

CORRESPONDENCE

In *C.R.* xiv (Dec. 1964), pp. 266–7 Professor D. M. Balme published a criticism of my edition of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* (Rome, 1963). Some points mentioned by him require a word of explanation from me. Before doing this, however, I wish to express my gratitude to him for the kindness with which he emphasized many good qualities he found in the above-mentioned publication.

Some points on which Professor Balme disagrees with me will lose their *raison d'être*, if one considers the *finality* of my publication. My book is 'primarily designed for readers familiar with scholastic philosophy'. It is precisely for this reason that I 'omitted' (at 436^{a2}) to mention the relation of *δύναμις* with *ἄλη* and 'its distinction from *ἐνέργεια* (which is the point at 468^{a28})'. These notions are the ABC of scholastic philosophy; let us add, also well known to Aristotelian students.

Professor Balme wonders why I did not deal so fully with Aristotle's psychological and biological parts of the *Parva Naturalia*. My answer is very simple: Aristotle's psychological ideas are preserved and defended even now in different philosophical and psychological systems, in particular, Neo-Thomism. Aristotle's biology, however (with very few exceptions), is really too obsolete.

Professor Balme affirms that I 'propose few emendations and reject many . . .'. To prove this, he quotes two facts: (1) at 438^{a2}, I 'ignored'—he says—'Blass's restoration accepted by D.-K. (31 B 84)'; (2) at 454^{a22}, I retained *οὔτε* for *μήτε*. I admit what Balme says. There are editors and critics who have a mania for correcting the grammar and literary style of Aristotle's works. In this way they show how Aristotle should have written, not how he actually wrote. I did not change *διαθρώσκον* into *διέσκον* (438^{a2}), because the correction suggested by Blass is by no means necessary. The word *διαθρώσκον* ('to leap forth', *exsilire*) suits very well here. It is to be found in all Greek manuscripts except *P* (*Vatic.* 1339), which actually reads *διέσκον*. This manuscript, however, written in the 14th/15th century, has but little authority, as I tried to show in my study on the Greek manuscripts of the *Parva Naturalia* (pp. 129–36).

Let us consider another point mentioned by Balme. I did not introduce into my Greek text *μήτε* instead of *οὔτε* (at 454^{a22}). This is quite true, but in a long note (18) I explained why I did not change the text accepted by

Bekker, Biehl, Hett, and others. Beare, in his English translation, inserted *μή* before *ἐχον* in order to 'restore sense and grammar'. I think that is logical; however, Beare should have changed *ζῳον* (^{a21}) into *ζῳν*, a reading which is to be found actually in manuscript *X* (*Ambros.* 435) and *U^a* (*Vindob. Philos.* 134). For 'an animal *not* endowed with sense-perception' is a *contradictory* notion for Aristotle (sense-perception entering the definition of animal). Even so, however, I could not follow Beare's suggestion, for it does not agree with the context. It is true that the literary shape of the whole passage is awkward, but this defect is not rare in Aristotle's genuine writings. The sixty-five Greek manuscripts (which I consulted) reproduce the text in question in essentially the same way as Bekker, Biehl, Hett, and so on. The only differences which I found in them are as follows: *οὔ* (^{a21}) is in several manuscripts (*Marcian.* 214; *Vatic.* 253; *Paris. Suppl.* 314; *Paris.* 2032; *Paris.* 1921, etc.) replaced by *οὐδέ*; the first *οὔτε* (^{a22}) is omitted by *P*, and replaced by *οὔ* in the manuscript *V* (*Laur. Plut.* 87. 20); the second *οὔτε* (in the same line) appears as *οὐδέ* in *V*.

One more objection. At 474^{a26}, I distinguished 'vital heat' from 'fire'. Balme says: 'This heat is actually called fire here (474^{a28}), yet again at 478^{a16}'. I am sorry to deny his assertion. The fire of which Aristotle speaks at 474^{a28} is to be taken in its *universal* extension: *πυρὶ γὰρ ἐργάζεσθαι πάντα*. At 474^{a26}, however, this extension is restricted to one determined *kind* of fire. Therefore it is called *θερμότης τις*. It is not *πῦρ* (*θερμότης*) *ἀπλῶς*. Similarly, at 478^{a16} Aristotle does not call vital heat *πῦρ* but *ψυχικὸν πῦρ* ('ignis vitalis').

Further, when explaining the *vital heat*, I said that it is not to be confused with a 'common fire' or 'any similar substance', but rather with a *pneuma*. This is emphatically asserted by Aristotle in *Anim. Gen.* (736^b35–737^a6). Mr. Balme replies: 'Solmsen pointed out in *J.H.S.* 1957' that 'the *G.A.* passage is unique and everywhere else Aristotle distinguishes *pneuma* from vital heat'. What a pity that Balme did not consult another reference quoted by me, namely 762^a19–23, where Aristotle says that 'in all *pneuma* soul heat is present' (*ἐν τούτῳ παντὶ [πνεύματι] θερμότητα ψυχικὴν*). Naturally, when I referred to vital heat as *pneuma*, I did not intend to identify these two concepts. Indeed,

it is too well known that *πνεῦμα* has different meanings (cf. Bonitz, *Ind. Ar.* 605^b21 ff.).

Mr. Balme wonders how I can say that the text 466^b1-10 'seems to me very clear'. Probably he did not read my two preceding notes (at 465^a20 and at 465^a27), where I tried to explain the difference between *φθορά ἀπλῆ* (*corruptio per se*), and *φθορά τῆς* (*corruptio secundum quid*); nor did he consult the author to whose commentary I referred the reader. Balme does not understand what my 'obscure' assertion can mean: 'Accidentia, quae talia, non habent contraria; ideo non possunt *per se* corrumpi'. I hope that he will change his mind if he reads the passage carefully, in which Aristotle says: τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντων οὐκ ἔστι [γένεσις καὶ φθορά] (*Met.* 1026^b23). (He can also consult the brief commentary to this text made by Sir David Ross.)

When explaining the text 452^b17-22, I reproduced the diagram which I found in the manuscript *E* (*Paris.* 1853). The same diagram, let us add, is to be found in some other manuscripts, namely *L* (*Vat.* 253), *O^d* (*Marc.* 209), *V* (*Laur. Plut.* 87, 20). This diagram here, however, has but little importance for us. Indeed, in the intention of Aristotle, its finality is not to *explain* his doctrine, but merely to *illustrate* it by means of some very simple geometrical principle, well known to students of philosophy. As it is known, in similar circumstances, Aristotle frequently makes recourse to mathematics. Precisely how Aristotle arranged the letters of his diagram will always remain a mystery to us. The sixty-five manuscripts (consulted by me) only increase our perplexity. Fortunately, we do not lose much by this unfortunate event. We do not study Aristotle, indeed, to learn mathematics (this science appears in a very

elementary form in his writings), but philosophy; and the philosophical point which he wishes to illustrate here is very simple: by means of little images of exterior things, which our mind possesses, we can judge indubitably their actual spatial and temporal 'magnitude', precisely, as by small lines we can learn accurately the magnitude of great lines in geometrical figures. Certainly, there exists the same proportion (*ἀνάλογον*) between exterior things and their images as between long and short lines in similar geometrical figures.

In his review of my book Professor Balme quotes some 'misprints and incomplete editing'. He does so, he says, 'in the hope of assisting towards a second edition'. I am sincerely grateful to him for this. I also found some mistakes, but fortunately they are of little importance; and as Professor Balme has pointed out, they are mostly in disagreement with my own Latin translation or notes. In these circumstances, any reader will be able to correct the mistakes himself. If, however, I find more mistakes or more important ones, I shall not wait for the next edition, but shall have them printed at once and added to the copies of my first edition.

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Professor Balme writes:

I am sorry if I have provoked Professor Siwek to the further defence of these opinions. They still seem to me quite mistaken. But let other students of Aristotle now judge for themselves.

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NOTES AND NEWS

ATHENÆUM, 'Studi Periodici di Letteratura e Storia dell'Antichità', was founded in 1913 by Carlo Pascal, Professor of Latin at Pavia. At his death he bequeathed the journal to his pupil Dr. Enrica Malcovati, who in 1927 entrusted the direction of it to Plinio Fraccaro, herself acting as secretary. In 1957 they became joint directors: three years later, on Fraccaro's death, his successor, Dr. Gianfranco Tibiletti, was assumed as co-director. Dr. Malcovati has thus been concerned with the journal for the greater part of its life and it is appropriate that volume lxii, appearing in 1965 but dated 1964, should be devoted to a series of articles in her honour on her retirement from teaching.