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## TOPICAL REVIEW

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### UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: "LIBERAL," "RADICAL," AND "BUREAUCRATIC" PERSPECTIVES\*

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THIS ESSAY REVIEWS AND ANALYZES RECENT NORTH AMERICAN WRITING ON UNITED States-Latin American relations, particularly on the Alliance for Progress. It does not attempt to summarize or evaluate the Alliance's history as such, nor does it deal with Latin American perspectives on the Alliance (or more generally on inter-American relations), though I hope to treat these subjects in future works. What this article does instead is to analyze the dwindling North American literature on the Alliance for Progress, as a means of illuminating the state of scholarship in this country on United States-Latin American relations. I shall draw on available writings to illustrate my major theme, which is that United States analysts of inter-American relations tend to adopt either of two alternative perspectives. These perspectives, which I will call "liberal" and "radical" (using both words without quote marks hereafter), differ sharply in their sets of assumptions about the nature of United States-Latin American relations and, more generally, about politics in America, North and South. Each perspective provides insights for interpreting the Alliance and for explaining other aspects of inter-American relations; neither, by itself, seems to me satisfactory. In the final section of this essay, I shall attempt to sketch out a complementary "bureaucratic politics" perspective, one that is usually missing from both liberal and radical ac-

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counts, and suggest that this third perspective may be useful for analyzing United States policy toward Latin America.

I. When President John F. Kennedy proclaimed the Alliance for Progress in 1961, North American reaction to his initiative was almost unanimously favorable. The Alliance program, as announced by Kennedy and agreed to internationally at Punta del Este, reflected, in fact, a virtual consensus among United States specialists on Latin America regarding the nature of Latin America's needs, North American interests and responsibilities, and the steps needed to improve inter-American relations. The consensus was far from accidental, since those who drafted the Alliance commitment had drawn extensively on scholarly critiques of United States policy in framing their approach, and relied particularly on the suggestions of prominent Latin American economists and political leaders.<sup>1</sup> ECLA doctrines, dismissed by official Washington for years, suddenly appeared to be accepted, as the United States government embraced such concepts as economic planning, regional trade agreements, and international commodity arrangements. After years of resistance, the American government committed itself publicly to a long-term and substantial transfer of United States resources, including public aid, to assist Latin American development. Long-standing debates about the proper United States policy toward Latin American dictatorships seemed to be resolved as Washington (moving forward in this respect, as in several others, along a trend actually begun during the second Eisenhower administration) pledged to encourage democratic governments. Perhaps most important, the Alliance program appeared to represent a United States government decision to support, even to foster, major social and economic transformations in Latin America. The United States government seemed to be backing those who called for revolutionary change in the hemisphere (albeit through peaceful processes) and who would tackle what were perceived in Washington as the major obstacles to development in Latin America.<sup>2</sup> The Alliance program was acclaimed by United States specialists on Latin American affairs as "an innovation of tremendous significance in inter-American relations," a "dramatic and fundamental reorientation of Washington's policy," "a major turning point in the history of United States-Latin American relations."<sup>3</sup>

Acclaimed at its start, the Alliance for Progress quickly became the object of controversy, which has outlived the Alliance itself. An extensive literature—vast compared to what had been written on inter-American relations in the three decades before 1961—burgeoned, arguing many points of view.<sup>4</sup>

Amid all the controversy, however, agreement has emerged on one key point which we may accept as stipulated for the purpose of discussion: that during the 1960s a substantial gap arose between what Washington's early rhetoric promised and what the United States government actually did. United States economic assistance failed to reach the projected levels and debt service requirements and other capital transfers may even have produced a net outflow of financial resources from Latin America to the United States. American "aid" was not only insufficient in

magnitude but often turned out to be misdirected from the standpoint of advancing Latin American development; it became a "substantial device for profiteering at public risk" as various conditions were imposed to serve a variety of United States special interests.<sup>5</sup>

Non-economic aspects of the Alliance fared no better. The supposed United States resolve to back constitutional regimes and oppose military takeovers did not hold up, as a new wave of military regimes swept to power, several with apparent United States support. (A cartoonist for the *San Francisco Chronicle* even mused, "The Alliance for Progress is very successful; we're getting a much better class of military dictatorship."<sup>6</sup>) Examples of repeated United States intervention in Latin American politics—particularly in the Bay of Pigs episode, the Dominican invasion, and the Camelot affair—contradicted the pledges United States officials had made. Perhaps most important, the supposed United States commitment to peaceful revolutionary change went unredeemed. So unrevolutionary an observer as the Republican George Cabot Lodge concluded by 1969 that "the total effect of the Alliance has been to solidify the status quo, to entrench the oligarchy, and to heighten the obstacles to change."<sup>7</sup>

That the Alliance for Progress did not achieve its original stated objectives is widely accepted. Analyzing why the Alliance failed would involve not only an examination of American aims but an investigation and explanation of the effects of American actions in Latin America. That is a fascinating subject but it is beyond the scope of this essay. What I want to emphasize as a point of departure is the general agreement among North American analysts that the Alliance's rhetoric was not even a reliable guide to American actions in Latin America during the 1960s, let alone an adequate predictor of their effects. By the end of the 1960s, indeed, the actions of the United States Government in and toward Latin America bore so little resemblance to the declarations of national intent Washington had enunciated in 1961 that virtually all agreed the Alliance was dead, if it had ever lived.

II. What happened to the Alliance? Was it thwarted, sabotaged, or simply abandoned? Or was it never what it seemed at the start, but rather a verbal façade, cloaking "real" American aims?

Two main categories of explanation dominate the extensive North American literature on the Alliance for Progress. Each reflects a major tradition in United States thinking about inter-American relations.<sup>8</sup> Each perspective has also been influenced by recent more general writings on foreign affairs: a similar liberal/radical split divides most scholars now writing on Vietnam and the Cold War.<sup>9</sup> Both because of Latin American and more general events, the liberal perspective is less pervasive than it was in the early 1960s, although it probably still informs a majority of books and articles on inter-American affairs. The radical perspective, in turn, has gained much more acceptance in recent years, especially among younger scholars. Whatever its appeal, however, each view leaves unanswered some significant questions about United States policy toward Latin America.

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The liberal approach, which underlay the Alliance itself, assumes an essential compatibility of interest between the United States and Latin America.<sup>10</sup> Additional key liberal assumptions are that the United States has a national interest, with respect to Latin America, "different from and superior to the private interests of any sector of American enterprise or of business enterprise as a whole," and that the United States Government is capable of defining and pursuing that interest.<sup>11</sup>

According to the liberal interpretation, historic difficulties between the United States and Latin America have arisen because of past United States policies now assumed to be non-recurrent ("gunboat" and "dollar diplomacy" especially); temporary confusions of private United States interests with the national public interest; North American neglect of Latin America; and "pervasive, serious and persistent misunderstanding" between the United States and Latin America, attributed to cultural differences and inadequate information.<sup>12</sup> The liberal view asserts that President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy dealt successfully with all four causes of inter-American tension; the United States Government paid attention to Latin America, ended unacceptable governmental actions, subordinated private interests to national concern (as in the case of the Mexican oil expropriation), and worked to enhance mutual understanding throughout the Americas. In undertaking these efforts, "The Roosevelt Administration, fortunately for the United States, was doing much to prepare Latin America psychologically for joining in a hemisphere-wide defense program to meet an external threat," but this important result of Roosevelt's initiative is regarded by most liberal writers as largely fortuitous, not as a clue to the United States government's intentions.<sup>13</sup>

Following World War II, American concern focused sharply on Europe and particularly on Russia, erstwhile ally of the United States but by then regarded as its natural rival. United States officials once again paid little attention to Latin American problems and issues, except for arranging regional defense measures. Latin American hopes that the United States would extend its Marshall Plan concept to the Western Hemisphere were disappointed, and Latin American attempts through the OAS to win United States trade concessions made little headway. United States policy towards Latin America during this period was not particularly exploitative, according to the liberal view, but simply ignored regional matters, which were not salient in Washington.

By the late 1950s, however, Latin American problems forced themselves back up toward the top of the United States foreign policy agenda. Among the specific reasons for Washington's increased attention to Latin America were the hostile reception accorded to Vice President Nixon on his 1958 trip to South America, the less dramatic but nevertheless important impressions of Latin America gathered by Milton Eisenhower, the President's brother, and especially the accession to power in nearby Cuba of a regime perceived as a threat to United States interests. Also influential were the increasingly forceful writings by Latin Americans, Raúl Prebisch most prominent among them, who argued that the United States and other industrial powers were largely responsible for Latin America's development problems because

the terms on which Latin American countries (and other "peripheral" areas) traded with the "central" powers were structured to the "periphery's" (i.e., Latin America's) disadvantage.<sup>14</sup>

Slowly but surely, according to the liberal account, the reasons for Latin American discontent with United States policy came to be understood in Washington. Steps began to be taken to assist Latin America, starting with the United States government's long-delayed decisions to welcome the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank and to pledge \$500 million in soft term capital to its Social Progress Trust Fund. Out of these steps, given increased impetus by the Kennedy campaign's political thrust and by the influence of Kennedy's advisors on Latin American affairs, came the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance is seen by liberal writers as a genuine United States government commitment to cooperate with Latin American countries in pursuing the ambitious political, social, and economic objectives proclaimed at Punta del Este.<sup>15</sup> Liberal writers agree that the Alliance was intended ultimately to promote United States national security and United States private economic interests, both of which were thought compatible with, indeed dependent upon, social and economic progress in Latin America.<sup>16</sup> Liberal writers do not pretend that United States policy was selfless and disinterested, but assert that the promotion of genuine Latin American economic and social development was central to the Alliance as a mutual aim of the United States and the other countries of the hemisphere.

Specific liberal explanations of separate aspects of the Alliance's overall failure (or abandonment) differ. All have in common, however, the assertion of a dichotomy between benevolent United States intentions and unfortunate actions. The latter are attributed to particular causes, even sometimes to accidental or contingent forces. The Alliance's disappointing record tends to be chalked up to "half-hearted execution" or to "lack of implementation" (either right from the start or following President Kennedy's death and Teodoro Moscoso's replacement as Alliance Coordinator).<sup>17</sup> It is argued that the Alliance's original aims were attenuated, and some even dropped, because of a series of intense short-term pressures to which responsible United States officials understandably but "erroneously" succumbed: to score immediate political impact, to gain Congressional support for foreign aid by serving local and special interests, and to help alleviate the United States balance of payments difficulties.<sup>18</sup> Objectives which apparently were assumed to be consistent at first—economic growth, social equity, political stability, constitutional democracy, the promotion of United States private economic interests, and the protection of United States national security—turned out to be in conflict. Some objectives were necessarily subordinated to others; liberal writers usually argue that the "wrong" aims were given preference.

Another reason for the Alliance's failure, according to liberal writers, was inadequate North American understanding of the nature of Latin American politics. The Alliance had been based on a "consensus model" of Latin American politics, which supposed that the traditional oligarchic pattern in Latin America was being

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replaced by a process of struggle and compromise among conflicting interest groups not unlike the United States political process.<sup>19</sup> “Middle sector” elements were believed to be the leading actors in Latin American politics by 1960, and to be committed to the Alliance’s political, economic, and social goals.<sup>20</sup> But the hoped-for democratic and progressive commitment of the “middle sectors” turned out to be largely illusory as middle class politicians showed themselves to be committed most of all to their own advancement. Often they allied with the traditional elites, whose values, attitudes, and consumption patterns they tended to emulate; they were not suitable “allies for progress.”<sup>21</sup>

Liberal writers are not uncritical of United States policy toward Latin America during the Alliance period; some, indeed, are devastatingly critical. Their attacks, however, are generally limited to questioning the efficacy of individual officials (or, at most, of sets of officials) and the appropriateness of their decisions, which are seen as “mistakes,” based on erroneous judgments or calculations, inadequate information, or faulty understanding. Some liberal writers appreciate that the repeated pattern of American actions suggests a more systemic explanation, but even they see the Alliance’s abandonment as essentially unnecessary and invariably conclude their expositions with exhortations to American officials henceforth to resist extraneous pressures and to pursue the Alliance’s original goals. The emphasis in liberal critiques is on the supposed discontinuities and contradictions between the aims of American policy, specific American actions, and their consequences.

Perhaps it would be useful here to illustrate the liberal approach by drawing on Riordan Roett’s *The Politics of Foreign Aid in Northeast Brazil*.<sup>22</sup>

Brazil’s vast, drought-stricken, bitterly poor northeast provinces seemed ready in the early 1960s to become the arena for a major attempt to undertake regional development based on structural changes: agrarian reform, industrialization, and a general realignment of political power. Dedicated and astute Brazilian leadership was available for this attempt in the person of Celso Furtado. Administrative flexibility and power were furnished by the national government’s Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE). Political clout had been achieved by bringing together a broadly-based coalition drawing on reformist politicians, urban workers, politicized students, and the new church. All that was lacking, or so it seemed, was material resources, which could be provided from abroad if external donors were willing to back the comprehensive development scheme Furtado and SUDENE proposed.

By July 1961, when President Kennedy received Furtado personally at the White House and attentively discussed SUDENE’s needs, the stage seemed set for a major United States effort to assist economic, social, and political change in a particularly needy region of Latin America. By early 1962, when USAID’s Northeast Survey Mission Team reported to President Kennedy—supporting SUDENE and Furtado and accepting the latter’s views on the preferred nature, scope, and modalities of United States assistance—all appeared ready for a major test of the Alliance



for Progress. AID now set up its only regional mission anywhere in the world in Recife, capital of Brazil's northeast, and prepared to help SUDENE.

Professor Roett's careful, well-documented study shows, however, that AID's effects on Northeast Brazil during the next few years "counteracted" the Alliance's stated goals of supporting social and economic change. AID's overall impact, Roett argues, was to undermine Furtado, to bypass SUDENE, and to help dissipate the coalition for structural change Furtado and SUDENE had so painstakingly assembled. The Northeast Survey Mission Team's alignment with Furtado turned out not to be binding on the United States government as a whole; USAID/Recife, USAID/Rio, and the political section of the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro were all more interested that AID should have an immediate political impact in Northeast Brazil (to combat supposed Communist influence there) than in longer-term, more fundamental programs. This emphasis on short-term political gain, in turn, induced AID to rely on direct agreements with state governments for school construction and similar projects rather than to work through SUDENE on more basic, change-oriented plans. AID's funds, channeled through the entrenched power brokers, thus wound up strengthening the traditional oligarchy's hold on northeast Brazil. American development assistance in northeast Brazil consequently hampered Brazil's modernization efforts, and suggested that "foreign aid can have a deleterious effect on a developing nation."<sup>23</sup>

Why was the proclaimed United States interest in supporting structural change abandoned in practice? Roett attributes this twist to a "basic misunderstanding" between Furtado and American officials as to the nature of the problem: "Furtado saw the northeast as a national economic and social problem; the United States viewed the region as an international security problem and foreign economic assistance as a weapon against a threat Brazil did not unanimously recognize."<sup>25</sup> Thus USAID moved away from SUDENE's priorities and eventually came to regard SUDENE as an obstacle.

In concentrating on immediate political impact, Roett argues, the United States government was "short-sighted." Failing to comprehend Furtado's priorities and needs and to perceive the political balance in the northeast, the United States "misjudged."<sup>26</sup> Such flaws, Roett suggests, produced the Alliance "failure" in northeast Brazil. Roett, in short, takes at face value all the Alliance's professed goals and the expressed intent of the early Kennedy administration's originally enunciated foreign aid philosophy, which he thinks were unnecessarily abandoned in northeast Brazil and elsewhere.<sup>27</sup>

III. The radical perspective on United States policy toward Latin America, and specifically on the Alliance for Progress, differs sharply from that embodied in liberal accounts.<sup>28</sup> Increasingly plausible to a generation of North Americans painfully seeking to make sense of this country's destructive acts abroad, especially in Asia but also in this hemisphere, the radical perspective offers a clear and understandable, if

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disturbing, vision of recent and contemporary United States foreign policy. Stated with different levels of subtlety by different authors, the radical view characteristically includes one theme: that United States foreign policies primarily serve the expansive interests of North American capitalism.

What liberals regard as mistakes, accidents, and discontinuities, radicals interpret as a rational, coherent, and continuous pattern. What liberals ascribe to misunderstanding and misjudgments, radicals tend to attribute to the designs of American officials, or at least to the predictable actions officials undertake, wittingly or unwittingly, in futherance of their institutional and class interests. Whereas liberals puzzle over apparent contradictions between United States purposes and the instruments chosen to advance them, radicals see clear linkages. What liberal writers believe unnecessary, radicals think to be determined by the requirements of the North American system. What liberals find surprising, radicals regard as predictable.

More fundamentally, whereas liberal critics presume an essential compatibility of interests between the United States and the countries of Latin America, radicals explain inter-American relations in terms of a basic conflict between the aim of the United States to dominate Latin America and the Latin Americans' urge to achieve sovereignty. And while liberals distinguish between a broader United States national interest and the interests of American business enterprises, radicals understand the latter to dictate the objectives of United States foreign policy, at least as a general rule. The United States government is believed to be capable of perceiving clearly and pursuing single-mindedly what is in the interests of American business—and to do so.

What is seen as a long-standing pattern of insistent United States political, military, and economic intervention in Latin America—epitomized during the first three decades of this century—is regarded by radicals as intrinsic to United States-Latin American relations. The Good Neighbor Policy is viewed, not as a substantive shift of United States policy, but simply as the choice of a new instrument to pursue the traditional United States aim: containing and exploiting Latin America. The United States, it is argued, prefers allies in the Western Hemisphere to be dependable and weak; the Good Neighbor Policy was allegedly established and structured with that goal in mind.<sup>29</sup>

Following World War II, with its effect of submerging United States—Latin American differences in common defense against the extra-hemispheric threat, the fundamental antagonism between the United States and Latin America emerged again, according to the radical interpretation. Nations which questioned North American hegemony—Argentina, Guatemala, and Cuba being the most dramatic examples—suffered United States intervention. The OAS and other inter-American institutions were used systematically to reinforce Latin American dependence on the United States. The driving force behind North American policy, radicals suggest, has always been the expansive need of private capitalism, which has adopted one means after another to protect and extend its stake in Latin America (and elsewhere). A typical statement is Dale Johnson's:



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Foreign policy flows naturally, and by and large rationally, from the structure described. The basis of United States foreign policy is a conception of national interest as inherently involved in the strengthening of international capitalism against the threats of socialism and nationalism. . . . United States private investment, aid programs, foreign policy, military assistance, military interventions, and international agencies, under the influence or control of the international business community, are interwoven and oriented toward the promotion and maintenance of influence and control in other countries.<sup>30</sup>

The Alliance for Progress, in the radical view, was perhaps the most sophisticated instrument of United States policy toward Latin America fashioned to date. It is argued that the Alliance was, from the start and in concept, a means to advance United States private economic interests in Latin America.<sup>31</sup> American interests were to be served specifically by reopening the area to United States investors and facilitating inter-American trade and, more generally, by preserving and reinforcing the socio-economic status quo in Latin America in order to preclude structural changes that might restrict the scope for United States business. Since North American "development" and Latin American "underdevelopment" have always been causally linked, radicals contend, the United States necessarily sees its interest in the preservation of Latin American dependence.<sup>32</sup> The Alliance was "merely one more means of integrating Latin America into the international system which creates dependency and hinders development in the region."<sup>33</sup>

Radicals regard the supposed Alliance commitments to a variety of other goals—social progress, more equitable income distribution, etc.—either as mere verbal glosses on traditional policies or else as the cynical cloaking of North American intent. Some go so far as to attribute virtually all American programs, however apparently benevolent—programs to expand agricultural production or even to control malaria, for instance—to the United States drive to dominate.<sup>34</sup> Others are willing to concede some non-exploitative, even reformist, motives to American officials, but argue that these aims are always subordinated to the primary goal of assuring domination.<sup>35</sup>

As for the supposedly misplaced United States reliance on "middle sector" elements as potential allies for progress, radicals contend that the United States government chose correctly those forces in Latin America which would cooperate with the North American program to reinforce the status quo. Radical critics, usually grounding their approach in Marxian analysis, generally adopt a "conflict theory" of Latin American politics, in which a fundamental struggle between classes is seen as central. So-called "middle sectors" are understood as having either joined or displaced traditional power-holders in the satisfied segment of society, and more important, as exactly that part of the satisfied segment likely to ally with external influence to solidify its position against lower class challenge.

It would be most interesting to illustrate the radical perspective by citing a specific radical alternative to Roett's appraisal of the Alliance's experience in north-

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east Brazil. Unfortunately, I have not found a good example; radical critics tend, indeed to eschew case-study treatments, preferring usually to deal in broad-brush terms.\* The most useful radical piece on northeast Brazil I could find, Joseph Page's recently published volume, concentrates much more on Brazilian events and personalities than on United States policies, and relies mainly on Roett's study for material on American attitudes and actions.<sup>36</sup> Drawing on Page and on the radical perspective generally, one can speculate however, that a full-blown radical account would deny that the Alliance was a failure in northeast Brazil, given its "real" objectives. It would suggest that, far from revealing faulty judgment and lack of understanding in undercutting SUDENE, the United States government displayed thereby its acumen and skill. Not shortsighted at all, in terms of their primary goals, United States officials short-circuited a structural solution to Brazil's development problems at precisely the crucial moment, thus assuring a perpetuation of Brazil's internal domination and external dependence. The northeast Brazil case would be seen as an example of the Alliance's aim to contain Latin America by thwarting basic change. "From this perspective," according to Page, "the work of USAID and the CIA must be deemed a great success. The forces of radicalism were defeated, the status quo remained secure, and the northeast did not become 'another Cuba.'" <sup>37</sup>

André Gunder Frank's more general view of Brazil-United States relations states the radical position well:

Far from contributing capital to, and improving the structure of, the Brazilian economy, the United States draws capital out of Brazil and with what remains gains control of Brazilian capital and channels it into directions that increase Brazil's dependence on the United States and hinder Brazil's economic growth. The terms of trade form neither an accidental or an extraneous but an integral part of this process. Far from pointing the way to Brazil's industrialization and development, the American Ambassador's recommended policies—emphasis on private enterprise, foreign investment, more raw material exports, etc.—would maintain Brazil's position as an underdeveloped, dependent economy.<sup>38</sup>

IV. Although sharply different, the liberal and radical perspectives on the Alliance for Progress and on inter-American relations generally share important traits. Each treats the Alliance as if it were a coherent policy, or set of policies, produced by a central apparatus. Each, indeed, accepts the "rational policy model" of foreign policy, assuming that policies are made by unitary, rational actors (analogous to individuals) choosing instruments in accord with established purposes.<sup>39</sup> Liberals tend to assume that policies are derived from stated objectives—some combination of "ideals" and "external political interests" (security, etc.)—although they usually

\* The work promoted by the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) to stimulate and facilitate empirical research on inter-American relations from a radical perspective represents a potentially important contribution, although few finished research projects are available to date.

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concede that policies also respond partly to "internal political and economic interests;" radicals tend mainly to discount the significance of the first two and to highlight the third.<sup>40</sup> But both concur that "the government" perceives interests, defines goals, makes decisions, and takes action in accord with identifiable aims.

Liberals, puzzled in the case of the Alliance for Progress by the evident dichotomy between stated purposes and perceived actions (and their consequences), explain the difference by arguing that the U.S. government abandoned its purpose, for the kinds of reasons outlined above. Radicals, struck by the same dichotomy, tend to impute purposes from actions and results, and to argue, therefore, that the Alliance's main stated goals were not its "real" ones, or at least not its primary ones. (It may not be accidental, then, that there are so few empirical studies of the Alliance's history grounded in the radical perspective. Since the radical tends to equate results with "policy," there is little to puzzle about in examining the Alliance's demise and no reason to study in detail why things turned out as they did.)\*

A second trait shared in liberal and radical writings on the Alliance—probably associated with their mutual reliance on the concept and language of "purpose" and their assumption of a unitary, rational actor who can be educated or blamed—is the tendency to present analysis and explanation with a strong overlay of evaluation, even exhortation. Hardly a book or article on the Alliance for Progress concludes without either an appeal to American officials to resurrect its principles and establish them as a guide for United States actions or a condemnation of the officers for exploiting Latin America and for their hypocrisy in announcing a "policy" so different from their real intentions. Even the most thorough and far-reaching liberal critics (De Onis and Levinson, Lodge, and Roett, for example) frame their argument in terms of particular failures and feel compelled to suggest still another Alliance effort. On the other hand, few radical writers are content to "tell it like it is;" they are generally outraged that it should be so. Implicitly or explicitly, they call for a basic change in the United States (including an end to capitalism), which would presumably remove the need for North American exploitation of Latin America and the Third World. The possibility that "domination" and "dependence" might characterize United States-Latin American relations regardless of the intentions of United States officials or even of the nature of the North American economy does not appear to concern radical critics, whose indignant tone suggests they assume these relations could be transformed.<sup>41</sup>

A third trait which I believe is shared in liberal and radical perspectives is the inability to provide a satisfying, consistent, and concise explanation for both the AI-

\* A second reason why the radical literature on inter-American affairs generally lacks substantial empirical support may be that the radical task so far has been largely reactive and critical, aimed at contradicting the established liberal framework. As the radical critique becomes increasingly conventional at U.S. universities, one may expect a turn toward more substantial research projects such as NACLA proposes. An interesting question is whether these will be funded by established sources of support.

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liance's birth and its death. The liberal view seems to account satisfactorily for the Alliance's creation, and the more detailed and critical versions provide plausible explanations of why this or that aspect of the Alliance was abandoned. But the stark dichotomy between the Alliance's rhetoric and United States actions during the 1960s is too overwhelming to leave one satisfied with the liberal explanation of the Alliance as a policy adopted and then abandoned, which could (or even should) be adopted again. Why did the United States government so completely abandon a policy announced with such fanfare? Liberals pose the question that way, and find no easy answer; many focus, therefore, on personalities like Lyndon Johnson and Thomas C. Mann to explain the supposed shift.<sup>42</sup>

The radical critique, on the other hand, assumes away the problem of explaining the gap between the Alliance's rhetoric and its reality by positing that United States actions in Latin America during the 1960s faithfully reflected "real" initial intentions, regardless of what was said. Radicals emphasize the North American aim to isolate and defeat the Cuban revolution as central to the Alliance's content, style, and timing. They stress, too, the predominant United States concern with security, reflected in the counterinsurgency programs which from the start accompanied the Alliance. But why, then, all the flamboyant North American talk about transforming structures in Latin America, about revolutionary social and economic change there? Radical critics can only presume that the Alliance's rhetorical commitment to change was an elaborate put-on, intended to camouflage the traditional American aim to dominate, or else that it is evidence of minimal understanding by United States officials as to what inter-American relations are really all about. That so many North Americans (including officials as well as the authors of liberal accounts) apparently took the Alliance's early rhetoric seriously can only be attributed to self-delusion or hypocrisy.

V. At least part of what is inadequate about both the liberal and radical perspectives on the Alliance for Progress might be corrected by consideration of what Graham Allison and others have called the "bureaucratic politics" perspective. This approach, rare among published analyses of inter-American relations, treats United States policy not as the choice of a single, rational actor, but rather as the product of a series of overlapping and interlocking bargaining processes within the North American system, involving both intra-governmental and extra-governmental actors.<sup>43</sup> Although these processes take place within established parameters and are importantly affected by extra-bureaucratic constraints, including shared values, their products are also very much influenced by events and procedures internal to governmental organizations and often minimized (or overlooked) by liberal and radical observers.

The Alliance for Progress as proclaimed in early 1961 may be seen from this perspective as the temporary outcome of internal American political processes which continued to take place thereafter and subsequently produce different results. If

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one focuses not on the presumed aims of the Alliance as the supposed policy of the United States government as an entity but rather on how the Alliance program came to be declared and later to be implemented (or not), the history and significance of the Alliance for Progress may be better understood.

Numerous North American individuals and organizations affect Latin America in some way. The set of those directly affecting United States government policies toward Latin America is much more restricted but nonetheless considerable. Private business and non-business interests of different kinds and degrees of influence play their roles. Business entities—from mineral exporters to tropical fish salesmen—want special consideration for whatever they buy, sell, or make, or else general improvement in the terms and conditions under which they work. Non-commercial private interests—religious groups, trade unions, academic specialists and institutions, groups united by common interests or causes, foundations, journalists and press associations, etc.—bring a wide variety of aims and perspectives to bear with differing degrees of effectiveness at various points in the policy-making process.

Within the United States government, too, a great number of interests and views come into play. Each agency has its own clientele and constituencies, its own personnel and recruitment, its own tasks and routines, its own piece of the mosaic. The Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency busy themselves mainly with protecting what are regarded as United States security interests, and scour Latin America looking for potential "threats." But the Defense Department is also out to protect its various institutional interests—to sell surplus or new equipment, for instance—and no agency escapes that tendency. The Treasury Department concerns itself with protecting the United States balance of payments, the Commerce Department with expanding United States exports, and the Agriculture Department with disposing of surplus crops. The White House staff, presumably imbued with the President's own perspective and concerned (among other matters) especially with his prestige and influence, is sensitive not only to possible threats but also to whatever opportunities are presented by Latin American issues to enhance the President's position. The White House staff is particularly aware of the partisan political implications of Latin American policy decisions and may provide the main point of access for those with political claims. The State Department, lacking its own constituency, is responsive to pressures from all sides; its institutional bias is probably toward continuity and toward accommodation with foreign governments. And aside from all these institutional interests affecting intra-governmental considerations of Latin American issues, there are the personal stakes of individuals whose views on specific matters are inevitably bound up with their own egos and ambitions and are conditioned by their psychological make-up.<sup>44</sup>

United States policy toward Latin America (or toward other foreign policy issues) emerges from the interplay of many actors who take part in a political process so arranged that it "has the effect of guaranteeing that those interests and points of view that are organized and articulate are injected without much alteration right into the center of the decision-making process."<sup>45</sup> Each of the actors has a different weight

and influence, depending on many considerations: the substance of the issue being considered and the context in which it is raised; the power, skills, stakes, and style of participants in the policy-making process, and their relative access to the relevant action and implementation channels; even the order in which participants take part. Actors with varying, sometimes conflicting, aims and views may have predominant influence with respect to different but related issues. The overall outcome of the process, therefore, need not be coherent, and often is not. That agencies with differing concepts, personnel, and procedures are eventually called upon to "implement policy," and thereby to shape it, further increases the likelihood that what comes out of the policy-making process reflects at least some of the variety of interests which feed in. (There are limits, of course, to what goes in, in the sense, for example, that no individual or organization is knowingly pursuing an objective adverse to the interests of all North Americans and that shared premises and values importantly shape the goals and procedures of all actors.) The relative importance of various influences on policy-making may vary greatly over time, and governmental actions and "policy" may consequently change, sometimes dramatically, with or without an amendment of official pronouncements.<sup>46</sup>

In the case of the Alliance for Progress, one may discern several reasons why the amalgam of influences on the North American policy-making process was critically different at the moment of the Alliance's inception from what it would be at any later point. Consideration of the Alliance came early in the administration of a new president, at a time when the United States policy-making process always is unusually centralized and therefore more accessible than normally to those who propose new measures and who are more likely to frame a coherent, inclusive formulation.<sup>47</sup> Not only was the early Kennedy administration, like all incipient regimes, receptive to novel and comprehensive approaches to old problems; it was particularly interested in a new mode for dealing with Latin America, an area which the presidential candidate had cited repeatedly as an example of the Republican administration's failure in foreign affairs.<sup>48</sup> The new President sought a policy for Latin America, consistent with his administration's New Frontier commitment to "get America moving again," which would visibly draw on active United States involvement to improve inter-American relations.

Given the nature of Kennedy's political coalition and the makeup of his immediate staff, the new administration turned to scholars for advice in designing its Latin American policy. Specialists, many of them personally and professionally committed to "inter-American cooperation" and particularly attentive to Latin American points of view, advocated changed North American attitudes and actions in order to remove what they considered to be artificial obstacles to improved United States-Latin American relations. Other groups in addition to academic specialists had exceptional access to policy-makers at the time the Alliance program was designed. Puerto Rican and other Caribbean politicians such as Luis Muñoz Marín, Teodoro Moscoso, Arturo Morales Carrión, Rómulo Betancourt, and José Figueres had a channel to the White House, mainly because they were closely linked to Adolf Berle,



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who directed the Latin American task force and to other of the eastern liberal Democratic advisers (like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.) who surrounded President Kennedy and wrote many of his speeches.<sup>49</sup> Some of these advisers, plus some Washington-based South American economists, even participated closely with the White House staff in drafting President Kennedy's major speech of March 13, 1961, outlining the Alliance. The State Department, on the contrary, had little hand in it.<sup>50</sup>

Those with a personal and ideological stake in promoting institutional democracy thus had a great deal to do with formulating the Alliance; career diplomats, who traditionally seek non-hostile relations with all types of regimes (not just democracies) were little more than bystanders at this point, though they were later expected to put American "policy" into effect. A similar division plagued the management of Latin American policy well into the Kennedy Administration, as Latin American policy decisions were largely entrusted to Berle, Schlesinger, and Goodwin, while one candidate after another turned down the post of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.<sup>51</sup> Even after Robert F. Woodward was appointed, in June 1961, the struggle between "Kennedy men" and "career men" continued to shape United States policy.<sup>52</sup> As the President's own concern with Latin American issues diminished, so did the influence of his personal appointees relative to that of established bureaucrats.

While academic specialists, Caribbean politicians, and presidential assistants had considerable influence on the making of United States policy toward Latin America early in the Kennedy Administration, other actors, conversely, had extraordinarily reduced roles. Corporate influence, particularly, was unusually limited for a number of reasons. First, President Kennedy's personal concern about the supposed security threat in Latin America—a concern deepened by Castro's stance in Cuba and reinforced by Khrushchev's January 1961 announcement of Russian support for "wars of national liberation"—caused the White House early in 1961 to approach Latin America mainly in national strategic terms.

Second, while many businessmen had been among those exercising policy-making responsibilities during the Eisenhower administration, they were rare among Kennedy's appointees. Of his first 200 appointments, 6 per cent came from business and 18 per cent from universities and foundations, compared to 42 per cent and 6 per cent respectively for the same posts in the Eisenhower period.<sup>53</sup> Finally, and perhaps most importantly, corporate interests and leaders were not generally part of the circle to which President Kennedy's key advisers on Latin America (especially Schlesinger, Goodwin, and Ralph Dungan in the White House) naturally responded, nor did they comprise a major part of the President's domestic political constituency.<sup>54</sup>

Far from reflecting big business domination of United States foreign policy, therefore, the Alliance for Progress commitment emerged in part because of the unusual (and temporary) reduction of corporate influence in the foreign policy-making process. The few businessmen involved in early Alliance policy-making were primarily those who favored the kind of Latin American development the Alliance promised to promote. And the Alliance's main goals had been established before these

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men had even been consulted. The Alliance for Progress was not dictated by big business interests, nor was it a mere rhetorical pose, adopted simply to camouflage traditional North American imperial designs. Rather, the Alliance's proclamation resulted from a political and bureaucratic process stacked temporarily to weight the influence of persons and groups genuinely interested in the Alliance's stated goals. If the Alliance rhetoric camouflaged anything, it was not the intentions of the framers but rather the lack of substantial agreement throughout the United States bureaucracy regarding the priority and feasibility of the announced aims.

Examination, from the bureaucratic politics perspective, of the origins of the Alliance tends to contradict the radical position as argued in the available literature. A bureaucratic politics approach to the Alliance's implementation phase, however, lends support—if not to the radical position as generally argued—to the basic radical contention that the United States government's virtual abandonment of the Alliance's reform thrust was not accidental but rather a predictable result of the way foreign policy-making relates to the North American economy. For when the salience of Latin American security problems diminished and the normal processes and channels for considering Latin American issues had been restored, the extensive United States business interests involved in Latin America were able to make themselves felt more forcefully again. (The confluence of substantial transnational relations between the United States and Latin America and the relative unimportance of security considerations in this hemisphere remain, indeed, the major facts shaping contemporary inter-American relations.)

Partly because corporate attempts to influence Latin American policies were systematic and sustained, business groups were able eventually to transform several Alliance programs into instruments for North American private gain, however far this result had been from the intent of those who drafted the Alliance's early doctrines. Partly because United States military attempts to assure continuing influence in Latin America were persistent and unimpeded, security aspects of the Alliance evolved from a coordinate aspect of United States policy into a predominant one. Partly because those who pressed for social, political, and economic reforms as the essence of the Alliance had so few bases of support in the North American political and economic system, including the bureaucracy, those parts of the Alliance program soon lost force. Asking the State Department bureaucracy to implement a policy adversely affecting United States private interests as well as perhaps undermining the power base of foreign governments with which the United States maintained friendly relations, without instituting major administrative and political efforts to assure that these programs would actually be carried out, was predictably ineffective. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. took delight in his ability to take "full advantage of the White House leverage and the presidential mandate" to assure that a document he drafted on Latin American policy emerged "substantially intact" from the bureaucracy.<sup>55</sup> One more sensitive to bureaucratic politics would have been at least as concerned about what

happened to the implementation of "policies" after such documents had been cleared."\*

VI. This article suggests that to explain or predict United States governmental actions in and toward Latin America (whether during the Alliance period or at any other time) one should probably not start—or at least certainly not stop—with the question, "what goals account for American actions?" Nor should one make the assumption that the United States government as a whole pursues an objective (or a set of objectives) which may be either presumed or imputed. Distinct organizations within the United States government, and even individuals and groups within organizations, pursue their own aims in accord with varying concepts, premises, and procedures. Clearly, some of these aims and concepts coincide (or nearly do so) across the government and even over time, accounting in part for some of the regularities in the international behavior of the United States. Generally accepted values, images, and premises set some of the parameters for United States foreign policy, and explication of all these should be central for foreign policy analysis.† But these common elements do not explain all foreign policy occurrences; intra-governmental differences, even conflicts, account for much of what is puzzling.

To improve our understanding of United States policy towards Latin America, we should be concerned not only with goals and results, as liberal and radical writers are, but also with other factors which determine foreign policy outcomes. In particular, we should focus more on the bureaucratic and political processes which translate (often inadequately) intent into action.‡

\* The usefulness of an approach focusing on organizational processes and bureaucratic politics might be further suggested by considering the case of northeast Brazil. Available material and time do not permit me to frame an alternative interpretation of the Brazil case here, but an analyst sensitive to the foreign policy-making process would ask questions like these; Who in the United States government took an interest in northeast Brazil? How, why, when, and for how long was that interest demonstrated? In what ways did the identity, stakes, and relative influence of participants in the process of making United States policy toward northeast Brazil change over time? What different assumptions were made by various United States actors about the nature of northeast Brazil's problems and about United States interests there? How did those assumptions relate to the primary missions of each of the various United States agencies involved? What mechanisms existed to assure that the perspective and premises of the President and the White House staff would be shared by State Department, AID, and CIA officials in Rio and Recife? What were the standard operating procedures of the United States mission in Brazil (for reporting on the use of United States funds, for instance), and how did these affect the concerns and actions of United States personnel?

† I regard as perhaps the most fruitful area for research on United States policy precisely the analysis of the various factors which structure and constrain bureaucratic consideration of alternative foreign policy actions, and how they do so.

‡ I should perhaps emphasize that this essay addresses itself only to the study of United States government policy toward Latin America, not more generally to United States-Latin American relations. The "bureaucratic politics" perspective is presumably somewhat less useful for studying the latter subject because it focuses attention on governmental decisions and actions, rather than on the series of non-governmental national and transnational processes which so

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The available writings on the Alliance, and on the making of United States foreign policy toward Latin America generally, do not facilitate this kind of analysis. Much more work has been done comparing acts and their consequences to stated purposes (and thereby evaluating "policy") than showing how varying aims relate to each other in the decision-making and implementation process. It would be most useful if some students of United States policy toward Latin America undertook to study the relative influence on policy formulation and implementation, at different stages and with respect to different kinds of issues, of a number of different actors. Most, perhaps all, of the main institutional actors—inside government and out—have been identified, but little empirical work has been done on how each contributes to the making of Latin American policy. Studies are needed, for instance, of the people who take part in the policy-making process at each of several points: their attitudes, assumptions, values, training, psychological characteristics, socio-economic ties, etc.<sup>56</sup> Research is required to identify the characteristic action channels for several types of policy issues and to ascertain who has what kinds of access at what stages, to those channels. It would be helpful to analyze the processes by which information about Latin American issues is sought, analyzed, and communicated in various parts of the bureaucracy, and to determine how the premises underlying the questions asked differ from agency to agency. Examination of the control and coordination mechanisms affecting United States policy toward Latin America would also be helpful.

Case studies are needed of how United States government policies have been made with respect to various kinds of issues—commodity agreements, treatment of United States investments, military assistance, etc.—involving several different agencies and interests. Detailed studies are also required on how the United States government has managed (or failed to manage) its overall relations with various countries of the hemisphere affected differently by the expression of United States interests through different government institutions. And research is needed on the mechanisms used by private organizations, including national and transnational institutions and especially corporate enterprises, to affect United States government policy or to bypass it.

In short, improved studies of United States policy toward Latin America will require hard work, some of it focused on the American policy-making process.\* It is hoped that this essay, exploring some of the inadequacies of the conventional liberal

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importantly affect the overall interaction between North America and Latin America. Even for studying the latter, however, an approach concentrating on bureaucratic structure and behavior should be helpful.

\* Obviously, other research emphases are also desirable. More must be done to analyze the specific consequences of the manifest assymetries of various kinds of power which characterize United States-Latin American relations. The concepts of dependence theory must be formulated in the form of testable hypotheses and applied to particular cases. The effects in the United States and in Latin America of prevailing concepts in each region about the nature of politics in the other might be profitably studied, as might the processes by which each society informs itself about the other. Further examples abound.

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and radical approaches to that task, and suggesting the usefulness of a complementary bureaucratic politics perspective, may be a useful contribution.

### NOTES

1. See Lincoln Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 5; Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago, 1970), 52–56.
2. According to Federico Gil, for instance, the United States was “offering to underwrite a social revolution in Latin America.” See Federico Gil, *Latin American-United States Relations* (N.Y., 1971), 240.
3. The three phrases quoted from Herbert K. May, *Problems and Prospects of the Alliance for Progress* (N.Y., 1968), 33; Levinson and De Onis, *op. cit.*, 5; and Gil, *op. cit.*, 227.
4. A useful listing, fairly complete through 1969, is Paquita Vivó, “A Guide to Writings on the Alliance for Progress” (Press Division, Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., Jan. 1970).
5. The quoted phrase is from Simon G. Hanson, *Five Years of the Alliance for Progress: An Appraisal* (Washington, D.C., 1967), 13.
6. *Ibid.*, 121.
7. George Cabot Lodge, *Engines of Change: United States Interests and Revolution in Latin America* (N.Y., 1970), 345.
8. The liberal tradition is discussed extensively below. The radical approach was largely dormant during World War II and much of the Cold War but had exercised a major influence on United States scholarship during the 1920s and earlier. See for instance the various works on American imperialism published in the 1920s, such as Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism* (N.Y., 1925) and Melvin M. Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo* (N.Y., 1928).
9. For an excellent discussion of recent writings on American foreign policy, especially regarding Vietnam, see Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1971). On the Cold War literature, see J. L. Richardson, “Cold War Revisionism: A Critique,” *World Politics* (July 1972), 578–612.
10. Among the writings I would classify as “liberal” are the cited works by Gordon, Gil, Levinson and De Onis, May, and Lodge. See also Adolf Berle, Jr., *Latin America Diplomacy and Reality* (N.Y., 1962); Harvey S. Perloff, *Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making* (Baltimore, Md., 1969); William D. Rogers, *The Twilight Struggle: The Alliance for Progress and the Politics of Development in Latin America* (N.Y., 1967); Martin C. Needler, *The United States and the Latin American Revolution* (Boston, 1972); J. Warren Nystrom and Nathan A. Haverstock, *The Alliance for Progress: Key to Latin American Development* (Princeton, 1966); and Paul Rosenstein Rodan, “Latin America in the Light of Reports on Development,” *Working Paper #66* (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dec. 1970).
11. Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (N.Y., 1961), 167.
12. The quoted phrase is from Milton Eisenhower, *The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y., 1963), 6. Eisenhower’s earnest book, based explicitly on the premise that “our welfare and the welfare of other American Republics are inextricably bound together” (p. 45) is a classic liberal statement. Another example, very influential as a text for a whole generation of North American students of United States-Latin American relations, is Samuel Flag Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United*

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- States: An Historical Interpretation* (N. Y., 1943). Bemis' argument, which was the conventional wisdom in North American universities when the Alliance was proclaimed, suggested that North American imperialism had been a temporary aberration. "A careful and conscientious appraisal of United States imperialism shows, I am convinced, that it was never deep-rooted in the character of the people, that it was essentially a protective imperialism, designed to protect, first the security of the Continental Republic, next the security of the entire New World, against intervention by the imperialistic powers of the Old World. It was, if you will, an imperialism against imperialism. It did not last long and it was not really bad." Bemis, *op. cit.*, 385–6.
13. The quoted phrase is from Edwin Lieuwen, *U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History* (N.Y., 1965), 72. Cf. Donald Dozer, *Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades of Inter-American Relations, 1930–1960* (Gainesville, Fla., 1959), 37.
  14. See, for example, Prebisch's well-known article "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries," *American Economic Review* (May 1959), 251–273. See also Levinson and De Onis, *op. cit.*, 39.
  15. The Punta del Este Charter pledged the signers to pursue the goals of sustained economic growth, more equitable income distribution, economic diversification, industrialization, increased agricultural production, reformed land tenure, extended education and reduced illiteracy, improved health services, expanded housing, price stability, regional economic integration, and multilateral agreements to diminish the adverse effects on Latin America of its dependence on export commodities subject to extreme price fluctuations. It made implicit the goal of promoting democratic government in the Hemisphere.
  16. See, for instance, Lincoln Gordon's argument, based on the assumptions that "economic development and social progress are 'Siamese twins'" and that the United States has "a national interest which converges with that of our Latin American neighbors" in promoting social and economic progress. Gordon, *op. cit.*, 11, 112.
  17. Harvey Perloff, for instance, argues that the Alliance was "a truly magnificent concept . . . carried out in a half-hearted way with a weak, underfinanced, and poorly designed mechanism." See Perloff, *op. cit.*, IX. Paul Rosenstein Rodan, one of the Alliance's original "Nine Wise Men," suggests that "while the Alliance failed, it is important to realize that it failed because of lack of implementation, not because of faulty objectives." See Rosenstein Rodan, *op. cit.*, 2.
  18. The most detailed and persuasive exposition of the Alliance's history in these terms is the cited study by Levinson and De Onis, which draws particularly on Levinson's first hand experience (and frustrations) as an AID official in Brazil and in Washington. See also *Colombia—A Case History of U.S. Aid* (A study Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs), Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Foreign Aid as a Political Instrument: The Case of the Dominican Republic," *Public Policy* (XIV, 1965), 141–160.
  19. For an interesting exposition of the "consensus" and "conflict" models of Latin American politics, and an argument that the Alliance was based on the assumptions of the former, see N. Joseph Cayer, "Political Development: The Case of Latin America," unpublished doctoral dissertation submitted at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst, Massachusetts), May 1972. See also Susanne Jonas Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies" in Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Comparative Politics Papers* (II, #15, 1971).
  20. The classic formulation of this view was John J. Johnson's *Political Change in Latin America: The Growth of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford, 1958), a book which was very influential when the Alliance program was being formulated. See also Robert J. Alexander, *Today's Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y., 1962).



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21. A considerable literature emerged during the 1960s on the political role of Latin American middle sectors. See, for instance, Claudio Véliz (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (N.Y., 1965); Véliz (ed.), *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (N.Y., 1967); Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America* (N.Y., 1967); and Víctor Alba, *Alliance Without Allies: The Mythology of Progress in Latin America* (N.Y., 1965).
22. (Nashville, Tenn., 1972).
23. *Ibid.*, 175.
24. *Ibid.*, 10.
15. *Ibid.*, 92.
26. *Ibid.*, especially 173–4.
27. *Ibid.*, 177.
28. Among the writings I would term radical are the aforementioned article by Bodenheimer, and also her "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society* (I, #3, May 1971). See also André Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (N.Y., 1969); James D. Cockcroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy* (Garden City, N.Y., 1972); James Petras, *Politics and Social Structure in Latin America* (N.Y., 1970); James Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Modernization from Above Versus Reform from Below: U.S. Policy Toward Latin American Agricultural Development," *Journal of Development Studies* (April 1970), 248–266; David Horowitz, "The Alliance for Progress," in Robert Rhodes (ed.), *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader* (N.Y., 1970), 45–61; and various articles in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?* (Greenwich, Conn., 1968), especially J. P. Morray, "The United States and Latin America," 99–119. See also K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (eds.), *Reading in U.S. Imperialism* (Boston, 1971) and North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), *Yanqui Dollar: The Contribution of U.S. Private Investment to Underdevelopment in Latin America* (N.Y., 1971). C. Wright Mills, *Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba* (N.Y., 1960) should also be consulted for its radical perspective. More general works, relevant to Latin American policy, include: Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (N.Y., 1969); Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (N.Y., 1969); and Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston, 1969).
29. This argument is developed most fully by David Green in *The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Chicago, 1971). See also Alonso Aguilar, *Pan Americanism from Monroe to the Present: A View From the Other Side* (N.Y., 1968).
30. See Cockcroft, Frank, and Johnson, *op. cit.*, 98, 100.
31. See, for example, Horowitz, *op. cit.*, 56–9; Morray, *op. cit.*, 108.
32. Much of the radical critique draws directly on the extensive Latin American literature on *dependencia*. For typical examples of the literature applying "dependence" concepts to the making of United States policy, see Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism," and Frank, *op. cit.* For a critique of some "dependencia" literature, and specifically of Bodenheimer's article, see David Ray, "The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* (Feb. 1973), 3–21.
33. Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism," 358.

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34. See, for example, Morray, *op. cit.*, 108, for an assertion that anti-malaria projects are "not unrelated to a veiled strategic purpose . . . to revive faith in the potential of the existing bourgeois order to meet the problems of the hemisphere."
35. Petras and LaPorte, *op. cit.*, 260, discuss "ambivalence" within the Kennedy Administration on the redistributionist-productionist issues of agricultural programs, but conclude that this ambivalence was inevitably resolved in favor of the "completely productionist point of view."
36. Joseph Page, *The Revolution That Never Was: Northeast Brazil, 1955-1964* (N.Y., 1972).
37. *Ibid.*, 220.
38. Frank, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
39. The following discussion draws substantially on the concepts and terminology advanced by Graham Allison, though I am using the term "bureaucratic politics perspective" (as do Halperin and Tanter) to refer generally to both Allison's Model II and Model III, i.e., "organizational process" and "governmental politics." See Graham T. Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, 1971); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications" in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman (eds.), *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton, 1972); and Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework," in Halperin and Kanter (eds.), *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston, 1973), 1-43. Ernest May's paper, "The 'Bureaucratic Politics' Approach: U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1942-1947, as an Illustrative Case," further outlines these concepts and suggests their possible usefulness for analyzing inter-American relations. May's paper, like the original version of this article, is being published in the volume edited by Cotler and Fagen.
40. See Ernest May, *op. cit.*
41. Cf. Howard Becker and Irving Louis Horowitz, "Radical Politics and Sociological Research: Observations on Methodology and Ideology," *American Journal of Sociology* (July 1972), 48-66.
42. See, for example, Jerome N. Slater, "Democracy Versus Stability: The Recent Latin American Policy of the United States," *Yale Review* (Dec. 1965), 169-181.
43. Surprisingly few studies of United States policy toward Latin America adopt this approach. The best examples of those that do are R. Harrison Wagner, *United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics* (Stanford, 1970) and R. Harrison Wagner, "Explaining and Judging U.S.-Latin American Policies," unpublished paper prepared for the Second National Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C. (April 16-19, 1970). Another useful illustration is Richard J. Bloomfield, "Who Makes American Foreign Policy: Some Latin American Case Studies," unpublished paper presented at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (April 1972). See also Abaham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), and Joseph Tulchin, "Inhibitions Affecting the Formulation and Execution of the Latin American Policy of the United States," *Ventures* (Fall 1967), 68-80.
44. See Ernest May, *op. cit.*, in the Cotler-Fagen volume.
45. Wagner, "Explaining and Judging the Alliance for Progress," 12. An additional major influence on Latin American policy-making, the subject of remarkably little research, has been the Congress and its committees, which often provide an effective channel for the expression of various private interests.
46. The "bureaucratic politics" perspective, therefore, produces some skepticism about the capacity of the United States government to pursue in a sustained manner a coherent Latin American policy. See Christopher Mitchell's paper, "Domination and Fragmentation in U.S. Latin American Policy," also in the Cotler-Fagen volume.

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47. See Wagner, *United States Policy Toward Latin America*, 150–51.
48. See, for instance, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, 1965), 183.
49. The Latin American task force consisted of Berle, Moscoso, Morales Carrión, three United States professors (Lincoln Gordon, Robert Alexander, and Arthur Whitaker), and Richard Goodwin, the gifted young speechwriter who had coined the phrase, “Alianza para el Progreso,” during the 1960 election campaign. Revealingly, Goodwin’s first formulation of the phrase in Spanish was grammatically incorrect (“Alianza para Progreso”). See Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, 183; De Onis and Levinson, *op. cit.*, 52–5.
50. According to Levinson and De Onis, Assistant Secretary of State Mann returned the draft speech to the White House without comment or criticism, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk made but one substantive suggestion. Levinson and De Onis, *op. cit.*, 58.
51. See De Lesseps S. Morrison (with Gerold Frank), *Latin American Mission: An Adventure in Hemisphere Diplomacy* (N.Y., 1965), 28, 66.
52. See Morrison, *op. cit.*, 223, Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, 231, 696–7.
53. From calculations done by Professor Seymour Harris as reported in Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, 199.
54. Levinson and De Onis, *op. cit.*, 71, note, for instance, that the administration did not invite businessmen to participate in the first Punta del Este meetings until three days before the conference, and even then only as observers.
55. Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, 231.
56. For one interesting attempt to do this kind of research, not on Latin American policy officials but on State Department and Defense Department officials generally, see Bernard Mennis, *American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe Regarding International Politics* (Columbus, Ohio, 1971). Another attempt, less systematic but nonetheless worthwhile, is Richard Barnet’s *Roots of War* (N.Y., 1972).