Community Based Natural Resources Management in Botswana

Abstract Since the mid-1980s, Botswana has relied on community based natural resources management (CBNRM) to incentivize communities to choose environmentally beneficial behaviour to advance conservation efforts. This approach has had some success, although it has not been as successful as had been hoped. Nevertheless, it is well acknowledged that CBNRM can play an important role in advancing conservation efforts. The state is therefore working to revamp the CBNRM framework so that it consistently yields beneficial results for communities and conservation. This article relies on regulatory theory and experience with CBNRM in Botswana to identify what it would take to establish an effective CBNRM regulatory framework there. It establishes that Botswana has failed to secure effective CBNRM consistently, due to the lack of a dedicated CBNRM law and inadequately resourced institutions. It recommends the promulgation of a CBNRM law with a community-centred and / or rights-based approach, and the establishment of an adequately resourced institution, charged with regulating CBNRM in Botswana.


Introduction
Botswana has an abundance of some of the world's most unique natural resources.Notably, these resources are commonly found in and around areas where communities live and thus play a prominent role in people's lives.These resources also attract a significant amount of tourism revenue. 1 Recognizing the relationship between people and natural resources, since the 1980s 2 the government has looked to advance environmental protection efforts by relying on links between the conservation of natural resources and community development to incentivize communities to choose environmentally beneficial behaviour consistently. 3This culminated in the turn to the Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) Policy, which has effectively become the ad hoc basis of CBNRM in the country (CBNRM Policy). 4 Over time, as communities in Botswana have grown, and their interaction with the resources around them has grown with them, it has become even more apparent that communities need to play a greater role in conservation efforts if conservation goals are to be attained.It has also become apparent that the ad hoc CBNRM framework based on the policy is deficient, in that it does not consistently yield positive results.This has prompted the state to take stock and explore how to craft a CBNRM framework that can attain positive results more consistently.
Against this backdrop, this article looks to contribute to discourse on what it will take to craft a consistently effective CBNRM framework in Botswana.It does this first by drawing from regulatory theory to identify what it takes to craft an effective environmental protection regulatory framework that incorporates CBNRM.Secondly, and following from this, the article identifies that a regulatory framework that incorporates CBNRM must feature a CBNRM law if it is to achieve consistently effective results.It must also feature an institutional framework led by a regulator that: is well resourced; communicates effectively; is empowered; and can be held accountable.Thirdly, the article draws from this discussion to analyse the experience with Botswana's ad hoc CBNRM framework and identify why the framework has failed to yield positive results consistently.The article then makes recommendations on what it would take to achieve effective CBNRM more consistently in Botswana.

CBNRM in law
To understand when CBNRM is effective in regulation, it is important to note that the primary aim of environmental protection efforts is the prevention of harm.Such prevention must be pursued while accounting for the fact that the environment features extensive interlinkages and that various environmental phenomena (such as air, water bodies and different species) are interconnected. 5As such, the effective environmental protection of one aspect of the environment in isolation could result in the transfer of the problem to other phenomena.For instance, a regulatory framework that caters extensively for water pollution but not land pollution is flawed. 6Similarly, protecting Breen and A Mosimane "Engaging common property theory: Implications for benefit sharing research in developing countries" (2012) 6/1 International Journal of the Commons 52. 4 The CBNRM Policy (government paper 2 of 2007) recognizes that all members of a community share an interest in improving their livelihoods through the sustainable management and equitable utilization of natural resources in their environs.In addition, several statutes and policies make general provision for greater community involvement in wildlife use and management.These include: the Wildlife Conservation Policy (1986) one species may encourage its growth while causing harm to another. 7In addition, it is important to account for the fact that several aspects of the environment are of common interest, regardless of the territory within which they may be found.8Thus, there is a common interest in migratory and nonmigratory species.There is also often a common interest in the conservation of some resources, habitats and watercourses.Further, it is also important to account for the fact that environmental harm often results from people making choices that they consider will lead to their socioeconomic development.A central part of tackling environmental deterioration, therefore, is affording people opportunities to develop socioeconomically while sustainably using the environment and educating them on how to utilize the environment sustainably.Once scientists determine that an intervention is needed to protect the environment in which communities live, it becomes important to determine standards that reflect conduct that is acceptable to conserve the environment.Importantly, being based on science means that these standards would be strict, and possibly unattainable where communities exploit the environment in pursuit of socioeconomic development.To insist on them may be futile.Regulatory theory holds that a preferable response is to rely on these science-based standards as a starting point and use them to engage with communities through "sustainable development analyses".These are analyses that determine the right standard to apply, based on consideration of the science and the socioeconomic needs of the communities living around resources and utilizing them. 9Involving communities in the determination of acceptable conduct will ensure greater compliance as communities become involved in determining levels of acceptable conduct that they consider attainable.It may also lead to communities that are well informed and agree to commit to standards that may even be more demanding than those prescribed by science.
Participation also means communities living in resource-rich areas have the opportunity to discuss and express the extent of their dependence on resources. 10This can help determine if certain communities deserve preferential treatment for reasons of equity. 11In this way, regulatory efforts will not alienate people and actors living and operating in the area. 12or all the benefits that this command-and-control approach based on sustainable development analyses may offer, however, the wide use of command-and-control across different jurisdictions over time has revealed that this approach has notable limitations. 13For instance, this approach is often prescriptive and rigid because it does not allow people and any actors significant room for innovation as they look to meet environmental protection standards prescribed by law.In addition, the command-and-control approach often focuses on, and is more effective when, regulating the activities of businesses and not the actions of individuals.14Further, the success of the command-and-control framework often depends on several unreliable variables, including the regulator's willpower and the degree of investment of capital resources. 15Due to reasons such as these, various alternatives to the command-and-control approach have emerged that seek to address its limitations. 16Most alternatives are designed to put businesses in a position to comply with laws in a non-confrontational manner.For instance, economic instruments such as subsidies and taxes can positively impact environmental performance by business actors.The same is true of an alternative approach, such as reporting by businesses.This can positively impact environmental protection efforts.In the same vein, CBNRM has emerged as the most appropriate alternative in conservation efforts that involve people going about their lives in their communities.It tackles the rigidity and lack of innovation exhibited in a command-and-control framework by relying on links between conservation of natural resources and individuals as well as community development to incentivize communities to choose environmentally beneficial behaviours in innovative ways that resonate with them. 17In doing so, CBNRM places business and individuals at the centre of environmental protection efforts in a manner that a command-and-control approach to regulation does not.By empowering all actors, CBNRM also ensures that businesses and individuals can act in furtherance of environmental protection objectives in a manner that command-and-control cannot guarantee, even when they are confronted by unwilling regulators and limited capital resources.

Weaving CBNRM into the legal framework
To incorporate CBNRM successfully into an environmental protection regulatory framework, it is important to accommodate the fact that, as part of the environmental protection regulatory framework, a CBNRM framework must incorporate fines and stringent sanctions to be applied following catastrophic, or continued, non-compliance. 18However, it is also important to accommodate the fact that, as an alternative to command-and-control regulation intended to incentivize communities to choose environmentally beneficial behaviours consistently, it is important for a framework incorporating CBNRM to provide clearly for compelling benefit sharing. 19To achieve all this, a CBNRM framework will need to allow deviation from national law through turning to responsive implementation and enforcement. 20To accommodate all this effectively, the first step to weaving CBNRM into the regulatory framework is, therefore, to craft a national law dedicated to CBNRM.This law should accommodate the application of laws in the command-and-control framework.However, because CBNRM is an alternative, the CBNRM law should be on a similar footing to other national laws and able to affect provisions in national laws so that a responsive approach to enforcement can be taken, in which regulators have room to opt for the most effective approaches to enforcement.There are several benefits associated with CBRNM as an alternative to the command-and-control approach. 21Among these benefits is that this approach allows for the engagement of communities in the sustainable management of natural resources.By being at the centre of this initiative, communities become active decision-makers in the conversation and use of natural resources.The bottom-up approach presented by CBNRM responds to the needs of local communities and promotes the collective ownership of decisions, in contrast to the command-and-control approach that dictates what communities must do, mostly without giving due consideration to, and understanding of, the local contexts in which the resources are based.In CBNRM, which is based on incentivizing communities to choose environmentally beneficial behaviour consistently, it is also important for the law to provide for an accessible approach to benefit sharing.
Importantly, legal provisions alone do not secure CBNRM unless they are implemented.Thus, an effective CBNRM law must provide for its legal implementation. 22Regulatory theorists contend that implementation of law in general is best done through regulatory institutions.Theorists have different views on the qualities that regulatory institutions must exhibit.However, it is possible to discern from the several theories that, for CBNRM to work, the regulator must exhibit four qualities.
First, regulatory theorists consider that effective institutional frameworks have sufficient financial and human resources at their disposal. 23 regulator is well-funded, with funding processes being transparent, efficient and simple. 24In addition, the regulator should be staffed by people who are qualified, knowledgeable, manage well and resolve conflicts efficiently and effectively. 25It is also important for people working with the regulator to foster and reinforce humility, openness, empathy and a steadfast commitment to public service. 26Once such people are recruited, they should be empowered to co-operate and co-ordinate with other relevant bodies to advance the agenda. 27econdly, regulatory theorists argue that an effective regulator must communicate well.The regulator must have clear objectives and functions, clearly articulated in a mission statement that is easily understood. 28CBNRM is typically based on a licensing and permit framework, with licences and permits issued upon an applicant's demonstration that the criteria specified in the applicable rules have been satisfied.It is, therefore, particularly important for the regulator to communicate requirements, options and choices efficiently. 29Efficient communication is also important in CBNRM because benefit sharing is central to the whole effort. 30It is important to communicate to communities what benefits they can expect.It is also important to explain that stakeholders directly involved in CBNRM efforts may be entitled to a greater share of the benefits.It is similarly important to ensure that those directly involved in a project are aware that parties further afield and not directly involved in CBNRM projects may be entitled to some of the benefits.Thus, it will be important for regulators to communicate to stakeholders what the returns on their participation will be. 31In light of the fact that stakeholders are at different levels of capacity, effective communication may also require educating people so that they can participate effectively in decision-making. 32Effective communication may also call for the regulator to ensure that there is consistent publication of information through public registers.Those interested in regulatory decisions should also be granted the opportunity to participate. 33hirdly, regulatory theorists argue that effective regulation is attained when the regulator is empowered to implement and enforce the law in a responsive way. 34In CBNRM therefore, regulators should be able to determine the most appropriate way to secure compliance, including exempting stakeholders from the strict application of law where this is warranted.To do this successfully and without conflict, an effective regulator must be independent from the state while still acting within national strategic priorities. 35In addition, the regulator should also regularly and purposefully engage with stakeholders to enhance public and stakeholder confidence in the institution and acceptance of its role. 36ourthly, regulatory theorists argue that a regulator should be accountable.In CBNRM, this is particularly important because CBNRM stakeholders are typically a diverse set of actors who often have interests at odds with each other.Separately, stakeholders' interests are often at odds with those of the regulator or of the laws. 37Theorists consider that accountability is secured where a regulator is receptive to stakeholder input and is respectful and empathetic to stakeholders adversely affected by decisions. 38Accountability is also found in situations where a regulator's decisions and functions are conducted with utmost integrity.Accountability also follows when regulators consistently assess their decisions, actions and interventions.This creates awareness and understanding of the impact of the regulator's actions and helps to communicate and demonstrate to stakeholders the added value the regulator brings. 39Importantly, these techniques can fail and so it remains critical for regulators to remain publicly accountable in adjudicatory fora. 40viewing the CBNRM experience in Botswana This discussion has highlighted where CBNRM falls in regulation and has identified important elements of the CBNRM legal and institutional framework that are needed to attain a CBNRM framework that can achieve positive results more consistently.Drawing from that discussion, it is possible to analyse Botswana's ad hoc CBNRM efforts to date and determine why these efforts have not yielded consistently positive results.

The legal framework
Botswana's legal framework is not based on baselines or quality standards that determine the right standard to apply based on consideration of the science and the socioeconomic needs of the communities living around resources and utilizing them. 41This is because laws on phenomena are not crafted on the basis of sustainable development analyses in the manner discussed above.This holds true for most of Botswana's air, land and water laws, such as the Atmospheric Pollution (Prevention) Act, 42 Waste Management Act 43 and Forest Act. 44urthermore, Botswana's legislative framework is primarily based on a command-and-control approach. 45Laws that form an important part of the environmental protection framework, such as the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act 46 and Tribal Land Act, 47 carry provisions styled as commands, with controls provided where commands are not followed. 48As is to be expected in a command-and-control based environmental protection framework, laws are based on strict liability and typically require actors to obtain prior authorization from regulators before conducting any activities that may cause environmental harm. 49These laws also grant regulators extensive inspection powers and, under these laws, it is a criminal offence to obstruct an official performing their duties or deny them entry. 50Laws also afford regulators the opportunity to use a mix of criminal and / or civil penalties to bring parties into compliance with the law, 51 with regulators often empowered to compel an infringing party to clean up any harm caused. 52t is in this context that the ad hoc CBNRM framework was introduced as an alternative to the command-and-control approach.The CBNRM framework is not based on a CBNRM law.Instead, it is based on a policy.The policy seeks to create a foundation for conservation-based development in which the need to protect biodiversity and the ecosystem is balanced with the need to improve rural livelihoods and reduce poverty.This is intended to be achieved by providing communities with diversified livelihoods, economic opportunities and incentives, and by managing and using the country's natural resources in a sustainable manner. 53It promotes the involvement of communities in the sustainable use and management of natural resources, such as wildlife, and lays down mechanisms for achieving this objective.To be eligible to participate, communities must form a registered accountable legal entity or a community-based organization (CBO). 54The CBNRM Policy notes that CBOs retain a 35 per cent share of the income from hunting and tourism activities. 55CBOs can carry out hunting and tourism activities in their specified areas or sub-lease these activities to safari operators.When assessing the performance of the CBNRM framework, it is striking that, in the hierarchy of laws, the policy occupies a lower tier to statutory laws.It cannot therefore alter those laws to accommodate alternative enforcement that accommodates community efforts to achieve conservation in non-traditional ways.For instance, while it may be beneficial to turn to CBNRM in wildlife conservation, such efforts will remain subject to section 93 of the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act.This section provides that the minister may recommend that any revenue derived from fees for licences or permits to hunt, capture, sell or farm any animals or in respect of any other wildlife activity in its area, other than a national park or game reserve, be paid to the district council concerned.Therefore, to the extent that this status pits the CBNRM Policy against ministerial discretion, it potentially disincentivizes local communities from partaking in CBNRM wildlife activities.

The institutional framework
In the absence of a dedicated CBNRM law, no institution has been created through that avenue that is dedicated to regulating CBNRM.Neither has a regulatory institution dedicated to CBNRM been created through other national laws.Instead, regulation has been approached in an ad hoc manner, led by successive departments of the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, Conservation and Tourism.This ad hoc arrangement has often meant that successive regulators have suffered from predictable deficiencies when looking to implement the CBNRM framework.
First, because regulators are part of a general ministry with a broader budget, funding the regulation of CBNRM efforts in Botswana has not been straightforward.Instead, funds are often drawn from a pool of communal resources. 56This situation is far from ideal, as dedicated funding is critical to regulatory success that can culminate in consistently effective CBNRM efforts. 57Efforts to broaden the funding base have been made through the establishment of the National Environmental Fund.Under the CBNRM Policy, 65 per cent of the proceeds from the sale by communities of hunting quotas and concessions are to be deposited into this fund.These funds are to finance the development and implementation of CBNRM activities. 58However, the National Environmental Fund is a common pool to finance and promote activities designed to conserve, protect and manage Botswana's environment.Funding to support CBNRM efforts is only one of many uses of the fund and history has shown that the yearly thematic uses of the fund do not always coincide with communities' priorities and their CBNRM efforts.For instance, under the Fifth National Environmental Fund Call for Proposals, successful proposals for funding had to fall within the following thematic areas: veldt product conservation and sustainable utilization; protection of the urban environment; climate change mitigation and adaption; and waste management and pollution control. 59elated to this, the fact that there is no dedicated institution means that regulators are employed to fill ministry or department roles.This means that they may not be CBNRM specialists and, even if they are, they may be asked to take on other responsibilities. 60In addition, while they may be well placed to co-operate and co-ordinate with other relevant bodies, they are not always knowledgeable enough to do so while advancing CBNRM or they may not have sufficient time to devote to CBNRM. 61These deficiencies in economic and human resources mean the framework will struggle to convince communities to make environmentally beneficial choices, with the result that CBNRM efforts do not yield consistently effective results.
Secondly, the absence of a CBNRM law creating the implementing institution has compromised the regulator's ability to communicate effectively.In a most basic sense, because the regulator is housed in the ministry and department, its objectives are informed by broader ministerial and departmental objectives. 62Specific CBNRM objectives that regulators may have will have been adapted from those in the CBNRM Policy.These are not necessarily sufficient as the regulator's objectives.In any event, the state's reliance on a command-and-control approach when it comes to conservation means that most of the objectives of the governmental institutions may not be informed by CBNRM considerations, but by command-and-control reasoning.Furthermore, communication has also been compromised in other ways.This is evident from the fact that regulators and public servants regularly assume that benefit-sharing follows the model used in diamond mining, with most government officers being of the view that natural resources are resources of "national interest" despite there being no law to this effect. 63In some ways, this assumption is rooted in the fact that the CBNRM Policy provides that the formula relied on to share benefits derived from all CBNRM projects requires that 65 per cent of returns shall be deposited with the National Environment Fund to finance community based environmental management and eco-tourism projects throughout the country. 64The remaining 35 per cent of proceeds from the sale of natural resource concessions and hunting quotas may be retained by CBOs, albeit subject to taxation. 65egulators have succeeded in making communities appreciate that, to gain value, they are better served creating CBOs that partner with members of the private sector through joint venture agreements to generate value. 66Communities also seem to understand that joint venture agreements entail any one of the following: the CBO subleasing entire resources to a safari company or companies that pay an annual rental fee to the village/s organization; the CBO subleasing specific areas to one or more safari companies for the development of tourism infrastructure; the CBO managing the natural resources of the remaining area and benefitting from the income derived from hunting, fishing, wildlife viewing and other activities, while safari operators profit from tourist lodge or camp income; and the safari company or companies subleasing the land from the community organization and providing their services at an agreed daily rate per tourist.The remainder of the daily rate income (gross profit) would then be equally divided between the partners. 67mportantly though, successive regulators have not educated communities on the fact that benefits for them can be limited.For instance, the Okavango Community Trust (NG 22/23 joint venture) revenue in 2004 was BWP 1.57 million.Despite the magnitude of the total CBO revenue, its allocation per annum to each community resident would be a mere BWP 202 if the trust distributed 100 per cent of its revenue, since the CBO had 7,779 members. 68Related to this, CBOs commonly lose out on revenue to third parties who are often better placed to benefit more from dealings with the operators.Mbaiwa notes, for example, that in the Okavango Delta a CBO sells a single elephant to a safari operator at BWP 40,000 (USD 8,000).The same elephant is sold to an overseas safari hunter by the operator at BWP 400,000 (USD 80,000). 69CBOs turning to the joint venture approach have commonly had the expectation that collaboration with the private sector would facilitate skills transfer and on-the-job training for their members. 70Indeed, in some CBOs (such as Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust), attempts to facilitate skills transfer and build expertise within the community are on-going through the job-shadowing initiative that will eventually allow locals to take over financial and operational lodge management responsibilities.
Further, where hunting safari outfits employ local staff, this tends to be as assistant managers. 71n most cases, assistant managers are only partially responsible for sales and reservations, with the actual management of the business (especially marketing and handling accounts) done by the private companies, with business accounts held outside the country. 72In other instances, community members are effectively labourers and landlords, who participate passively in environmental protection efforts in the hope that they will make some money, with the regulatory framework offering them no relief.Instances such as this, characterized by a lack of effective communication and education, have led to the growing perception that CBNRM carries no real incentive to support community socioeconomic development. 73This deficiency in communication and education has left communities less inclined to make environmentally beneficial choices, with the result that CBNRM efforts do not yield consistently effective results.
Thirdly, while CBNRM depends on responsive enforcement by empowered regulators, regulators in Botswana are not sufficiently empowered to be responsive, because there is no dedicated CBNRM law, and the actions they take will be subject to the strict application of laws.Importantly, regulators cannot even turn to the customary law that communities have traditionally trusted for alternative enforcement. 74This is because, under Botswana law, protection and conservation, and the commercial use of natural resources are considered non-traditional and therefore bound by common law.Customary law is restricted to subsistence use of resources and, by the same token, traditional leaders do not have jurisdiction over issues arising in the management of natural resources. 75In these circumstances, CBNRM enforcement is often strictly applied based on national law. 76This limits the opportunities for regulators to incentivize communities to make environmentally beneficial choices in return for favourable, or considerate, enforcement.The result is that CBNRM efforts do not yield consistently effective results.
Fourthly, the accountability of regulators in Botswana is limited, in large part because, with the CBNRM framework not being based on a national law, there has not been much commitment to informing and educating communities on their rights and options. 77Without this, communities do not participate in regulation and are not able to hold regulators to account.Regulators can make decisions that are impactful, and they go unchallenged. 78For instance, in 2001, a directive from the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Local Government unilaterally declared that funds earned from CBNRM projects should be managed in trust by district councils and that decisions regarding their use should be made in consultation with the affected communities.Certainly, there were several justifications for these proposed changes.It was argued that the funds generated were earned from natural resources and as such should benefit the whole nation, as with resources generated from trade in diamonds and other revenue-earning natural resources.However, this is far from ideal.Of course, there are opportunities to hold regulators to account through adjudicatory fora. 79However, that avenue is expensive and only available to those with capacity. 80In this environment, the CBNRM framework has struggled to yield consistently effective results.
Fifthly, the value of CBNRM in Botswana has been compromised by a lack of research.While all ministries have applied research units tasked with collecting and analysing data and assisting with the formulation and implementation of evidence-based policies that directly address the needs of citizens, there is apparent undervaluing and underutilization of indigenous skills, knowledge, resources and materials in Botswana. 81Due to a lack of funding and a failure to attract and retain senior research professionals, Botswana has failed to research important issues such as indigenous knowledge.In cases where research relevant to advancing CBNRM has been carried out, most of it has been undertaken by foreign researchers and international organizations.Experience suggests that this poses problems, because the interventions may be incompatible with local conditions. 82qually importantly, the results that are generated by such research initiatives are seen as being informed by and reflective of the opinions of outsiders.Even if government-led initiatives are undertaken based on these results, therefore, these efforts are seen as being driven, and even imposed, by outsiders.The result is that communities do not willingly embrace these initiatives and efforts.All this works together to compromise the value of CBNRM in the state.

CBNRM experience in other countries
CBNRM has been implemented in southern Africa for more than 25 years. 83The Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is considered the flagship programme.In Zimbabwe, wildlife legislation devolves authority only as far as the rural district councils, while the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act 1987 permits rural district councils to grant permits to local communities for the commercial use of natural resources.Separately, the Zambia Wildlife Act 2015 provides for the creation of community resources boards whose functions include managing wildlife under their jurisdiction within quotas specified by the National Parks and Wildlife Department and negotiating management agreements with hunting outfitters and photographic tour operators. 84The community resources boards also have rights to a share of the revenue generated by wildlife utilization.Alternatively, in Namibia laws grant local communities the right to set up conservancies for the sustainable management and utilization of some species of game.Communities also retain all the income derived from the management of the game. 85Similarly, in Mozambique the Forest and Wildlife Law 1999 provides rights to local communities to obtain logging licences and timber concessions, thereby assuming the role of private operators. 86Also, local communities are granted the right to participate in the granting of licences to logging companies and to receive a share of the public revenues from those licences. 87hese experiences reflect a rights-based approach that is granted through legislation and supported by policies.This is in contrast with Botswana's current CBNRM framework, where access to resources by local communities is only through policy directives.Also, in other jurisdictions, local communities have the right to retain all or a substantial portion of benefits accrued from managing the resources.However, Botswana's CBNRM Policy directs communities to return 65 per cent of income to the National Environmental Fund.This severs the key link between benefit output and management input, as local communities benefit less from management, contradicting the logic of CBNRM. 88hile the rights-based approaches exhibited in Mozambique and Namibia are most likely to lead to long-term CBNRM success, legislation itself is not a guarantee to successful CBNRM.For instance, in Mozambique, the lack of compliance with legislation and shortage of technical skills at the community level have impacted the success of CBNRM. 89However, experience in the region demonstrates the importance of entrenching community rights in legislation and clearly defining these rights.Strong legal rights are a crucial foundation for CBRNM sustainability, as communities can demand these rights according to legislation.The lack of legislation in Botswana has the effect of disempowering communities, as the principles set out in the CBRNM are not justiciable.

Way forward
This discussion has indicated the flaws in the existing framework.This article offers three core recommendations to remedy the flaws and create an effective and beneficial CBNRM framework.
First, it recommends the promulgation of a CBNRM law with a community-centred and / or rights-based approach.The main objective of such a law would be to empower local communities to participate actively, and formally, in CBNRM by granting them rights to manage natural resources and profit commercially from the management of natural resources, whether these fall in the areas where they live or further afield.With respect to the formulation of the law, there is value in drawing guidance from, and building on, the efforts made in establishing the Kavango Zambezi Trans-frontier Conservation Area.This experience, while ongoing, has explored what it will take to "sustainably manage the Kavango Zambezi ecosystem, its heritage and cultural resources based on best conservation and tourism models for the socio-economic wellbeing of the communities and other stakeholders in and around the eco-region through harmonization of policies, strategies and practices". 90A CBNRM law must, equally, look to craft laws that recognize the important role played by communities in sustainably managing resources for their well-being.For the law to have value, it must be rooted in public participation.The law must also be drafted with due regard to the socioeconomic needs of communities.Further, the law must empower communities to enforce the law in the first instance.This would be supported by national level enforcement efforts that are responsive and designed to promote compliance with laws and, thus, promote conservation in a manner led by communities and in a manner that accommodates and promotes the turn to community-based management of resources.
Secondly, the article recommends the creation of a government institution solely responsible for CBNRM in Botswana.The function of the institution and its objectives would be centred on CBNRM.A separate institution would also need to have a funding structure with resources dedicated to CBNRM at the state level.An institution of that nature would also possibly draw donor funding.Further, creating a stand-alone institution would mean that personnel hired to work for, and with, the institution would be knowledgeable of, and have expertise in, CBNRM.Also, the institution could educate communities on the command-and-control approach and on CBNRM, and help communities appreciate how to participate in governance so that their views are heard.This would be likely to lead to greater success in CBNRM.It is also important for the institution to be empowered to enforce laws.In particular, the institution should be empowered to adopt a responsive approach to enforcement, capable of harnessing community-led enforcement in the broader enforcement effort.
Thirdly, regulators need to promote research and development.This is particularly important in Botswana where extensive knowledge of conserving natural resources can be found among the older generations and the communities in which they live.Such research should ideally be conducted by the various applied research units, with all ministries encouraged to participate.This should be done in conjunction with the efforts of a CBNRM institution tasked with conducting research on conservation and the potential for CBNRM in Botswana.This research should form the basis for evidence-based polices and laws that respond to the direct needs of communities.Once policies are formulated, it will also be important to educate communities on CBNRM in Botswana.

Conclusion
This discussion has established that Botswana's ad hoc CBNRM framework has consistently failed to secure effective CBNRM because the country does not have laws based on sustainable development analyses that form the foundation on which a CBNRM framework is built.In addition, there is 90 "Kavango Zambezi Trans-frontier Conservation Area (KAZA TFCA)" (2022), available at: <https://www.kavangozambezi.org/en/about/about-kaza>(last accessed 10 October 2023).
no dedicated CBNRM law intentionally crafted as a legal alternative to the command-and-control approach found in national conservation laws.There is also no adequately resourced institution charged with regulating CBNRM that communicates well, is empowered and responsive, as well as accountable.It stands to reason that, if an effective framework is to be realized, it will need to address these issues and deficiencies.Encouragingly, there are reports that a CBNRM law is being drafted.There is, however, limited chatter about laws being revised based on sustainable development analyses to craft standards that reflect community sentiments.The likely reason is that this would be exceptionally expensive and time consuming.Perhaps the intent is to address this in a piecemeal manner through subsidiary legislation.Only time will tell.Nevertheless, it is an issue that must be addressed if successful CBNRM is to be attained.In addition, the attainment of successful CBNRM hinges on a CBNRM law creating an institution that is adequately resourced and charged with regulating CBNRM, which communicates well, is empowered and responsive, as well as accountable.
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