (primarily) serve their own self-interest. In a humanitarian game, agencies are predisposed to claim disinterested acts. The interest in the provision of protection and assistance to victims of disasters emerges in a universe in which ‘it is better to seem disinterested rather than interested, as generous and altruistic rather than egotistical’.¹⁹ Humanitarian practices cannot articulate an economic or other self-interest as the main stake in the field. It is disconcerting and possibly symbolically self-destructive to claim that one acts out of egotistical interests. However, this characteristic of humanitarianism does not exclude competition between agencies that provide humanitarian assistance and protection. For example, Dennis McNamara, who became UNHCR Special Envoy in the Balkans when the Kosovo crisis exploded, refers to a competition between the UNHCR and NATO.

Governments see bilateral programs serving national interests more effectively. Hence there is support for NATO’s post-conflict role, for European Union and OSCE bodies and at the same time there has been very inadequate funding for an organization like UNHCR which is charged by these same players with coordinating the humanitarian response.²⁰

Refugees—and internally displaced persons—have the capacity to trigger a humanitarian interest and to structure a field of humanitarian practices arranged in relation to this interest in a specific context. The Kosovo Albanians emerged in and helped to trigger the humanitarian field. In relation to the field they became a figure of a persecuted people requiring assistance and protection from states and international and transnational organisations. However, the displacement of people by itself, need not necessarily create an interest in providing assistance and protection. A humanitarian field must be brought into existence through the humanitarian practices of agencies with an interest in providing assistance and protection that are responding to—and thus also co-constituting—this request for help. In other words, a humanitarian interest and a related humanitarian field are the result of the work of agencies and the deployment of humanitarian technologies.

The humanitarian technologies are mechanisms of arranging assistance and/or protection (defined in terms of non-refoulement and asylum) of refugees. These consist of institutionalised know-how and procedures. Together with the material resources such as airplanes and vehicles, these mechanisms constitute what could be

¹⁸ This may also have as a consequence that refugees lose their political voice, or, in other words, the refugee regime strips the refugees of their capacity for political agency. This has been argued among others by Hannah Arendt and Peter Nyers. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, new edition (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp. 267–302. Peter Nyers, ‘Emergency or Emerging Identities? Refugees and Transformations in World Order’, *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*. 28: 1 (1998), pp. 1–26.

¹⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, p. 89.

²⁰ “‘It is hard to be optimistic’”. Interview with Dennis McNamara’. *Refugees Magazine*, no. 116 (1999). [<http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rm116/rm11609.htm>]

considered the humanitarian capital. This is—to paraphrase Bourdieu—‘what is efficacious [in the humanitarian field], both as a weapon and a stake of struggle, [which] allows the possessors of that capital to wield a power, an influence, and thus to *exist*, in the [humanitarian] field, instead of being considered a negligible quantity’.²¹ The position of the agencies in the field depends on the volume and the structure of the humanitarian capital they possess.

If NATO can be considered as having restyled itself partly into, among others, a humanitarian organisation, as a consequence of its engagement in the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo,²² then NATO functioned like a specialised agency which developed a capacity for humanitarian practices and articulated an interest in the provision of assistance and protection to victims of armed conflict and internal violence. This implies that NATO has obtained humanitarian capital, that is capital which is at stake in the humanitarian field and which makes it possible for it to wield power in the humanitarian field.

How did a military alliance develop a capacity for humanitarian action which made it possible for this organisation to be integrated in the humanitarian field? The development of NATO’s humanitarian capital evolved from four strategies:²³

- The conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital.
- The development of a network of co-operation with humanitarian organisations (social capital).
- The development of a capacity to co-ordinate humanitarian practices (organisational capital).
- The development of symbolic capital, that is the recognition of being a legitimate participant in the field.

The conversion of military capital

The key issue for NATO was to convert its military know-how and capabilities into humanitarian practices. More specifically, the conversion question referred first of all to the process through which NATO gained humanitarian credits—through the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection in the Kosovo refugee crisis—by means of its military capital. A standard example of the conversion of capital is the conversion from economic capital (money and material wealth) into cultural capital (knowledge, skills among other obtained through education) and *vice versa*. In many modern societies, economic capital allows one to buy cultural capital, that is education materialised in diplomas, and the possession of specific forms of

²¹ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, *Reflective Sociology*, p. 98.

²² An interesting question, which is not dealt with in this article, is how the partial transfiguration of NATO during the Kosovo crisis connects to its engagements in Bosnia.

²³ The notion of strategy does not necessarily imply a utility-maximising agency which consciously decides about specific paths of action to obtain the maximum benefit at the least cost possible. It simply refers to the idea that the humanitarian capacity has to be manufactured over time and through active practices of conversion.

cultural capital, in its turn, allows one to obtain economic capital among others because particular diplomas give access to better paid jobs.²⁴

The conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital is first of all a technical question. It depends on the degree to which the equipment, the command structure, the operational and tactical procedures and routines, the organisational dispositions of the people in the command structure and those implementing the decisions can be adapted to the requirements of humanitarian operations. It differs from the symbolic struggle which focuses on the recognition of the position of the military in the humanitarian field.

At the technical level, the conversion of military into humanitarian capital is to an extent a non-question because the military has an inherent capacity to perform humanitarian practices. As the UNHCR states in *The State of the World's Refugees 1993*:

The difficulties of supplying an army in the field have much in common with the problem of assisting large numbers of displaced people affected by war. The logistical capabilities of military organizations and their ability to deploy rapidly, mobilizing transport and communication as well as supplies for immediate survival, can provide an indispensable lifeline in refugee emergencies taking place in the midst of armed conflict.²⁵

The Canadian Chief of the Land Staff refers to the dual use of intelligence technology:

Technology that provide accurate knowledge of what is happening on the ground, for example, can be critical to responding appropriately to a humanitarian crisis. By helping to track refugee flows, or to pinpoint bodies hidden under rubble, sophisticated military sensor systems could save civilian lives as readily as they could locate enemy positions.²⁶

In other words, the logistical technologies and skills that have been developed for use in a military field structured around war can be easily transplanted into a humanitarian field that is structured around the assistance and protection of victims. This implies that the incorporation of a humanitarian interest by the military can develop relatively smoothly insofar as it depends on the capacity to assist human beings in complex emergency situations. The main obstacle to that endeavour would be other agencies contesting the presence of a military organisation in the humanitarian field. But that kind of obstacle is a matter of symbolic capital, to which we will return below.

The ease whereby logistical technologies and skills can be transplanted from the military to the humanitarian field partly explains why NATO could so rapidly respond to the refugee crisis. The logistics, such as airlift capacity and troops with the skills and command structure to build camps, were already in place in FYROM and Albania. These were positioned in the area in an earlier phase of the crisis, among others to assist, if required, with the emergency evacuation of the OSCE's

²⁴ Extensively on the issue of the conversion of economic capital and cultural capital: Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 1984).

²⁵ UNHCR, *The State of The World's Refugees 1993. The Challenge of Protection* (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 77–8.

²⁶ Lgen W. Leach, *CF Perspectives on Human Security*. 5 November 1999. [http://131.137.96.10/eng/archive/speeches/05novleach_s_e.htm]

Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) personnel.²⁷ The troops and capacity could be easily redirected from their military role to relieving refugees and assisting humanitarian organisations. NATO also set up specific command and troop structures for its humanitarian mission shortly after 23 March 1999. The main example was Operation Allied Harbour, which was launched in mid-April. That operation provided 8,000 troops stationed in Albania to ensure the transport, safe arrival, and distribution of aid.²⁸ Operation Allied Harbour was the first operation that NATO developed specifically for a humanitarian mission and that went beyond supporting humanitarian organisations.²⁹

There are a number of indications, nevertheless, that the conversion did not happen as automatically at the technical level. Two issues stand out that suggest additional work was required to render the military capabilities and skills of NATO operational in a field structured around a humanitarian interest. First, NATO organised training seminars to promote understanding and to improve co-operation between the military and humanitarian organisations. As an example, from 10 to 12 February 1999 NATO and Switzerland co-sponsored a workshop on humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. The aim of the workshop was to promote mutual understanding on practical questions of co-operation and co-ordination of agencies engaged in humanitarian situations. Among the panellists were organisations such as the UNHCR, the OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission Humanitarian Office, the Office of the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR).³⁰ The fact that this workshop was organised may be taken to reveal an awareness that the mutual deployment of military capital and humanitarian capital in the humanitarian field would require adaptation from both the military and the humanitarian organisations.³¹

The second issue is that there are indications that the command structure and routines of military organisations differ from structures and routines of humanitarian organisations. While humanitarian agencies tend to have a more decentralised command structure the military work on the basis of a hierarchical structure that clearly defines who is in command. The military, moreover, standardise their procedures to a greater extent, so as to limit uncertainty. Humanitarian organisations are more prone to positively value improvisation. These differences result in difficulties, misunderstandings and tensions on the ground.³² Another example of

²⁷ This mission was set up after Serbia had agreed to comply with the demand to stop the violence in Kosovo in October 1998. The KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo on 20 March 1999.

²⁸ *Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News*, 33: 3098 (9 April 1999), p. 2; also vol. 33: 3099 (14 April 1999), p. 3; and vol. 33: 3101 (20 April 1999), p. 2.

²⁹ Ambassador Sergio Balanzino, see n. 7 above, *NATO Review*, p. 4.

³⁰ *Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News*, 33: 3080 (10 February 1999), p. 2.

³¹ This is probably not the only function of these seminars. Most likely they also play an important role in the development of networks (social capital) and recognition (symbolic capital). The need for mutual understanding is also expressed in an article in *NATO Review* by the Delegate of the ICRC to the European Union: Thierry Germond, 'NATO and the ICRC: A Partnership Serving the Victims of Armed Conflicts', *NATO Review* 45: 3 (1997), pp. 30–32 [Webedition: <http://hq.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9703-9.htm>]

³² Kathleen Newland and Deborah Waller Meyers, 'Peacekeeping and Refugee Relief', *International Peacekeeping* 5: 4 (1998), pp. 24–5.

tensions arising from differences in operational requirements is suggested by UNCHR Sadako Ogata, in an interview with *Libération* about the relations with NATO.

Relations are complicated, but I am trying to make them simpler. I have asked NATO to share information on displaced populations that it picks up through its air surveillance, but so far it has refused to do so ... The UNHCR must conduct this humanitarian operation, but can only do so with increased contribution from NATO Countries which have the means necessary for action on this scale.³³

Military organisations do not willingly share intelligence with other organisations since they reason that it could help military opponents to evaluate their intelligence capacity. The latter is normally understood to weaken one's military capacity in the context of the military field.

These examples imply that even if military capital is geared towards humanitarian operations, it remains to an extent a specific form of capital which continues to be partly alien to the decision-making and implementation structure of humanitarian organisations who primarily define humanitarian capital.³⁴

These two elements indicate an awareness of the difference at the operational level between humanitarian and military skills, knowledge and routines. However, they do not necessarily imply that a successful conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital is impossible or even difficult at the technical level. Rather, they indicate that buying humanitarian credits may require negotiating, retraining, co-ordinating, and adapting procedures, knowledge, skills, and so on. In other words, adequately capitalising on military capital in the humanitarian field requires some kinds of work and it is contested not only at the symbolic level (as we will argue below) but also at the more technical level of decision-making and implementation routines, skills and procedures.³⁵

Social and organisational capital

NATO's strategy to incorporate a humanitarian interest is not limited to its deployment of military capital in support of humanitarian organisations. The organisation also developed social and organisational capital related to a humanitarian interest. Social capital is the capacity derived from being part of networks and from relations of acquaintance and mutual recognition.³⁶ Organisational capital refers to a capacity to co-ordinate and organise complex practices involving a variety of agencies.

In 1998 NATO explicitly developed humanitarian organisational capital through the creation of an institutionalised disaster response capacity. This capacity has two major institutional components. The first is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response

³³ Quoted in *Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News*, 33: 3102 (23 April 1999), p. 2–3.

³⁴ See also José Maria Mendiluce, 'Meeting the Challenge of Refugees: Growing Cooperation between UNHCR and NATO', *NATO Review* 42: 2 (1994), pp. 23–26.

³⁵ For examples on the Kosovo refugee crisis: UNHCR, *The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response*. EPAU/2000/001, February 2000 (e.g. para. 437, p. 109).

³⁶ John Thompson, 'Introduction', in Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, p. 14.

Unit (EADRU), an institutional forum which can be organised on the request of an EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) state that is hit by a major disaster. It is not a permanent organisation. It consists of a mix of national elements (for example, rescue and medical supply and transport) which are volunteered by EAPC countries. The contributors decide on the deployment of these elements and they also bear the costs of the operation.³⁷

The second component of the disaster response capacity is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). This Centre is a small but permanent institution, which was inaugurated on 3 June 1998. It has six to seven permanent staff. Staff can be increased in case of a major emergency. The task of this institution is 'to coordinate the response capabilities of the 44 member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to ensure a prompt and effective disaster assistance to the United Nations'.³⁸ In case of a disaster, EADRCC will develop appropriate plans and procedures for the use of the EADRU. In principle its responsibility is limited to technological and natural disasters. In practice the EADRCC may have become involved in the complex emergency situation in Kosovo because it was the only instrument available for the EAPC countries to co-ordinate their humanitarian responses to the crisis.³⁹

The EADRCC converts the mechanisms and experience in civil-emergency planning—which during the Cold War focused on supporting the survival of society in case of a major war⁴⁰—into a humanitarian capacity. It does not have a pool of material resources, such as airplanes or stocks of relief supplies, which could be used in case an emergency situation emerges. The strength of this Centre rests on its capacity to co-ordinate humanitarian actions of EAPC member states with the UN. A good example of its organisational capital is the co-ordination of humanitarian aid flights, as described by Ambassador Sergio Balanzino:

The massive expulsion of refugees from Kosovo (. . .) prompted many nations spontaneously to fly relief supplies into those countries. Initially, none of these operations was coordinated with UNHCR. In order to allow UNHCR to develop a more comprehensive picture of what humanitarian assistance was being provided, the EADRCC proposed an arrangement whereby humanitarian aid flights into the region would be given air clearance only after they had been verified and prioritised by UNHCR. The EADRCC brought together the major players in air clearance (...) in order to develop an agreed set of procedures which is being successfully used to coordinate humanitarian and military flights.⁴¹

NATO also developed—or at least tried to develop—social capital in the humanitarian area through networking with humanitarian organisations. The information available to me does not allow me to realistically assess the nature and the importance of the humanitarian network including the degree to which it is

³⁷ Francesco Palmeri, 'A Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Capability', *NATO Review*, 46: 3 (1998) [Web version <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9803-07.htm>]

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Web version, pp. 1–2.

³⁹ Interview with Mr. Evert Somer, Coordinator at the EADRCC, by S. Werger: Svante Werger, 'Improving Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination', *BEREDSKAP—The Magazine of the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning*, no. 3 (1999), pp. 10–12.

⁴⁰ On Civil Emergency Planning: Francesco Palmeri, 'Civil Emergency Planning: A Valuable Form of Cooperation Emerges from the Shadows', *NATO Review*, 2 (1996), pp. 29–33.

⁴¹ Ambassador Sergio Balanzino, see n. 7, *NATO Review*, p. 3.

institutionalised. NATO's public discourse, nevertheless, contains indications that the organisation tried to develop social capital in the humanitarian field. In its official representation of the EADRCC, NATO emphasised the new centre would not replace but support the relevant UN bodies such as the OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) and the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Ambassador Sergio Balanzino, moreover, suggests that the EADRCC began to assist the UNHCR as early as June 1998.⁴² In its public discourses NATO regularly refers to co-operation with a variety of humanitarian organisations. Co-operative action is important for developing social networks. It implies the development of contacts between staff, and if the co-operation develops over a longer period, these contacts may become institutionalised.⁴³ In addition, the exchange of staff hints at the development of social capital. NATO was seen to send a liaison officer to the UNHCR.⁴⁴ The organisation of joint seminars and workshops may be taken to contribute to the creation of a network of connections and acquaintances, as well.⁴⁵

Symbolic capital: the ambivalent status of the military in the humanitarian field

So far, I have argued that at a technical level NATO converted its military capital rather easily into humanitarian capital. I have also shown that NATO developed organisational capital specifically geared towards the humanitarian field and that there are some indications that the organisation tried to develop social capital in the humanitarian area. For a successful transformation of NATO into a humanitarian agency, however, the symbolic work to acquire 'a reputation for competence and an image of respectability and honourability'⁴⁶ is the most strenuous. Military organisations can be active in the humanitarian field but they will remain strangers to that field. The precarious position of NATO was further intensified because it simultaneously enacted multiple roles in the Kosovo conflict.⁴⁷

NATO is not an obvious candidate for developing a stake in humanitarian practices. It is largely a military organisation which organises a system of military and diplomatic guarantees against external aggression. Even now that NATO identifies itself more explicitly as a project for constructing a community based on

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 2

⁴³ Obviously, a thorough evaluation of the significance these practices had for the appropriation of a significant volume of social capital in the humanitarian field requires a longer time perspective. It also requires that one examines the social spin-off of this co-operation in other documents than the indications given in the available public discourse of NATO.

⁴⁴ Press Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, 1 April 1999.

⁴⁵ UNHCR, *The Kosovo Refugee Crisis. An Independent Evaluation*, ch. 7: see n. 35.

⁴⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 291.

⁴⁷ Pierre Krähenbühl, 'Conflict in the Balkan: Human Tragedies and the Challenge to Independent Humanitarian Action', *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 837 (31 March 2000), pp. 11–29 [<http://www.icrc.org/irceng.nsf/4dc394db5b54f3f.../114ceddb53690d3f412568d20033357d?openDocument>]; "It is hard to be optimistic". Interview with Dennis McNamara, *Refugees Magazine*, no. 116 (1999). [<http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rm116/rm11609.htm>]

shared values⁴⁸, its possession of the most significant volume of military capital in contemporary Europe is one of the key factors which makes it different from other community building instruments like the OSCE and the EU.

When a military organisation develops a humanitarian interest, it is usually not unambiguously welcomed within the field in which humanitarian organisations operate.⁴⁹ Some organisations will radically oppose the involvement of the military; for example, in the context of the Kosovo crisis the president of MSF (Médecins sans Frontières) stated that a humanitarian intervention supported by force is a contradiction.⁵⁰ Others react more moderately and accept the need for support from the military while expressing, nevertheless, a concern about the problems the military may pose for humanitarian operations.⁵¹ For example, while accepting that military force may support humanitarian operations under particular conditions, the UNHCR also immediately warns about the difficulties involved:

The co-ordination of humanitarian efforts with political and military actions in refugee-producing conflicts is not without its difficulties. It blurs traditionally distinct roles and, if mismanaged, could compromise the strictly neutral character of humanitarian aid, which is the best guarantee of access to people in need.⁵²

The opposition to and concern about the involvement of the military in humanitarian operations has a general and historical ground. Humanitarian practices often deal with the disastrous consequences that the use of military force has for human beings. The Red Cross, for example, has provided soldiers and other victims of war with medical help. Its assistance to soldiers rests on transfiguring the soldier into a suffering and needy human being. This process replaces the soldier's military value with his/her human value. If this is indeed a paradigmatic example of humanitarian practices, then the transformation of a military alliance into a humanitarian agency is very likely to have an estranging effect and to become contested within the humanitarian field.

⁴⁸ For example: Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana, *NATO as a Community of Values*. Manfred Woerner Memorial lecture at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, 2 June 1999. See also among others: Karin Fierke, *Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Karin Fierke, 'Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement: NATO, Russia, and the CEECs', *Millennium*, 28: 1 (1999), pp. 27–52; Lene Hansen, 'NATO's Dual Logic of Security. Institutional Reconstruction in the Light of Bosnia'. Paper presented at the 23rd Annual BISA Conference, University of Sussex, 14–16 December 1998; Michael C. Williams, 'The Discursive Power of Community: Considerations on the European "Security Community"', Paper presented at the Conference 'Power, Security and Community: IR Theory and the Politics of EU Enlargement', Copenhagen, 9–12 October 1997; Michael Williams and Iver B. Neumann, 'From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the power of identity', *Millennium*, 29: 2 (2000), pp. 375–87.

⁴⁹ In the context of Kosovo see among others: Jacky Mamou, 'Au nom de l'humanitaire', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1999, p. 32; and Cornelio Sommaruga, 'North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross.' *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 837 (31 March 2000), pp. 258–62 [<http://www.icrc.org/irceng.nsf/4dc394db5b54f3fa.../ec6bf492b4a2fb40412568d40043bd3a?OpenDocument>]

⁵⁰ Pierre de Senarclens, *L'humanitaire en catastrophe* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999), p. 23.

⁵¹ Although the UNHCR recognised the support of NATO, it was not unambiguously happy with this support. For example: "It is hard to be optimistic". Interview with Dennis McNamara, *Refugees Magazine*, see n. 20; UNHCR, *The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response*, see n. 35 (e.g. paragraph 438 p. 89, paragraph 446 p. 90, paragraphs 495–498 pp. 100–101, and chapter 7).

⁵² UNHCR, *The State of The World's Refugees 1993*, p. 78, see n. 7.

Military force and technology are developed in the framework of a field which is structured around an interest in deterring and/or fighting an enemy rather than an interest in assisting and relieving the victims of violence. Therefore, the military necessarily incorporates an interest in producing rather than relieving human insecurity. This partly explains that, although military capital can be set at work relatively easily in a humanitarian field, military agencies remain strangers in that field.

The ambivalent position of NATO in the case of Kosovo was not just a specific case of tensions triggered by any deployment of the military in a humanitarian field. Its ambivalent status was further exacerbated because it was simultaneously active in the humanitarian and the military field.

Both the humanitarian and the military field became central to the crisis shortly after the negotiations in Rambouillet were suspended. Immediately after that suspension, the NATO Secretary General consulted with the member states about launching air operations in accordance with the authority delegated to him by the North Atlantic Council of 30 January 1999. On 22 March the North Atlantic Council authorised the Secretary General of NATO to decide after consultation on a broader range of air operations. The next day the Secretary General directed SACEUR to start air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 24 March the Secretary General made a Press Statement saying 'I have been informed by SACEUR, General Clark, that at this moment NATO Air Operations against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have commenced'. This does not mean that the air strikes launched the military field into existence. NATO military action commenced most explicitly when on 24 September 1998 the North Atlantic Council authorised SACEUR to issue an ACTWARN 'for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo', but only by effectively starting the bombing, the military game became more prominent as a separate field of practice. Military plans were put into effect. Military decision-makers faced the paradoxes and frictions of both the virtual and real battlefield. The military campaign became a major concern for decision-makers, to an extent irrespective of its relation to the diplomatic field. As a result NATO confirmed its military status of being a war machine, that is an organisation primarily designed to deter war by military means, and in case this fails, to effectively use its military capacity.

Symbolic practices emerged that were aimed at making the double employment of NATO's military forces compatible and at moderating the contradictions between the humanitarian interest and the military interest. On many occasions NATO could be seen to be aware of its ambivalent position. It struggled hard to keep up an image that the military and humanitarian operations were compatible rather than contradictory to one another. The Secretary General of NATO had stated already on 23 March 1999:

It [the military action] will be directed towards disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Serb Army and Special Police Forces and weakening their ability to cause further humanitarian catastrophe. Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo . . .⁵³

⁵³ Secretary General Javier Solana, *Press Statement*, 23 March 1999.

However, throughout the Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis NATO had to face the fact that the massive refugee flows started immediately after the start of the air campaign. NATO continuously denied that it had any responsibility for the refugee flows, and instead blamed Milosevic for the refugee crisis, or emphasised that the ethnic cleansing had already been planned before the NATO operations began.⁵⁴ But there were also more subtle statements as when NATO spokesman Jamie Shea referred to the number of refugees and displaced persons at a press conference in early April 1999. He then referred to the number of refugees and displaced persons since the beginning of the crisis in March 1998, thereby separating the start of the refugee crisis from the launching of the air campaign.⁵⁵

The ambivalent status resulting from the double employment of NATO's military forces was also very visible in the symbolic struggle that was triggered by NATO's bombing of a group of Kosovo Albanians in Korisa, in mid-May 1999.⁵⁶ This was an especially tragic case of the more general problem that one part of NATO's military machinery was producing human misery and victims—the so-called 'collateral damage'—while another section of this same machinery was claiming to relieve human misery resulting from the conflict.⁵⁷ The so-called 'collateral damage' made the credibility of NATO's humanitarian claims vulnerable to pressures emphasising that it violated fundamental rules of humanitarian law (for example, Amnesty International regularly expressed this concern to the Secretary General of NATO⁵⁸).

For humanitarian agencies these incidents made it even more difficult than it already tends to be in complex emergencies to sustain their claim that they are neutral or beyond politics (which is often seen as an important source of enabling humanitarian practices in a conflict situation).

In addition to a humanitarian game and a military game, NATO was also involved in a geopolitical, strategic game which further increased the ambivalence of NATO's activities in the humanitarian field. NATO articulated an interest in the maintenance of stability and security in South Eastern Europe. Since early 1998, the diplomatic mechanism of the Partnership for Peace was used to support the neighbouring countries, and in particular Albania. The main concern was to prevent the violence in Kosovo from spilling over in regional instability.⁵⁹ This interest continued to be articulated in NATO practices throughout the Kosovo crisis. After the Kosovo Albanian refugees poured out of Kosovo into Albania, FYROM and Montenegro, the discourse partly constructed the refugees as a factor that would be potentially destabilising the region and in particular FYROM. When the Kosovo

⁵⁴ For example: *Press Statement by the Secretary General of NATO*, 1 April 1999; Daily Press Conference by NATO Spokesperson summarised in *Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News*, 33: 3096 (2 April 1999), p. 3.

⁵⁵ *Nouvelles Atlantiques/Atlantic News*, 33: 3097 (7 April 1999), p. 1; also vol. 33: 3098 (9 April 1999), p. 1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 33: 3109 (19 May 1999), p. 2.

⁵⁷ See among others, Edward W. Said, 'La trahison des intellectuels', in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (August 1999), pp. 6–7.

⁵⁸ 'Amnesty International concerns relating to NATO Bombings'. Amnesty International—News Release—EUR 70/69/99, 18 May 1999. [<http://www.amnesty.org/news/1999/47006999.htm>]

⁵⁹ For example: *Statement on Kosovo*. NATO Press Release, see n. 7 above. *Statement on Kosovo*, NATO Press Release M-NAC-D-1(98)77, 11 June 1998 [<http://hq.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-077e.htm>]

Albanian refugees started moving out of Kosovo in great numbers, they consequently connected a strategic question about regional stability to a humanitarian dynamic resulting in an overlap between the regional stability game and the humanitarian field. For example, accommodating refugees in camps, pressuring the government of the FYROM, promising an activation of Partnership for Peace mechanisms, air-lifting refugees out of the FYROM, and so on, were constructed as being significant both for the humanitarian cause and for the more traditional, geopolitically defined stability interest. Tony Blair explicitly addressed the co-existence of the two interests at a press conference at NATO Headquarters (20 May 1999):

Milosevic must understand this, that we have embarked upon this action not simply because there is a strategic interest of NATO engaged, there is such an interest and I can make to you all the arguments about how important it is strategically for NATO that we are engaged, but we have embarked on it for a simple humanitarian reason and cause and we are not going to allow Milosevic to get away with this policy of ethnic cleansing, we will defeat that policy.⁶⁰

The crossover between the stability game and the humanitarian field with regard to the refugee crisis easily triggered questions about the sincerity of the Alliance's humanitarian interest. A crossover between a humanitarian interest and a traditional self-interest necessarily raises problems about the disinterested nature of the agency which enacts both interests at the same time. But this is especially the case for NATO. NATO remains primarily a military alliance in the eyes of many political and humanitarian agencies and therefore it is more easily recognised as a serious player in the geopolitical stability game than it is in the humanitarian game. This awareness became a source for contesting NATO's articulation of a humanitarian interest. It thus became another issue involved in the symbolic struggle about the recognition and contestation of NATO's reputation and authority as a humanitarian agency. NATO again emphasised the compatibility between the two interests while its critics invoked the double interest to contest the credibility of NATO's attempts to incorporate a humanitarian interest.⁶¹

To conclude, despite NATO's humanitarian activities its position within the humanitarian field remained contested. This resulted first from the inherent ambivalence surrounding the deployment of the military in a humanitarian field. It was later exacerbated by NATO's activities in a military and a geopolitical field. These activities often led to situations in which the credibility of NATO as a humanitarian agency came under pressure. As a result, the conversion of military capital into humanitarian capital also required a significant amount of symbolic work in the struggle to support NATO's position and authority in the humanitarian field.

⁶⁰ For another example: the response of the Secretary General to a question by Antoine Guillau (TF1) at the Press Conference by the Secretary General of NATO, 12 April 1999.

⁶¹ About the strategic interest of the Kosovo crisis, see among others: Jacques Paul Klein, 'Stopping the Whirlwind', *The World Today*, 55: 6 (1999), pp. 7–9. An example of stating the compatibility between the different interests: 'Today we confirm that we will play a full part in a comprehensive approach to stabilize this region. Such an approach which should address the political, economic, security and humanitarian aspects must involve a number of institutions but let me say that NATO will have its role to play.' Secretary General Javier Solana, Press Conference, 12 April 1999. For a critique of NATO on these and related issues, among others: Noam Chomsky, 'L'Otan, maître du monde', *Le Monde Diplomatique* (May 1999), pp. 1, 4–5; Peter Gowan, 'The NATO Powers and the Balkan Tragedy', *New Left Review*, no. 234 (March–April 1999), pp. 83–105.

The political significance of NATO's humanitarianism

In the above I have looked at how NATO articulated a humanitarian interest and at the different elements of the transfiguration of NATO into a humanitarian agency. This is an interesting issue in itself. Given NATO's prominent role in both the Kosovo crisis and the struggle about rearranging the European security complex, however, the question arises 'What is the political significance of NATO's humanitarianism?' This question is about how the articulation of a humanitarian interest converts into political authority. Political authority refers to the capacity of legitimate naming of a problem, the setting in which the problem emerges and the dynamics through which the problem is managed.⁶²

During the Kosovo crisis the credible articulation of a humanitarian interest became a political stake for NATO. After the refugees flowed out of Kosovo, its political reputation became entangled with the effective provision of humanitarian assistance to the refugees and the objective to guarantee the refugees and the internally displaced persons a safe return to their 'homes' in Kosovo. To an extent this was the result of the discourse about the Kosovo conflict that NATO had developed since mid-1998. NATO's discourse extensively justified its involvement on the basis of the humanitarian needs of the Kosovo Albanians and the violation of human rights.⁶³ Consequently, NATO partly defined the stakes of the conflict in terms of a humanitarian interest. This position, which incorporated the need to alleviate human suffering, became a major issue once the images and stories about the Kosovo Albanian refugees and, to a lesser extent, the internally displaced persons became a key factor in the political spectacle of the Kosovo conflict⁶⁴. In the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, the images of refugee flows took on a ritualised form, suggesting a battle between barbarous forces and the civilised world.

What we have seen in Kosovo in the last few days is a direct challenge to all the values on which we are building our new undivided Europe. Milosevic and his government are the antithesis of all we value. So, we cannot tolerate the behaviour of a more barbarous age in a Europe which is striving towards a more united and more enlightened future. Our cause is a just one. It is our duty to fulfil it.⁶⁵

Once it had become part of the political spectacle of the Kosovo conflict, political reputation and authority partly depended on the representation of the refugees and NATO's practices towards these refugees. Convincingly displaying a humanitarian interest became an element in the struggle to demonstrate the appropriate and effective governance of the Kosovo conflict by NATO.⁶⁶

⁶² Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, p. 181.

⁶³ For example: The Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, *A Strategy for the 21st Century*. Lecture in Berlin, 1 February 1999.

⁶⁴ The concept (and its meaning) is borrowed from Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984 [1967]) and Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.

⁶⁵ The Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, *Press Statement*. 1 April 1999.

⁶⁶ The struggle for political credibility in the political spectacle was a complex game in which many crucial issues were at stake. Among the most visible were the preservation of cohesion between the member states, the manufacturing of domestic support both among the wider public and the political parties, and the international perception of NATO's actions.

The political significance of NATO's humanitarianism also went beyond the Kosovo conflict as such. The humanitarian practices were relevant for the struggle for international political authority in the definition and management of the security dynamics that have characterised the European security complex after the Cold War.

With the breakdown of the Cold War structure the position of NATO in the European security complex became precarious. Although NATO still upheld the strategy that the survival of its member states depended on the effective use of the military capital it possessed, the political relevance of the military game rapidly diminished.⁶⁷ The relevance of military capital for governing the post-Cold War security dynamic was increasingly questioned. This is indicated by the cuts in defence budgets and by the move from a conscript to a professional army in some European countries, and so on. This post-Cold War climate positioned NATO in a new situation in which its political relevance was at stake. Why would a military alliance, which is so strongly tied up with the Cold War framework as NATO, be needed in a post-Cold War security dynamic? In addition to the traditional military question of defence against external aggression, which did not disappear, NATO faced a political game in which its authority to govern security dynamics was at stake.⁶⁸ Economic and diplomatic capital quickly gained in importance, without however, rendering military capital irrelevant. But it was more difficult to convert military capital into political authority in the struggle for the domination of the governance of European security dynamics after the Cold War.

In this context, NATO articulated a civilisational strategy that was aimed at the creation of a pan-European community of values.⁶⁹ The affirmation of values was not new but its strategic role definitely changed in the 1990s.⁷⁰ The affirmation of an Atlantic civilisation transformed from a ritualistic confirmation of values into a key aspect of the security strategy of NATO. Besides the traditional security concept of defending the member states of the alliance and their values against an external aggressor, NATO enacts a strategy of integrating non-member states into a particular form of life characterised by the liberal values of democracy, the free market and respect for human rights.⁷¹ The game in which this strategy operates is characterised by a struggle for the inclusion in (and therefore also exclusion from) a

⁶⁷ For a more recent affirmation of the importance of its military capital: *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23 and 24 April 1999.

⁶⁸ Although one could argue that NATO also faced similar political games on several occasions during the Cold War (e.g. during the nuclear missile crisis in Europe in the 1980s), it is generally agreed that NATO's political relevance has become questioned to an unprecedented degree in the 1990s.

⁶⁹ For a recent example of this discourse: Lord Robertson, *NATO in the New Millennium*. Manfred Wörner Memorial Lecture Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, 25 January 2001.

⁷⁰ For example: Opening Statements and Article 2 of *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington DC—4 April 1949.

⁷¹ For example, Javier Solana, *NATO as a Community of Values* (n. 48). On the double face of NATO, see among others: Fierke, *Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security, and Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement*; Hansen, *NATO's Dual Logic of Security*; Williams, *The Discursive Power of Community*: details in n. 48. On how these strategies relate to the more general dynamics in the European security complex: Ola Tunander, 'Post-Cold War Europe: Synthesis of Bipolar Friend-Foe Structure and a Hierarchic Cosmos-Chaos Structure', in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev, and Victoria Ingrid Einagel (eds.), *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity* (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 17–44.

'family of states' through the articulation of values.⁷² The civilisation strategy articulates an interest in defending the universal European values in places where they are violated.⁷³ But, the military is not generally considered to be a major instrument in this struggle. Diplomatic instruments like the Partnership for Peace, economic capital which supports the spread of the free market, and international legal or other kinds of rule-setting capital which regulate the respect for values are more important in this strategy. Consequently, military capital does not convert quickly into political capital in the community of values game. Moreover, in this game the relevance of military capital is contested. The values that are at stake exclude a military-sustained expansion of values, as is most explicitly articulated in the Helsinki principles of 1975 that still play a norm-setting role.

This situation is to an extent homologous to NATO's position in the Kosovo conflict. Both in Kosovo and in the European security complex NATO articulated a military and geopolitical strategy aimed at reproducing a game in which military capital is made directly politically relevant. It simultaneously developed a strategy in the interest of supporting pan-European values, which include the value of assisting and protecting human beings in need. In both security spaces military capital was contested. Moreover, NATO situated itself in an ambivalent position in which it simultaneously played a military and geostrategic game structured around an interest in the military and diplomatic protection of European security and stability on the one hand, and a humanitarian—or, more generally stated a value-oriented—game in which the Kosovo Albanian refugees became a symbol of the battle between good and evil, civilised and barbarian, light and dark on the other hand. The homology between NATO's position and the related strategies in the Kosovo conflict on the one hand and its position and related strategies in the struggles for political authority in the European security complex made it structurally possible to directly capitalise in the post-Cold War European security game on the political and humanitarian capital acquired in the Kosovo conflict.

As already indicated previously, the problem for NATO has been that its military capital has remained a key element determining its political identity in the European security complex. Despite the civilisation strategy, its military capital is key to differentiating it from other community building agencies. Therefore, it continues to be important if not crucial for NATO to politically capitalise on its military capital. After the return of the refugees, the struggle over the significance of military force has continued. At present, one of the most interesting aspects of the struggle is the debate about the respective roles of the police, the military and the so-called third force (like the French *Gendarmerie* and the Italian *Carabinieri*) in peacebuilding operations in Kosovo.⁷⁴

⁷² '... I look forward to the day when we will be able to welcome a democratic Yugoslavia back into the European family ...' Javier Solana, article for the International Press 'NATO United to Succeed'. 12 May 1999.

⁷³ For example, Lord Robertson, *NATO at the Beginning of the 21st Century*. Speech by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO to the Netherlands Atlantic Association, 13 April 2000; Lord Robertson, 'Remarks at the Press Conference to mark the First Anniversary of the Kosovo Air Campaign'. 21 March 2000.

⁷⁴ I am indebted to Didier Bigo for making this point. The competition between the military, the police and the 'third force' in Kosovo is an interesting and telling struggle which operates both at the bureaucratic level as a competition between services and at the political, diplomatic level as a competition between the EU and NATO.

In the Kosovo conflict, NATO was involved in a struggle for the revaluation of military capital both in the more traditional defence game and in the community of values game. Through the air campaign NATO demonstrated its capacity to deploy its military capital in a conflict to preserve regional stability and to affirm civilisation against a barbarian force. Beside the military campaign, the conversion of its military capital into humanitarian capital added to the revaluation of military capital as well. For NATO, demonstrating the value of its military capital in the humanitarian field confirmed that military capital is not only important in protecting the community of values and the member states against external challenges. Military capital can also play a role in the protection and affirmation of human rights through the relief of suffering and the provision of assistance and protection to refugees. In other words, NATO converted its military capital into political capital—that is, reputation and authority in the European security complex—by demonstrating how military capital is necessary for the stakes in both the collective defence game and the community of values game. These stakes are European stability, the protection of the boundaries of the community of values and the assistance and protection of victims of practices that violate the values the community shares, which includes the reconstruction of war-torn societies. It is also in this sense that the Kosovo Albanian refugees were most explicitly significant for NATO in the context of the struggle for political authority in the European security complex. The Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis and its importance in the political spectacle triggered the articulation of a humanitarian interest in NATO. In its humanitarian practices it converted military capital into political capital *via* its conversion into humanitarian capital. In other words, the Kosovo Albanian refugees derived their political significance for NATO from the degree to which they made it possible for NATO to demonstrate the humanitarian value of military capital and the degree to which NATO could politically capitalise on it both in the immediate context of the Kosovo conflict and in the course of the struggle for the definition of the European security complex.