Divine Sovereignty and Clerical Authority in Early Shi‘i Islamism: Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935–80) and Taqī al-Mudarrisī (b. 1945) on the Islamic State

Abstract Divine sovereignty (ḥākimiyya)—as conceived by Abū al-A‘lā Mawdūdī (1903–79) and popularised by Sayyid Quṭb (1906–66) - has been a central component of Islamist thought. This article investigates the reception of the concept within Shi‘i Islam. As case studies, the article choses two prominent actors in the formative period of Shi‘i Islamism in Iraq: Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935–80) and Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī (b. 1945). By discussing their reflections on the nature of an Islamic state, the article pursues three objectives: first, it overcomes a trend in academic scholarship that disregards Sunni influences on the development of Shi‘i Islamism. Second, the article highlights the role that the Iraqi Shi‘i intellectual milieu played in incorporating key Islamist concepts into Shi‘i political thought. Finally, the article demonstrates the different receptions of ḥākimiyya. Bāqir al-Ṣadr uses the ideological repertoire of Islamism to explore in pragmatic terms the parameters that define the state as Islamically legitimate. In contrast, Taqī al-Mudarrisī uses ḥākimiyya to redefine the sovereignty of the state in Islamic terms. He operationalises the concept in a Shi‘i context by arguing that the state must be led by a just jurisconsult (al-faqīh al-‘ādil) who becomes the sole agent of divine sovereignty in the state.

explores. Second, by providing novel insights into the initial reception of ideological components of Sunni Islamism by Shi'i theorists in Iraq, the article highlights the central role the Iraqi Shi'i intellectual milieu played in incorporating key Islamist terms and concepts into Shi'i political thought. Most academic scholarship has focussed on the rise of Shi'i Islamism in Iran and tends to view it in isolation, overstating the singularity of the Iranian revolutionary moment and ignoring significant intellectual contributions of Shi'i Islamist actors outside of Iran. 7 Finally, in their appropriation of ḥ akimiyya, Baqir al-Ṣ adr and Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄articulate different conceptions of the nature of an Islamic state and justifications of its sovereignty. Baqir al-Ṣ adr reiterates the traditional perspective of Shi'i legal and political theory, by suggesting that only a state led by an infallible Imam implements divine sovereignty. He uses the ideological repertoire of Islamism to explore in pragmatic terms the parameters that define the state as Islamically legitimate. Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄uses the concept of ḥ akimiyya to undertake a discursive shift away from traditional approaches in Islamic thought that seek to give secular power, exercised by state, religious legitimacy. He follows Mawdudı̄and Quṭ b in arguing that the sovereignty of the state itself needs to be re-defined so that the state not only accords with Islamic values and principles but becomes the very means to ensure their implementation. In addition, Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄operationalises ḥ akimiyya in a Shi'i context by radically redefining the place of Shi'i clerical authority within the state. The state must be led by a just jurisconsult (al-faqı̄h al-'adil) whose expertise in Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) transforms him into the sole agent of divine sovereignty. He thereby anticipates Khomeini's understanding of the guardianship of the jurisconsult (wilaȳat al-faqı̄h) that has served as ideological foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran since . The ideological shift between Baqir al-Ṣ adr and Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄from reflecting on the Islamic legitimacy of the state to defining its sovereignty in Islamic terms was shaped by the dissimilar political contexts of Iraq in the s and s and by the domestic repercussions of geopolitical developments in the Middle East.

Divine Sovereignty and Political Legitimacy in Modern Islamic Thought
By translating divine sovereignty into the political realm, Mawdudı̄reconfigured the Qur'anic dictum that "authority belongs to God alone (al-ḥ ukm li-llah)" 8 to the central ideological foundation of an Islamic state. Mawdudı's formulation of ḥ akimiyya signifies his acceptance of the modern state as a reality 9 while at the same time responding to the ideological marginalisation of Islam and the loss of significance which the sharı̄'a had suffered. 10 Thereby, Mawdudı's idea breaks with the modalities of legitimising secular power in pre-modern Muslim societies. 11 Before the rise of the modern nation-state, Islamic political theory assumed a dualism between "Sulṭ an and Scholar". 12 The sulṭ an, as secular ruler, possessed "discretionary authority", 13 known as siyasa, which included maintaining order and promoting the welfare of his people. Political authority was conceived as temporal and temporary; dynastic rule (dawla) came and passed and was ultimately of no particular significance in ensuring that Islamic law was upheld. 14 The latter role fell to the 'ulama' who exercised independent legal and adjudicative authority by issuing fatwas and acting as judges in sharı̄'a courts. The legal and judicial autonomy of the 'ulama' curtailed the sovereignty of the sulṭ an who had to govern in line with Islamic law in order to make his rule legitimate in Islamic terms (siyasa shar'iyya). Pre-modern Muslim polities were therefore characterised by a close cooperation between political rulers and religious scholars, while both acted autonomously in their respective spheres of action.
Modernist discourses in the late nineteenth century that engaged with European ideas of constitutionalism and parliamentarism equally worked on the basis of pre-modern Islamic political theories. By equating the Qur'anic concept of consultation (shura) 15 with constitutional and consultative forms of government, modernist reformers like the Young Ottoman Namık Kemal (-) and the Syrian reformer 'Abd al-Raḥ man al-Kawakibı( -) sought to create better forms of governance that are not entirely dependent on the whims and fancies of an individual ruler. 16 Al-Kawakibı̄presents both the sharı̄'a and "the will of the people (iradat al-umma)" 17 as means to limit the power of the ruler. The Egyptian modernist Muḥ ammad 'Abduh (-) argues that shurāas a general "Islamic requirement (wajib shar'ı̄)" is meant to curb the potential despotism of secular rule. 18 'Abduh's disciple Muḥ ammad Rashıd Riḍ ā(-) equally affirms that Islam provides foundations for a political system in which "authority (sulṭ a) belongs to the people (umma), 'their matter is consultation among them' 19 and their government is akin to the republic (al-jumhuriyya)". 20 The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥ asan al-Banna( -) followed similar arguments in his discussions of the nature of an Islamic government: the ruler needs to respect the will of the people (iradat al-umma) and promote their welfare by consulting with them. 21 Muslim modernists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sought to tame the potentially despotic power of the state by finding antecedents of modern notions of popular sovereignty in the Islamic tradition. Al-Bannāintended to immunise Islam from state interference by re-Islamising society. Mawdudı's approach, however, signifies a shift 11 Zaman, 'Sovereignty of God', pp. -. 12 March, Caliphate of Man, p. . 13 Ibid., p. . 14 Hallaq, Impossible State, pp. -.    from previous approaches seeking to circumscribe secular power. He seeks to reconceptualise the ideological orientation of the state as such. 22 Any political system that invests political authority to the people which includes their right to give themselves their own laws is un-Islamic and will yield injustice. Such a legislative prerogative, however operationalised, contravenes fundamental Islamic principles, as "Islam admits of no sovereignty except that of God and, consequently, does not recognise any Law-giver other than Him". 23 Mawdudı̄defines an Islamic state as "an ideological state" 24 whose foundation is a shared commitment to Islam that transcends geographical, ethnic and national boundaries. Quṭ b uses ḥ akimiyya in his writings to emphasise the uniqueness of the Islamic socio-political order which "is based on the premise that sovereignty (ḥ akimiyya) belongs to God alone" 25 and demarcates it from "a society of ignorance (mujtama' jahilı̄)" 26 which "is built on the premise to attack the power of God (sulṭ an allah) on earth". 27 Any political order that does not implement ḥ akimiyya constitutes idolatry (shirk). 28 While Mawdudı̄critiques notions of popular sovereignty as potentially despotic and Quṭ b sees in the promotion of democracy signs for the resurgence of the pre-Islamic age of ignorance ( jahiliyya), their theories include elements of popular participation and consultative forms of decision-making. The Islamic state is based on the sharı̄'a, but Mawdudı̄recognises the need of the human interpretation of law to ensure its implementation to new circumstances and the role ijtihad, as independent legal reasoning, plays in this process. 29 The interpretation of the sharı̄'a is a communal mandate, and "in this sense the Islamic polity is a democracy". 30 The restricted legislative authority of the community in interpreting the law reveals "a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God". 31 Mawdudıc alls this "theo-democracy". 32 God has delegated his sovereignty to humanity appointing the Muslim community and the Islamic state as His vicegerent (khalı̄fa). 33 Even Quṭ b with a more demanding vision of ḥ akimiyya recognises consultative elements in an Islamic state and refers to shurāas "a pillar of the life of the Muslim community". 34 These discourses on divine sovereignty, political legitimacy and consultative and constitutional forms of government form one backdrop that shaped the early political reflections of Baqir al-Ṣ adr and Taqı̄al  seminaries (ḥ awza) in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala, they were equally influenced by developments within Shi'i political theory that dated back to the late eighteenth century. Reflecting particular theological concerns of Twelver Shi'ism and its distinct structure of religious authority, these debates were concerned with identifying the conditions for legitimate political authority and the relationship of clerical authority to secular power. In a Twelver Shi'i context, legitimate authority-both religiously and politically-can only be exercised by the Imam from the family of Prophet (ahl al-bayt) who is qua his divine designation (naṣ ṣ ) the only infallible (ma'ṣ um), and hence legitimate, leader of the umma. With the exception of the caliphate of 'Alı, none of the  Imams ever held political authority. The  th Imam has lived in occultation since  CE and will only establish his rule when he re-appears as Mahdı̄at the end of times. Therefore, all existing polities are from a theological perspective illegitimate. 36 This has created a certain scepticism towards political power and the state in Twelver Shi'i legal theory and provides a potential source for political dissent. The revolt of the third Imam Ḥ usayn against the Umayyad dynasty in  CE provides the mythico-historical paradigm which has been given a particular revolutionary reading by Shi'i Islamist thinkers in the latter half of the twentieth century. 37 At the same time, the occultation of the  th Imam has made the establishment of a legitimate polity a messianic aspiration in Twelver Shi'i thought and allows for a pragmatic acceptance of the political realities and even cooperating with illegitimate rulers under certain circumstances. 38 As any existing polity is illegitimate, it does not really matter what form it takes, as long as it is somehow committed to Islamic principles and the 'ulama' can freely exercise their religious prerogatives of issuing fatwas and exercising judicial authority. Similar to pre-modern Sunni notions of siyasa shar'iyya, the political sovereignty held by a ruler, such as the shah in Iran, was personal and arbitrary-and theologically illegitimate. The role of the 'ulama' was to guide them to implement divine law to give their rule religious legitimacy (salṭ anat-e mashru'). 39 The 'ulama' justified their authority by arguing that they collectively deputise for the Hidden Imam (al-niyaba al-'amma). After the establishment of the uṣ ulı̄4 0 school as the mainstream understanding of Twelver Shi'i jurisprudence in the late eighteenth century, clerical authority became more formalised distinguishing between 'ulama' entitled to arrive at independent legal judgements (mujtahid) and lay Shi'i followers (muqallid) who need to follow the legal rulings of a particular scholar, referred to as grand ayatollah (ayat allah al-'uẓ ma) or source of emulation (marja' al-taqlı̄d, pl. maraji'). 41 The extent of clerical deputyship     The uṣ ulı̄school in Shi'i jurisprudence considers the 'alim or jurisconsult ( faqı̄h) to be entitled to engage in independent reasoning (ijtihad) based on the four sources of Shi'i jurisprudence (uṣ ul al-fiqh): the Qur'an, the sunna, consensus (ijma') and reason ('aql). The uṣ ulı̄school thereby contravenes the approach of the more scripturalist akhbarı̄s who reject the use of reason and primarily rely on the traditions (akhbar) attributed to the  Imams. See R. Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbarı̄Shı̄'ı̄School (Leiden, ), pp. -. has been contested. In the early nineteenth century, Shi'i scholars like Aḥ mad Naraqı( /-) developed the notion of the guardianship of the jurisconsult (wilaȳat al-faqı̄h) and a stronger political mandate of the 'ulama'. 42 Naraqı̄argues that the guardianship (wilaȳa) exercised by the Imam entails all the prerogatives the Prophet Muḥ ammad possessed, and this guardianship has then been passed onto the 'ulama' who equally possess all prerogatives of the Prophet and the Imam. 43 Murtaḍ āAnṣ arı̄(-), although a student of Naraqı, restricts the authority of the 'ulama' to exercising judicial authority and issuing fatwas and does not assign any political authority to them. 44 For Anṣ arı, during the occultation of the Imam, any government is illegitimate, but a government that promotes Twelver Shi'ism is preferable to one that does not. 45 Debates on the extent of clerical involvement in affairs of the state resurfaced at the time of the Constitutional Revolution (-) in Iran. The influence of Muslim modernist discourses around shurāand the distinction between despotic and constitutional forms of government shaped efforts by its clerical supporters to find antecedents for these concepts within traditions of Shi'i legal and political theory. For Muḥ ammad Ḥ usayn Na'ını( -), consultation and the collective deputyship of the 'ulama' are the two sources of a constitutional government. While infallibility ('iṣ ma) is the foundation of the leadership of the Imam, shurāreplaces infallibility as a means to decision-making during the occultation of the Imam while being circumscribed by the collective authority of the 'ulama'. The clerics fulfil their mandate by exercising oversight over the legislative process, for example, as part of the committee of mujtahids that scrutinises all legislation. 46 Equally, they can occasionally step in to curb the despotic tendencies of a ruler and to protect the rights of the people. Al-Kawakibı̄expands the traditional role of the sharı̄'a in circumscribing the sovereignty of the ruler by adding consultation and a constitution as further curtailing institutions. Na'ını, following him, embraces a constitutional government and ensures the conformity of parliamentary legislation with the sharı̄'a by restricting it to matters of governance (siyasa), known in Shi'i jurisprudence as 'urf (customary law), and by enshrining clerical oversight over the legislative process. 47 Shi'i legal and political theory until the mid-twentieth century accepted the separate, yet interconnected, spheres of political and religious authority in the state and sought to delimit the extent of secular power. The concept of wilaȳat al-faqı̄h has been used in Shi'i jurisprudence to constitute the autonomous authority of the jurisconsults in legal and judicial matters and to justify their involvement in affairs of the state in order to ensure its religious legitimacy, similar to classical Sunni conceptions of siyasa shar'iyya. While the extent of wilaȳat al-faqı̄h has been contested, even the strongest supporters of the comprehensive independent authority of the 'ulama', such as the twentieth-century Iraqi scholar Muḥ ammad Riḍ āal-Muẓ affar (-) never questioned the discretionary authority held by secular power and postulated the need to be loyal and cooperate with a government that has some Islamic foundations. 48 These debates on the legitimacy of secular power, the place of clerical authority in a state and its relationship to consultative forms of government in Shi'i political and legal theory shaped the ideological trajectories of the emergent Shi'i Islamist field in Iraq. Formative discourses within Sunni Islamism in the mid-twentieth century equally had a significant impact.

Baqir al-Ṣ adr and his Usus al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (-): Text and Context
Context: Iraq in  -Between Two Regimes Ḥ izb al-Da'wa has been the most prominent and influential Shi'i Islamist party in Iraq. It was founded in a period when the young Iraqi state was at a critical juncture. Created in , Iraq was a British-controlled monarchy, ruled by a Hashemite king, that enjoyed some freedoms with a quasi-independent press and a multi-party system with regular elections. The monarchy came to an end on  July  when army officers, led by 'Abd al-Karım Qasim (-), deposed and killed the king and established the Iraqi republic. They followed the example of Egyptian Free Officers under Gamal Abdel Nasser (-) who had ended the British-backed monarchy in Egypt six years earlier. Qasim's new regime was equally inspired by pan-Arab socialism and its anti-imperialism. Leftist groups, in particular the Iraqi Communist Party (Al-Ḥ izb al-Shuyu'ı̄al-'Iraqı̄), were initially an important power base for the new regime. 49 The seat of the clerical leadership of Iraqi Shi'is is the city of Najaf in southern Iraq in which the shrine of Imam 'Alı̄is located. Najaf also hosts the most important Shi'i seminaries (ḥ awza) which, in that time, were led by Muḥ sin al-Ḥ akım (-). As grand ayotallah and marja' al-taqlı̄d, he was the clerical leader of Iraqi Shi'is in the s and s. The Shi'i clerical establishment in Najaf was characterised in that period by a strong proclivity towards political quietism avoiding any association with the state. The memory of the failed  revolt against the British occupation, which was led by senior clerics in Najaf, was a reason for this attitude. Many clerics were forced to leave Iraq in the aftermath of the revolt and only allowed to return in the s with a commitment to stay out of politics. 50 However, the distance towards politics and the dissociation from the state had an impact on the Shi'i majority in the newly-established Iraqi state. Shi'is had been largely disenfranchised, being poorly represented in the political and socio-economic elite of the country. 51 The only means of political mobilisation for Shi'is lay in secular leftist parties such as the pan-Arabist and socialist Ba'th Party or the Communist Party which had many Shi'i  members. Islamist movements were also present. An offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been active in Iraq since  with Sayyid Quṭ b being one of the contributors to its journal. The Iraqi Brotherhood was involved in domestic politics supporting a series of national strikes and protests against the Hashemite monarchy and British influence over Iraq in , inspired by the Free Officers' coup in Egypt. 52 Another prominent Islamist organisation which branched out to Iraq was Ḥ izb al-Taḥ rı̄r (Party of Liberation), established by the Palestinian scholar Taqı̄al-Dın al-Nabahanı̄(-) in Jerusalem in  with the aim to restore the Islamic caliphate. 53 The Muslim Brotherhood and Ḥ izb al-Taḥ rı̄r also had Shi'i members some of whom would later become leading figures in Ḥ izb al-Da'wa. 54 While earlier efforts by young activists to establish a Shi'i political party in  had failed, 55 the domestic repercussions of another regional conflict gave the initial impetus for the formation of Ḥ izb al-Da'wa. The Suez Crisis of  led to anti-British solidarity protests in Iraq that senior clerics in Najaf endorsed with Muḥ ammad Riḍ āal-Muẓ affar writing a letter of support to the shaykh al-azhar in Cairo. 56 Shi'i activists approached two sons of Muḥ sin al-Ḥ akım, Mahdı̄(-) and Baqir (-), to secure the tacit approval of the senior clerics in Najaf and seminary students such as Baqir al-Ṣ adr to provide intellectual leadership. 57 Initial informal meetings began towards the end of  on a regular basis before Ḥ izb al-Da'wa was established in Najaf in October  and its leadership elected in Karbala in the summer of , shortly after Qasim's coup. 58 The coup was cautiously welcomed by Shi'i clerics and political activists. Qasim's mother was Shi'i, and he presented himself as a "Shi'i leader (za'im shı̄'ı̄)" when Muḥ sin al-Ḥ akım agreed to meet him in . 59 Muḥ sin al-Ḥ akım also appeared more open to using parties as means of political mobilisation after the coup. When Qasim, during a brief liberalising period, permitted the formation of political parties, 60 al-Ḥ akım endorsed the formation of Al-Ḥ izb al-Islamı̄(The Islamic Party) in  which was the political wing of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood. 61 However, the initial 'honeymoon period' with the new regime did not last long. The introduction of a new Personal Status Law in  that sought to limit polygamy and gave equal inheritance to men and women was the first arena of conflict between the new regime and senior clerics who had to witness the state's interference into their domain of legal authority. Qasim's support for the Communists led Muḥ sin al-Ḥ akım to issue a fatwa in  equating Communism with unbelief (kufr) and heresy (ilḥ ad).     The Usus became the central ideological document of Ḥ izb al-Da'wa formulating a number of principles that define the character of an Islamic state. According to Baqir al-Ṣ adr's students, there were originally up to  principles of which either nine or  have been reprinted in different sources. 68 These principles were not published and only circulated internally which partially explains why most of them might have been lost. The format of the text consisting of shorter theses of a few sentences and paragraphs might have been inspired by the foundational text of Ḥ izb al-Taḥ rı̄r, Niẓ am al-Islam (The Order of Islam), written in  by al-Nabahanı, which equally sets out short principles to outline the ideological parameters and the structure of a restored Islamic caliphate. 69 At the same time, the Usus bears the imprint of a variety of Sunni Islamist sources to different degrees while referring to specific concerns of Shi'i legal and political theory.
The starting point of Baqir al-Ṣ adr's book-common with other Islamist discourses-is the affirmation that Islam not just represents a particular belief system but has introduced "a complete social order (niẓ am ijtima'ı̄shamil)" 70 that Muslims need to establish (Principle ). He, similar to Mawdudı, defines an Islamic state as "ideological state (al-dawla    al-fikriyya)" 71 (Principle ) whose identity is based on a shared adherence to Islam rather than ethno-national ties or geographical boundaries. 72 The establishment of an Islamic state needs to be preceded, however, by a complete re-Islamisation of society, "a transformative mission (da'wa taghayiriyya)". 73 European colonialism has introduced "foreign intellectual and political frameworks" 74 into Muslim societies that can only be addressed by a radical reorientation of the political order and social life towards Islamic principles (Principle ). Reflecting the approach promulgated by Ḥ asan al-Banna, assuming power or changing the political system alone is not sufficient to establish an Islamic state, 75 as the locus of change needs to be the Islamic community (umma) itself: If the umma does not transform in its innermost constitution, even if the government (ḥ ukm) is to change, it will not mean that the fundamental and complete revolution (al-inqilab al-asasıā l-shamil) within the inner nature and spirit of the umma will occur. 76 (Principle ).
Other principles exhibit Baqir al-Ṣ adr's political pragmatism: an Islamic state does not enforce an Islamic way of life on its Muslim citizens and treats them as Muslims-regardless of their conduct-if they profess Islam (Principle ). 77 He endorses the Pan-Islamic utopian ideal of a politically united umma and the aim to establish an Islamic state stretching the entire globe. 78 At the same, the state can be given a piece of a land as a trust and be tasked to administer it on behalf of the umma. By presenting the state's responsibility of governing a certain area as a "religious ruling (ḥ ukm shar'ı̄)", 79 Baqir al-Ṣ adr accepts on pragmatic grounds the de facto division of the Muslim world in different states (Principle ). Countering Western imperialism and "the influence of the unbeliever" 80 is part of the responsibility of the Islamic state and can include military confrontation as part of its jihad (Principle ). Nevertheless, its foreign relations are primarily based on bilateral or multilateral treatises, in particular if economic ties with non-Muslim countries increase "Islamic welfare (maṣ laha islamiyya)" 81 (Principle ). Baqir al-Ṣ adr's pragmatism comes further to the fore when he discusses different types of states (Principle ): he echoes Mawdudı̄and Quṭ b when he characterises Communist, liberal democratic or authoritarian states as constituting "the government of unbelief and ignorance (ḥ ukm al-kufr wa-l-jahiliyya)", 82 because either their ideological foundations are not based on Islamic principles or they exhort the absolute power of an individual. However, he only sees opposing such a state reasonable if such activism, that can include violence, would promise 71 Ibid., p. . In Arabic, the designation of the Islamic state as fikrıcould also be translated as 'ideational', i.e. a state built on shared ideas and concepts. For Quṭ b's discussion of the concepts ( fikrat) distinguishing an Islamic state from other polities, see idem, Al-'Adala al-Ijtima'iyya, pp. -.       success. In fact, Baqir al-Ṣ adr, develops quite a broad understanding of what an Islamic state is and distinguishes three types of states that equally qualify to be Islamic: () A state that fully implements Islamic principles without any caveat: Such a state historically only existed at the time of the Prophet and when 'Ali became the fourth caliph. In line with Shi'i conceptions of legitimate political authority, a true Islamic state can only exist in the presence of the Imam as its infallible leader who demands absolute obedience of Muslims. Such a state alone possesses "the divine form (al-shakl al-ilahı̄)" 83 and, being led by the designated successor of the Prophet Muḥ ammad, implements "the sovereignty (ḥ akimiyya) of the Messenger of God". 84 () A state in which not all laws are derived from Islamic principles and its leadership cannot be considered Islamically legitimate: Such a state is still Islamic, but "the scholar (al-'arif) among the Muslims must explain to the state the principles of Islam it is ignorant of and in addition teach the principles of Islam to anyone who is ignorant of them, in particular the ruling authority (al-sult ̣ a al-ḥ akima)". 85 Muslim scholars are able to play a political and public advisory role directing the policies and legislation of the ruling authorities to conform to Islamic principles as much as possible and being capable of propagating Islamic principles in the public. Obedience to such a state is required, even "when the ruling authority decides on an erroneous point of view". 86 () A state that entirely counters Islamic principles and is based on arbitrary decisions of its ruler, when Muslims can still work within the government and are in a position to mitigate the state's despotic character and work towards the establishment of justice: For Baqir al-Ṣ adr, Muslims need to accept the existence of such a state, despite its illegitimacy, as long as there is a chance to uphold an Islamic lifestyle and to promote it publicly. Only when the integrity of Islam as such is in danger, they are required to dissociate themselves from such a state and, under certain circumstances, entitled to oppose it.
Baqir al-Ṣ adr develops an extremely broad and pragmatic understanding of an Islamic statefrom a state, led by the infallible Imam as the sole agent of ḥ akimiyya, to the most minimalist definition. In a counterintuitive, if not contradictory, manner, he characterises even the third type as Islamic as long as it allows its Muslim citizens to practice and propagate their religion freely: "the state in all three types is an Islamic state as it is established on the ideological foundation of Islam and its existence centres around an Islamic base". 87 Shurāis the legitimate mode of decision-making in an Islamic state in the absence of an infallible leader and results from "the government of the people (ḥ ukm al-umma)" 88 (Principle ), reflecting a similar argument made by clerical supporters of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran such as Na'ını. 89 Baqir al-Ṣ adr does not really explicate how shurāshould 83 Ibid., p. . 84 Ibid.

87
Ibid., p.  (emphasis added). 88 Ibid., p. . function in an Islamic state and, similar to al-Banna, only attaches some general conditions to its operation such as that the form of government must not contradict Islamic principles and promote the welfare of the people (Principle ). Baqir al-Ṣ adr initiates some considerations on how shurāmight operate in the legislative processes differentiating between "legal rulings (aḥ kam al-sharı̄'a)" 90 and "legal directives (ta'alı̄m) or laws (qawanı̄n)": 91 the legislative authority of the people and their elected representatives is restricted to the latter which respond to the specific needs of the time and the government (Principle ).
While laws can be determined by the state in a consultative process, Baqir al-Ṣ adr equally restricts its legislative and judicial authority. Judicial authority is germane to the clerics, must remain outside of state control and "is not part of the government apparatus" 92 (Principle ). Equally explaining legal rulings remains the sole prerogative of scholars qualified to undertake ijtihad: The just mujtahid alone has the right to explain the legal rulings (aḥ kam al-sharı̄'a) in light of the four sources of jurisprudence [Qur'an, sunna, consensus and reason]. His explanation of the religious rulings is on these grounds called ifta'. 93 Baqir al-Ṣ adr integrates in his discussion of the legislative authority of the state vis-à-vis the legal prerogative of the 'ulama' concerns of modernist and Islamist thought into traditional Shi'i legal theory. The distinction between unchangeable and flexible parts of the sharı̄'a goes back to modernist reformers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century such as Muḥ ammad 'Abduh and Rashıd Riḍ ā9 4 and is also reiterated in the works of Islamists such as Mawdudı, 95 in particular with the aim to relax restrictive views of ijtihad in Sunni jurisprudence. Baqir al-Ṣ adr is equally concerned about legal flexibility in socio-political matters but does not have make an argument for ijtihad as it is a central element of Shi'i jurisprudence. His distinction between legal rulings issued by mujtahids and laws made by the state mirrors the traditional division between sharı̄'a rulings (aḥ kam al-sharı̄'a) and the legal discretion of the ruler that is described as 'urf (customary law) in Shi'i jurisprudence. While in traditional jurisprudence the ruler would determine 'urf, Na'ını̄assigns this aspect of legislative authority to the people in a constitutional government. Baqir al-Ṣ adr follows his footsteps while moving away from traditional terminology.
The manifesto does not give the question of clerical authority in an Islamic state a very prominent role. The discussion of the relationship between the maraji' al-taqlı̄d and the state remains vague in contrast to political theories developed by later Shi'i Islamists in which these reflections are central. 96 The aim is to protect the two core prerogatives of the mujtahids, issuing fatwas (ifta') and legal judgements (qaḍ a'), by denying any role for the state therein. Nevertheless, the mujtahids play a role within the state's legislative process though it remains unclear to what extent they are involved in the aforementioned 90 Al-Ḥ usaynı, Usus al-Dawla al-Islamiyya, p. . 91 Ibid.

92
Ibid., p. . 93 Ibid. consultative process to determine legal directives. Baqir al-Ṣ adr argues that if there is one single marja', his fatwas become the official legal ruling (ḥ ukm) of the state. If several maraji' co-exist and issue different fatwas on a certain question, the government chooses one fatwa and implements as part of the state's laws or policies. This political decision does not undermine the legal validity of the other fatwas or the other maraji's status as sources of emulation but merely results from the pragmatic need to have a single law or policy in place for the state. 97 Baqir al-Ṣ adr's Usus is a hybrid document of experimental nature and perhaps lacks intellectual coherence. The manifesto blends different Islamist trends while positioning them within traditional Shi'i legal and political theory. Even as the text reveals the influence of Mawdudı̄and Quṭ b, Baqir al-Ṣ adr does not apply their overtly political reading of ḥ akimiyya to the state. For him, ḥ akimiyya is only implemented in a state led by the Imam and is not central to define a state as Islamic in his absence. His definition remains pragmatic and traditional: the manifesto is more concerned about setting out the parameters of legitimate government in Islam when an infallible leader is absent. The state needs to conform to Islamic principles and to promote the welfare of Muslims. Reflecting the influence of modernist Muslim thought and Na'ını's constitutional theories, in the absence of an infallible leader, people manage their affairs in a consultative manner and are entitled to arrive at laws pertaining to the organisation of the state that are informed by the principles of the sharı̄'a and cannot contradict them. Most importantly, the state needs to respect and protect the legal and judicial autonomy of the 'ulama' and implement their rulings, as pre-modern Muslim polities had done before, in order to be Islamically legitimate.
The manifesto is not a programme for revolutionary change to establish a state that implements ḥ akimiyya. While Baqir al-Ṣ adr pays rhetorical adherence to the utopian ideal of a global Islamic state, he dissociates himself from ideas put forward by al-Nabahanı̄and resembles more Hasan al-Banna's pragmatic acceptance of the political realities and his emphasis on the socio-moral transformation of Muslim societies. The reality of the state and its political sovereignty are accepted and its governance is legitimate, even if it exhibits a most minimal conformity to Islamic principles. The state does not need to become an instrument to implement ḥ akimiyya, as only the Imam as the umma's infallible leader can do so. Baqir al-Ṣ adr's own intellectual lineage as a Shi'i scholar comes to the fore as well: he was a student of Muḥ ammad Riḍ āal-Muẓ affar who remained within the quietist tradition of Twelver Shi'i jurisprudence by suggesting that Shi'is should be loyal to the state. 98 The patronage of Muḥ sin al-Ḥ akım also explains the manifesto's oscillation between ideological purity and pragmatic adjustments to realpolitik. Al-Ḥ akım gave his tacit approval to the formation of the party but remained a cautious political actor and rejected any openly oppositional stance to the state. 99 Baqir al-Ṣ adr's manifesto gave permission to cooperate with the Hashemite monarchy or the new Qasim regime as long as some commitments to Islamic principles are retained and the legal and judicial autonomy of the 'ulama' is respected.

Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄and his Al-Qiyada al-Islamiyya (-): Text and Context
Context: Iraq in  -Authoritarianism and the Demise of Pan-Arabism Iraq in , when Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄began writing his book, had experienced four coup d'états and more than ten years of military rule. Qasim was assassinated in February  in a coup launched by military officers supported by the Ba'th party. A few months later, Colonel 'Abd al-Salam 'Ārif (-) who played a leading role in  coup and became president when the Ba'th party took power launched a counter-coup deposing members of the Ba'th party from the government. He died in an airplane crash in , and his brother, 'Abd al-Raḥ man 'Ārif (-) became new president. The political infighting that marked the first years of the Iraqi republic occurred within different elements in the army and different political parties that were all broadly committed to pan-Arabism and socialism. 101 The political leadership was dominated by pan-Arabist Sunnis who doubted the Arabness of Shi'is-many clerics and prominent Shi'i families had Iranian roots-and pursued a socialist nationalisation policy that disproportionally disadvantaged the Shi'i mercantile class.
Both repressive authoritarian policies and economic reforms ensured that the Sunni dominance became more enshrined in the regime which adopted an increasingly anti-Shi'i sectarian tone. 102 The demise of the Iraqi Communist Party following the first Ba'th coup in  also created an organisational void for political activists of a Shi'i background. This lack of Shi'i political mobilisation within existing secular parties provided an opportunity for Shi'i Islamist parties such as Ḥ izb al-Da'wa to become the centres of Shi'i political activism while further enshrining sectarian identities. 103 The second coup of the Ba'th party in , under the leadership of Saddam Hussein (-) created more stability but further marginalised political activists and clerical leaders of Iraq's Shi'i community. A first major clampdown-with many more to come in the following decades-on Shi'i religious leaders, activists and institutions began in the summer of . 104 Regionally, this period inaugurated the demise of Nasserist pan-Arabism when Arab forces were defeated in the Six-Day War with Israel in . Leftist politics of various shades and secular Arab nationalism appeared ineffective and discredited leading to the wider regional 'Islamic resurgence' in the s in which Islamist mass politics became the major site of resistance against various regimes in the Middle East. This resistance was increasingly inspired by the more revolutionary writings of Sayyid Quṭ b, who had died in prison as a symbol of Islamist opposition against the 'un-godly' regime of Nasser in , and began to include militant activism. 105 Baqir al-Ṣ adr wrote in the more liberal context of the Iraqi kingdom that had a fairly free press and a multi-party system and experienced regular mass protests and revolts. 106 He might have shared the cautiously optimistic outlook towards the new regime that came to power in , given its strong anti-imperialist orientation. However, ten years of political instability and increasing authoritarianism, a further sectarianisation of Iraqi politics and the rise of more militant forms of Islamism provided a very different context for Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı.
In these tumultuous years, he emerged as leader of the political branch of the Shırazı̄clerical network, whose figurehead was Muḥ ammad al-Shırazı̄(-), a cleric stemming from a family with Iranian roots in Karbala, the city that hosts the shrine of Imam Ḥ usayn. Reflecting the historical rivalry between the two shrine cities, Najaf and Karbala, the rise of Muḥ ammad al-Shırazı̄and his claim to be a marja' al-taqlı̄d in the early s at a very young age aimed at competing with Najaf as the centre of gravity of Shi'i clerical authority. While his position as grand ayatollah has not been recognised by the Najafi establishment, its rejection served as important marker of the emergent distinct identity of the Shırazı̄network. 107 Muḥ ammad al-Shırazı̄and his brothers Ḥ asan (-) and Ṣ adiq (b. ) were involved in preliminary meetings of the Ḥ izb al-Da'wa but parted ways being concerned about the role of clerical authority within its structure. 108  Al-Mudarrisı̄dissociates his theory from traditional modes of Islamic governance, demanding a shift from the traditional view that "the ruler (al-ḥ akim) is God's shadow on earth" to "the view of Islam that 'authority belongs to God alone (al-ḥ ukm li-llah)'". 121 Pre-modern theories of Islamic governance adopted a defensive stance seeking to protect Islam from corrupt rulers and thereby preventing Islam from shaping politics. Similar to Quṭ b, al-Mudarrisıs eeks to make Islamic morality and its sustenance dependent on the state. 122 By implementing ḥ akimiyya, a political order is established whose "form (shakl)" and "spirit (ruḥ )" 123 not only conform to Islamic structures of governance but whose raison d'être lies in the implementation of Islamic values.
Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄embeds Mawdudı's and Quṭ b's notion of ḥ akimiyya and its sociopolitical implementation in Shi'i theories of clerical authority referring to the general deputyship of the 'ulama'; at the time of the Prophet and the Imams, they were in charge of implementing ḥ akimiyya. At the time of occultation, their deputies, the jurisconsults, need to fulfil this role. Al-Mudarrisı̄creates a functional analogy between the Prophet and Imams and their deputies in the time of occultation by creating parallels between their respective sources of authority. The complete leadership of the jurisconsult is based on his jurisprudential knowledge ( fiqh) and justice ('adala) which is parallel to the two sources of prophetic authority: revelation (waḥ ı̄) and infallibility ('iṣ ma): 124 And it is like that with a leader (ra'ı̄s) who rules over the Muslims during the occultation of the Imam, as his position is based on two conditions: jurisprudential knowledge ( fiqh), which is knowledge in the religion, and justice, which is impartiality in the religion and resembles infallibility and serves the same purpose. Without these two conditions leadership in religion is not legitimate, neither for the Prophet, nor for the Imam, nor for the just jurisconsult (al-faqı̄h al-'adil) who succeeds the Imam and leads the community in his absence. 125 Al-Mudarrisı̄extends the communal mandate of the marja' beyond merely religious and legal matters, arguing that the secularisation of his authority is a Western ploy, implemented to weaken Islam. On the contrary, the mandate and guardianship of the just jurisconsult is absolute and unrestricted: "The just jurisconsult is the leader (imam) of the Muslims, not only in providing a source of religious emulation (al-marja'iyya al-dı̄niyya) but also in political and social matters". 126 Referring to the tradition that the 'ulama' are the heirs of the Prophet, he suggest "the spiritual connection (al-rabiṭ a al-ma'nawiyya) and the real proximity that connects the prophets and the scholars". 127 For al-Mudarrisı, the jurisconsults are not simply the guardians of prophetic knowledge and sources of legislative authority but partake in the prophetic charisma that entitles them to assume his political mandate as well: 128 need to be curtailed anymore to prevent corruption and despotism as traditional theories suggest. The state is righteous, just and Islamic when its sovereignty is embodied by the just jurisconsult. Al-Mudarrisı's teacher, Muḥ ammad al-Shırazı, took the scope of the 'ulama's authority as deputies of the Hidden Imam to a new level, by adding to their traditional legal and judicial authority full political authority in an Islamic state, mirroring Mawdudı's translation of divine sovereignty from the legal realm to the sovereignty of the state. 138 The jurisconsult, traditionally conceived as the agent of God's legal sovereignty, becomes in Muḥ ammad al-Shırazı's and al-Mudarrisı's reading the sole legitimate agent of God's political sovereignty. They retain the personification of charismatic authority in Shi'i theology: divine sovereignty-or guardianship (wilaȳa) in Shi'i terms-is personified by the Prophet, transferred to the Imams after his death and fully exercised by the just jurisconsult as head of state.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran ten years after al-Mudarrisı̄wrote his book implemented a political system that institutionalised the deputyship of the Shi'i clergy, known as wilaȳat al-faqı̄h, within the state's political apparatus by making the ruling jurisconsult (valı̄-ye faqı̄h) the head of state who holds supreme executive, legislative and judicial authority. Al-Mudarrisı̄anticipates Khomeini's own formulation of wilaȳat al-faqı̄h that the latter would develop during his exile in Najaf in . Yet, Khomeini's reflections on the role of the jurisconsult remain rather vague, emphasising his mandate to form an Islamic government to ensure the implementation of Islamic law. Al-Mudarrisı̄is more explicit about the status of the jurisconsult in an Islamic state, by considering his authority to be absolute, unrestricted and including the state's executive, legislative and judicial powers.

Conclusion
The article suggests that understanding the genesis of Shi'i Islamism in the s and s requires a systematic reflection on the organisational and ideological connections that existed between Sunni and Shi'i Islamists. 139 The earliest ideological formulations of Baqir al-Ṣ adr and Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄engage with the conceptual repertoire of nascent Sunni Islamism as the terminology both employ in their writings clearly suggests. While they embed Sunni Islamist thought in Shi'i legal and political theories, their approaches to delineating the contours of an Islamic state remain indebted to reflections provided by al-Banna, Mawdudı, Quṭ b and other Sunni Islamists. The article also demonstrates how Iraq provided a particularly fertile ground for such reflections among Shi'i Islamist activists. The presence of Sunni Islamist organisations, the accessibility of publications and journals disseminating their ideas and the involvement of Iraqi Shi'is in these movements allowed for the creative appropriation of the diverse range of Sunni Islamist ideological iterations into Shi'i political thought.
The capaciousness of Islamist thought at that time included a spectrum of different views from a more pragmatic approach put forward by Hasan al-Bannāto a more comprehensive rejection of the non-Islamic ideological sources of political systems by Quṭ b, as an 138 Ibrahim, Al-Faqı̄h wa-l-Dawla, pp. -. 139 See Fuchs in this volume on the relationship between the Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami and the Islamic Republic of Iran. articulation "high utopian Islamism". 140 This capaciousness also impacted on the early political views of Baqir al-Ṣ adr and Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄and allowed them to respond ideologically to changing political circumstances in their countries and the wider Middle East. Baqir al-Ṣ adr, despite a rhetorical commitment to the ideological nature of an Islamic state, operates more in a traditional manner seeking to translate the modalities of pre-modern clergy-state relations into the context of a modern state and being more concerned about how to make the existing political order legitimate. His intervention suggests a continuation of the dual sovereignty of pre-modern Muslim polities: the state retains its responsibility for political matters and possesses some discretionary legislative authority, based on the collective authority of the umma, while legal and adjudicative authority (ifta' and qaḍ a') is held by the 'ulama'. A truly Islamic state that implements ḥ akimiyya remains a messianic aspiration: only the Imam as infallible leader can fully implement divine sovereignty. Baqir al-Ṣ adr's minimalist approach to Islamic legitimacy resonates with the pragmatism of the early Muslim Brotherhood and is indebted to the ideas of clerical supporters of the Constitutional Revolution who accepted the secular rule of the Iranian shah but sought to curtail his despotism by the legal and judicial authority and oversight of the 'ulama' and an elected parliament. Similar to the more liberal context of the Egyptian monarchy in the s in which al-Bannābegan his activities, Baqir al-Ṣ adr established Ḥ izb al-Da'wa in the freer environment of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq and the promises and hopes connected to the pan-Arabist coup of Qasim in .
At the time when al-Mudarrisı̄wrote his book, the domestic context, the wider geopolitical configuration and the ideological spectrum of Islamism had altered. Ten years of increasingly authoritarian rule in Iraq illustrated the intrusive and repressive powers of the state of which Shi'i political and clerical activists in Iraq were of the receiving end. The demise of pan-Arabism and the momentum that more militant forms of Islamism had gained as a consequence limited the room for pragmatic adjustments and allowed Taqı̄al-Mudarrisı̄to embrace the concept of ḥ ākimiyya more fully. Unlike Baqir al-Ṣ adr and previous Shi'i scholars, he does not seek to tame the state and to make it Islamically legitimate but conceives of the state and its sovereignty as a political necessity to establish an Islamic socio-moral order. That al-Mudarrisı̄does not theorise any further on the meaning of ḥ akimiyya or feels the need to define it illustrates how much the term had gained currency in Islamist thought at that time. He can take the concept as a starting point of his political theory and embed it in Shi'i notions of political and clerical authority. This allows him to operationalise divine sovereignty in an Islamic(-Shi'i) state by focussing on the individual authority of the jurisconsult: as traditional agent of God's legal sovereignty, arriving at new legal judgements (aḥ kām) by interpreting the sources of Islamic jurisprudence, he becomes the sole agent of God's political sovereignty as ruler (ḥ ākim) of the Islamic state. His reading marks a radical reinterpretation of clerical authority in Shi'i Islam and a complete re-appraisal of the sovereignty of the state: while the notion of wilāyat al-faqı̄h has been used to justify a more assertive public and political advisory role for 'ulama', al-Mudarrisı̄employs it to suggest that only the state of the jurisconsult implements divine sovereignty.
The flexibility of Islamist thought and the selective engagement with its diverse repertoire also become evident in the intellectual trajectories that would shape the later political ideas 140 March, Caliphate of Man, p. .