that the respondents identified themselves as partisans on 95.6 per cent of the questionnaires returned. In a state in which nearly half of the voters now classify themselves as independents, our activists were an extremely partisan lot. They included the Republican National Committeeman, several county chairmen, precinct committee persons, prominent labor leaders active in the Democratic Party, and some former members of the Iowa General Assembly.

The data indicate not only that there were a large number of party identifiers mentioned above, but also that even among the losers, 43.4 per cent of the workers had been active in the party more than six years. Sixty-three per cent had worked in at least one previous campaign. And, among the bolters, more than half had previous campaign experience. Moreover, among the losers, 76.2 per cent, and among the bolters, 72 per cent, asserted that they intended to be as active or more active in the future. To be sure, this could mean a minimum of activity, but that would not square with the original identification of these persons as the most active for the candidates in each county. It did not surprise us that most of the workers did not say they had been recruited by the party. Iowa party officials have a tradition of avoiding official open recruitment of workers in primary elections. Finally, the data revealed almost no differences between the winners and losers (35.9–36.5 per cent) or the bolters (33.3 per cent) and the nonbolters (36.5 per cent) in terms of future willingness to take a more responsible position in the party at some future time. The assertion in the letter that when some workers defected after the primary it was not a party loss is unwarranted.

In view of these facts, the writer of the letter, by claiming that in order to reach our conclusions, we should have asked our “respondents whether they would have been active in the campaign had their candidate not entered the primary,” misunderstood our intentions. We sought to determine what happened to partisan activists after they worked in hotly contested primaries. The persons in our universe, as noted above, were identified by the candidates as their most active, or among the most active, partisans in each of 12 counties. Our methods, we think, were empirically sound. It was not essential to the study that they be persons who would have participated in the campaign under other circumstances. If we had not questioned the party members working for Mezvinsky, Schwengel, Albrecht, Stanley, and Strout, we would have interviewed those working for candidates A, B, C, D, and E, or whoever ran in the primary under investigation.

What we found was that all workers who had participated in the primaries reduced some of their activities in the autumn general election, but that workers who had supported candidates who lost in a primary performed far fewer campaign activities in the general election than those who had worked for winners. In addition, some of the activists in each party refused to work for the winners of the primaries, some decided to split their tickets, some worked elsewhere, 12 per cent were sufficiently alienated to vote for their previous opponents, and 21.3 per cent worked for the opposing party in November. Thus, we drew conclusions about a divisive primary. Frankly, we can’t fathom why that should imply that they would have had to work in the primaries even if other persons had been the candidates.

Concomitantly, with reference to the fourth paragraph of the letter, we believe our data clearly indicate that a loss of talent to the party as we defined it occurred. Our candidates had partisan workers, and when some of those who worked for the losing candidates subsequently temporarily rejected the party to which they had given their efforts, this was a loss. Mr. Schnall suggests that such defection was due to an end of a personal commitment and a loss of “motivation” rather than to the “primary.” But this loss would not have taken place had there been no primary in which the partisan workers could have become disenchanted. Of course motivations change. One of the tasks of political scientists is to relate institutional arrangements to individual behavior and that is what we have done. Because of the outcome of the primary, individuals altered their patterns of behavior. There is nothing illogical about this inference. Schnall’s argument ignores the intentions mentioned above, of workers for losers to participate in future campaigns and also their willingness to take more responsible positions in the party. To reiterate, there was almost no difference in this ambition among partisans working for winners, losers, bolters, and non-bolters.

We appreciate that the letter writer found our approach imaginative and our statistical computations meticulous, and we will stand by our modest statement that our data confirm some divisive effects of the direct primary election. Nothing in the letter convinces us that we should do otherwise.

Donald Bruce Johnson

University of Iowa

To the Editor:

Those of us who toil in the vineyards of Public Administration can only applaud the gradual attempt of APSR to renew its connection with us. Larry B. Hill’s effort in the September 1974 APSR is, unfortunately, almost typical in its failure to come to terms with the logic of its own
argument. The result is a fundamental contradiction easily outlined.

Purporting to offer an "authority-based conception of institutionalization," the author begins by emphasizing offensive capability, specifically relating his conception to Braibanti's; to be successfully offensive, an institution must be able to "propel" its own norms into other institutions. This comes close to some old definitions of power, those which highlight the ability of one actor to compel another to do what he would otherwise not do. Almost immediately, however, Hill retreated from this definition to another, that of a "shared normative framework" among institutions (p. 1076), an approach which concludes that ombudsmen have "little real power" (p. 1084) and that departments never view an ombudsman "as a dangerous enemy" (p. 1083). This second view dominates the article, so we must go further if we are to unravel what Hill is saying.

If, as he notes, institutions are organizations which become valued for their own existence, the essence of the Selznick approach, then a "shared normative framework" must mean widespread acceptance of the norm of mutual survival; ombudsmen and other agencies simply assume, and tacitly agree, they will not threaten each other's existence (value). Most certainly, cooperation becomes "an important index of the ombudsman's institutionalization" (p. 1085), but this can only mean cooperation in achieving the goal of mutual survival. It follows immediately that assistance to clients becomes a very subsidiary value, if it is a value at all. To put it another way, why shouldn't agencies be "prompt" in responding to ombudsmen (p. 1082) if they share an understanding that the latter will not be "offensive?"

Now if institutions and institutional leaders function within this shared normative framework of mutual survival, relationships among them can hardly be defined in terms of power and/or authority. People who share a given norm are likely to agree in the first place, so we must ask what Hill can possibly mean by the phrase "authority figure" as applied to ombudsmen? The only logical explanation is that ombudsmen and agencies, taken together, are "authority figures" in relationships with clients but not with each other. Reduced to its bare outline, then, Hill's conclusion is that the power elite is alive and working well. So what else is new?

The intellectual tragedy is that Hill doesn't seem to notice any of this. He states on p. 1082, e.g., that "it could have been predicted that in a first rush of crusading zeal," ombudsmen would be very threatening to agencies; his own analysis would indicate precisely the opposite. Any "new" institution interested in creating the expectation that it shares the value of mutual survival (p. 1076) will become anything but "crusading," and nobody should predict otherwise (new nation-states often emphasize their own neutrality so as to avoid offending powerful neighbors). To the extent the institutional approach is valid, it demonstrates the poverty of conventional pluralism. As Galbraith has convincingly argued on the economic side, private institutions exist for their own purposes, not those of their customers. On the public side, it is nonsense to assume institutions represent their clients; the function of the latter is only to contribute to institutional survival.

University of Pittsburgh

FREDERICK C. THAYER

TO THE EDITOR:

When you sent me a copy of Mr. Thayer's letter concerning my article in the September, 1974 issue of the APSR, I began to read with some trepidation. I recognize that my own judgments about the ombudsman are fallible—even after spending ten years researching and writing on the subject, as are those of the APSR's editor and his referees, and those of the very helpful group of people whose assistance I acknowledged in the article. And if a reader of the published article had noted flaws serious enough to warrant the writing of a lengthy critical letter to the editor, surely this was cause for worry. A quick reading of the letter did not mollify my fears, for I found great difficulty in making heads or tails out of what Mr. Thayer was saying and how it might relate to my article. It was only after reading over the letter several times that I was able to understand it sufficiently to be able to formulate a response.

Mr. Thayer's first sentence puzzled me: I knew that the APSR has not concentrated upon the field of public administration, but I was not aware—as Mr. Thayer's letter implies—that the Review's connection with P.A. had been severed at some point in the past so that my article assumes additional importance as a step in the reunion of the two. But Thayer's next sentence delivers the zinger; my article is, he says: "unfortunately, almost typical in its failure to come to terms with the logic of its own argument." In passing, I wonder what my article is "almost typical" of—of articles in general, of public administration articles, of those published in the APSR? When I learned in the paragraph's last sentence that my "fundamental contradiction [can be] easily outlined," I approached the remainder with fear and trembling.

Fortunately, for me, Mr. Thayer's bark is much worse than his bite; I never did find the promised outline. His technique is to take several of my statements and then draw conclusions, which usually are quite bizarre. Because his attack