Lucian W. Pye was born in 1921 in Fenchow, Shansi Province, China, where his parents were educational missionaries teaching in the Congregational Mission. He went through the fourth grade at the American school in China, then completed primary education at the Oberlin, Ohio, public school. In 1936, he returned to China with his family and, during the Japanese occupation, completed high school at the North China American School in Peking. After graduating from Carleton College in 1943 he joined the U.S. Marine Corps, finding himself at war’s end back in Peking as an intelligence officer with the Fifth Marine Regiment.

While accidents of personal biography undoubtedly affect the scholarly commitments all of us make, in Pye’s case the impact was profound. His dominant intellectual concern has been to explore, theoretically and empirically, the cultural differences that help explain why the game of politics differs so greatly from one nation to another. And China itself, unique among nations but also one of the class of non-Western societies moving toward modernization, has been the subject of more than half his twelve books. Reviewers have often commented, whether in admiration or frustration, on the intuitive quality of Pye’s insights and generalizations about Chinese and other Asian cultures. It sounds plausible, they write, or far-fetched as the case may be, but how can he know that? A large part of the answer surely lies in a confident sensitivity acquired early in life to the tangible reality and great importance of cultural differences.

Lucian Pye’s scholarly contributions fall into four overlapping realms. First, he has been a leader, both intellectually and organizationally, in studying the politics of modernization in the Third World. Virtually all his writings have made theoretical or empirical contributions to our understanding of the development process, and he has advanced the work of other scholars in this field through his participation in many committees and organizations, including particularly the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. A member of this Committee from its origin in 1953, he succeeded Gabriel Almond as its Chairman a decade later and served as editor or co-editor of three volumes in the Committee’s influential series.1 Second, Pye is one of a small
handful of scholars to have studied Asian politics from a broadly comparative standpoint, having written both an analytical study comparing the cultural dimensions of authority in ten Asian countries as well as monographs based on intensive research on three particular societies. Third, he would certainly have to be included on any knowledgeable informant’s short list of internationally recognized specialists on contemporary China. Finally, Pye is widely regarded as the foremost contemporary practitioner and proponent of the concept of political culture as a way of penetrating beneath the surface of political life to the deeper layers of attitude, value and sentiment that motivate political behavior.2

The crucial years of Lucian Pye’s intellectual formation were as a graduate student and research associate at Yale from 1947 to 1952. An impressive contingent of political scientists from Chicago, where the seeds of the behavioral revolution had been sown, had by then migrated to New Haven. Harold Lasswell, who had pioneered the application of psychological perspectives to political science in the 1930s, was teaching at the Law School, and the Political Science faculty included such other luminaries of the Chicago school as William Fox, Bernard Brodie, Klaus Knorr, Nathan Leites, and Gabriel Almond. Of these, the most influential for Pye were Leites and Almond. Leites was teaching at Yale while at work on The Operational Code of the Politburo, the first in a series of stimulating studies that sought to extract from the writings of leading Bolsheviks the underlying assumptions and rules of action that guided their political behavior.3 Pye’s dissertation, which analyzed the attitudes underlying the system of warlord politics in China in the 1920s, was undoubtedly influenced by Leites, and after Pye had received his degree the two teamed up informally in a Yale seminar on comparative political elites.4 Almond entered the picture as leader of a seminar which analyzed the psychological, sociological, and anthropological literature pertaining to international affairs; he recalls his student Pye as “generally leaving me a little breathless; he had so much energy and enthusiasm.” As his friends will tell you, both qualities remain in large supply.

Personal mentors such as these were clearly very important, and their impact was enhanced by several strong intellectual currents rushing through the social science world in those years. The insights of cultural anthropology and psychoanalysis were being employed to explore the mysteries of “national character” and gain deeper understanding of political behavior in advanced as well as primitive societies. In particular, the effort to understand the causes of the Second World War, and then of the Cold War that erupted immediately thereafter, led anthropologists like Ruth Benedict, Geoffrey Gorer, and Clyde Kluckhohn, as well as psychologists like Erich Fromm and Erik Erikson, to puzzle about qualities in the cultures of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union that might have generated such aggressive, authoritarian political systems. And just as scholars in these disciplines were attempt-

His dominant intellectual concern has been to explore, theoretically and empirically, the cultural differences that help explain why the game of politics differs so greatly from one nation to another.
Pye’s first field study, carried out in Malaya in 1952-53 under the auspices of Princeton’s Center for International Studies, was associated with this intellectual “revolution” as well as with the two genuine revolutionary developments of the era: the expansion of Communism and the collapse of colonial empires. The inspiration for the project was provided by Almond’s work on *The Appeals of Communism* (1954), which explored through in-depth interviews and analysis of ideological texts the reasons why former members of Communist parties in Western Europe and the United States had joined, then left, the Communist movement. Pye was an ideal candidate for a counterpart study on the “People’s Liberation” variant of Communism. Based on lengthy interviews of sixty Malayan Chinese, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya* (Pye 1956) was the first interpretive study based on a body of empirical data gathered systematically from the participants on a non-Western Communist movement. It revealed one of the central preoccupations that would mark all Pye’s subsequent work: the desire to uncover underlying patterns of thought and motivation in the individuals being studied, while at the same time setting their behavior in the larger context of social and political upheaval in transitional societies.

All of Pye’s substantial studies have attempted to perform the difficult feat of working at both macro and micro levels of analysis, with the balance usually favoring the latter.

The Center was then the largest university-based interdisciplinary research group in the country, carrying out studies of political and economic development, Communist societies, and American foreign policy. Under Max Millikan’s leadership the Center was attracting a steady flow of research funds and had recruited such first-class scholars from relevant social science fields as Everett Hagen, Harold Isaacs, Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, and Walt Rostow. It was a fine place for a young scholar of Pye’s inclinations. In 1958-59 he set off for Burma to do field work that resulted in his second book, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* (1971). Pye’s distinctive approach to the politics of modernization first fully reveals itself here. The focus is squarely on “that complex of attitudes and practices which we may call the political culture and which reflects both the historical evolution of the society and the psychological reactions to social change of the society’s political actors” (Pye 1971, xvi).

One might almost say that Pye’s most important subsequent work has involved an empirical and theoretical elaboration of the concepts imbedded in that sentence.

About the time that book appeared in 1956, Pye accepted MIT’s invitation to join its recently established Center for International Studies and to teach in a new program that would soon develop into a full-fledged Department of Political Science.
He would remain interested above all in the elite political cultures of transitional societies, and he would interpret these cultures as shaped by a blend of universal historical factors, particular national histories, and individual psychological traits as shaped by family socialization patterns. With varying degrees of success, all Pye's substantial studies have attempted to perform the difficult feat of working at both macro and micro levels of analysis, with the balance usually favoring the latter. The first third of the Burma book sets the broad context: a comparative conceptual analysis of nation-building, followed by a discussion of the specific Burmese experience with the traumas of transition. The book's core, however, lies in the portrait of Burmese political culture derived from interviews with politicians, administrators and other political elites, as well as from secondary sources on family relationships and the socialization process. The book's subtitle, "Burma's Search for Identity," suggests the important role that Erik Erikson's work, especially his concept of ego identity, had by then come to play in Pye's treatment of the nation-building process.

Before nations can develop, Pye argued, leaders must emerge who have constructed coherent identities for themselves and who can therefore speak in terms that will bring meaning to other people's search for identity. Building a nation can be seen as creating a sense of collective identity: "Fundamentally, the hope for transitional peoples resides in their quests for new collective as well as individual identities. Their development hinges on their capacity to find meaning in a fusion of what we have called traditional and modern modes of action, a fusion of the world culture and their own historic cultures" (Pye 1971, 287).

We should, he suggests, resist the tendency to discard old models as we develop new ones, and look instead for the enduring truths in old approaches that later events may seem to have discredited.

While acknowledging the seriousness of all the manifest objective problems facing transitional societies, Pye has consistently distinguished himself from most analysts by his steadfast insistence that anxieties, fears of failure, and other psychological phenomena are every bit as real and inhibiting as other obstacles to development: "The shocking fact has been that in the last decade the new countries of Asia have had more difficulty with the psychological than with the objective economic problems basic to nation building" (Pye 1971, xv). As this strong statement suggests, he never fell into the easy optimism that overtook some of the development experts of the day, imbued with the faith that rational planning along with sufficient injections of modern technology, skills, and capital would do the trick. In Pye's view, the heart of the development problem lies in such psychological variables as trust and aggression, and in attitudes toward intangibles like time, order, predictability, power. No one believing in the centrality of personal attributes such as these is likely to be sanguine either about the prospects for
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rapid modernization or about the ability of outside experts to facilitate the process.

Not long after drawing attention to the ways in which a feeble sense of national identity could impede modernization, as in Burma, Pye returned to his first love, China. Here was a radically different case. Cultural identity was clearly not the problem, in a society so profoundly aware of its historical continuity and the greatness of its civilization. In *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, the first in a series of books on China, Pye identified the basic problem in China's modernization as an "authority crisis" arising "when the cultural and psychological bases for the legitimacy of political power are radically undermined by the developmental process" (1968, 6). He saw legitimacy having evaporated as traditional leaders proved unable to cope with the demands of modernization and as other social structures—above all the family—progressively lost their ability to elicit compliance to society's norms.

This was a high-risk book. Not only was it rather more assertively psychocultural than his previous books, and less attentive to historical and institutional factors, but the style was consciously that of an "interpretive and speculative essay." He described the book as "an exercise in exploring a set of interrelated hypotheses" intended to account for "the constellation of sentiment and attitudes that we feel must have existed for the Chinese system to have developed as it has." Supporting empirical data were explicitly offered as illustration, not proof, of his hypotheses (Pye 1968, viii).

Pye's subsequent work on China has included an introductory text, now in its third edition; a psychobiography of Mao; and a very down-to-earth analysis of Chinese commercial negotiating style which, while not precisely a handbook for negotiations, will very likely be read with profit for years to come by those seeking to do business of one sort or another with the Chinese. His fullest and most important China book to date, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (1981), is a rich analytical account of factionalism in Chinese politics from Mao's death in 1976 to the appointment of Hu Yaobang as Party Chairman in 1981. As is customary in Pye's work, the study is guided by a central hypothesis: "The fundamental dynamic of Chinese politics is a continuous tension between the imperative of consensus and conformity, on the one hand, and the belief, on the other hand, that one can find security only in special, particularistic relationships, which by their very nature tend to threaten the principle of consensus" (1981, 4). Pye argues that factions in Chinese politics are not primarily based, as in the West or the Soviet Union, on policy issues, bureaucratic interests, generational differences, or geographical connections, although all these factors may play a part. Rather, they are rooted in the mutual loyalties of constellations of officials who band together either out of career self-interest or "the highly particularistic sentiments associated with personal ties in Chinese culture, that is the spirit of guanxi" (1981, 6). This thesis is systematically explored in a series of chapters developing specific analytical propositions about factional behavior.

In passing, Pye alludes to the "models" developed over the years by Western analysts to explain Chinese politics, drawing attention in particular to the oscillation between "consensus models" and "conflict models" in response to changing political contingencies and outcomes. We should, he suggests, resist the tendency to discard old models as we develop new ones, and look instead for the enduring truths in old approaches that later events may seem to have discredited. In his view,
the reality is that the opposites of consensus and of conflict are both deeply rooted in Chinese culture, and our analytical problem is to understand the distinctive dynamic that Chinese politics has acquired through its particular blending of the opposites. Such reconciliations are a hallmark of Pye’s work: he often shapes his findings in terms of tensions and paradoxes, presenting forcefully both sides of any pair of opposites and suggesting that interpretations of behavior must take each fully into account. In his interpretations, people do not tend to make a consistent rational choice between one or another apparently incompatible course of action. Rather, they follow first one course, then the other, thereby introducing a permanent dynamic element into the political process. The polity retains its coherence despite these oscillations, since each of the qualities making up a pair of opposites itself stems from a widely accepted, more or less permanent cultural norm. Thus both the passionate, ideological politics of Mao and the pragmatic, liberalizing politics of Deng—so nearly polar opposites that they might seem to represent wholly distinct cultures—are seen as reflecting different aspects of a single, quintessential Chinese political culture. 7

Pye’s work on the modernization process in non-Western societies is most richly reflected in his recent book on Asian Power and Politics. 8 As Howard Wriggins observed in a review article: “Who but Lucian Pye would be bold enough to undertake this ambitious and controversial study of comparative political cultures in ten Asian polities?” (Wriggins 1987, 343). Acknowledging that, on the face of it, the mere idea of treating Asia as a single entity is absurd, Pye nonetheless contends that despite their great historical and religious diversity, Asian societies do in fact share orientations toward authority that differ importantly from those held in the West, and in Africa and Latin America, as well. Whereas in the West power is viewed largely in terms of decision-making—the ability to set agendas and mobilize resources to achieve specified goals—power in Asian nations tends to be identified with social status and to be oriented toward producing such “outputs” as deference, dignity, pride, and respect. His broader conceptual point, bluntly stated, is that “theories which seek to specify general propositions about power miss the point entirely.” What we must do, he suggests, is to concentrate on concepts that bring out “the actual dynamics of politics in particular situations and that also identify changes over time.” 9 The central proposition of the book—illustrated in the particular contexts of political attitudes and behavior in China, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan—is that the key determinants of political development are “changes in people’s subjective understandings of the nature of power, changes in their expectations about authority, and changes in their interpretations of what constitutes legitimacy” (Pye 1985, 19).

Pye gratefully acknowledges his debt in this book to more than thirty former graduate students whose doctoral dissertations had been written under his supervision on one or another of these countries. Counting only those whose dissertations subsequently appeared as books (and adding for good measure a few former Pye students who wrote on other countries), an undoubtedly incomplete listing would include Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Lewis Austin, Russell Betts, David Denoon, Dorothy Fontana, John Franklinstein, Jean Grossholtz, Karl Jackson, Vincent Lowe, Alan Liu, Colin MacAndrews, Samuel Popkin, Jane Pratt, Richard Samuels, Susan Shirk, Richard Solomon, Sophia Wang, and Marvin Zonis. In fact, Pye has supervised more doctoral dissertations, by a substantial margin, than any other member of his department, most of them based on a year or more of field research. Some have pursued topics close to his own research agenda, but many have not. One of those whose dissertation research was in substance closely related, on political leadership in China, has emphasized Pye’s large capacity to stimulate his students to think independently, and his corresponding sensitivity about imposing on them his own conceptual or methodological leanings. 10 Perhaps a quarter of his doctoral stu-
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dents have been Asians, for whom he has been a particularly important mentor and source of support. This is certainly in large part because he puts them at ease with his friendly manner and empathetic understanding of their educational and cultural backgrounds. I do not know how he would respond to the hypothesis that some of them may see in Professor Pye a culturally comfortable professorial version of paternalistic authority. However that may be, it is clear that students keep coming to him, whatever their background, because he is accessible, unfailingly supportive, and brimming over with ideas for them to explore—and at the same time a rigorous and effective critic of their work. As one former student has commented, "he is never short of enthusiasm for even the most underdeveloped ideas—nor do they stay underdeveloped for long!" His students must also sense, quite correctly, that once he takes them on, he stays with them through thick and thin: personal loyalty and commitment are values he prizes very highly indeed.

Although Pye's professional life has centered on research and teaching, without the diversions for government service or academic administration that enliven or divert some careers, he has by no means been living in an ivory tower. Regular trips to Asia keep him in touch with current developments, he consults periodically for the RAND Corporation, and he writes and talks frequently on Asian foreign and domestic policy issues. He appears in Washington from time to time to testify before a Congressional committee, or to advise the State Department or the National Security Council, but he has never revealed symptoms of Potomac Fever—unless a brief period of involvement in Senator Henry Jackson's Presidential campaign could be construed as such. His contributions to policy discussions are reported to be insightful and relevant, neither excessively "academic" nor concerned with tactical or operational details.

In fact, Pye's real fascination is more with the process of policy than with its substance. Passionately interested in deciphering the strategies, stratagems, and operational codes of decision makers, he seems temperamentally and intellectually best suited to play the outsider's role of analyst and critic. Indeed, one of the major values of his work, with its focus on the underlying sources of elite attitudes and motivations, lies in the implicit warning that the policies proclaimed by statesmen, our own as well as those of other nations, need not be taken as representing their true or full intentions. Policy makers are well aware of this, to be sure, but there is a world of difference between recognizing the pragmatic need for Machiavellian manipulation, on the one hand, and probing the cultural and psychological sources of elite behavior on the other.

A major share of Pye's "extra-curricular" energy has been invested in a variety of private organizations where scholars, government experts, and lay leaders gather to discuss policy issues and to develop Asia-related research and exchange programs. In the mid-1960s he directed an influential project on China for the Council on Foreign Relations that resulted in several books and helped reawaken American opinion to the possibilities for a more constructive relationship with Communist China. He has remained closely connected with the Council, serving for years as a Director. He was also among the founders, and is currently Vice Chairman, of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a group that facilitates academic and other exchanges with China. (It was, indeed, the instigator of "ping-pong diplomacy," that early ice-breaking maneuver that helped reestablish constructive relationships between China and the outside world.) Pye has long been a Trustee of the Asia Foundation and has served as Director of the Advisory Committee of the University Service Centre in Hong Kong, a research center that has for the past quarter century served as an outpost for scholars from around the world carrying out research on China. Those who know him in these and other similar contexts speak warmly of his enthusiastic and effective personal commitment to such activities.

The concept of political culture is the unifying intellectual thread in Lucian Pye's work. He is no evangelist for the ap-
approach, recognizing its risks and anyhow preferring, in matters methodological, to let a hundred flowers bloom. But psychologically oriented cultural analysis is distinctly his own preferred style of work, his way of making sense of the political domain he has surveyed. His forthcoming book, *The Mandarin and the Cadre*, includes a chapter on “Explaining Political Culture” that addresses conceptual and methodological issues more directly, and more provocatively, than anything he has written in recent years. This is not the place to enter into the substance of that discussion except to observe that it suggests some qualities about Pye’s work that derive from his focus on political culture and that give it a special cachet. One striking trait is a deep-seated instinct not to take things at face value. Pye listens to what people write and say about themselves, their motives, their actions, and he observes what they do. Then he dives below the surface, examining the overt behavior for hints and clues as to what may really be going on. Interpretation and generalization abound, often unsupported by the sorts of evidence most of us have been taught to look for. Some find this distasteful, especially in contexts where the power of the evidence rests heavily on psychoanalytic interpretation of childhood family relationships. But in the hands of a sensitive, experienced analyst with an intuitive feel for the society in question and unusual qualities of imagination and insight, such an approach can reveal things we did not know and help explain the otherwise inexplicable.

Pye’s work on Burma, for instance, was from the start skeptical of the capacity of that nation’s leaders to create an effective nation-state despite its objectively strong economic situation. He can be seen in retrospect as having shrewdly exposed the psychological and cultural sources of Burma’s failure to take advantage of its relatively favorable prospects. And his early writing about China distinguishes itself from that of many analysts by recognizing the potential in Mao, and in Chinese political culture as a whole, for a sharp turn toward an ideologically based politics of radical conflict. The central thrust of a *Foreign Affairs* article written just before the Cultural Revolution is to question the utility of a “prudence model” accepted by many China watchers that rested on the presumption that “Chinese behavior is eminently intelligent, ingenious and rational” and thus unlikely to repeat the extreme behavior of the Great Leap period. Pye observed that this presumption may tell us more about the “rationality and sobriety” of the analysts than about the Chinese, and warned us to be prepared for “radical change,” “instability,” and “tensions and conflicts” among the leadership (*Foreign Affairs* 1966, 387–402).

The chance of learning something we did not know from Pye’s work is enhanced by a related characteristic: his marked distaste for the obvious. If he has not yet written somewhere that he would rather be wrong than banal, consider it an oversight. It is not for nothing that his books are often x-rated “bold,” “provocative,” or “stimulating.” When I once congratulated him in public for having ranked somewhere near the top in a list of most-cited political scientists, he retorted that he knew he had critics, but he hadn’t known there were that many of them out there. There is something of a paradox in the way Lucian Pye combines unusual intellectual boldness, and an associated toughness in sticking to his guns under fire, with an otherwise accommodating style and a quite traditional mode of professional life. Although a forceful personality, he is gracious and cooperative in day-to-day collegial dealings, respectful of conventions and of the opinions of others. There is nothing of the prima donna there, none of the rough edges and quirks that often accompany high creativity and originality of mind. He also gives sound, practical advice and assistance to students and junior colleagues about how the career game should be played. But when he sits down to write, he “disdains timorous qualifications,” as a reviewer once put it, and strides hip-deep into controversial waters without appearing to worry overmuch about the “decent opinion” of more conventional scholars.

The early excitement generated by the political culture approach had begun to wane by the late 1960s. The attitudinal
and behavioral data required were hard to come by, and sound interpretations frustratingly elusive. Many younger scholars turned toward political economy as a promising source of harder data and presumably more rigorous interpretations of political and economic developments. Except for a handful of serious practitioners of the art, those who referred to political culture too often treated it as a loose catch-all category, a black box in which nested historical, cultural and psychological factors that clearly inhibited modernization but were not analyzed with much precision. In recent years the concept has been receiving more serious attention from students of American as well as comparative politics. In particular, cultural factors are more often being identified as important sources of political and economic behavior in the Third World, as, for example, in analyzing the developmental successes of the Confucian societies of East Asia. Islamic fundamentalism is probably the most dramatic development of recent times in which failure to appreciate adequately the salience of non-rational and noneconomic factors has led Western observers to misperceive radically a major political development. Political culture will surely continue to develop as a vital explanatory concept in the discipline, and Lucian Pye’s large body of work on Asian politics will long remain a prime source of knowledge and a guide to future research.

About the Author

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Notes


2. The fullest formal exposition of his views on the origins and importance of the political culture concept is to be found in the entry on “Political Culture” in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, Vol. 12, pp. 218-25, 1968). For a more recent and more polemical discussion of political culture as applied to the study of contemporary China, see The Mandarin and the Code: Aspects of Chinese Political Culture (University of Michigan China Center, forthcoming).


4. The dissertation was published 20 years later as Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China (Praeger, 1971). Leites and Pye continued to collaborate over the years, teaching a course together at MIT in the late 1960s and preparing a RAND monograph on “Nuances in Chinese Political Culture” (RAND, 1970).

5. In the late 1950s, Erikson had led a faculty seminar at MIT that many of its participants recall as one of the most stimulating occasions of their careers. For the best sense of Pye’s intellectual debt to Erikson, see “Personal Identity and Political Ideology,” a review article on Erikson’s Young Man Luther that explores the relevance of his approach for political scientists. (In Dwaine Marvick, ed., Political Decisionmakers [Free Press of Glencoe, 1961], pp. 290-313.)


7. The Mandarin and the Code is an extended exploration of this theme.

8. Asian Power and Politics: Cultural Dimensions of Authority (with Mary Pye) (Harvard University Press, 1985). Mary Pye’s formal designation as collaborator in this book is a thoroughly deserved tribute to the quiet but vital role she has played over the years as a highly skilled critic and editor of her husband’s prose. Some of his colleagues occasionally volunteer their help in this capacity, hoping more often than not to spare the author a subsequent critical jibe inspired by some unduly provocative bit of prose; their well-meaning advice is generally gratefully acknowledged and ignored. Mary alone speaks with authority.

9. Asian Power and Politics, p. 18. This skep-
ticism about "general propositions" seems in some way removed from the spirit that governed most analyses of modernization in the early years of the behavioral revolution, when the search for regularities and universal propositions was earnestly pursued. In a stimulating conceptual chapter, Pye discusses some of the ways in which his thinking about the modernization process has evolved since that time.

10. It is striking that both Samuel Huntington and Myron Weiner chose to conclude their contributions to the retrospective analysis they recently edited of scholarly thinking on political change in the Third World with a strong assertion of the need for greater attention to comparative analysis of the cultural dimensions of modernization. See Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Little, Brown & Co., 1987), pp. 28 and 60.

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The State and Its Study
The Whole and the Parts
The Third Annual
John Gaus Lecture

James W. Fesler
Yale University

John Gaus gave me my first job as a political scientist, one with the National Resources Committee (later rechristened the National Resources Planning Board). His group’s report, Regional Factors in National Planning and Development, included two chapters that constituted my first professional publication. Our frequent contacts thereafter were marked by the kindness and generosity on his part that so many of my generation found inspiring. His scholarly perspective and reflectiveness shaped the work of younger scholars. He so defined the horizons of public administration as to invite us to be political scientists and social scientists, not just narrow specialists in our subdiscipline.

He would be surprised, I believe, by the current tendency to view bureaucracy as dominant in the state. He would worry on two grounds. First, it misperceives the real-world situation. Second, it unduly magnifies the role of students of public ad-