

INTRODUCTION



In 1993, when I was a student of grade eight in a private school in Lahore, our class was divided up in four groups for a geography project on Pakistan. The group of which I was a part had to make a sculptural map of Pakistan, demonstrating the diverse physical and social qualities of its landscape. And so we had set about carving our country with stuff like styrofoam, cotton, and cardboard. In the final map that we made, the region of Gilgit-Baltistan—then the ‘Northern Areas’—had remained unlabelled and unpeopled, marked only with mountains made of clay.

Even today, nature remains the primary modality through which Gilgit-Baltistan is understood within the Pakistani national imagination. Its magnificent peaks and breathtaking valleys invoke within Pakistanis a simultaneous sense of emotional attachment and proud ownership, permitting them to claim Pakistan as ‘beautiful’. But while Gilgit-Baltistan is externally produced as an idyllic tourist destination, it is internally managed as a suspect security zone. This is because the region is internationally considered as part of the disputed area of Kashmir—a territory that both Pakistan and India claim, and have turned into the most militarized zone in the world over the last seven decades. This is also because Gilgit-Baltistan is the only Shia-dominated political unit in a Sunni-dominated Pakistan.

Ironically, at the heart of the territory of Kashmir—which Pakistan claims on the basis of its ‘Muslim’ identity—lies the region of Gilgit-Baltistan which

contradicts this identity by being home to a different kind of Muslim than that endorsed by Pakistani nationalism. Such territorial and religious anxieties transform Gilgit-Baltistan from a place of mythical beauty into a zone of treachery, proudly claimed yet disavowed at the same time. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of the region express a strong yearning for recognition and inclusion within the Pakistani nation-state, and feel a deep love and loyalty towards it—only to find themselves constantly alienated and betrayed. This book charts such dynamics of attachment and alienation, placing at its centre the emotionalities—of love and betrayal, loyalty and suspicion, beauty and terror—that help us grasp how the Kashmir conflict is affectively structured and experienced on the ground. After all, Kashmir is not just a matter of national security in India and Pakistan, but a place that has become the emotional heart of these nationalisms. How this ‘heart of hostility’ translates into political subjection and intimately felt struggle in the terrain of Gilgit-Baltistan is the story that I wish to narrate in this book.¹

THE ANGUISH OF LOVE

Pakistan ne hamaray ehsasaat ke saath khela hai!

‘Pakistan has played with/manipulated our emotions!’

This is a refrain that is often heard in Gilgit-Baltistani protests against the Pakistan state, and came up repeatedly during my interviews in the region. People in Gilgit-Baltistan attribute their political predicament not just to the lack of rights as a result of being entangled in the Kashmir dispute, but fundamentally to the lack of ‘trust’ (*bharosa/aitmad*) in the region by the Pakistani state authorities, which signifies a ‘betrayal’ (*bewafai/dhoka*) of the region’s own ‘love’ (*muhabbat*) and ‘loyalty’ (*wafadari*) to Pakistan. As one interviewee commented to me, the real problem is that ‘Pakistan is not *sincere* with us.’² Across the border, in Srinagar, Kashmiris voice-related grievances against the Indian state: ‘They [Indians] *can’t feel or represent* our sentiments.’³ Such feeling-thoughts compel us to rethink the state–citizen relation in deeply emotional and intimate terms, in place of purely legalistic logics. This is

especially true in conflict zones like Kashmir, where the attitudes of aggressive hyper-nationalism and struggles of self-determination have become immersed in multiple emotional histories. These emotional structures, histories, and experiences are central for gaining a grounded understanding of the Kashmir conflict, as well as of the state–citizen dynamic in general.

Let me recognize at the outset that this dynamic, as well as the emotionality of rule and resistance, operates differently in the different regions that form part of the conflict of Kashmir. In Gilgit-Baltistan, intriguingly, love is a compelling constellation through which we may chart how the dynamic of citizenship operates on the ground. In order to grasp the politics of love and emotional attachment in the case of state-making in Gilgit-Baltistan, it is crucial to first note the profound significance of love in the very structuring of individual subjectivity and social being in South Asia. If South Asian legends, poetic thought, and popular culture particularly from Pakistan and north India are an indicator, then we might say that the history of all hitherto existing society is not the history of class struggles, but of love struggles.⁴ The struggles of legendary lovers—from Heer Ranjha to Mirza Sahiban, Laila Majnun to Sassi Punnu, and Shirin Farhad to Sohni Mahiwal—form the foundational motif in the dominant literary traditions of the Perso-Indian cosmopolis from the medieval period onwards. Narratives of love-martyrs embodied the paradigmatic theme of separation and union, but also that of defiance and rebellion against patriarchal, priestly, and class oppression.⁵ Performed through poetic storytelling and illustrated through painting, the power of love in these narratives embraced a transcendental spirit of piety and collective oneness, and served to define the moral universe and cognitive hearts of local populations. If language reflects the life-worlds of its speakers and their frames of meaning and value, then we might grasp how cherished love is by witnessing the many modes of referring to a beloved soul: *yaar*, *jaan*, *jaaneman*, *jigar*, *dost*, *rafeeq*, *habeeb*, *sanam*, *sajan*, *dildar*, *dilbar*, *piya*, *mehboob*, *saaqi*, *saheb*, *saiyaan*, *mahi*, *mitwa*, *mitr*—at least nineteen terms just in the Gujrati-Urdu-Hindi tongue that I am familiar with.

Alongside a devotional affection and life-consuming desire for the beloved, expressive traditions of love in South Asia are necessarily inscribed with themes of anguish and alienation—particularly since the beloveds are always obstructed by hostile environments. Moreover, love is deemed to characterize

all human and human–divine relations, not just the affair of romance. As Gold (2006) notes in the illuminating edited volume *Love in South Asia: A Cultural History*, idioms of love tend to be more expansive in South Asia and are used to describe not only spiritual love, as has been widely recognized, but also intimately felt community ties and ecologies. These factors take us closer to the argument that I wish to make here: that it this expansive, cultural–poetic constellation of love which is being drawn upon by Gilgiti subjects, as they articulate their feelings of love, loyalty, and longing for the Pakistani nation/state. It is because of the pathos of this same paradigmatic constellation that they speak of insincerity, betrayal, and *be-wafai*—no-loyalty—in return. This doubleness in relation to love is even indicated by the term *khelna*, which is referred to in the quotation at the beginning of this section. The Urdu word *khelna* means the light-hearted, joyous play that is involved in love, but depending on the way it is used, it can simultaneously mean a kind of insincere play, a pretense, and ultimately, the state of manipulated love.

It is precisely this state of manipulated love that Pakistan has come to represent in Gilgit-Baltistan, in betrayal of the true love that Gilgitis feel they have expressed towards the country. This longing for love, attachment, and national belonging is a formative factor that is often eclipsed in analyses of power and state-making, which are often focused on disciplinary practices of rule and regulation. Of particular relevance here is James Scott's now canonical work, *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009), in which he argues that hill communities in upland Southeast Asia and Northeast India have historically been focused on evading centralized state authority, and it is only the result of top-down practices of internal colonialism that successive states have brought them under their rule—a process that has accelerated since the 1950s. Gilgit-Baltistan is not unlike Scott's description of hill peoples at state frontiers, but here the chronicle of internal colonialism—while extremely present and pertinent—is simply insufficient. Already out-of-the-way subjects are not trying to run away further, but longing to belong. Their strong desire for inclusion and recognition is a yearning for identity in a world where modernity and the nation-state—no matter how evident their violences are—remain both seductive and enchanting, and a necessary existent without which no vision of life is deemed possible. In Gilgit-Baltistan, this yearning is also historically linked to the affective power of a moral Muslim community

promised in the form of Pakistan in 1947, which was deemed more appealing than either Hindu-ruled Kashmir or Hindu-dominated India at the moment of partition.

Such a yearning is not only unexplainable within Scott's framework, but also within that of Judith Butler (1997), who productively raised the question of love, the psyche, and the formation of the subject in *The Psychic Life of Power*. Recognizing that love is what is missing from Althusser's theorization of rule and regulation, Butler rightly guides us that passionate attachments form the psychic ground of power. And yet this attachment seems to be always a disciplinary cultivation. While not denying the possibility of a narcissistic attachment to subjection, I wish to highlight that we also need to recognize the possibility of an affirmative attachment constituted by desire and surrender. This is offered in the language of the heart, and deemed to be abused through the language of force and the law. It is precisely because social emotionality in South Asia inhabits this sensibility of love-offerings, moral community, and affective expectations, that leaders like Gandhi and Baccha Khan—who embraced a politics of love—had such a deep resonance across South Asia. And it is also for this reason that the local struggles for substantive citizenship that I discuss later in the book—poetic, faith-based, and ecological—are fundamentally tied to the ethical-emotional aspirations of promoting *insaaniyat* (humanism) instead of prejudice and ecological stewardship instead of greed.⁶

In *Muslim Becoming*, Naveeda Khan (2012) productively brings our attention to the question of aspiration in Pakistan. Yet her analysis seems to be limited to the striving for a better Muslim-ness that Pakistanis seem to be constantly engaged in. This emphasis occludes attention to other kinds of ethical-political struggles that may be linked to Islam—such as the faith-based movement for textbook reform that I discuss in Chapter 3—but cannot be exhausted only by reference to Islamic discourses and theological argumentation between differently pious subjects. The understanding of Pakistani subjects as 'Muslims' tends to somehow pigeonhole them as pious-or-not, and fails to attend to how they negotiate the state as political, cultural, and development subjects. Moreover, while Khan's emphasis on skepticism also rings true for everyday, middle-class life in Pakistan, it nevertheless fails to capture the sense of anguish that is actually felt due to devastated, betrayed aspirations in the state.

This is perhaps most visible, not from the Lahori streets at the heart of Punjab which form the ethnographic site for Khan, but from marginal, Gilgiti ones in Pakistan's borderlands. Such border territories also make more visible the contradictions that lie at the core of nationalism and state-making in Pakistan.

DELUSIONAL STATES

Several scholars have explored the socio-political and class-centred basis for the emergence of Pakistan, unravelling the constructed idea of Islamic nationalism which eventually came to be identified as the basis for the country's creation.⁷ Post-1947, this ideological fixation with Islam as the *raison d'être* of the Pakistani nation was transformed and coupled with an ideological obsession with India, the presumed opposite of an Islamic Pakistan. Notwithstanding the contradictions of such a vision—such as the presence of many more Muslims in India and the familial ties that continued across a yet-to-be-consolidated border—the portrayal of India as an aggressive, overbearing enemy came to constitute a central pillar of state-formative ideology as propagated in particular by military leaders in Pakistan. In this portrayal, the Pakistani state is deemed to face a permanent existential threat from India, and must constantly battle to uphold the glory of Islam as well as its own glory as a Muslim state.

It is often recognized that such hawkish national imaginaries in Pakistan have served to entrench military interests by helping to justify high defense expenditures, a prioritization of the needs of military personnel, as well as direct military intervention in politics. What is less emphasized and theorized is the sheer extent of *delusion* that such an imaginary inculcates in the political and social order. This sense of delusion might be especially visible in the case of Pakistan, but is certainly not limited to it. Rose (1996) has long alerted us to the fundamental role of fantasy in the construction of modern nations and states. Fantasy, though, almost feels too light a term for the kind of paranoid state sensibilities we have actually witnessed in the twentieth- and twenty-first century. Particularly under conditions of the 'war on terror', it would not be far-fetched to argue that delusion has become a global condition of stateness, sustained by simultaneous beliefs of persecution and grandeur and

also instrumentalized to justify extreme surveillance regimes as well as highly militarized societies.

The delusional state is most evident, in fact, in a context that is considered decisively incomparable to Pakistan in terms of classic comparative analysis: the United States. Given the historical, political, and economic connections between the US and Pakistan since 1947, the comparison is perfectly apt and necessary. In making this comparison, I am following Philip McMichael (1990) where he critiques the ahistoricity of the conventional comparative method and argues for a historically grounded ‘incorporated comparison’ approach that reveals the relationality of social processes.

One of the most illuminating theses on the US as state of delusion is offered by Ann McClintock in *Paranoid Empire* (2009). Reflecting on the obscene specters of violence embodied by Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib—‘shadowlands of empire,’ as she compellingly calls them—McClintock argues that the US as empire and nation-state ‘has entered the domain of paranoia’ where ‘fantasies of global omnipotence’ combine with ‘nightmares of impending attack.’ Her elaboration of this double-edged nature of paranoid power is worth quoting at length here:

... for it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the ‘war on terror,’ a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for ‘terror’ is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere ‘a consensual hallucination,’ and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of *catastrophic self-delusion* and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.⁸

I would like to expand McClintock’s insightful argument by contending that the shadowlands of empire generated by such ‘catastrophic self-delusion’ are not limited to post-9/11 extraordinary prisons. Nation-states like Pakistan have long served as shadowlands of empire. As Saadia Toor demonstrates

in *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan* (2012), the state in Pakistan has been intimately structured by US foreign policy since its inception, and it continues to be implicated in the nightmarish violence under US-led terror wars that have been so foundational to global political rule in the new millennium. Coached and contained as a Cold War ally, Pakistan has come to mirror its imperial master in its delusional, omnipotent sense of power combined with a perpetual threat of engulfment. In both contexts, the delusions and their spectral violence are not spontaneous responses to incidences of attack, but rather outcomes of a long-standing paranoid state militarism that justifies itself through the social production of fear.

In the specific context of Pakistan, the machinery of paranoia and surveillance has expanded to such an extent that a Pakistani journalist has fittingly termed the country as the ‘Intelligence Republic of Pakistan’ in place of its official label—the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Nowhere is this paranoid state of permanent existential threat deemed more at stake than in disputed Kashmir, where the twin imperatives of defending Islam and defending the border against India converge. And within Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan poses a particularly vexed territorial and religious anxiety because its majority-Shia populace contests the dominant Muslim sensibility that a Sunni-ized Pakistani state has sought to normalize for its citizens. How does the delusional state play out in this fraught region? In addressing this question in the book, my purpose is to shift attention away from the trite narrative of how regionalisms constantly threaten the imagined order of the nation-state. Instead, I provide an ethnographic glimpse of the lived practices through which the state-citizen relation is made, felt, and reworked in the most contested border zone of Pakistan.

Feelings are central to the story of state-citizen relations that I wish to tell, not only because the state and its regions are imagined through particular emotional logics, but also because rule is desired and inhabited emotionally by state subjects.⁹ Love, trust, and betrayal is one aspect of how this dynamic is felt in Gilgit-Baltistan, as discussed in the previous section. The other linked dynamic is that of loyalty and suspicion, and in the book, I demonstrate how this dynamic unravels in the context of state-formative processes of militarization and sectarianization. Gilgiti male subjects are not just loving but also especially loyal, and this has to do with the history of male employment as military

wage-labour in this frontier region. The ‘political economy of defence’ in Pakistan—a foundational framing for understanding the Pakistani ‘state of martial rule’¹⁰—is thus underpinned and buttressed in Gilgit-Baltistan by a political economy of feeling. This is a state where militarization is critically linked to livelihoods and cultural orientations, shaping popular understandings of life and politics and hence reordering people’s identities and aspirations. These aspects of the cultural–economic politics of militarization have been most compellingly explored in the context of the United States by the pioneering feminist scholar Catherine Lutz (1999, 2004), and it is thus the US again, which provides a frame of connection and comparison for me as I attempt to understand the militarized reality in Pakistan.

My key argument is that the employment of Gilgit-Baltistani men in the military creates loyal subjects who have come to revere the military and the military-state, hence producing the conditions of possibility for continued military authoritarianism in the region. At the same time, the activities of the intelligence agencies—key creators and enactors in the delusional state—constantly render people into permanent suspects and sources of threat. Suspicion is thus integral to the emotional structure of state power as people are *assumed* to be suspect *by definition* because they live in a Shia-majority, disputed border zone. This presumed suspicion is translated into a regime of monitoring and intimidation by the military–intelligence establishment, for which the suspicion serves as a convenient rationale for maintaining its own political and economic authority. More worryingly, the military–intelligence state also accomplishes its rule by promoting suspicion *amongst* citizens, most notably between the Shia and Sunni communities in Gilgit through state-backed sectarianizing discourses and practices. These practices have led to heightened feelings of emotional ill-will amongst these communities, and have damaged the cultures of pluralism that have historically dominated the region. Apart from suspected subjects, thus, the delusional state also produces suspicious subjects.

This strategy has further served to create the effect and affect of Gilgit-Baltistan as a quintessentially sectarian space where Shia–Sunni conflict can ‘erupt’ anytime unless prevented by an ever-vigilant, supposedly neutral state. Brimming with sectarian sentimentality, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan are thus imagined as irrational and non-political—as in, they are considered

incapable of being proper political subjects and agents. By sectarianizing citizenship and politics, the question of substantive citizenship rights in Gilgit-Baltistan is thus trumped, reinforcing the securocratic interests of the state in relation to Kashmir. Ultimately, the political economy of feelings based on loyalty and suspicion results in a militarization of citizenship in Gilgit-Baltistan. It embodies forms of emotional regulation that are paradoxical yet not contradictory: loyalty to an employment-giving military integrates people into the nation and accomplishes rule by creating consent, while suspicion services state power by emotionally disintegrating the region and hindering the possibilities of regional political solidarity and resistance.

BETWEEN BEAUTY AND TERROR

Far from being a harbinger of order, thus, the delusional state in Pakistan ironically thrives by producing a state of disorder—one that is very much perceived as such by Gilgit-Baltistani subjects and constantly critiqued for its duplicity and dangerousness. The spectacular deception of the state, however, is erased in the national imaginary because the region itself is projected as the source of danger instead of state policy. Delusion after all is always underpinned by denial. Simultaneously, the political repression and religious manipulation in Gilgit-Baltistan is invisibilized by the continued representation of the region as a mythical space of immense beauty. Indeed, in national texts and self-imaginings, the region's mountains, glaciers and forests are made central to the very definition of the physical structure, geographical landscape, and ecological constitution of the Pakistani nation and state. This aesthetic politics of nature constitutes another aspect of the affective production of state power in Gilgit-Baltistan, as the imagination and incorporation of the region within the Pakistani nation/state is centrally grounded in the emotional attachments invoked by nature. If maps produce the geo-body of the nation—as Winichakul (1997) has argued—then representational practices surrounding the ecology of particular regions serve to constitute what I call the eco-body of the nation, converting natural splendor into territorial essence and epitome.¹¹ Moreover, I demonstrate how this eco-body is configured on the ground through

transnational conservation and development projects such as national parks, and examine the ways in which they are resisted and re-imagined by Shimshali villagers in Gilgit-Baltistan.

The ecological terrain of struggle is especially significant as it is one that is often overlooked both in studies of Pakistan as well as of Kashmir, ridden as they are with the standard plot of geopolitical security and religious militancy.¹² The last two decades, however, have seen the emergence of a significant body of scholarship on Kashmir that has challenged the domination of a security-centered narrative. Most relevant for my work is scholarship that offers an ethnographic and critical-literary perspective on the Kashmir conflict, emphasizing aspects such as the representation of Kashmir in cultural discourse in India,¹³ the social production of the jihadist in Azad Kashmir,¹⁴ the interplay of militarization and humanitarian development in Kargil,¹⁵ law as a site for control and protest,¹⁶ artistic resistances to the violence in Kashmir,¹⁷ and gendered performances in Kashmiri human rights struggles.¹⁸

Within ethnographic works on Kashmir and Pakistan, my approach is especially aligned with Ravina Aggarwal's work on Ladakh—*Beyond Lines of Control* (2004)—and Magnus Marsden's *Living Islam* (2005) which focuses on Chitral. Both texts examine the lived experience of regional and religious identity in postcolonial contexts that are closely related to Gilgit-Baltistan. Importantly, they also push the boundaries of representation for these contexts beyond folkloric description, romanticized landscapes, and portrayals of tribal life. While Aggarwal illuminates the ways in which marginalized Ladakhi subjects negotiate life in the shadow of the Kashmir conflict, Marsden attends more to the meaning of being Muslim in the Islamicizing context of Northern Pakistan. These texts, however, pay less attention to the ways in which life and identity in these border regions is profoundly structured by the processes of state-making, and the emotionalities that form the ground of such processes— aspects that I emphasize in this book. Moreover, research on Kashmir and Northern Pakistan often tends to ignore how deeply national state-making practices are reinforced and underpinned by neoliberal and imperial politics. In Pakistan's case in particular, I have already highlighted the relevance of the US in grasping delusional state rule and military cultural politics. The terrain of international development in Gilgit-Baltistan similarly cannot be understood without attending to the transnational politics of capital, ecology, and empire.

In the final section of the book titled ‘Saving Nature, Saving People’, I thus probe both the politics of international biodiversity conservation as well as the politics of imperial humanitarian development. Taking the popular book *Three Cups of Tea* as a point of entry, I demonstrate how feelings of humanitarian care and compassion are used for justifying imperial, military projects of education and counter-insurgency in Gilgit-Baltistan, thus extending my analysis of how militarism is sustained through a political economy of feeling. I further demonstrate how a depoliticized and dehistoricized narrative of the war on terror—a quintessentially delusional one—is produced through a therapeutic tale of humanitarian development in Gilgit-Baltistan that juxtaposes American goodness and character against the constructed ignorance and extremism of the Muslim other.

Hence, while I begin the book by showing how Gilgit-Baltistan is produced as a space of beauty, I end it by elaborating how it simultaneously becomes reduced to a fearful and dangerous space of terror. Oscillating between beauty and terror, loyalty and suspicion, and love and betrayal—opposing yet complementing, overlapping and overflowing—I chart the multiple emotional registers through which state and imperial projects are instantiated and locally negotiated in Gilgit-Baltistan.

THE REGION

Gilgit-Baltistan is often described as a region at the crossroads of South Asia and Central Asia, since it is located between the borders of India, Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan. Criss-crossing the Hindu Kush, Himalayas, and Karakoram mountains, the region of Gilgit-Baltistan covers an area of approximately 72,500 square kilometres and is divided into ten administrative districts—Gilgit, Ghizer, Astore, Ghanche, Shigar, Hunza, Nagar, Diamer, Skardu, and Kharmang. The mountainous and glacial terrain of the region constitutes a key catchment area for the Indus river, which is often described as the lifeline of agriculture in Pakistan. Indeed, the Indus derives around 72 per cent of its mean annual flow from rivers in Gilgit-Baltistan.¹⁹ The region sustains a predominantly agro-pastoral population of around one

million, which is spread across some 700 villages and belongs to at least five indigenous ethno-linguistic groups—Shina, Balti, Burushaski, Wakhi, and Khowar. Each of these groups has a multifaceted socio-political and cultural history, including princely dynasties, linguistic patterns, customs, epics, and festivals. Each group also practices distinct kinship relations, and complex intergroup dynamics that vary from valley to valley in this extensive terrain. Apart from stunning peaks, the landscape of the region is defined by fields of wheat, maize, buckwheat, barley, potato, and walnuts amongst other crops, grazing spaces, as well as a variety of fruit orchards. Compared to other areas in Pakistan, land distribution in Gilgit-Baltistan tends to be fairly equal with the average land holding per household being around one hectare.²⁰ Non-farm employment in businesses, banks, development organizations, and an expanding local government has steadily risen since the completion of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) in 1979 which provides the central link between the region and the rest of Pakistan.

Once home to animistic traditions and Buddhism, the religious landscape of Gilgit-Baltistan is today shaped by the Shia, Sunni, Ismaili, and Nurbakhshi interpretations of Islam. There is a flourishing culture of intellectual discourse in the region, signified by activities such as progressive seminars, critical publications, and literary festivals. People in Gilgit-Baltistan deeply enjoy traditional music and dance, alongside polo which is the region's most popular sport. Gilgit-Baltistan is also renowned as a tourist destination and global biodiversity hotspot. It is incredibly rich in plant and wildlife diversity, supporting several rare and endangered species such as the markhor (*Capra falconeri*) and snow leopard (*Uncia uncia*). Over the last three decades, several conservation organizations as well as other non-profits have initiated development projects in the region.

Historically, the territories that today form Gilgit-Baltistan were under the dual sovereignty of the British as well as the Maharaja of Kashmir, while in practice many of the areas were dominated by feudal kingdoms that had significant independent control over their terrains. In 1935, the areas that came under the rule of the Kashmiri Maharaja—the Gilgit *wazarat* as it was called—was leased by the British from the Maharaja of Kashmir for a period of sixty years. On 1 August 1947, the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, prematurely terminated the lease, effectively returning the region to Maharaja

Hari Singh who was the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir at the time of partition. When the rulers of the princely states of India were given a choice to accede to either Pakistan or India, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir allegedly decided in favor of India on 26 October 1947. The predominantly Muslim population of the Gilgit region resented the collapsing of their territory under ‘Kashmir’ and opposed the accession of their land to India by a Hindu Maharaja whose sovereignty over their region was already contested by local rulers. Dogra rule from Kashmir was disliked by locals for several reasons: people perceived themselves to be ethnically distinct from Kashmiris, Muslims were underrepresented in Kashmiri armed forces, and there was a prohibition on slaughtering cows.²¹ On 31 October 1947, the local paramilitary force called the Gilgit Scouts—led by its British commandant Major Brown—initiated a revolt against the governor of the Jammu and Kashmir state stationed in Gilgit, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, and arrested him with the help of the Muslim soldiers of the Jammu and Kashmir armed force.²² The territory around Gilgit was thus liberated through a mutiny, and on 1 November 1947, local military and political leaders declared a new independent state centered in Gilgit. This independence was short-lived, however: the leaders of the rebellion and the members of local ruling families realized that the region’s security as well as their personal interest would be better served with the Muslim-majority Pakistan. They acceded to Pakistan within two weeks, although 1 November is still celebrated in the region as *yaum-e-azadi*—the ‘day of freedom’ from the Dogra state of Kashmir.

While the political leadership of Pakistan accepted the accession of the Gilgit region, it did not formally incorporate the region into its territory due to ongoing tensions with India over the control of Jammu and Kashmir. Challenging Hari Singh’s accession, the Pakistani government argued that Kashmir’s rightful place was in Pakistan due to its Muslim-majority population. It therefore provided support to Pakhtun tribesmen who had invaded Kashmir—ostensibly to liberate and annex Kashmir—but more likely motivated by ‘opportunity, bravado, and possibly hunger’ instead of Pakistani nationalism.²³ India and Pakistan subsequently became embroiled in a full-fledged war over Kashmir. Aided by local resistance, the Pakistani armed forces obtained control of over 13,297 square kilometres of Kashmir that came to be known as ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK)—Azad Kashmir in

short—within Pakistan. On 13 August 1948, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) passed a resolution that called for a ceasefire between the two countries, the withdrawal of troops from Kashmir, and the holding of a UN-sponsored plebiscite in both Indian and Pakistan controlled Kashmir to determine the political will of its people. In accordance with this resolution, a ceasefire line was established in July 1949 that separated Indian-controlled Kashmir from its Pakistani counterpart but the agreement to demilitarize and to conduct a plebiscite is yet to be realized.

In April 1949, representatives of the Government of Pakistan, Azad Kashmir, and All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference signed the ‘Karachi Agreement’ which allowed for Gilgit-Baltistan—then called the ‘Northern Areas’—to come under the purview of a Pakistani Political Agent who also controlled the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), while Azad Kashmir was granted significant autonomy. This Agreement is much maligned in Gilgit today, for it had no representation from Gilgit-Baltistan and sealed the fate of the region by enabling direct Pakistani rule without permitting any democratic rights.

It is important to note that the 1949 UNCIP resolution as well as subsequent UN negotiations regard the region of Gilgit-Baltistan as part of disputed Kashmir, in contrast to the opposition to a political future with Kashmir which was expressed at the moment of partition. The status of Gilgit-Baltistan has thus become intricately intertwined with that of Kashmir. As a disputed border zone, the region is claimed by both Pakistan and India and is internationally considered as forming 86 per cent of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.

While India denies that there is any dispute and lays total claim to all regions that once came under the purview of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan officially regards Kashmir as a ‘disputed territory’ and a ‘frontier undefined’. State-led media campaigns in Pakistan continually raise awareness about the plight of Indian-controlled Kashmir, offer solidarity, and reassert Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri *haq-e-khud-iradiyat*—the Kashmiri right to self-determination. Hence, the place of Kashmir in Pakistani state-building is defined by a curious saviour nationalism—a nationalism that is geared towards saving a community, place or people, which is not yet wholly part of the nation. This saviour rhetoric of nationalism on Kashmir has its problems, of course, because it is ultimately motivated by self-interest and seeks to win over

more territory and people into the boundary of the Pakistani nation and state. It is also problematic because the emphasis on Indian atrocities in Pakistani media has historically been central to the production of a militarized ethos in Pakistan, in which Indian violence against Kashmir is used to create support for Pakistani military domination by whipping up anti-India sentiment. Yet in the peculiar case of Kashmir, the saviour nationalism of Pakistan has a liberatory dimension and potential as well because unlike the Indian stance on Kashmir, it is predicated on advocating self-determination for the subject population. In discourse at least—and discourses are real and impactful—the official policy of Pakistan on Kashmir remains cognizant of Kashmiri aspirations and rights through its emphasis on the region as a disputed territory with the promised right to a plebiscite. This is not just reiterated to the Pakistani public internally, but was most recently reinforced by Pakistani ambassadors internationally as India escalated its brutal violence in Kashmir in the latter half of 2016. It is not insignificant to Kashmiris that Pakistan is often the only country raising the issue of Kashmiri self-determination in international forums.

Of course, Pakistan gets a kick out of reporting Indian brutalities abroad, and itself has a record of suppressing dissent in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, both of which continue to be principally ruled through the Pakistani central government as well as the military-state that I discussed in the previous section. Importantly, whether the question is that of Azad Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan, there tends to be an ‘intellectual silence’ on both these regions within academic and policy debates in Pakistan.²⁴ This is reflective of the larger social and emotional imaginary in the country, within which Kashmir figures primarily as a place where Indian soldiers commit atrocities, and where Pakistanis seek to support and save their Muslim brothers and sisters. Pakistan even observes a ‘Kashmir Day’ on 5 February every year—a holiday that is meant to express solidarity with Kashmiris fighting against Indian oppression. Kashmir is thus not just a territory that the Pakistani state desires, and one that is used to fuel a massive military apparatus. Like a flag or an anthem, a particular interpretation of the *masla-e-Kashmir* (Kashmir Problem) has been turned into a potent, emotional symbol of the Pakistani nation itself and the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir has become a legitimating ground for performing Pakistani nationalism. That this saviour nationalism is built on the backs of a terrible state policy of repression and sponsored militancy

in Pakistan-administered Kashmir as well as in Pakistan at large is rarely brought to public vision. In the following section, I highlight my own surprises, tensions, and realizations as I struggled to understand and research the political and social life of conflict in Gilgit-Baltistan.

NAVIGATING THE FIELD

Before commencing my dissertation research in Gilgit-Baltistan in 2003, I had visited the region several times as a tourist and as a development worker. In particular, I had stayed with a local family in Gilgit for three months in the summer of 2001, as an intern at an environmental non-profit. This was an incredible learning experience, as I had the opportunity to conduct fieldwork in fifteen villages of the region on issues of gender relations, the built environment, and community development. Hence, when I decided to return to Gilgit-Baltistan as an academic researcher, I had some degree of confidence in my ability to navigate the field context—even if my topical focus was now far more political. I was worried too, of course: an American colleague had tried to dissuade me from my research, informing me about how previous academics interested in political processes in the region had been harassed by the Pakistani intelligence agencies and were eventually unable to complete their work. But these researchers were of foreign origin. I felt that as a Pakistani with previous development experience in the region, I was more of an ‘insider’ as compared to a foreigner who would clearly be perceived as an ‘outsider’. Things would surely be easier for me. As it turned out, this was sheer naiveté on my part.

At the most basic level, I had anticipated but not quite grasped the difference between going to a remote, largely rural context as a non-governmental organization (NGO) worker and as an independent researcher. City folk who are engaged in internships and consultancies in Gilgit find themselves in a framework of facilitation that is comfortable and privileged. The local NGO provides housing, transport, and, most importantly, a meaningful status. Now that I was in Gilgit as an academic, these basic necessities of inhabiting a place had to be accomplished, instead of being assumed. My housing arrangements

were always in flux, and involved stays with two wonderful host families, crashing at friends when one host family had moved to Islamabad and the other had guests, a girls' hostel, and a teaching resource centre that provided lodging. Transport was now about catching the public Suzuki, Wagon, or taxi, instead of a four-wheel drive that picks and drops. The fact that I was a young, unmarried, female researcher made matters more complicated. For example, my stay in the girls' hostel was short-lived as I often had to be out in the evenings, interviewing men, and this was deemed to affect the reputation of the hostel. On a few occasions, the driver in a Suzuki could be uncomfortably frank and inquisitive, as an unaccompanied, privileged-looking Pakistani woman catching public transport is not a common sight in Gilgit.

But these were minor adjustments, compared to the major dilemma I faced: the constant suspicion of what an independent, unmarried Pakistan woman was *really* doing in Gilgit-Baltistan. That I, out of my own accord, wanted to research the political predicament of Gilgit-Baltistan for my PhD thesis was often considered entirely implausible. The most popular local theory for my existence was that I was looking for a suitable boy to marry. People I met joked with me about whether I was 'researching' prospective grooms, and I was always amusedly assuring them that I had no such intentions. It was hard to be amused, though, when people started suspecting me of being a spy.

The first time a Gilgiti suggestively brought up my potential 'Indian' backing, I was so shocked that I started laughing—till I realized that the accusation was serious and I was expected to defend myself. In 2005, I was interviewing Sajid, an activist and development practitioner based in Gilgit. I was introduced to him through a friend of mine who was Sajid's relative and a prominent journalist of the region. Sajid also knew me through the host family with whom I had stayed in Gilgit in 2001 during my internship. Hence, I was not a random person who had just arrived at his door. And yet, Sajid kept asking me circuitous questions about whether my 'assignment' was in any way sponsored by a 'neighbouring country'. When I tried to convince him that this was my sixth trip to the region and I got interested in its politics out of my own curiosities, he said: 'I would like to believe you. But I have never met a Pakistani who has genuinely showed concern for Gilgit-Baltistan. You come here to rule us, or for tourism and NGO work. No one talks about rights.'

My conversation with Sajid was also an early indicator of the difficulties that lay ahead for me in the research process. I had to get accustomed to the discomfiting reference of ‘you Pakistanis’ which often emerged in my interviews, and which constructed me as representative of a callous and unjust Pakistan. The spying allegations only multiplied to include the possibility that I could be a Pakistani spy, or worse, an American spy as I studied at an American university. The history of my predecessors worked to validate local mistrust. People in Gilgit were all too familiar with academic researchers who had ultimately turned out to be foreign spies. I was frustrated, and even hurt, when I discovered that a couple of people whom I had interviewed, befriended, and trusted, still suspected me of being untrustworthy. Eventually I realized that this suspicion was more structural than personal. It was an index of what social relationships had become in Gilgit, and characteristic of conflict zones more generally that have become engulfed with spies and surveillance.

It was this context of surveillance that eventually compelled me to cut my stay short. While I managed to conduct research in the region, my plans for an extensive stay in the region were disrupted by the ‘messages’ that I started receiving through two friends who were assisting me in my research. They had been ‘approached’ regarding my activities, and were told that I must cease my interviews and leave the region. When one of them really pleaded with me, I left—but I kept returning for shorter periods. I did not want to get in trouble, but I especially did not want to bring any harm to my facilitators.

Sociological and ethnographic research in Gilgit is also deeply affected by the region’s sectarianized context—a topic that I discuss at length in Chapters 3 and 4. I was often asked about my sectarian identity at the beginning or during an interview, if the interviewee had not already discovered it through his or her own sources. My identity as an Ismaili Muslim often allowed my Shia and Sunni respondents to open up to me, especially when discussing matters of sectarianism. Ismailis in Gilgit are both admired and resented for their highly educated, liberal ethos, as well as the economic advancements that the community has made as a result of the work of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). But Ismailis are also often perceived as peace-keepers in a volatile place. It is not unusual, for example, for an Ismaili judge to be appointed to mediate a dispute between Shia and Sunni parties in Gilgit.

Interestingly, my sectarian reception in the region transformed mid-way through my research, after I got married. That I now had a Pakistani husband was most comforting for my Gilgiti friends—it meant that I was a normal, family-oriented person, not an itinerant, Americanized woman. But the fact that I had married someone who grew up in a Sunni household was met with visible displeasure from several of my Ismaili acquaintances, even as many more remained perfectly accepting. Shia friends remained the same towards me, while Sunni friends and respondents were decidedly pleased. In fact, on two separate occasions, Sunni friends who were helping me with my research introduced me with pride to Sunni interviewees: ‘*Ab yeh humari ho gai hain*’ (now she belongs to us).


This begins to point to the gendered nature of my research in Gilgit-Baltistan as well. In terms of access, being a woman did not pose any significant difficulty as I could interview both men and women freely, and travel to any region that I wished to visit. In terms of attitude, however, I sometimes had to contend with patriarchal notions of women’s worth and work. A female, Pakistani researcher asking questions about ‘sensitive’ issues was considered absurd by some male acquaintances, who referred to me as a ‘little girl’ and were non-serious, dismissive, or patronizing towards my efforts. I was told by men and women that instead of talking about politics, I should work on topics such as folklore or work for an NGO. While such attitudes were upsetting at the time, it is important to emphasize that they were also quite rare. My research more generally received affirming and enthusiastic support from colleagues, mentors, friends, and respondents in Gilgit-Baltistan. They appreciated the fact that I was working on an under-studied topic, and that I had chosen to work as a visiting lecturer at the local, government-run Karakoram International University. My identity as a Karachite also proved to be a surprising source of connection with several male and female respondents. Whenever I said ‘Karachi’ in response to the ubiquitous question about my place of origin, I was almost always met with a nostalgic smile followed by details about the months or years someone had ‘sat’ in Karachi.

My place in the Gilgiti social landscape was also aided by my clothing decisions. For the duration of field research, I had decided to cover my head with a dupatta and wear full sleeves kurtas. This made me more comfortable in my surroundings, and it also met the approval of people around me. But

fitting into local culture as a researcher is more complicated than adopting 'local dress,' as I learnt gradually. One afternoon, for example, I was walking a short distance from one NGO office to another on a public road, with a local female friend Asmara. NGO offices are spaces where the usual Gilgiti norms of women's dress are somewhat relaxed, so women who might cover their heads in the bazaar may not be compelled to do so in the office premises. When Asmara and I walked out of the first NGO, I promptly covered my head—as had become second nature to me anytime I was in public space. Asmara followed suit, but a little while later, lightly said, '*Yaar* why did you cover your head? I have to do it because of you.' Completely stunned, I replied, 'What? I do it because of *you!* And to fit in! You know well I don't cover my head in Karachi.' She said, 'Yes, I know why you do it, but this is a short road and I don't think we need to cover our heads here. Who made these rules anyway? Are we not decent like this? Why is clothing a sign of respect, and not behavior?' Gendered norms are thus not static, and are constantly shifting as men and women struggle to negotiate with and manoeuvre societal expectations. On several occasions after this conversation, I accompanied Asmara to new public spaces—such as a restaurant in the bazaar—where it was not common at the time for local women to dine without men, or to dine at all. Asmara also suggested that I should stop covering my head so that people around me who appreciated my research would see that a woman could be honourable without covering her head. While I did not heed this advice for the sake of consistency, my conversations with Asmara nevertheless helped me gain a deeper appreciation of how ethnographers find themselves inserted into everyday negotiations of culture and power.

Let me now share details of my specific research location and approach (Map 1.1). While I have travelled, stayed and researched in several parts of Gilgit-Baltistan over the last 15 years, the ethnographic ground of this book is primarily formed by two sites: the city of Gilgit which is located in Gilgit district and forms the key political and administrative center of Gilgit-Baltistan, and the village of Shimshal which is located at the extreme end of Hunza district alongside the Pakistan–China border.

Gilgit city has a population of approximately 200,000, while the Shimshal village is inhabited by around 1,700 residents. When I refer to 'Gilgitis' in the book, the reference is to those who reside in Gilgit, but it must be clarified



MAP 1.1 The city of Gilgit and the village of Shimshal, in relation to Gilgit-Baltistan

Source: Map by Moacir P. de Sa Pereira. Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data@naturalearthdata.com.

Note: Map not drawn to scale and may not represent authentic international boundaries.

that the inhabitants of Gilgit belong to all parts of Gilgit-Baltistan. Even families living in Gilgit for two generations might still trace their origin to Astore, Ghizer, Hunza, Skardu, or other regions of Gilgit-Baltistan where they may continue to have land, relatives, and an alternate residence. As indicated earlier, extended stays in the border region of Gilgit-Baltistan for investigating 'sensitive' topics was risky both for myself and for my research subjects. Hence, I conducted my research over a period of nine months during several trips to the region between 2003 and 2007, with the longest one lasting from August to November 2006. Serving as a visiting lecturer at the Karakoram University in Gilgit offered me a meaningful local status, and greatly facilitated my research due to the generous support of faculty and students. To understand state power and social struggle in Gilgit-Baltistan, I used a combination of ethnographic methods including participant observation, documentary analysis—of government data, historical texts, religious pamphlets, NGO reports, political magazines, and poetry collections—as well as open-ended interviews with over fifty respondents. The interviewees included political and social activists, development workers, members of the local state administration and legislature, journalists, pastoralists, shopkeepers, poets, preachers, students, teachers, mothers, and women from ordinary families. Many of my respondents were men, partly because public politics and activism continues to be dominated by men in the region. Most of my friendships, however, were with women who enormously aided in deepening my perspective on the local experience of state power, sectarianism, and development in the region.

THE JOURNEY OF WRITING

Feelings are not only central to the state–citizen relation but also active in the process of research and publication. To claim my own citizenship within academic worlds, I have often been asked to 'change the tone' of my work—a tempering that is of thoughts, feelings, and ultimately, of politics. An analysis that cares is often deemed feeble and unacceptable. Specifically, the transnational lens of my work which incorporates the US and Pakistan in a single analytic frame causes deep discomfort to white reviewers, who prefer

that my analysis remain confined to the ‘local’. In the historical moment that we find ourselves in, it is easy and popular to believe that Pakistan is exceptionally messed up, and hence evidence to the contrary is dismissed, while bringing in the extraordinary violence of the US into the picture is actively thwarted. My critique of US imperialism and humanitarianism in Chapter 6, for example, was deemed by some reviewers to be ‘irrelevant’ to understanding Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, by others to be too ‘indignant’. One reviewer felt that my discussion was ‘crude’ and polemical. My language could be more ‘nuanced’—which meant, not as direct. Hence, political anger and inconveniently historicized critique that feels and exposes imperialism has little place in ‘objective’ social scientific knowledge till it is pacified and sanitized. This impulse to sanitize was reflected perfectly in the response of yet another reviewer of this work, who felt that the words ‘imperial’ and ‘empire’ in my text should be deleted altogether—something that goes against the very premise of this book in which Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan are situated squarely within the imperial context of the Cold War and the war on terror. In these judgments that pass for reviews, the positionality and politics of the reviewers remains unquestioned, while the authors are asked to *tone down* their writing in order to prove the seriousness and objectivity of their research.

What I am describing here is reflective of the larger policing mechanisms within academic systems of power. A critical–progressive text, grounded in inconvenient facts, argument, and empathy might trigger deep unease and fear from imperial others—emotional responses that themselves protect the status quo, and yet remain unacknowledged and masked in review processes that privilege the imperial perspective as neutral, and sabotage perspectives that inquire. When such perspectives, theory, and critique come from a Pakistani, brown, Muslim woman in this historical conjuncture, it strikes as a talking back that is resisted in subtle and overt ways while never being exposed as such—because the problem of *reactionary emotion* is quietly transferred to the author instead of the imperial reviewer. It is also felt as an assertion of equality and confidence that must be tamed and contained. Such punitive gate-keeping of feminist knowledge from colonized people of colour, reinforces the racial, gendered, and religious biases that are already rampant within deeply embedded structures of the world and academia.²⁵ And it is akin to patriarchal

forms of disciplining that require women to be nice, polite, emotionally cautious and subdued, and politically conformist and non-confrontational. The irony, of course, is that privileged reviewers cannot identify the emotional terrain of their own privilege, and reflect on their deep-seated power that has historically deprived diverse voices of legitimacy, and suppressed them through tone and content policing. This deprivation and suppression is the bedrock of academic imperialism.

Resisting this imperialism to the extent permissible within the very structures of academia, I begin the narrative struggle in this book with Chapter 1 which examines the power of representation and the representation of power in Gilgit-Baltistan. I demonstrate how the region is centrally imagined in Pakistan through the lens of natural beauty, and how its physical landscape serves to produce the eco-body of the Pakistani nation-state. I further interrogate how knowledge about the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan has been historically regulated through discursive modes of illegibility, framing the way the region was named the 'Northern Areas', the way it was mapped, and the way in which it continues to be represented in the Pakistani constitution, census, and textbook. Chapter 2 explores the contested meanings of militarization in Gilgit-Baltistan. I analyse the multiple ways in which the military-intelligence regime—the most potent face of the Pakistani state in Gilgit-Baltistan—occupies bodies, discourses, and subjectivities in the region, and emphasize the emotional regulation through which this power is entrenched. In Chapter 3, I investigate the gradual sectarianization of the state and citizenry in Gilgit-Baltistan, detailing how inter-sect relations in the region have been radically transformed through international and national mobilizations of political Islam. Focusing on the realm of education, I discuss how in the early years of Pakistan the place of Islam in Pakistan's education system embraced a social justice orientation, thus offering liberatory possibilities. However, gradually, different visions of Islam came to be constructed as normal in the Pakistani curriculum. I then discuss how Sunni-biased public school texts became the subject of a 'textbook controversy' between 2000–2005 in Gilgit, leading to the most potent Shia movement against the Pakistani state in recent history, and one that offers an important lens for understanding the negotiation of religious identity in contemporary Pakistan. Chapter 4 continues the attention on sectarianization in educational spaces, illuminating how sectarian discord

is felt, reproduced, and contested in everyday life in Gilgit. Drawing upon ordinary, daily encounters between members of the two prominent sects—Sunni and Shia—in the region, I argue that a ‘sectarian imaginary’ has become dominant in Gilgit whereby feelings of ill-will and suspicion have become routinized and normalized. At the same time, I discuss local poetic performances and political seminars through which Gilgitis strive to create a critical public space for contesting sectarianism, and hope to promote a progressive ethos of faith and politics in their strife-torn region. Chapter 5 turns the attention to the politics of nature conservation in Gilgit-Baltistan, demonstrating how the region is produced as an eco-body on the ground through the creation of national parks and community-based conservation schemes. I demonstrate how this territorialization of nature has been successfully resisted by the agro-pastoral community of Shimshal in an epistemic–material struggle, which counters the exclusionary ideals of development through which peasants and pastoralists are relegated as backward and marginal. In Chapter 6, the final chapter, I interrogate the discourse of humanitarian empire and education—like international conservation, this is another form of international development discourse through which Gilgit-Baltistan has been represented and reshaped in recent years. Taking the immensely popular book *Three Cups of Tea* as its point of entry, I detail how the texts and practices of imperial humanitarianism in Northern Pakistan have attempted to reinvent the American military as a culturally sensitive and caring institution, thus serving to justify and extend the culture of empire and its so-called war on terror.

In analysing the micro-politics of multiple projects of rule such as mapping, surveillance, textbook representation, and imperial conservation, my purpose is to go beyond a narrative of disenfranchisement and violence to examine what other kinds of contestations affect life in ‘conflict zones’ and how they reshape the state and its border subjects. Simultaneously, I analyse a range of ordinary and organized cultural–political action through which agents—including state officials themselves—strive to promote a progressive vision of ethics and politics in Gilgit-Baltistan. Covering religio-political movements, literary performances, and community-based conservation initiatives, I examine how people in Gilgit-Baltistan feel their present and struggle to imagine new social futures for their region. In particular, I emphasize that citizen-subjects in Gilgit-Baltistan—from political activists and preachers to

poets and pastoralists—are demanding inclusion not only in terms of political rights—an aspect that over-determines the discourse on Kashmir—but also through struggles for religious recognition and ecological sovereignty which they see as integral to a meaningful life of dignity.

NOTES

- 1 Kashmir is described as the ‘heart of hostility’ between India and Pakistan in the Washington Times article by Emily Wax, ‘In Kashmir, stone throwers face off with Indian security forces’, 17 July 2010.
- 2 My emphasis.
- 3 Varma (2009); my emphasis
- 4 On the poetics of love, knowledge, and resistance in South Asia, see Ali (2016).
- 5 Gaur (2008).
- 6 Here, it is important to recognize feminist contributions that have long emphasized the epistemic centrality of emotions. See for example, Hochschild (1983), Jagger (1989), and Ahmed (2004).
- 7 For example, Alavi (1990), Daechsel (2009), and Devji (2013).
- 8 McClintock (2009: 51); my emphasis.
- 9 For insightful analyses of the connections between state power, emotions, and the everyday, see Good and Good (1988), Berezin (1999), Stoler (2004), Gregg and Seigworth (2010), and Laszczkowski and Reeves (2015).
- 10 Jalal (1990).
- 11 Kabir (2009) and Ali (2014).
- 12 For a notable exception, see Bhan and Trisal (2017).
- 13 Kabir (2009).
- 14 Robinson (2013).
- 15 Bhan (2013).
- 16 Hoffman and Duschinski (2014).
- 17 Misri (2014) and Kaul (2017).
- 18 Zia (2016). Historical understandings of Kashmir have also been enhanced through critical scholarship in recent years. Amongst other dimensions, this work has focused on the origin of the Kashmir dispute and the question of legal accession (Lamb, 1991), the changing contours of the Kashmir policy of India and Pakistan and the popular insurgency that erupted in Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1989 (Bose, 1997; Ganguly, 1997), the pre-partition histories of political and religious dynamics in the region under Dogra and British rule (Zutshi, 2003; Rai, 2004), the fraught relationship between the Northern Areas and Kashmir (Kreutzmann, 2008), the histories of violence and dispossession in Kashmir (Schofield, 2010; Snedden, 2011), the multiple

imaginings of Kashmir in local literary and historical traditions (Zutshi, 2014), and the gendered dimensions of violence in Kashmir (Shekhawat, 2014). Basharat Peer's *Curfewed Night* (2010) and the edited volume by Sanjay Kak *Until My Freedom Has Come* (2011), are other notable texts that have contributed to a deeper understanding of everyday life and cultural politics in Kashmir.

- 19 Government of Pakistan and IUCN (2003).
- 20 Kreuzmann (1991).
- 21 Ali (1990).
- 22 Sökefeld (2005) and Bangash (2010).
- 23 Haroon (2007: 181).
- 24 The term 'intellectual silence' is used in reference to Azad Kashmir by Rifaat Hussain (2004).
- 25 'People of colour' is not a term I connect with or like to use, especially because it poses white as neutral, a centre that is beyond colour, as if white is not a colour like any other. 'People of colour' is normalized in US academic discourse as a self-ascribed descriptor—defined by white theory itself for the majority of the world's population. It is a thoroughly unintuitive term for me as someone who grew up in Pakistan, but we live under conditions of Western-centric academic discourse, in which even feminist theory has had to normalize such otherizing categories as 'people of colour' in order to articulate its critique of racial injustice and violence.